JUDGMENT : R. Sudhakar, J. 1. The application A.No.94 of 2013 is filed under Order II Rule 1 of Insolvency Rules read with Section 21 of Presidency Towns Insolvency Act 1909 praying to annul the order of adjudication dated 9.7.2009 made against the applicant. 2. The brief facts of the case for disposal of the application are as follows:- The first respondent, petitioning-creditor based on an order dated 24.7.2002 in C.P.No.332 of 2000 passed by the First Additional Labour Court, Chennai after issuing Insolvency Notice, filed Insolvency Petition No.80 of 2007 under Sections 9(2) and 10 to 13 of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909. This Court ordered notice to the debtor, the applicant herein which was not served and the notice was returned unserved with endorsement "left". Thereafter paper publication was effected and this court by order dated 9.7.2009 passed ex parte order of adjudication against the debtor, the applicant herein declaring him as insolvent. 3. The applicant has stated that he ought not to have been adjudicated as an insolvent, as the order, which is the basis for the Insolvency Notice as well as the Insolvency Petition, is not an order or decree within the meaning of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act. The essential conditions of a decree or order contemplated under the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act is that the adjudication must be in a suit and not otherwise. The certificate issued by the Government states that the amounts have to be recovered under the provisions of the Revenue Recovery Act. W hen the order is incapable of execution by a civil Court, the insolvency proceedings under Section 9(2) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act as if the certificate is a decree is wholly unsustainable and untenable in law. The applicant/debtor, therefore, prays to annul the order of adjudication made against the applicant on 9.7.2009. 4. The Insolvency Petition was filed alleging that the debtor did not respond to the Insolvency Notice within the stipulated time or the paper publication. When the Insolvency Petition was taken up for enquiry, the debtor was absent and therefore, he was set ex parte. Thereafter, it was posted before the Master for recording evidence. The creditor, the first respondent herein filed proof affidavit, marked relevant documents and was placed before this Court. 5. When the Insolvency Petition was taken up for enquiry, the debtor was absent and therefore, he was set ex parte. Thereafter, it was posted before the Master for recording evidence. The creditor, the first respondent herein filed proof affidavit, marked relevant documents and was placed before this Court. 5. This Court considering the evidence recorded before the Master, more particularly, the order passed by the First Additional Labour Court, Chennai, came to the conclusion that the debtor, the applicant herein had committed act of insolvency rendering him liable to be adjudicated as insolvent in terms of Sections 9 to 13 of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 and the following order was passed on 9.7.2009:- (i) the respondent is hereby adjudicated as insolvent and all the assets and other effects of the said insolvent wherever situate do vest in the Official Assignee of this Court for administration; (ii) that the said insolvent do appear before the Official Assignee of this Court within one week from the date of service of this order; (iii) that the said insolvent do file in court his schedule of affairs together with a copy thereof within thirty days from the service of this order; (iv) that the said insolvent shall apply for his discharge within a period of 18 months from this date; and (v) that the Official Assignee do from and out of the estate of the insolvent herein pay to the said petitioning creditor his cost of this petition when taxed by the Taxing Officer of this court and noted in the margin thereof, with interest thereon at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of taxation to the date of realisation." 6. Consequent to the above order, a notice was issued by the Official Assignee to the present applicant and on such notice, the present application has been filed to annul the order of adjudication made against the applicant on 9.7.2009. 7. Respondents have been served. W hen the matter was listed respondents counsel took time for filing counter. However, no counter was filed so far. 8. In any event, considering the primary legal issue which has been raised by the present applicant, there appears to be no good reason as to why the matter should not be decided on law on admitted facts and the relevant documents are already in file. 9. However, no counter was filed so far. 8. In any event, considering the primary legal issue which has been raised by the present applicant, there appears to be no good reason as to why the matter should not be decided on law on admitted facts and the relevant documents are already in file. 9. Heard Mr.C.Ramesh, learned counsel appearing for the applicant/Insolvent; Mr.J.Balagopal, learned counsel appearing for the first respondent/petitioning-creditor and Mr.Krishnasamy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Official Assignee to assist the Court on the legal issue that arises in the application. 10. Mr.C.Ramesh, learned counsel appearing for the applicant/insolvent pointed out that the order passed by the First Additional Labour Court, Chennai in C.P.No.332 of 2000 is not a decree or order of Civil Court. Therefore, the Insolvency Petition filed under Sections 9(2), 10 to 13 of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 is not maintainable as it does not fall within the definition of “decree” or “order” for payment of money as per the provisions of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909. He contended that the term “decree” and “order” should be an order passed by a Competent Civil Court in adjudication of a lis. He referred to Section 2(2) and 2(14) of the Code of Civil Procedure which is relevant to the present issue and it reads as follows: "Section (2) "decree" means the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. It shall be deemed to include the rejection of a plaint and the determination of any question within section 144, but shall not include- (a) any adjudication from which an appeal lies as an appeal from an order, or (b) any order of dismissal for default. Explanation: A decree is preliminary when further proceedings have to be taken before the suit can be completely disposed of. It is final when such adjudication completely disposes of the suit. It may be partly preliminary and partly final;” “Section (14) "order" means the formal expression of any decision of a Civil Court which is not a decree;" 11. Explanation: A decree is preliminary when further proceedings have to be taken before the suit can be completely disposed of. It is final when such adjudication completely disposes of the suit. It may be partly preliminary and partly final;” “Section (14) "order" means the formal expression of any decision of a Civil Court which is not a decree;" 11. It is also the further case of the applicant that the order, based on which the insolvency petition has been filed, is passed by a Tribunal and it does not fall within the definition of Civil Court. Such an order cannot be the cause of action for filing the present Insolvency Petition. In support of this plea, he relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Paramjeet Singh Patheja – vs. - ICDS Ltd., reported in 2006(5) CTC 357, more particularly para 47 and it reads as follows:-"47.For the foregoing discussions we hold: (i) that no insolvency notice can be issued under Section 9(2) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 on the basis of an Arbitration Award; (ii) that execution proceedings in respect of the award cannot be proceeded with in view of the statutory stay under Section 22 of the SICA Act. As such, no insolvency notice is liable to be issued against the appellant. (iii)Insolvency notice cannot be issued on Arbitration Award. (iv) An arbitration award is neither a decree nor an Order for payment within the meaning of Section 9(2). The expression "decree" in the Court Fees Act, 1870 is liable to be construed with reference to its definition in the C.P.C. and held that there are essential conditions for a "decree": (a) that the adjudication must be given in a Suit. (b) that the suit must start with a plaint and culminate in a decree, and (c) that the adjudication must be formal and final and must be given by a Civil or Revenue Court. An award does not satisfy any of the requirements of a decree. It is not rendered in a suit nor is an arbitral proceedings commenced by the institution of a plaint. (v) A legal fiction ought not to be extended beyond its legitimate field. As such, an award rendered under the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1996 cannot be construed to be a "decree" for the purpose of Section 9(2) of the Insolvency Act. (v) A legal fiction ought not to be extended beyond its legitimate field. As such, an award rendered under the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1996 cannot be construed to be a "decree" for the purpose of Section 9(2) of the Insolvency Act. (vi) An insolvency notice should be in strict compliance with the requirements in Section 9(3) and the Rules made thereunder. (vii) It is a well established rule that a provision must be construed in a manner which would give effect to its purpose and to cure the mischief in the light of which it was enacted. The object of Section 22, in protecting guarantors from legal proceedings pending a reference to BIFR of the principal debtor, is to ensure that a scheme for rehabilitation would not be defeated by isolated proceedings adopted against the guarantors of a sick company. To achieve that purpose, it is imperative that the expression "suit" in Section 22 be given its plain meaning, namely any proceedings adopted for realization of a right vested in a party by law. This would clearly include arbitration proceedings. (viii) In any event, award which is incapable of execution and cannot form the basis of an insolvency notice." He therefore, justified the present application filed in terms of Section 21 of the Presidency Town Insolvency Act 1909 to annul the adjudication. 12. Shri J.Balagopal, learned counsel appearing for the first respondent creditor who has an order in his favour adjudicating the present applicant as insolvent pointed out that the order of the Labour Court based on which the Insolvency Petition has been filed will fall within the definition an “order” for payment of money and therefore, he justified the Insolvency Petition in terms of Sections 9(2) and 10 to 13 of the Presidency Towns insolvency Act, 1909. He also contended that the decision of the Supreme Court reported in 2006(5) CTC 357 referred to above will have no relevance to the facts of the present case and that case arose out of an arbitration award. 13. The further objection of Sri Balagopal, learned counsel for the first respondent creditor is that the present application filed under Section 21 of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 cannot be filed by the debtor. Therefore, the application is to be rejected or dismissed. 14. 13. The further objection of Sri Balagopal, learned counsel for the first respondent creditor is that the present application filed under Section 21 of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 cannot be filed by the debtor. Therefore, the application is to be rejected or dismissed. 14. Having considered the rival submission, this court is inclined to accept the argument made by the learned counsel for the applicant/debtor and sustain his objection that the Insolvency Petition is not in order for the reason that section 21 of Presidency Towns insolvency Act, 1909 provides as to when the court can annul adjudication and it can be done on the following contingencies:- “321.When adjudication may be annulled:-This Section gives power to the Court to annul an adjudication:- (1) where, in the opinion of the Court, a debtor ought not to have been adjudged insolvent; (2) where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that the debts of the insolvent are paid in full; (3) where an order of adjudication has been made on a debtor's petition presented without leave of the Court where such leave was necessary.” 15. Present application falls under the first provision, namely, that the debtor ought not to have been adjudged insolvent for the reasons that the order based on which the Insolvency Petition was filed is passed by a Tribunal constituted under the Industrial Dispute Act and that claim was made for payment of salary and other benefits under a special enactment. what is provided under Section 9(2) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 is that if a debtor commits an act of insolvency consequent to a decree or order passed against the debtor for payment of money, he can be proceeded against. The term “Decree” or “Order” as defined under Section 9(2) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 has been clearly interpreted by the Supreme Court in para 47 of the decision reported in 2006(5) CTC 357 referred to above that adjudication must be given in a suit and it start with a plaint and culminate in a decree. The term “Decree” or “Order” as defined under Section 9(2) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 has been clearly interpreted by the Supreme Court in para 47 of the decision reported in 2006(5) CTC 357 referred to above that adjudication must be given in a suit and it start with a plaint and culminate in a decree. In that case, the Supreme Court considered a plea of insolvency on the ground that the debtor had suffered an award under the arbitral proceedings and the Supreme Court was categorical in stating that an award does not satisfy the requirements of a decree as it is not rendered in a suit and that an arbitral proceedings is not commenced by way of a plaint. 16. The Supreme Court makes it clear that it is only a decree or an order of a Civil Court that will have a bearing in an application under Section 9(2) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909. In this case also, the entire insolvency proceedings is based an award of Industrial Tribunal and that order of the Tribunal is not a decree or order of a civil court. The first respondent, petitioning-creditor is not able to establish it is so. Therefore, the application made by the applicant/debtor is sustained and the Insolvency proceedings, therefore, has to be annulled as invalid in law. 17. One other objection raised by Shri Balagopal, learned counsel appearing for the first respondent, petitioning creditor is that the application under Section 21 of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 by the debtor is not maintainable, as the provision under Section 21 provides for annulment only on account of petition filed by the debtor for adjudicating himself as insolvent. Whereas in the present case, the petition is filed by the creditor. 18. The above objection is also considered and rejected as Section 21 Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 clearly provides a power to the court to annul adjudication in certain cases and there are two contingencies provided thereunder. The first contingency is that if in the opinion of the court, a debtor ought not to have been adjudged as insolvent, the court can on an application of any person interested allow the application for annulment of adjudication. Section 21(1) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 provides for several contingencies to approach the court for annulment of adjudication. The first contingency is that if in the opinion of the court, a debtor ought not to have been adjudged as insolvent, the court can on an application of any person interested allow the application for annulment of adjudication. Section 21(1) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 provides for several contingencies to approach the court for annulment of adjudication. Making it clear that the present application falls under the first contingency of invalidity in law. This court is not concerned with the other contingencies set out in Section 21(1) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act 1909 as it operates in separate facets and it cannot be clubbed together. 19. Mulla on the Law of Insolvency in India (Tagore Law Lectures 1929) has to say thus in para 320 thus: .“320. Who may apply to annulment:- An application to annul an adjudication under the first part of this section may be made by the debtor, or any creditor, or any other person interested in annulling it, e.g., a mortgagee of the debtor's property. The substratum of an insolvency petition is the act of insolvency. If what was visibly an act of insolvency on the date of the petition cannot be attributed that character when the petition comes on for orders, because of subsequent events; it is legitimate and proper that the Court should take stock of the actual situation as on the date of the disposal, instead of relying upon the past state of affairs which has ceased to exist.” 20. The view taken by this court is fortified by the observation made by the author as above. 21. In any event as has been pointed out by Sri Krishnasamy, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the Official Assignee, the power of the court under Section 7 of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 is wide enough to consider the plea of this nature. Section 7 reads as follows:-“7. 21. In any event as has been pointed out by Sri Krishnasamy, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the Official Assignee, the power of the court under Section 7 of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 is wide enough to consider the plea of this nature. Section 7 reads as follows:-“7. Power of Court to decide all questions arising in insolvency:-Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Court shall have full power to decide all questions of priorities, and all other questions whatsoever, whether of law or fact, which may arise in any case of insolvency coming within the congizance of the Court, or which the Court may deem it expedient or necessary to decide for the purpose of doing complete justice or making a complete distribution of property in any such case: Provided that, unless all the parties otherwise agree, the power hereby given shall, for the purpose of deciding any matter arising under Section 36, be exercised only in the manner and to the extent provided in that section.” 22. For all the above said reasons, the application is maintainable in law and on facts. The applicant has made out a case for annulment of the adjudication as it is invalid by law. Accordingly, the Application is allowed. The order of adjudication dated 9.7.2009 passed in I.P.No.80 of 2007 is annulled.