Judgment : S.C. Dharmadhikari, J. 1. In this Criminal Application the only point that arises for our consideration is whether an offence punishable under Section 185 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is cognizable or non-cognizable. 2. The facts that are necessary to appreciate this question are that on 27.04.2011 the Applicant was driving a motor vehicle when she was signalled to stop by an officer of the N.M. Joshi Marg Police Station, Mumbai. The Applicant was further put to a “Breath Alcohol Analysis Test” and after the test was conducted, no statement was recorded nor was any report given to the Applicant. The Applicant was further directed to deposit a sum of Rs.2000/- for which the Applicant was furnished a receipt. The Applicant was further directed to attend the Court of Special Metropolitan Magistrate (Morning Court), Bhoiwada, Mumbai on 03.05.2011. Thereafter, the Applicant was allowed to go as per the directions of the officers of Respondent No.3. 3. It is stated that on 03.05.2011 the Applicant attended the Court of Special Metropolitan Magistrate, Dadar, Mumbai where number of persons were present. The Applicant's name was called out, but no documents were furnished to the Applicant. The Applicant was asked whether she pleaded guilty to the charge under Section 185 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The Applicant pleaded not guilty and thereafter the Applicant was directed to attend the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate, 29th Court, Dadar Mumbai. A copy of charge sheet filed by the officers of Respondent No.3 dated 03.05.2011 is annexed as Annexure-A to the Criminal Application. 4. Mr. H.K. Prem, learned counsel appearing for the Applicant, has submitted that an offence punishable under Section 185 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short “the MV Act”) is a cognizable offence. This would be evident from the scheme of the MV Act vis-a-vis the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Mr. Prem, inviting our attention to the definitions of the terms “cognizable offence” and “cognizable case” as appearing in Section 2(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, has submitted that by its very definition, an offence would be a cognizable offence if a police officer is empowered to arrest without warrant in accordance with the First Schedule of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or under any other law for the time being in force. The First Schedule comprises of two parts. The First Schedule comprises of two parts. Part-I tabulates the offences under the Indian Penal Code whereas Part-II provides for classification of offences falling in other laws or statutes. In other words, if a statute other than the Indian Penal Code does not categorically classify an offence as cognizable or non cognizable and further does not provide any mechanism to the police to arrest without warrant, Part-II of the First Schedule classifies the offences as cognizable or non cognizable on the basis of the punishment prescribed for the said offence. Thus, an offence other than provided in the Indian Penal Code would be cognizable if either the said statute expressly provides the said offence to be cognizable or empowers a police officer to arrest without warrant. In the alternative the same would be cognizable or non cognizable depending on the punishment prescribed in reference to Part-II of the First Schedule of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 5. Mr. Prem submitted that Section 41 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 provides for as to when the police could arrest without warrant. A closer look of Section 41 would demonstrate that the police are empowered to arrest without warrant essentially in connection with the commission of a cognizable offence. As such, Section 2(c) and Section 41 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 complement each other in laying down the mandate of law that an offence is cognizable where the police can arrest without warrant and vice versa. The conjoint reading of Sections 2(c) and 41, therefore, clearly demonstrates that the law mandates an offence to be cognizable if the police are empowered to arrest without warrant. 6. Mr. Prem submitted that in view of the above position, the provisions of the MV Act especially Sections 202 and 203 thereof require a closer look. Howsoever, similar or dissimilar Sections 202 and 203 may appear, the Legislature has incorporated them by segregating them distinctively and in different spheres. The Legislature by virtue of Section 202 has expressly empowered the police to arrest without warrant for offences punishable under, inter alia, Section 185. However, at the same time, the Legislature, in its own wisdom, has qualified the provision of arrest without warrant by restricting the said power to a police officer in uniform. The Legislature by virtue of Section 202 has expressly empowered the police to arrest without warrant for offences punishable under, inter alia, Section 185. However, at the same time, the Legislature, in its own wisdom, has qualified the provision of arrest without warrant by restricting the said power to a police officer in uniform. Thus, though a police officer is empowered to arrest without warrant for the commission of offences of, inter alia, Section 185 of the MV Act, at the same time the said arrest can be effected only by a police officer in uniform. It is submitted that merely by virtue of this qualification that is embargoed on the police, the same would not change the complexion of the offence from a cognizable to a non-cognizable one. 7. Mr. Prem submitted that it would be also imperative to note the distinction between Section 202 and 203 for the purposes of the present challenge. Section 202(1) empowers the police officer in uniform to arrest without warrant, any person “who in his presence” commits an offence. That would mean for the purposes of the present challenge, that for a police officer in uniform to arrest a person under Section 202, an offence has to be committed in the presence of the said Police Officer. As and by way of illustration, if a person whilst driving a motor vehicle, consumes alcohol, and the said act of driving and consumption of alcohol is committed in the presence and/or in the sight of the Police Officer, the said Police Officer is empowered to arrest the said person under the provisions of Section 202 of the MV Act. The proviso thereafter provides for such a person arrested to be subjected to a medical examination as contemplated under Sections 203 and 204 of the MV Act within two hours of his arrest. 8. Mr. Prem submitted that on the other hand, Section 203 is distinctively different from Section 202 for the purposes of the present challenge. Here again, the Legislature in its wisdom has qualified a Police Officer to be a Police Officer in uniform or an officer of the Motor Vehicle Department for the purposes of obtaining specimens of breath for Breath test. However, at the same time, the arrest which is contemplated under Section 203 is only by a Police Officer in uniform without empowering the officer of the Motor Vehicle Department therefor. However, at the same time, the arrest which is contemplated under Section 203 is only by a Police Officer in uniform without empowering the officer of the Motor Vehicle Department therefor. Sub-clause (3) of Section 203 provides for a police officer in uniform to arrest a person if the said person in consequence of the breath test carried out on him shows the presence of alcohol in his blood. Thus, Mr. Prem submitted that on one hand, Section 202 provides for the immediate arrest of an offender whereas Section 203 provides for the arrest of an offender after the breath test which is carried out on the said person. The distinction is essentially with respect to the commission of an offence under Section 185 in the presence of the police officer as contemplated by Section 202 of the MV Act whereas on the other hand, Section 203 provide for subjecting an offender to a breath test on a reasonable suspicion of the offender having committed an offence and thereafter, arresting the said offender. In both the cases, offenders are arrested without warrant by a police officer albeit in uniform. 9. Mr. Prem submitted that an analogous reading of Sections 202 and 203 of the MV Act vis-a-vis Section 41 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 would clearly show that the offence under Section 185 is intended by the Legislature to be cognizable. The arrest without warrant by the police officer under Section 202 of the MV Act would be analogous to the arrest by a police officer under Section 41(1)(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Both the provisions contemplate the arrest of an offender who commits in presence of a Police Officer a cognizable offence. On the other hand, Section 203 of the MV Act is analogous with Section 41(1)(b)(ii)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Both the provisions contemplate the arrest of a person without warrant by the Police Officer who is satisfied that such an arrest is necessary for proper investigation of the offence. 10. Mr. Prem, thus, submitted that Section 185 is a cognizable offence as it provides for a Police Officer in uniform to arrest an offender without warrant. Both the provisions contemplate the arrest of a person without warrant by the Police Officer who is satisfied that such an arrest is necessary for proper investigation of the offence. 10. Mr. Prem, thus, submitted that Section 185 is a cognizable offence as it provides for a Police Officer in uniform to arrest an offender without warrant. If such a provision stands enacted by the Legislature, it would be an error to fall back on Part-II of the First Schedule to the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for the determination of the classification of Section 185 of the MV Act as cognizable or non-cognizable. 11. Mr. Prem submitted that if an offence is a cognizable offence, the Police Officer would be under a mandate to register a First Information Report under Section 154(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for the purposes of investigating the same. After having registered such an offence under Section 154(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the officer in charge of the Police Station under Section 156(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 has a statutory right to investigate the said cognizable case without requiring a sanction of a Magistrate. However, this statutory right under Section 156(1) is subject to the fulfillment of a pre-requisite condition contemplated under Section 157(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The condition is that the officer in charge of a Police Station before proceeding to investigate the facts and circumstance of the case should have “reason to suspect” the commission of an offence which he is empowered under Section 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to investigate. It is settled law as decided by the Honourable Supreme Court in the matter of Bhajanlal v/s State of Haryana reported in AIR 1992 SC 604 that the condition precedent to the commencement of an investigation under Section 157(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is the existence of the reason to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence which has to be prima facie disclosed by the allegations made in the First Information lead before the police officer under Section 154(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. In other words, if an offence is cognizable, the investigation thereof can proceed only after the registration of an FIR as contemplated under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. In other words, if an offence is cognizable, the investigation thereof can proceed only after the registration of an FIR as contemplated under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Without such registration of an FIR, no investigation can be commenced for cognizable offences. 12. Mr. Prem submitted that in the present case though the offences under Section 185 of the MV Act are cognizable, no FIR as mandated under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was registered nor any investigation as contemplated by Section 156 undertaken nor a report as mandated under Section 157 sent to the Magistrate. The proceedings are, therefore, abjectly illegal and deserve to be quashed and set aside. 13. Mr. Prem submitted that if the offence under Section 185 was to be non-cognizable, then in that case, the police would not be empowered to arrest without warrant. A harmonious reading of the provisions of the MV Act and more particularly Sections 202 and 203 vis-a-vis Section 2(c) and 41 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 would make it abundantly clear that an offence under Section 185 is cognizable. To contend that the offence is a non-cognizable offence and at the same time empowering the police to arrest an offender without warrant would be in the teeth of Section 2(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and the said provisions would be rendered ultra vires. 14. Lastly, Mr. Prem submitted that be that as it may, assuming for the sake of argument the offence to be non-cognizable (notwithstanding the power to arrest without warrant) the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 provides a mechanism for investigating the same. Section 155 requires an officer in charge of the Police Station to refer the said offence to the Magistrate and is estopped by virtue of Section 155(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 from investigating a non-cognizable case without an order of the Magistrate. In the present case, no such procedure has admittedly been followed and as such the present proceedings are rendered abjectly illegal and deserve to be quashed forthwith. 15. Mr. Prem submitted that the charge sheet which is filed by the police in the present case before the Magistrate is abjectly illegal inasmuch as the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 does not contemplate such a proceeding in any manner at all. 15. Mr. Prem submitted that the charge sheet which is filed by the police in the present case before the Magistrate is abjectly illegal inasmuch as the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 does not contemplate such a proceeding in any manner at all. Either the police ought to register an FIR, investigate the FIR under the provisions of Sections 156, 157, etc. of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and file a police report as contemplated by Section 173 by complying with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or if the police investigate a non-cognizable case under Section 155 (2), the police have to file a complaint before the learned Magistrate which would be treated in the nature of Section 2(d) for which a cognizance would be taken under Section 190(1) (a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 16. On the other hand, Mrs. Kejriwal, learned APP appearing on behalf of the Respondents/State, submitted that the controversy as to whether an offence is cognizable or non-cognizable has been decided by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Sandeep Indravadan Sagar v/s State of Maharashtra in Criminal Writ Petition No.1849/2010 along with connected Criminal Writ Petitions and Applications decided on 10.01.2013. This particular Application was also on Board, but could not be taken up. Therefore, a different view is not permissible. In any event, the argument raised that the learned Single Judge's judgment is erroneous and incorrect and is, therefore, required to be overruled, should not be accepted. 17. Mrs. Kejriwal submits that in the present case on her own showing the Applicant was driving the motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol. If that was the offence, then, the Applicant was stopped by the officer concerned and subjected to a Breath Test for detecting presence of alcohol in her blood. The Applicant submitted to all this voluntarily. There was no question of any arrest. The Applicant was then directed to attend the Court of Special Metropolitan Magistrate (Morning Court), Bhoiwada on 03.05.2011. She attended the Court and was asked whether she pleaded guilty to a charge under Section 185 of the MV Act. She pleaded not guilty. Therefore, she was directed to attend the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate, 29th Court, Dadar on 03.05.2011 and a copy of the charge sheet has been annexed as Annexure-A to this Criminal Application. She attended the Court and was asked whether she pleaded guilty to a charge under Section 185 of the MV Act. She pleaded not guilty. Therefore, she was directed to attend the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate, 29th Court, Dadar on 03.05.2011 and a copy of the charge sheet has been annexed as Annexure-A to this Criminal Application. Mrs.Kejriwal submits that the view taken by the learned Single Judge is the only view in the given facts and circumstances. There is no question of any arrest being effected and therefore, the provisions with regard to a power of arrest without warrant need not be adverted to. When an offence is non-cognizable, the view taken by the learned Single Judge is correct. It does not require any reconsideration. The Criminal Application be, therefore, dismissed. 18. For properly appreciating the rival contentions, a reference will have to be made to the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. This is an Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to Motor Vehicles. The Old Act 1939 came to be amended in 1988. It was further amended in 1994. The statement of objects and reasons for the Amendment Act 54 of 1994 reads thus:- “Amendment Act 54 of 1994 Statement of Objects and Reasons. The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988) consolidated and rationalised various laws regulating road transport. The Act came into force with effect from 1st July, 1989 replacing the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. 2. After the coming into force of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, Government received a number of representations and suggestions from the State Governments, transport operators and members of public regarding the inconvenience faced by them because of the operation of some of the provisions of the 1988 Act. A Review Committee was, therefore, constituted by the Government in March, 1990 to examine and review the 1988 Act. 3. The recommendations of the Review Committee were forwarded to the State Governments for comments and they generally agree with these recommendations. The Government also considered a large number of representations received, after finalisation of the Report of the Review Committee, from the transport operators and public for making amendments in the Act. The draft of the proposals based on the recommendation of the Review Committee and representations from the public were placed before the Transport Development Council for seeking their views in the matter. The draft of the proposals based on the recommendation of the Review Committee and representations from the public were placed before the Transport Development Council for seeking their views in the matter. The important suggestions made by the Transport Development Council relate to, or are on account of,– (a) the introduction of newer type of vehicles and fast increasing number of both commercial and personal vehicles in the country; (b) providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long-drawn procedure; (c) protecting consumers’ interest in Transport Sector; (d) concern for road safety standards, transport of hazardous chemicals and pollution control; (e) delegation of greater powers to State Transport Authorities and rationalising the role of public authorities in certain matters; (f) the simplification of procedures and policy liberalisation in the field of Road Transport; (g) enhancing penalties for traffic offenders. 4. Therefore, the proposed legislation has been prepared in the light of the above background. The Bill inter alia provides for – (a) modification and amplification of certain definitions of new type of vehicles; (b) simplification of procedure for grant of driving licences; (c) putting restrictions on the alteration of vehicles; (d) certain exemptions for vehicles running on non-polluting fuels; (e) ceilings on individuals or company holdings removed to curb “benami” holdings; (f) States authorised to appoint one or more State Transport Appellate Tribunals; (g) punitive checks on the use of such components that do not conform to the prescribed standards by manufactures, and also stocking / sale by the traders; (h) increase in the amount of compensation of the victims of hit and run cases; (i) removal of time limit for filing of application by road accident victims for compensation; (j) punishment in case of certain offences is made stringent; (k) a new pre-determined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age / income, which is more liberal and rational. 5. The Law Commission in its 119th Report had recommended that every application for a claim be made to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in which the accident occurred or to the Claims Tribunal within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the claimant resides or carries on business or within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant resides, at the option of the claimant. The Bill also makes necessary provision to give effect to the said recommendation.” 19. Thus, the amendment envisages stringent punishment in case of certain offences. 20. We are, in this case, concerned with the provisions which are contained in Chapter-XIII of the MV Act entitled “offences, penalties and procedure”. Section 177 with which this Chapter opens makes general provisions for punishment of offences. Section 178 provides for penalty for travelling without pass or ticket and for dereliction of duty on the part of conductor and refusal to ply contract carriage, etc.. Section 179 makes disobedience of orders, obstruction and refusal to give information an offence. Allowing unauthorized persons to drive vehicles is an offence punishable under Section 180. Driving vehicles in contravention of Section 3 or Section 4 is also made punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three months or with fine or with both and that is by Section 181. Section 182 deals with offences relating to licences. Section 182A provides for punishment for offences relating to construction and maintenance of vehicles. Section 183 makes driving at excessive speed an offence. Section 184 makes driving dangerously also an offence. 21. Then, comes Section 185 and which has substituted clause (1). This substitution is by Act 54 of 1994. Section 185 reads thus:- “185. Driving by a drunken person or by a person under the influence of drugs. – Whoever, while driving, or attempting to drive, a motor vehicle, – [(a) has, in his blood, alcohol exceeding 30 mg. per 100 ml. of blood detected in a test by a breath analyser, or] (b) is under the influence of a drug to such an extent as to be incapable of exercising proper control over the vehicle, shall be punishable for the first offence with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees, or with both; and for a second or subsequent offence, if committed within three years of the commission of the previous similar offence, with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two year, or with fine which may extend to three thousand rupees, or with both. Explanation – For the purposes of this section, the drug or drugs specified by the Central Government in this behalf, by notification in the Official Gazette, shall be deemed to render a person incapable of exercising proper control over a motor vehicle.” 22. There are then several provisions enabling dealing with cases of driving vehicles when a person is mentally or physically unfit and punishment for offences relating to accidents and punishment for abatement of certain offences. 23. We are not concerned with other offences. Sections 202 and 203 of the MV Act read as under:- “202. Power to arrest without warrant. – (1) A police officer in uniform may arrest without warrant any person who in his presence commits an offence punishable under section 184 or section 185 or section 197: Provided that any person so arrested in connection with an offence punishable under section 185 shall, within two hours of his arrest, be subjected to a medical examination referred to in sections 203 and 204 by a registered medical practitioner failing which he shall be released from custody. (2) A police officer in uniform may arrest without warrant any person, who has committed an offence under this Act, if such person refuses to give his name and address. (3) A police officer arresting without warrant the driver of a motor vehicle shall if the circumstances so require take or cause to be taken any steps he may consider proper for the temporary disposal of the vehicle.” 203. Breath tests. (3) A police officer arresting without warrant the driver of a motor vehicle shall if the circumstances so require take or cause to be taken any steps he may consider proper for the temporary disposal of the vehicle.” 203. Breath tests. – (1) A police officer in uniform or an officer of the Motor Vehicle Department, as may be authorised in this behalf by that Department, may require any person driving or attempting to drive a motor vehicle in a public place to provide one or more specimens of breath for breath test there or nearby, if such police officer or officer has any reasonable cause to suspect him of having committed an offence under section 185: (2) If a motor vehicle is involved in an accident in a public place and a police officer in uniform has any reasonable cause to suspect that the person who was driving the motor vehicle at the time of the accident had alcohol in his blood or that he was driving under the influence of a drug referred to in section 185 he may require the person so driving the motor vehicle, to provide a specimen of his breath for a breath test – (a) in the case of a person who is at a hospital as an indoor patient, at the hospital, (b) in the case of any other person, either at or near the place where the requirement is made, or, if the police officer thinks fit, at a police station specified by the police officer: Provided that a person shall not be required to provide such a specimen while at a hospital as an indoor patient if the registered medical practitioner in immediate charge of his case is not first notified of the proposal to make the requirement or objects to the provision of a specimen on the ground that its provision or the requirement to provide it would be prejudicial to the proper care or treatment of the patient. (3) If it appears to a police officer in uniform, in consequence of a breath test carried out by him on any person under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), that the device by means of which the test has been carried out indicates the presence of alcohol in the person’s blood, the police officer may arrest that person without warrant except while that person is at a hospital as an indoor patient. (4) If a person, required by a police officer under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) to provide a specimen of breath for a breath test, refuses or fails to do so and the police officer has reasonable cause to suspect him of having alcohol in his blood, the police officer may arrest him without warrant except while he is at a hospital as an indoor patient. (5) A person arrested under this section shall while at a police station, be given an opportunity to provide a specimen of breath for a breath test there. (6) The results of a breath test made in pursuance of the provisions of this section shall be admissible in evidence. Provided that requirement for breath test shall be made (unless it is made) as soon as reasonably practicable after the commission of such offence. Explanation. – For the purposes of this section “breath test”, means a test for the purpose of obtaining an indication of the presence of alcohol in a person’s blood carried out, on one or more specimens of breath provided by that person, by means of a device of a type approved by the Central Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, for the purpose of such a test.” 24. A perusal of these provisions in the backdrop of the Statement of Objects and Reasons would enable us to hold that Section 185 makes it an offence if a motor vehicle is driven by a person under the influence of alcohol or by a person under the influence of drugs. What is further material is the fact that the offence is committed while driving or attempting to drive a motor vehicle. Therefore, the offence is of driving or attempting to drive a motor vehicle in a drunken state or under the influence of drugs. 25. What is further material is the fact that the offence is committed while driving or attempting to drive a motor vehicle. Therefore, the offence is of driving or attempting to drive a motor vehicle in a drunken state or under the influence of drugs. 25. The menace of drunken driving has been considered by the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of the State through PS Lodhi Colony, New Delhi v/s Sanjeev Nanda reported in AIR 2012 SC 3104 : (2012) 8 SCC 450 . The Honourable Supreme Court has observed thus:- 85. …...... This court in Kurban Hussain Mohamedalli Rangawalla v. State of Maharashtra [ AIR 1965 SC 1616 ] approved the plea that simply because of the fact that no untoward incident had taken place prior to the occurrence of the accident, one cannot infer that the accused was sober and not in a drunken state. In the instant case, the presence of alcohol content was much more (i.e. 0.115%) than the permissible limit and that the accused was in an inebriated state at the time of accident due to the influence of liquor and in the accident, six human lives were lost. 86. Drunken driving has become a menace to our society. Every day drunken driving results in accidents and several human lives are lost, pedestrians in many of our cities are not safe. Late night parties among urban elite have now become a way of life followed by drunken driving. Alcohol consumption impairs consciousness and vision and it becomes impossible to judge accurately how far away the objects are. When depth perception deteriorates, eye muscles lose their precision causing inability to focus on the objects. Further, in more unfavourable conditions like fog, mist, rain, etc., whether it is night or day, it can reduce the visibility of an object to the point of being below the limit of discernibility. In short, alcohol leads to loss of coordination, poor judgment, slowing down of reflexes and distortion of vision. 87. Punishment meted out to a drunken driver, is at least a deterrent for other such persons getting away with minor punishment and fine. Such incidents are bound to increase with no safety for pedestrians on the roads. In short, alcohol leads to loss of coordination, poor judgment, slowing down of reflexes and distortion of vision. 87. Punishment meted out to a drunken driver, is at least a deterrent for other such persons getting away with minor punishment and fine. Such incidents are bound to increase with no safety for pedestrians on the roads. The contention raised by learned senior counsel that the accused was not under the influence of liquor or beyond the limit prescribed under the Motor Vehicles Act and he was in his senses and the victims were at fault being on the middle of the road, is without any substance and only to be rejected.” 26. The question before us is because Section 202 confers the power in a police officer in uniform to arrest any person without warrant, whether the offence is of the nature urged before us. That power is conferred if the offence punishable under Section 184 or 185 or 197 is committed in the presence of a police officer in uniform. Section 197 is an offence of taking vehicle without authority whereas Section 184 is an offence committed because of dangerous driving. The Legislature has advisedly inserted this provision so as to enable a police officer in uniform to arrest any person who in his presence commits this offence. In case of an offence punishable under Section 185, however, a police officer has to be vigilant and within two hours of arrest of such person, he should be subjected to a medical examination referred to in Sections 203 and 204 by a registered Medical Practitioner, failing which he shall be released from custody. 27. By sub-section (2) of Section 202, a police officer in uniform is given discretion to arrest without warrant any person who has committed an offence under the MV Act if such person refuses to give his name and address. The power is also conferred in a police officer by sub-section (3) of Section 202 to take or cause to be taken any steps for the temporary disposal of the vehicle. This power is to be exercised if the circumstances so require. 28. The power is also conferred in a police officer by sub-section (3) of Section 202 to take or cause to be taken any steps for the temporary disposal of the vehicle. This power is to be exercised if the circumstances so require. 28. By Section 203(1) of the MV Act the power is given to both, a police officer in uniform or an officer of the Motor Vehicle Department as may be authorized in this behalf by that Department, to require any person driving or attempting to drive a motor vehicle, to provide one or more specimens of breath for a Breath Test there or nearby if such police officer or officer has any reasonable cause to suspect him of having committed an offence punishable under Section 185. 29. By sub-section (2) of Section 203, if a motor vehicle is involved in an accident in a public place and a police officer in uniform has any reasonable cause to suspect that a person has alcohol in his blood or was driving under the influence of drugs, then, he may require such person to provide a specimen of his breath for a breath test. 30. By sub-section (3) of Section 203, a police officer in uniform, in consequence of a breath test carried out by him indicating presence of alcohol in blood, may arrest that person without warrant except if such person is admitted in a hospital as an indoor patient. In view of sub-section (4) of Section 203, refusal or failure to provide specimen of breath within the meaning of this provision would also result in a person being arrested. 31. Therefore, it is not as if by calling upon somebody to subject himself to a breath test on account of a reasonable cause and suspicion of having committed an offence punishable under Section 185 that arrest is imminent or must follow. Therefore, the Legislature has authorized such specimens being collected not only by a police officer in uniform but an officer of the Motor Vehicle Department. Thereafter, it is only in certain circumstances and events that an arrest is permitted. Even Section 202 has clarified that the power has to be exercised only when a police officer in uniform finds that the offence punishable under Sections 184 or 185 or 197 is committed by a person in his presence. Thereafter, it is only in certain circumstances and events that an arrest is permitted. Even Section 202 has clarified that the power has to be exercised only when a police officer in uniform finds that the offence punishable under Sections 184 or 185 or 197 is committed by a person in his presence. The arrest cannot continue unless a person suspected of having committed an offence punishable under Section 185 is subjected to a medical examination referred to in Sections 203 and 204. 32. To our mind, therefore, there is nothing in these provisions which would enable us to hold that a person suspected of driving in a drunken state or found to have been driving in such state or under the influence of drugs, is to be arrested forthwith. If his arrest is not immediate or imminent, but all that is provided is to subject him to certain tests, then it is difficult to conceive that the Legislature intended such offence to be cognizable. The Legislature was aware of the gravity and seriousness of such offence, and therefore, provided for punishment as enumerated therein. 33. The argument is that the offence is cognizable and that is evident by the fact that a police officer is empowered to arrest without warrant. It is contended that sub-section (1) of Section 202 empowers police officer in uniform to arrest without warrant any person who in his presence commits an offence. In these circumstances the further argument is that the definition of the term “cognizable offence and non-cognizable offence” as appearing in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 should not be taken assistance of. That is taken assistance of by the learned Single Judge, and therefore, his judgment requires reconsideration. 34. Before Honourable Mr. Justice A.M. Thipsay, the Petitioner was arrested by the Charkop Division of Malwani Police Station on the allegation of having committed an offence punishable under Section 185 of the MV Act. He was released on a cash bond of Rs.2000/-. As per the terms of the Bond, he appeared before the Special Metropolitan Magistrate, Borivali. 34. Before Honourable Mr. Justice A.M. Thipsay, the Petitioner was arrested by the Charkop Division of Malwani Police Station on the allegation of having committed an offence punishable under Section 185 of the MV Act. He was released on a cash bond of Rs.2000/-. As per the terms of the Bond, he appeared before the Special Metropolitan Magistrate, Borivali. On that date, the police filed the charge sheet against him and the learned Single Judge was concerned with the questions as to whether, the charge sheet can be filed without any First Information Report; can in a Summons Triable Case, the charge sheet be filed; and can in a trial an order of conviction and sentence be made in advance. It is in that context the question of offence being cognizable and non-cognizable arose for the learned Single Judge's consideration. 35. The learned Single Judge noted the contentions and held that the investigation in relation to the offence punishable under Section 185 need not precede the registration of a First Information Report within the meaning of Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. That is not the requirement even when the investigations are commenced in a cognizable offence. In other words, the investigations into a cognizable offence need not be preceded by the registration of a First Information Report. 36. Our attention has been invited to several judgments and one of which is reported in AIR 1981 SC 368 (State of Gujarat v/s Lalsingh Kashansingh). The learned counsel for Applicant submitted that in this judgment the Honourable Supreme Court considered its earlier decisions and held as under:- “18. In Abasbhai's case (ibid), a Sub-Inspector got a warrant issued under Section 6 of the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act, which authorised him to search certain premises. In execution of that warrant the Sub-Inspector raided a house and arrested three persons who were found therein. The case was tried by the Magistrate concerned as a cognizable one. At the trial at the stage of arguments, it was contended on behalf of the accused that offences under Sections 4 and 5 were non-cognizable, and since the procedure of warrant case had been followed by the Magistrate, the trial was illegal. The trial court accepted the argument and acquitted the accused. In appeal before the High Court, it was agitated that the offence was a cognizable one. The trial court accepted the argument and acquitted the accused. In appeal before the High Court, it was agitated that the offence was a cognizable one. The High Court reasoned – and we think rightly – that since under S.6 of the Act the Commissioner of Police has power to issue special warrants of search and also to arrest, he is competent to do personally, what he may authorize others to do by special warrant. It followed the dictum of Deodhar Singh's case ((1899) ILR 27 Cal. 144), in regard to the interpretation of the words "a police officer" in the definition of "cognizable offence" given in the Code of Criminal Procedure. On these premises, the High Court held that offences under Sections 4 and 5 are cognizable. 19. In Emperor v. Ismail (AIR 1930 Bom. 49) (ibid), a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, reaffirmed the dictum of Abasbhai's case (AIR 1926 Bom. 195), that an offence punishable under Section 4 of the Act, is cognizable. 20. In Delhi Administration v. Parkash Chand (AIR 1967 Delhi 151), H. R. Khanna, J., following the dictum of the Calcutta High Court in Deodhar Singh's case ((1899 ILR 27 Cal 144), and of Bombay High Court in Abasbhai's case, held that offences under Sections 3 and 4 of Delhi Gambling Act are 'cognizable offences' as Section 5 of the Delhi Act gives the Superintendent of Police power to arrest or authorise any officer of police, not below the rank of Sub-Inspector, to arrest without a warrant. 21. It is argued on behalf of the appellant-State that the ratio of the aforesaid decisions in Deodhar Singh's case and Parkash Chand's case is not applicable to offences under the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act, because the Bengal Act and the Delhi Act expressly empower the Superintendent of Police either to arrest himself or direct arrest by another police officer of requisite rank; whereas in Section 6(1) of the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act there are no express words giving an option, to the Commissioner of Police to effect arrest, personally. 22. We are unable to accept this argument. The difference pointed out, is a distinction without a difference. What was explicit in the Bengal Gambling Act and the Delhi Gambling Act, is implicit in Section 6(1) of the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act. 23. 22. We are unable to accept this argument. The difference pointed out, is a distinction without a difference. What was explicit in the Bengal Gambling Act and the Delhi Gambling Act, is implicit in Section 6(1) of the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act. 23. It will now be appropriate to notice this Court's decision in Union of India v. I. C. Lala ( AIR 1973 SC 2204 ). In that case, two army officers and one business-man were charged with the conspiracy of the offences punishable under Sections 120B and 420 of the Indian Penal Code, read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The officer who investigated these offences was an Inspector of the Delhi Police Establishment. Under S.5A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, before its amendment in 1974, no officer below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police could investigate an offence punishable under Sections 161, 165 and 165A of the Indian Penal Code and under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, without the order of the Presidency Magistrate or a Magistrate of the First Class. The question before the Court was, whether sanction under Section 196A of the Code was necessary. The answer to this question turned upon whether an offence under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act was non-cognizable or cognizable. The High Court held that an offence under Section 5(2) of that Act was non-cognizable because it was not an offence for which any police officer could arrest without a warrant. The same argument which was canvassed before the High Court was repeated before this Court. And it was contended that the words 'a police officer' in Section 4(1)(f) of the Code mean 'any' police officer. This argument was repelled by this Court and it was held that such an approach could not be a criterion for deciding whether the offence is cognizable or non cognizable. It was observed: “If we pursue the same line of argument and look at the definition of non-cognizable offence in S.4(1)(a) which defines non-cognizable offence an offence for which a police officer, within or without a presidency town, may not arrest without warrant, it might mean that as these are cases where a police officer of the rank of Dy. Superintendent and above can arrest without warrant these are not non-cognizable offences either. Superintendent and above can arrest without warrant these are not non-cognizable offences either. How can there be a case which is neither cognizable nor non cognizable. It was sought to be argued that these offences would be cognizable offences when they are investigated by the Deputy Superintendents of Police and superior officers and non cognizable when they are investigated by officers below the rank of Deputy Superintendents. We fail to see how an offence would be cognizable in certain circumstances and non-cognizable in certain other circumstances... We do not consider that this is a reasonable interpretation to place.”” 37. We are of the view that the question that was raised before the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Lalsingh Kashansingh (supra) was a distinct one. There, certain premises were raided because of suspicion that gambling activities were going on therein. The persons were arrested and instruments of gaming were also seized. Further, the issue was that an application was made to the Police Inspector requesting him to enlarge them on bail. He did not consider their application nor did he pass any order. At about noon, the Respondents before the Supreme Court were produced before the Magistrate and he released them on bail. The said Police Inspector did not consider releasing them on bail because he was prohibited by the circular issued by the Superintendent of Police directing all Police Sub Inspectors not to release any person arrested in connection with offences punishable under Sections 4 and 5 of the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act, 1887 on bail, as in the Form of Warrant prescribed under Section 6 of the said Act it is mentioned that the arrested persons should be produced before the Magistrate. It is in these circumstances the circular was impugned by filing a Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India before the High Court of Gujarath. The Honourable Supreme Court while dealing with the contentions with regard to the legality and validity of the circular made the said observations. These observations must be seen in the context of competence of the officers empowered to exercise the powers under the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act, 1887. It was not as much a discussion and conclusion on the offence being cognizable. These observations must be seen in the context of competence of the officers empowered to exercise the powers under the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act, 1887. It was not as much a discussion and conclusion on the offence being cognizable. The Honourable Supreme Court did refer to definition of the term “cognizable”, but it was in the context of the meaning of the term “police officer” as appearing in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 and particularly in the definition of the term “cognizable offence”. The Honourable Supreme Court was not considering any issue other than the legality and validity of the circular. This would be evident from the discussion in paragraphs reproduced above. This judgment is not an authority on the point. 38. The learned Single Judge of this Court referred to the definition of the term “cognizable offence” as appearing in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and proceeded to hold that merely because Section 202 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in the present case empowers a police officer to arrest a person without warrant provided he commits an offence in his presence, will not make the offence punishable under Section 185 cognizable. The learned Single Judge has referred to the scheme of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and has found that the MV Act does not make offence cognizable. Therefore, one has to necessarily fall back on Part-II of the First Schedule to the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The learned Single Judge in paragraph 19 of his judgment rightly held that the power to arrest given to a police officer under Section 202 is not an unqualified power. That power can be exercised only if the offence is committed in the presence of a police officer and when such police officer is in uniform. 39. We need not go into larger question and issue raised by the learned counsel for Applicant because in the facts before us, it is conceded that the Applicant was driving the motor vehicle. She was signalled to stop by the officer of N.M. Joshi Marg Police Station. She was further put to Breath Test and after the test was conducted, she was directed to deposit a sum of Rs.2000/- and receipt was furnished to her. She was directed to attend the Court of Special Metropolitan Magistrate (Morning Court), Bhoiwada. She was signalled to stop by the officer of N.M. Joshi Marg Police Station. She was further put to Breath Test and after the test was conducted, she was directed to deposit a sum of Rs.2000/- and receipt was furnished to her. She was directed to attend the Court of Special Metropolitan Magistrate (Morning Court), Bhoiwada. She attended the Court and it was asked whether she pleads guilty to the charge. She did not plead guilty, therefore, she was directed to attend the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate, 29th Court, Dadar and the copy of charge sheet filed was provided to her. The documents that are handed over to us as a compilation would indicate that at no point the Applicant was arrested as claimed by her. She accompanied the officer voluntarily and subjected herself to the Breath Test. She also collected the receipt for deposits and thereafter, attended the Court. She relies upon the true copy of charge sheet filed in the Court and therefore, it is urged that same would evidence her arrest and release on bail. 40. It is not possible to accept this contention. The whole criminal application and contentions raised before us appear to be an afterthought. The documents have been obtained and thereafter, contrary to the initial assertions, what is argued is that the Applicant was arrested. The additional grounds incorporated by way of amendment are based on these documents. However, we are of the opinion that in the facts of this case there was no arrest. The Applicant was apprehended while driving the vehicle. She was asked to accompany the officer who admittedly was a police officer and it is not disputed that he was in his uniform. He stopped the vehicle and thereafter, put the Applicant to the test. The test was conducted and the Applicant was directed to deposit a sum of Rs.2000/-. Thereafter, she went away. Now the contention that the amount of Rs.2000/- was Cash Bail Sum and thus, the Applicant was arrested, is clearly an afterthought. The power to arrest without warrant conferred in a police officer in uniform is to take care of the acts specified in Sections 184, 185 and 197 of the MV Act. Each of these acts endanger safety of public. It is common ground that driving a motor vehicle at speed or in a manner which is dangerous to public, results in accident. Each of these acts endanger safety of public. It is common ground that driving a motor vehicle at speed or in a manner which is dangerous to public, results in accident. Such accident may result in casualty. In such circumstances whenever a person is found to be driving dangerously or in a drunken state or under the influence of drugs, that he can be proceeded in accordance with law. The offence is committed in the present case if any person while driving or attempting to drive the motor vehicle has in his blood alcohol exceeding 30 mg. per 100 ml. of blood and which is detected in the test by the Breath Analyzer. That the Applicant was subjected to such test and the report indicated presence of alcohol exceeding the limits specified by clause (a) of Section 185, that the police officer decided to proceed against her. However, we do not find that she was arrested as is now claimed. The case is pending in the Trial Court. No opinion need be expressed on merits of the charges which are levelled against the Applicant as they would prejudice the case of either side. We are of the opinion that the Applicant voluntarily and on her own accompanied the Police Officer in uniform and subjected herself to the test and thereafter, further process of law. The incident has taken place on 27.04.2011 and on that date the Applicant after subjecting herself to the test was not detained in custody or arrested, but allowed to go. She was free throughout and even when she has not accepted guilt, but claimed to be tried. In these circumstances to now urge that she was arrested, would not be proper. The Applicant has understood the whole matter in the perspective in which she has seen it and as narrated in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Criminal Application. In these circumstances we do not see how any prejudice has been caused. 41. The argument that subjecting oneself to the test itself is deprivation of life and liberty, cannot be accepted in the teeth of the clear language of Sections 185, 202 and 203 of the MV Act. In these circumstances we do not see how any prejudice has been caused. 41. The argument that subjecting oneself to the test itself is deprivation of life and liberty, cannot be accepted in the teeth of the clear language of Sections 185, 202 and 203 of the MV Act. It is only when a police officer in uniform requires any person driving or attempting to drive a motor vehicle in a public place, to provide one or more specimens of breath for Breath Test there or nearby if such police officer or officer has any reasonable cause to suspect him of having committed an offence that the requirement of Breath Test has to be fulfilled. Secondly, that requirement is to be fulfilled in the event a motor vehicle is involved in accident in a public place and a police officer in uniform has a reasonable cause to suspect that a person who was driving the motor vehicle at the time of accident has alcohol in his blood or that he was driving the motor vehicle under the influence of drugs, that he may require the person driving the motor vehicle to provide specimen of his breath for Breath Test. Either which way, subjecting oneself to such tests by itself does not deprive a person of his liberty inasmuch as he is not arrested as claimed. If that was the intent, then, the Legislature would not have incorporated or inserted sub-sections (3) and (4) in Section 203. The consequences are provided by sub-section (5) of Section 203. Thus, the arrest is contemplated only so as to carryout the Breath Test. The results of Breath Test may in pursuance of the provisions of Section 203 shall be admissible in evidence and by the explanation provided below sub-section (6) of Section 203, it would be apparent as to why Section 203 has been brought on the statute book. The Breath Test and Laboratory Test are both provided in order to obtain a proof of person being in such state as could be termed as unfit to drive a motor vehicle. 42. Section 205 of the MV Act makes the matter more clear. It reads as under:- “205. Presumption of unfitness to drive. The Breath Test and Laboratory Test are both provided in order to obtain a proof of person being in such state as could be termed as unfit to drive a motor vehicle. 42. Section 205 of the MV Act makes the matter more clear. It reads as under:- “205. Presumption of unfitness to drive. – In any proceeding for an offence punishable under section 185 if it is proved that the accused, when requested by a police officer at any time so to do, had refused, omitted or failed to consent to the taking of or providing a specimen of his breath for a breath test or a specimen of his blood for a laboratory test, his refusal, omission or failure may, unless reasonable cause therefor is shown, be presumed to be a circumstance supporting any evidence given on behalf of the prosecution or rebutting any evidence given on behalf of the defence, with respect to his condition at that time.” 43. A bare reading thereof would enable us to hold that presumption of unfitness to drive the motor vehicle can be raised in any proceedings for an offence punishable under Section 185 if it is proved that the accused, when requested by a police officer at any time so to do, had refused, omitted or failed to consent to the taking of or providing a specimen of his breath for a Breath Test or a specimen of his blood for a Laboratory Test, then, his refusal, omission or failure may, unless reasonable cause therefor is shown, is presumed to be a circumstance as indicated in Section 205. Thus, the presence of alcohol or drug would lead the competent court to conclude that the vehicle was driven by a person, who has alcohol in his blood or was under the influence of a drug to such an extent so as to render him incapable of exercising proper control of the vehicle. By Section 184, the offence is of dangerous driving. However, in order to find out whether a person was under the influence of alcohol that the tests are provided. Moreover, a complete reading of the statutory provisions in question would denote that there is no arrest or deprivation of life and liberty. If that were to be the intent, the words “unless reasonable cause therefor is shown” would not appear in Section 205. Moreover, a complete reading of the statutory provisions in question would denote that there is no arrest or deprivation of life and liberty. If that were to be the intent, the words “unless reasonable cause therefor is shown” would not appear in Section 205. In these circumstances by mere subjecting oneself to the tests, the right to life and liberty guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution of India is not in any way jeopardized. 44. Even the power to arrest without warrant conferred by Section 202 of the MV Act is subject to certain conditions and it has been clarified that a person arrested by a police officer in connection with an offence punishable under Section 185 shall within two hours of his arrest be subjected to a medical examination referred to in Sections 203 and 204 by a registered medical practitioner. Failure to subject him to such test within the time specified would result in his release from custody. The proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 202 would show that it is only when a police officer in uniform on being satisfied that in his presence an offence punishable under Section 184, 185 or 197 is committed that he may arrest without warrant such person. However, in connection with the offence carved out by Section 185 a person arrested would have to be subjected to the tests. A person can be arrested if he refuses to give his name and address and equally what one finds is that the requirement for a Breath Test has to be made as soon as reasonably practicable after the commission of such offence. (see sub-section (1) of Section 203). Therefore, the power to arrest without warrant in case of the offence punishable under Section 185 of the MV Act is only to enable a police officer in uniform to subject a person to the tests specified in Sections 203 and 204 of the MV Act. Thereafter, it is for the law to take its course. In such circumstances the argument that by subjecting the Applicant in this case to a Breath Test means she was arrested and that power having been exercised without pre-registration of a First Information Report entails in deprivation of her life and liberty, cannot be accepted. 45. Thereafter, it is for the law to take its course. In such circumstances the argument that by subjecting the Applicant in this case to a Breath Test means she was arrested and that power having been exercised without pre-registration of a First Information Report entails in deprivation of her life and liberty, cannot be accepted. 45. If it cannot be accepted in this case and for the reasons aforestated, then, any larger issue or wider controversy need not be gone into. In a given case and if the arrest effected by taking recourse to Section 202 and sub-sections thereof continues, then, depending upon the circumstances in each case a conclusion can be drawn that a person is deprived of his life and liberty without due process of law. In that event the competent court can make appropriate orders protecting life and liberty of an aggrieved person. Beyond that we do not think any academic discussion and with regard to the correctness of the view taken by the learned Single Judge of this Court is necessary. We are of the opinion that the learned Single Judge has not observed anything contrary to the mandate flowing from Sections 185, 202 and 203 of the MV Act insofar as subjecting a person to the tests enumerated therein. The learned Single Judge's observations thereafter need not detain us because once the above view on facts can be taken, then, the further aspects of the question as to whether the offence punishable under Section 185 of the MV Act is cognizable or non-cognizable need not be decided. In any event, the offence cannot be said to be cognizable only because a power is conferred to arrest any person committing such offence, without warrant. It is apparent that a person arrested in connection with an offence punishable under Section 185 of the MV Act has to be subjected to a medical examination referred to in Sections 203 and 204 by a registered medical practitioner. The Breath Test has to be carried out so as to ascertain whether there was presence of alcohol in his body or a person was under the influence of a drug. Therefore, this is not an absolute power to arrest without warrant, but subject to the conditions specified in law and there are inbuilt safeguards and protection so that a person is not deprived of his life and liberty. Therefore, this is not an absolute power to arrest without warrant, but subject to the conditions specified in law and there are inbuilt safeguards and protection so that a person is not deprived of his life and liberty. In these circumstances merely because the power to arrest without warrant is conferred in a police officer in uniform does not mean that the offence is cognizable. Even if a person is to be subjected to the tests, the Police Officer must have a reasonable cause to suspect him of having committed an offence punishable under Section 185. Therefore, if there is a reasonable cause to suspect a person having committed an offence punishable under Section 185, that he can be subjected to a Breath Test and by calling upon him or requiring him subject himself to such test, is not necessarily arrest. He could be arrested provided a Breath Test carried out on him indicating presence of alcohol in his blood. He cannot be arrested if he is at a hospital as an indoor patient. If the person concerned refuses to provide a specimen of breath for a Breath Test or fails to do so and a police officer has a reasonable cause to suspect him of having alcohol in his blood that he may arrest that person except while that person is in hospital as an indoor patient. Even after his arrest he shall while at police station be given an opportunity to provide a specimen of breath for a Breath Test. Therefore, with all this it is not as if the offence can be said to be cognizable. Additionally also because of the extent of punishment, namely, imprisonment for less than two years that a conclusion can safely be reached that an offence punishable under Section 185 of the MV Act is not cognizable. 46. For the aforesaid reasons, we find no merit in this criminal application. The Criminal Application is dismissed. Rule is discharged.