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2013 DIGILAW 243 (CHH)

Krishna Nepali v. State of C. G.

2013-08-26

RADHE SHYAM SHARMA, SATISH K.AGNIHOTRI

body2013
JUDGMENT As per Hon'ble Shri Radhe Shyam Sharma, J. 1. This appeal is directed against judgment dated 31.7.2007 passed by Fourth Additional Sessions Judge, Durg in Sessions Trial No.261/2006. By the impugned judgment, accused/appellants Krishna Nepali and Golu @ Madhu have been convicted and sentenced in the following manner with a direction to run the sentences concurrently: Sl. Offence under Jail sentence Payment Default of payment No. section of fine of fine 1. Section 450 IPC RI for ten years Rs.5,000/- RI for one year 2. Section 376(2)(g) Imprisonment for Rs.50,000/- R-I for three years IPC life 3. Section 506 RI for five years - - Part II IPC 2. Accused Golu alias Madhu had filed Criminal Appeal No.733/2007 against the judgment impugned herein. The instant appeal has been filed by accused Golu alias Madhu and co-accused Krishna Nepali. By permitting accused Golu alias Madhu to prosecute the instant appeal, .Criminal Appeal No.733/2007 has been dismissed as unnecessary by a Division Bench of this Court on 5-8-2008. 3. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is as under: On 12.8.2006, at about 4 pm, prosecutrix (PW-2) was alone at her house and was 'washing clothes. At that time, the appellants knocked the door of her house. When she opened the door, the appellants forcibly entered into her house and asked her for sexual intercourse with her. On her refusal, the appellants forcibly caused her to fall down on the bed. Appellant Golu @ Madhu caught her hands and appellant Krishna Nepali removed her clothes and committed forcible sexual intercourse with her. Thereafter, appellant Krishna Nepali caught her hands and appellant Golu @ Madhu committed sexual intercourse with her. The appellants threatened her for life and also assaulted her with a wooden stick. She sustained injuries on the head. She lodged First Information Report (Ex-P/l) in Police Station Chhawani. She was sent to District Hospital, Durg for medical examination vide Ex-P/4. Dr. Manjusha Amaredkar (PW-5) examined her and gave a report (Ex-P/4A), in which she found a contusion on the frontal scalp. Two slides of her vaginal swab were prepared. Petticoat and slides of vaginal swab were seized. The appellants were also sent to Government Hospital, Supela for medical examination. Dr. R.K. Saxena (PW-6) examined the appellants and gave reports (Ex-P/10 and P/11), in which he found that the appellants were capable of performing sexual intercourse. Two slides of her vaginal swab were prepared. Petticoat and slides of vaginal swab were seized. The appellants were also sent to Government Hospital, Supela for medical examination. Dr. R.K. Saxena (PW-6) examined the appellants and gave reports (Ex-P/10 and P/11), in which he found that the appellants were capable of performing sexual intercourse. In further investigation, charge-sheet was filed against the appellants in the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Durg, who, in turn, committed the case to the Court of Session, Durg, from where it was received on transfer by Fourth Additional Sessions Judge, Durg, who conducted the trial and convicted and sentenced the appellants as mentioned above. 4. Mr. Sunil Verma and Mr. Jitendra Gupia, learned counsel appearing for appellant No.1 and Mr. Samir Singh, learned counsel appearing for appellant No.2 argued that the evidence of prosecutrix (PW-2) is full of contradictions. The case of the prosecution is highly improbable. A close scrutiny of the evidence available on record reveals that the evidence of prosecutrix (PW-2) is not reliable. They further argued that prosecutrix (PW-2) used to sell liquor and when she was prevented by the appellants for doing the illegal work, she falsely implicated the appellants. The prosecutrix herself was indulging in illegal activities. Therefore, her evidence is not reliable and cannot be based for conviction of the appellants. 5. On the other hand, Mr. Akhil Mishra, learned Addl. Public Prosecutor and Mr. UNS Deo, learned Govt. Advocate for the State/respondent, supporting the impugned judgment, submitted that the conviction and sentence awarded to the appellants do not warrant any interference by this Court. 6. Now, we shall examine whether the evidence of prosecutrix (PW2) is sufficient to convict the appellants without corroboration? Evidence of Prosecutrix: 7. In Mohd. Imran Khan Vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) 2012 Cri.L.J. 693 (SC), the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as follows: "15. It is a trite law that a woman, who is the victim of sexual assault, is not an accomplice to the crime but is a victim of another person's lust. The prosecutrix stands at a higher pedestal than an injured witness as she suffers from emotional injury. Therefore, her evidence need not be tested with the same amount of suspicion as that of an accomplice. The prosecutrix stands at a higher pedestal than an injured witness as she suffers from emotional injury. Therefore, her evidence need not be tested with the same amount of suspicion as that of an accomplice. The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter called 'Evidence Act'), nowhere says that her evidence' cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars. She is undoubtedly a competent witness under Section 118 of Evidence Act and her evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured ih cases of physical violence. The same degree of care and caution must attach in the evaluation of her evidence as in the case of an injured complainant or witness and no more. If the court keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that it can act on the evidence of the prosecutrix, there is no rule of law or practice incorporated in the Evidence Act similar to illustration (b) to Section 114 which requires it to look for corroboration. If for some reason the court is hesitant to place implicit reliance on the testimoriy of the prosecutrix it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. If the totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case disclose that the prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, the court should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her evidence. The court must be alive to its responsibility and the sensitive while dealing with cases involving sexual molestations. Rape is not merely a physical assault, rather it often distracts the whole personality of the victim. The rapist degrades the very soul of the helpless female and, therefore, the testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and in such cases, non-examination even of other witnesses may not be a serious infirmity in the prosecution case, particularly where the witnesses had not seen the commission of the offence. (Vide: State of Maharashtra v. Chandra Prakash Kewalchand Jain, AIR 1990 SC 658 : (1990 Cri LJ 889); State of U.P. v. Pappu @ Yunus & Anr., AIR 2005 SC 1248 ; (2004 AIR SCW 6563); and Vijay @ Chinee v. State of M.P., (2010) 8 SCC 191 ) : (AIR 2011 SC (Cri) 940 : 2010 AIR SCW 5510). (Vide: State of Maharashtra v. Chandra Prakash Kewalchand Jain, AIR 1990 SC 658 : (1990 Cri LJ 889); State of U.P. v. Pappu @ Yunus & Anr., AIR 2005 SC 1248 ; (2004 AIR SCW 6563); and Vijay @ Chinee v. State of M.P., (2010) 8 SCC 191 ) : (AIR 2011 SC (Cri) 940 : 2010 AIR SCW 5510). Thus, the law that emerges on the issue is to the effect that statement of prosecutrix, if found to be worthy of credence and reliable, requires no corroboration. The court may convict the accused on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix." 8. In Vljay alias Chinee Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2010) 8 SCC 191 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed thus: "9. In State of Maharashtra Vs. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain, (1990) 1 SCC 550 , this Court held that a woman, who is the victim of sexual assault, is not an accomplice to the crime but is a victim of another person's lust and, therefore, her evidence need not be tested with the same amount of suspicion as that of an accomplice. The Court observed as under: (SCC p. 559, para .16) "16. A prosecutrix of a sex offence cannot be put on par with an accomplice. She is in fact a victim, of the crime. The Evidence Act nowhere says that her evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars. She is undoubtedly a competent witness under Section 118 and her evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured in cases of physical violence. The same degree of care and caution must attach in the evaluation of her evidence as in. the case of an injured complainant or witness and no more. What is necessary is that the court must be alive to and conscious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a person who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her. If the court keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that it can act on the evidence of the prosecutrix, there is no rule of law or practice incorporated in the Evidence Act similar to Illustration (b) to Section 114 which requires it to look for corroboration. If the court keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that it can act on the evidence of the prosecutrix, there is no rule of law or practice incorporated in the Evidence Act similar to Illustration (b) to Section 114 which requires it to look for corroboration. If for some reason the court is hesitant to place implicit reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The nature of evidence required to lend assurance to the testimony of the prosecutrix must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. But if a prosecutrix is an adult and of full understanding the court is entitled to base a conviction on her evidence unless the same is shown to be infirm and not trustworthy. If the totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case disclose that the prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, the court should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her evidence." 10. In State of U.P. v. Pappu, (2005)3 SCC 594 , this Court held that even in a case where it is shown that the girl is a girl of easy virtue or a girl habituated to sexual intercourse, it may not be a ground to absolve the accused from the charge of rape. It has to be established that there was consent by her for that particular occasion. Absence of injury on the prosecutrix may not be a factor that leads the court to absolve the accused. This Court further held that there can be conviction on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix and in case, the court is not satisfied with the version of the prosecutrix, it can seek other evidence, direct or circumstantial, by which it may get assurance of her testimony. The Court held as under: (SCC p. 597, para 12) "12. It is well settled that a prosecutrix complaining of having been a victim of the offence of rape is not an accomplice after the crime. There is no rule of law that her testimony cannot be acted upon without corroboration in material particulars. She stands at a higher pedestal than an injured witness. It is well settled that a prosecutrix complaining of having been a victim of the offence of rape is not an accomplice after the crime. There is no rule of law that her testimony cannot be acted upon without corroboration in material particulars. She stands at a higher pedestal than an injured witness. In the latter case, there is injury on the physical form, while in the former it is both physical as well as psychological and emotional. However, if the court of facts finds it difficult to accept the version of the prosecutrix on its face value, it may search for evidence, direct or circumstantial, which would lend assurance to her testimony. Assurance, short of corroboration as understood in. the context of an accomplice, would do." 11. In State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384 , this Court held that in cases involving sexual harassment, molestation, etc., the court is duty-bound to deal with such cases with utmost sensitivity. Minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of a 'prosecutrix should not be a ground for throwing out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. Evidence of the victim of sexual assault is enough for conviction and it does not require any corroboration unless there are compelling reasons for seeking corroboration. The court may look for some assurances of her statement to satisfy judicial conscience. The statement of the prosecutrix is more reliable than that of an injured witness as she is not an accomplice. The Court further held that the delay in filing FIR or sexual offence may not be even properly explained, but if found natural, the accused cannot be given any benefit thereof. The Court observed as under: (SCC pp. 394-96 & 403, paras 8 & 21) "8. ... The court overlooked the situation in which a poor helpless minor girl had found herself in the company of three desperate young men who were threatening her and preventing her from raising any alarm. Again, if the investigating officer did not conduct the investigation properly or was negligent in not being able to trace out the driver or the car, how can that become a ground to discredit the testimony of the prosecutrix? The prosecutrix had no control over the investigating agency and the negligence of an investigating officer could not affect the credibility of the statement of the prosecutrix. .. The prosecutrix had no control over the investigating agency and the negligence of an investigating officer could not affect the credibility of the statement of the prosecutrix. .. The courts must, while evaluating evidence, remain alive to the fact that in a case of rape, no self-respecting woman would come forward in a court just to make a humiliating statement against her honour such as is involved in the commission of rape on her. In cases involving sexual molestation, supposed considerations which have no material effect on the veracity of the prosecution case or even discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix should not, unless the discrepancies are such which are of fatal nature, be allowed to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. ...Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such case amounts to adding insult to injury. ... Corroboration as a condition for judicial reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix is not a requirement of law but a guidance of prudence under given circumstances. .... * * * 21. ... The courts should examine the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix, which are not of a fatal nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. If evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars. If for some reason the court finds it difficult to place implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony, short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and the trial court must be alive to its responsibility and be sensitive while dealing with cases involving sexual molestations." 12. In State of Orissa v. Thakara Besra, (2002) 9 SCC 86 , this Court held that rape is not mere physical assault, rather it often distracts (sic destroys) the whole personality of the victim. In State of Orissa v. Thakara Besra, (2002) 9 SCC 86 , this Court held that rape is not mere physical assault, rather it often distracts (sic destroys) the whole personality of the victim. The rapist degrades the very soul of the helpless female and, therefore, the testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and in such cases, non-examination even of other witnesses may not be a serious infirmity in the prosecution case, particularly where the witnesses had not seen the commission of the offence. 13. In State of H.P. v. Raghubir Singh, (1993) 2 SCC 622 , this Court held that there is no legal compulsion to look or any other evidence to corroborate the evidence of the prosecutrix before recording an order of conviction. Evidence has to be weighed and not counted. Conviction can be recorded on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, if her evidence inspires confidence and there is absence of circumstances which militate against her veracity. A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Wahid Khan v. State of M.P., (2010) 2 SCC 9 , placing reliance on an earlier judgment in Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1952 SC 54 ." 9. Prosecutrix (PW-2) deposed that on 12.08.2006, at about 3.30 pm, she was alone at her house and was washing clothes. Her children were playing outside the house. At that time, the appellants knocked the door of her house. She opened the door. The appellants forcibly entered the house and asked her for sexual intercourse with her. On her refusal, the appellants forcibly caused her to fall down on the bed. Appellant Golu @ Madhu caught her hands and appellant Krishna Nepali removed her clothes and committed forcible sexual intercourse with her. Thereafter, appellant Krishna Nepali caught her hands and appellant Golu @ Madhu committed sexual intercourse with her. She further deposed that the appellants threatened her of the life and of her husband in case she would narrate the incident to anybody and they also assaulted her with a Danda. She sustained injuries on the head. 10. Thereafter, appellant Krishna Nepali caught her hands and appellant Golu @ Madhu committed sexual intercourse with her. She further deposed that the appellants threatened her of the life and of her husband in case she would narrate the incident to anybody and they also assaulted her with a Danda. She sustained injuries on the head. 10. Learned counsel for the appellants argued that had the appellants committed forcible sexual intercourse with prosecutrix (PW-2), she would have sustained some injuries on her body, but the doctor, who examined prosecutrix (PW-2), specifically deposed that no internal injury was 'present on private parts of the body of prosecutrix (PW-2). Prosecutrix (PW-2) has falsely implicated the appellants. The above argument of the learned counsel for the appellants is not acceptable. Absence of Injuries: 11. In Vijay alias Chinee (Supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus: "25. In Gurcharan Singh v. State of Haryana (1972) 2 SCC 749 this Court has held that: the absence of injury or mark of violence on the private part of the person of the prosecutrix is of no consequence when the prosecutrix is minor and the would merely suggest want of violent resistance on the part of the prosecutrix. Further absence of violence or stiff resistance in the present case may as well suggest helpless surrender to the inevitable due to sheer timidity. In any event, her consent would not take the case out of the definition of rape. 26. In Devinder Singh v. State of H.P. (2003) 11 SCC 488 , a similar issue was considered by this Court and the Court took into consideration the relevant evidence wherein rape was alleged to have been committed by five persons. No injury was found on the body of the prosecutrix. There was no matting on the pubic hair with discharge, and no injury was found on the genital areas. However, it was found that the prosecutrix was used to sexual intercourse. This Court held that the fact that no injury was found on her body only goes to show that she did not put up resistance." 12. In O.M Baby (Dead) by LRs. Vs. State of Kerala, 2012 Cri. L.J. 3794, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus: "12. Insofar as absence of injuries on the body of the victim is concerned, the evidence on record discloses that in the first medical examination itself, i.e. Ext. In O.M Baby (Dead) by LRs. Vs. State of Kerala, 2012 Cri. L.J. 3794, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus: "12. Insofar as absence of injuries on the body of the victim is concerned, the evidence on record discloses that in the first medical examination itself, i.e. Ext. P-1 it is recorded that the victim was walking in pain. The evidence of PW11, Dr. Shirley Vasu, Assistant Professor of Forensic Medicine, who had examined the victim for determination of her age, clearly shows that circum areolar bite mark contusion of both breast was noted alongwith laceration of lower lip. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that in the present case, the prosecution has not succeeded in showing that the victim had not suffered any external injuries whatsoever. In any event, absence of injuries or mark of violence on the person of the prosecutrix may not be decisive, particularly, in a situation where the victim did not offer any resistance on account of threat or fear meted out to her as in the present case. Such a view has already been expressed by this Court in Gurucharan Singh v. State of Haryana and Devinder Singh v. State of H.P.. 13. An argument has been made by the learned counsel for the appellant that in view of certain inconsistencies in the evidence of the prosecutrix her testimony should not be accepted without any corroboration. As already noted, not only corroboration in the form of external injuries is available in the present case, even otherwise i.e. in the absence of corroboration the testimony of the victim cannot be ignored, unless the inconsistencies or contradictions are sufficiently serious to warrant such a course of action. We have already observed that the inconsistencies in the statement of PW-2 are on minor aspects which do not affect the core of the case. The golden rule of appreciation of the testimony of a prosecutrix laid down in Rameswar v. State of Rajasthan and amplified in State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain has been consistently followed till date. It will, therefore, be useful to reproduce herein para 16 of the judgment of this Court in the above case of State of Maharashtra v. Chandra Prakash Kewalchand Jain (supra):. "16. A prosecutrix of a sex offence cannot be put on a par with an accomplice. She is in fact a victim of the crime. It will, therefore, be useful to reproduce herein para 16 of the judgment of this Court in the above case of State of Maharashtra v. Chandra Prakash Kewalchand Jain (supra):. "16. A prosecutrix of a sex offence cannot be put on a par with an accomplice. She is in fact a victim of the crime. The Evidence Act nowhere says that her evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars. She is undoubtedly a competent witness under Section 118 and her evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured in cases of physical violence. The same degree of care and caution must attach in the evaluation of her evidence as in the case of an injured complainant or witness and no more. What is necessary is that the court must be alive to and conscious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a person who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her. If the court keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that it can action the evidence of the prosecutrix, there is no rule of law or practice incorporated in the Evidence Act similar to Illustration (b) to Section 114 which requires it to look for corroboration. If for some reason the court is hesitant to place implicit reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The nature of evidence required to lend assurance to the testimony of the prosecutrix must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. But if a prosecutrix is an adult and to full understanding the court is entitled to base a conviction on her evidence unless the same is shown to be infirm and not trustworthy. If the totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case disclose that the prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged the court should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her evidence. 14. If the totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case disclose that the prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged the court should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her evidence. 14. We would further like to observe that while appreciating the evidence of the prosecutrix, the court must keep in mind that in the context of the values prevailing in the country, particularly in rural India, it would be unusual for a woman to come up with a false story of being a victim of sexual assault so as to implicate an innocent person. Such a view has been expressed by the judgment of this Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh and has found reiteration in a recent judgment in Rajinder alias Raju v. State of H.P. Para 19 whereof may be usefully extracted. "19. In the context of Indian culture, a woman-victim of sexual aggression - would rather suffer silently than to falsely implicate somebody. Any statement of rape is an extremely humiliating experience for a woman and until she is a victim of sex crime, she would not blame anyone but the real culprit. While appreciating the evidence of the prosecutrix, the courts must always keep in mind that no self-respecting woman would put her honour at stake by falsely alleging commission of rape on her and therefore, ordinarily a look for corroboration of her testimony is unnecessary and uncalled for. But for high improbability in the prosecution case, the conviction in the case of sex crime my be based on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix. It has been rightly said that corroborative evidence is not an imperative component of judicial credence in every case of rape nor the absence of injuries on the private parts of the victim can be construed as evidence of consent." 13. So far as injuries are concerned, prosecutrix (PW-2) specifically deposed that the appellants caught her hands, caused her to fall down on the bed, appellant Golu @ Madhu caught her hands and appellant Krishna Nepali committed forcible sexual intercourse with her and thereafter appellant Krishna Nepali caught her hands and appellant Golu @ Madhu committed forcible sexual intercourse with her. The appellants threatened her for life, therefore, she could not resist out of fear. The appellants threatened her for life, therefore, she could not resist out of fear. This appears to be a case of non-resistance on the part of prosecutrix (PW-2) because of fear. The appellants caught her hands and she was not free to resist. Therefore, her conduct was not unnatural. Merely prosecutrix (PW-2) did not disclose the incident to the neighbours or did not raise any alarm when she was being subjected to rape, it cannot be a ground to hold her conduct as unnatural and discard her testimony. 14. Dr. Manjusha Amaredkar (PW-5) deposed that she examined prosecutrix (PW-2) and gave the report (Ex-P/4A) in which she found a contusion on the frontal scalp of prosecutrix (PW-2). It appears that the appellants assaulted prosecutrix (PW-2) and prosecutrix (PW-2) sustained injury on her head. Prosecutrix (PW-2) is a married lady. The appellants caught her hands and then committed sexual intercourse with her. Therefore, merely on the basis of absence of injury on her private parts, her evidence cannot be discarded. Her evidence is reliable, cogent and clinching and can form basis for conviction. Non-Disclosure of the Incident: 15. Prosecutrix (PW-2) deposed that she went to STD-PCO, informed the police, the police came to the STD-PCO, took her to Police Station, Chhawni and there she lodged First Information Report (Ex-P/1). She was sent to District Hospital, Durg for medical examination. Madanlal Nirmalkar (PW-3), husband of prosecutrix (PW-2) deposed that on 12.8.2006, he had gone to Village Kapsi for medicines. When he returned home, prosecutrix (PW-2) narrated him the incident. 16. In State of Punjab Vs. Gurmit Singh and others (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that a girl, in a tradition-bound non-permissive society in India, would be extremely reluctant even to admit that any incident which is likely to reflect upon her chastity had occurred, being conscious of the danger of being ostracized by the society or being looked down upon by the society. Her not informing the teachers or her friends at the examination centre under the circumstances cannot detract from her reliability. Her not informing the teachers or her friends at the examination centre under the circumstances cannot detract from her reliability. In the normal course of human conduct, this unmarried minor girl, would not like to give publicity to the traumatic experience she had undergone and would feel terribly embarrassed in relation to the incident to narrate it to her teachers and others overpowered by a feeling of shame and her natural inclination would be to avoid talking about it to anyone, lest the family name and honour is brought into controversy. Therefore, her informing her mother only on return to the parental house and no one else at the examination centre prior thereto is in accordance with the natural human conduct of a female. 17. In the instant case, prosecutrix (PW-2) went to the STD-PCO immediately, informed the police and lodged First Information Report (Ex-P/1). Merely prosecutrix (PW-2) did not disclose the incident to the neighbours or did not raise any alarm when she was being subjected to rape, it cannot be a ground to hold her conduct as unnatural and discard her testimony. Chastity of the Prosecutrix: 18. So far as easy virtue of the prosecutrix is concerned, in State of U.P. Vs. Pappu (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that even in a case where it is shown that the girl is of easy virtue or habituated to sexual intercourse, it may not be a ground to absolve the accused from the charge of rape. It has to be established that there was consent by her for that particular occasion. Absence of injury on the prosecutrix may not be a factor that leads the Court to absolve the accused. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further held that there can be conviction on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix and in case, the court is not satisfied with the version of the prosecutrix, it can seek other evidence, direct or circumstantial, by which it may get assurance of her testimony. 19. In a rape case, unless character of the prosecutrix is still a issue, her character is not relevant factor to be taken into consideration at all. 20. In the instant case, the date and time of the incident was 12.8.2006 at about 16.00 hours and FIR (Ex-P/1) was lodged on the same day at 17.00 hours. 19. In a rape case, unless character of the prosecutrix is still a issue, her character is not relevant factor to be taken into consideration at all. 20. In the instant case, the date and time of the incident was 12.8.2006 at about 16.00 hours and FIR (Ex-P/1) was lodged on the same day at 17.00 hours. It appears that the FIR (Ex-P/l) was lodged within an hour of the incident. It appears that prosecutrix (PW-2) lodged First Information Report without any delay. After the incident, prosecutrix (PW-2) went to the STD-PCO immediately, informed the police and lodged the FIR. It also shows that the evidence of prosecutrix (PW-2) is reliable and trustworthy. 21. On examining the instant case in its entirety, we find that the evidence of prosecutrix (PW-2) is cogent, convincing, reliable and trustworthy. The trial Court has rightly accepted the testimony of prosecutrix (PW-2). The judgment of conviction and sentence against the appellants under Sections 450, 376 (2)(g) and 506 Part II IPC do not call for any interference by this Court. 22. Learned counsel for the appellants submit that the, learned Additional Sessions Judge awarded maximum sentence to the appellants for the offence under Section 376 (2)(g) IPC. For offence, under Section 376 (2) (g) IPC, the minimum jail sentence prescribed is ten years. The appellants are in jail since 13.8.2006. The appellants have already served the jail sentence for about seven years. Learned counsel appearing for appellant Golu @ Madhu, however, submits that the prosecutrix has filed a compromise petition. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, ends of justice would be met if the jail sentence awarded to the appellants are reduced to the period already undergone by them. 23. Learned counsel appearing, for the State/respondent/opposed the above arguments. 24. So far as sentence part is concerned; it is a case of gang-rape. While awarding imprisonment for life, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, specifically mentioned in para 17 of the impugned judgment that appellant-Krishna Nepali was a habitual offender. 25. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the considered view that the sentences awarded to the appellants are not exceptionable. 26. In the result, the appeal, being devoid of any merit, is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. Appeal Dismissed.