Judgment :- 1. The complaint in this contempt petition is about willful disobedience/breach of the orders dated 28-5-2012 and 4-6-2012 passed by the learned Joint Charity Commissioner, Nagpur, below Exhibits 20 and 31 respectively in exercise of his jurisdiction under Section 41A of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 in the proceedings, i.e. Application No.3 of 2010. 2. Assuming that there is non-compliance or disobedience of such order, the question is whether the provision of Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is attracted or not. The reliance is placed by Shri Chandurkar, the learned counsel for the petitioners, upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of K. Shamrao and others v. Assistant Charity Commissioner, reported in (2003) 3 SCC 563 . He has urged that the Apex Court has held that the Assistant Charity Commissioner appointed under Section 5 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 is a ‘Court’ for the purposes of the Contempt of Courts Act. He further submits that Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act does not make any distinction between the orders passed in exercise of administrative power and judicial or quasi judicial power. Hence, the provision of Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act is attracted. 3. The provision of Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act being relevant, is reproduced below: “2(b). “civil contempt” means wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a Court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a Court.” It is obvious from the aforesaid provision that it is only the judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of the Court or willful breach of the undertaking given to the Court, which attracts civil contempt. Necessarily, therefore, it is the direction or the order passed in quasi judicial or judicial proceedings by a ‘Court’, which would attract the definition of ‘civil contempt’ under the Contempt of Courts Act. It is not the direction or order passed in exercise of administrative power, which is contemplated by Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act. 4. It cannot be disputed that the Apex Court has held that the Assistant Charity Commissioner appointed under Section 5 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act is a ‘Court’ for the purposes of the Contempt of Courts Act. 4. It cannot be disputed that the Apex Court has held that the Assistant Charity Commissioner appointed under Section 5 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act is a ‘Court’ for the purposes of the Contempt of Courts Act. The question is while exercising jurisdiction under Section 41A of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, whether the Charity Commissioner acts as a ‘Court’ and exercises judicial or quasi judicial power. This Court has already taken a view in the case of Damodarv. Dy. Charity Commissioner, reported in 2011(6) Mh.L.J. 431 , and Vanmalav. Dy. Charity Commissioner, reported in 2012(3) Mh.L.J. 594 , that the power conferred by Section 41A of the Bombay Public Trusts Act is purely an administrative power and it is neither a judicial or quasi judicial power. Hence, in such proceedings, the Charity Commissioner does not act as a ‘Court’ within the meaning of the Contempt of Courts Act. The provision of Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act is not attracted. 5. In view of above, the contempt petition is dismissed.