1. These two Cr. revision petitions had been clubbed together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. These petitions have been filed by the complainant against two ditto orders of even date, 19.5.2012, whereby Id. 1st Additional Munsiff, (Judicial Magistrate), Srinagar has dismissed the two complaints, each titled, "Anwar Ahmad Pandith v Abdul Rashid Pandith" under sec. 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act (for short the Act) instituted by the complainant/petitioner against the respondent. 3. Heard and perused the record. 4. Brief facts, which are necessary for disposal of these revision petitions, are that on 29-12-2011 petitioner through his Attorney Holder, Zeeshan Pandith, filed two separate complaints before the Id. 1st Additional Munsiff (judicial Magistrate), Srinagar under sec.138 of the Act against the respondent alleging inter alia that the two cheques, No. 03606078 dated 10.11.2011 and No. 03606079 dated 17.11.2011 issued by the respondent were dishonored. Ld. trial Court after recording initial statements of the complainant and the witness in each complaint and finding prima facie case under sec.138 of the Act against the accused, issued process against him. 5. Respondent caused his appearance before the Court in both the cases on 10.04.2012 through his counsel, who on the same day moved application in each case for dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the power-of-attorney on whose basis complaint has been filed does not authorize the attorney holder, Zeeshan Pandith, to file the said complaints. The attorney holder has been authorized to do or execute all or any one of the acts mentioned in the power-of-attorney in connection with the court cases pending before the Court of law. The power of attorney does not authorize him to institute any complaint(s) under sec. 138 of the Act. 6. The Id. trial Court after obtaining objections of the complainant and hearing both the sides passed the impugned orders dismissing the complaints. The Id. Court took the view that under sec. 142 of the Act, a complaint can be made only by the payee of the cheque or as the case may be by the holder in due course of the cheque. The Id. The Id. Court took the view that under sec. 142 of the Act, a complaint can be made only by the payee of the cheque or as the case may be by the holder in due course of the cheque. The Id. Court was also of the view that the complaint can also be made by the attorney holder of the Payee, who has been specifically empowered in this behalf because in the latter case the attorney holder acts as an agent of the payee and not in his personal capacity. Ld. Court, however, also took the view that to initiate such action the attorney holder must be given the specific power by the payee. Having viewed thus, the Id. Court found that in these cases, specific powers were lacking because all that the complainant has asked the attorney holder to do is to represent him in civil and criminal cases "which were already pending in the courts when the power-of-attorney was executed and registered". 7. It may be restated precisely that the view taken by the Id. trial Judge is that in terms of sec. 142 of the Act a complaint for offence under sec. 138 of the Act can be made by the power-attorney-holder of the Payee. However, the Id, Judge dismissed the complaints taking the view that the law requires that to lodge such a complaint the attorney holder must have been given specific power by the payee but in this case specific power to institute fresh cases including complaints was lacking "because all that the complainant has asked the attorney holder to do is to represent the complainant in civil or criminal cases which were already pending in the courts when the Power of Attorney was executed and registered". The Id. trial Judge has, thus, concluded in both the cases that the "complaint has been filed by a person which had no authority to file the complaint" and dismissed the complaints. 8. It is also in the context to emphasize here that in the objections to the applications of the respondent/accused it was contended on behalf of the petitioner/complainant that the applications had been filed with out any authority as there is no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short the Code) allowing the accused to move such application and the objection in this regard should have been taken during the trial. It was also contended that the complainant is an old person and the power of attorney given by him was 'general' in nature and authorizes the attorney holder to file the complaints as well. The power-of -attorney gave the attorney holder all the powers to do all lawful acts necessary on behalf of the principal. It was also contended that the power of attorney should be read as a whole. 9. The present revisions by and large are based on the same grounds, which had been taken on behalf of the complainant before the Id. trial Court. 10. The question, thus, raised is whether under the power-of-attorney dt. 28.11.2011 and registered on 29.11.2011 executed by the complainant, the attorney holder, Zeeshan Pandith, was authorized to file the complaint(s) in question against the petitioner-accused? 11. Before taking on board the above question it, however, would be useful and pertinent to move a step back and see whether a complaint for an offence under sec. 138 of the Act can be lodged through a power-of-attorney Holder? 12. Sec. 138 of the Act defines the offence relating to dishonor of cheque punishable under that section. Sec. 142 of the Act provides for a special provision for taking cognizance of offence under sec. 138. Clause (a) of sec. 142 of the Act is relevant and the same reads; "142. Cognizance of offences:- Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)-, (a) No court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under section 138 except upon a complaint, in writing, made by the payee or, as the case may be, the holder in due course of the cheque." 13. A plain look at sec.142 clause (a) of the Act would show that cognizance of an offence under sec. 138 of the Act can be taken only in the manner prescribed under clause (a) and in that general law provided under sec. 190 of the Code shall not apply. Sec. 142(a) has overriding effect on sec. 190 of the Code. Clause(a) of sec. 142 in its clear terms mandates that cognizance of offence under sec. 138 of the Act can be taken only upon a complaint, in writing, made by the payee of the cheque or, the holder in due course of the cheque i.e. where the payee has endorsed the cheque to some one else. 190 of the Code. Clause(a) of sec. 142 in its clear terms mandates that cognizance of offence under sec. 138 of the Act can be taken only upon a complaint, in writing, made by the payee of the cheque or, the holder in due course of the cheque i.e. where the payee has endorsed the cheque to some one else. No cognizance can be taken by the Court in any other manner even if provided under sec. 190 of the Code. 14. Answer to the proposition, that is, whether a complaint can be lodged through an attorney holder, however, is available in the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shankar Finance & Investments v. State of A.P (2008) 8 SCC 536 where the Hon'ble Court has interpreted sec.142 of the Act and held that a complaint under sec.138 of the Act, can be filed by the payee through his Power-of-Attorney holder. In that case the Payee of the cheque was M/S Shanker Finance and Investments and the complaint for offence punishable under sec. 138 of the Act was filed by "M/S Shanker Finance and Investments, a proprietary concern of Atamakuri Shankara Rao, represented by its power-of-attorney holder Sri Thamada Satyanarayana. 15. The matter landed up before the Hon'ble Supreme Court because the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in a petition under sec. 482 of the Code (Central) filed by one of the accused had held that "the complaint was not signed by the payee, that is, the sole proprietor of the payee concern, but was signed by power-of-attorney holder and that was not maintainable". 16. The Hon'ble Supreme Court while interpreting sec. 142 (a) of the Act observed in paragraph-9 of the judgment: "9. Section 142(a) of the Act requires that no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under Section 138 except upon a complaint made in writing by the payee. Thus the two requirements are that (a) the complaint should be made in writing (in contradistinction from an oral complaint); and (b) the complainant should be the payee (or the holder in due course, where the payee has endorsed the cheque in favour of someone else). The payee, as noticed above, is M/s Shankar Finance and Investments. Once the complaint is in the name of the "payee" and is in writing, the requirements of Section 142 are fulfilled. The payee, as noticed above, is M/s Shankar Finance and Investments. Once the complaint is in the name of the "payee" and is in writing, the requirements of Section 142 are fulfilled. Who should represent the payee where the payee is a company, or how the payee should be represented where payee is a sole proprietary concern, is not a matter that is governed by Section 142, but by the general law". 17. The next question taken up by the Hon'ble Supreme Court was whether the attorney holder can lodge the complaint, where proprietary concern carries on business through an Attorney holder. Hon'ble Court observed in paragraph-11: "The next question is where a proprietary concern carries on business through an attorney holder, whether the attorney holder can lodge the complaint? The attorney holder is the agent of the grantor. When the grantor authorizes the attorney holder to initiate legal proceedings and the attorney holder accordingly initiates legal proceedings, he does so as the agent of the grantor and the initiation is by the grantor represented by his attorney holder, and not by the attorney holder in his personal capacity. Therefore, where the payee is a proprietary concern, the complaint can be filed: (i) by the proprietor of the proprietary concern, describing himself as the sole proprietor of the "payee"; (ii) the proprietary concern, describing itself as a sole proprietary concern, represented by its sole proprietor; and (iii) the proprietor or the proprietary concern represented by the attorney holder under a power of attorney executed by the sole proprietor." 18. The question once again came to be raised before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Parveen v. Mohd. Tajjuddin (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 699 after the High Court quashed the prosecution of respondent of that case under sec. 138 of the Act only on the ground that the complaint was filed by the power-of-attorney holder of the payee. Hon'ble Supreme Court referring to Shankar Finance & Investments' case (supra) observed: "1. The question that whether the signing of the complaint by the payee him self is a sine quo non for taking cognizance of offence under section 138 of the Act holder is no more res Integra. Hon'ble Supreme Court referring to Shankar Finance & Investments' case (supra) observed: "1. The question that whether the signing of the complaint by the payee him self is a sine quo non for taking cognizance of offence under section 138 of the Act holder is no more res Integra. In Shankar Finance & Investments v State of AP this Court interpreted Section 142 Of the Act and held that complaint under Section 138 can be filed by the payee through his power-of-attorney holder." 19. It therefore, is to be taken as a settled position that a complaint for offence under sec. 138 of the Act, besides the payee of the cheque or its holder in due course as provided under sec. 142 (a) of the Act, can be lodged by the payee through his power-of-attorney holder. To say precisely, payee of a cheque can lodge the complaint through his Attorney Holder. The complaint, however, should be in writing and will have to be lodged in the name of the payee. 20. In the present cases, the payee of the two cheques is Anwar Ahmed Pandith and both the complaints have been lodged in his name through his attorney holder, Zeeshan Ahmed Pandith. Requirement of sec. 142(a) therefore has been fulfilled. 21. The question raised, however, as said above, is whether the power-of-attorney executed by the payee on 28.11.2011 and registered on 29-11-2011 authorizes the attorney holder to lodge the complaints in question on behalf of the Payee. 22. Ld. counsel for petitioner, Mr. Qadiri, would say in this regard that the power-of-attorney dated 28.11.2011 executed by the complainant when read in its entirety would show that the complainant had intended to appoint Mr. Zeeshan Pandith as his general power-of-attorney holder in respect of all the cases pending and arising in the courts and authorize him to file fresh case(s) like the complaints under consideration. This he has done because he was an old person unable to pursue the pending cases and file and defend the fresh cases. The intent and purport of power of attorney was made clear by incorporating a general clause in the concluding part of the deed of power-of-attorney where the complainant has agreed that; "all the acts and things lawfully done by my attorney shall be deemed to have been done by me and shall be binding on us". Mr. The intent and purport of power of attorney was made clear by incorporating a general clause in the concluding part of the deed of power-of-attorney where the complainant has agreed that; "all the acts and things lawfully done by my attorney shall be deemed to have been done by me and shall be binding on us". Mr. Qadiri submitted further that the Id. trial Judge has fallen into error by not reading the power-of-attorney in its entirety, ignoring the general clause and assuming that the attorney holder was authorized only to represent him in civil and criminal cases which were already pending in the courts.The Id. Judge should have interpreted the power-of-attorney in its entirety and given due weightage to the general clause. In support of his arguments, Id. counsel relied upon decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Atul Mathur v. Atul Kalra and another, (1989) 4 SCC 514 . 23. Per contra, Mr. Dar, Id. counsel for respondent would say and sought to project that the power-of-attorney in its specific terms authorizes the attorney holder to do or execute specified act in respect of pending cases only and its scope could not have been and cannot be extended to the filing of fresh cases like the complaints under consideration. 24. Relevant portion of the instrument of Power of Attorney in question reads; "to do or execute all or any one of the following act in connection with Court cases pending before the Hon'ble Court of law in which I am the party." 25. The meaning of term 'cases pending' used in the instrument cannot prima facie be restricted to those cases which were pending in the courts as at the time of the execution of the instrument. This could have been so had the word 'pending' been prefixed by the word 'already'. That is what the Id. trial Judge seems to have fictitiously done while interpreting the instrument of the power-of-attorney in the impugned order. While observing that the complainant has asked the attorney holder to represent him in civil and criminal cases which were 'already pending' in the courts when the power-of-attorney was executed, Id. trial Judge has erred in assuming the word 'already' prefixing the word 'pending' also the term "which were already pending in the Courts when the power-of-attorney was executed and registered" in the instrument. Word 'already' does not figure in the instrument. trial Judge has erred in assuming the word 'already' prefixing the word 'pending' also the term "which were already pending in the Courts when the power-of-attorney was executed and registered" in the instrument. Word 'already' does not figure in the instrument. Both the complaints open with the assertion that the attorney holder has been authorized to present and prosecute the complaints. This assertion read with the powers specified and the general' clause incorporated in the instrument of the power-of-attorney are sufficient to show prima facie that the attorney holder had the authorization to lodge the complaints in question. 26. In Atul Mathur's (supra) attorney holder Mr. Atul Mathur, Divisional Manager, Bombay of Messrs Jenson and Nicholson (India Pvt. Ltd) was conferred powers to act on behalf of the Company only in civil suits, sales tax proceedings and excise matters. However, on the strength of said power of attorney, he filed a complaint on behalf of the Company under sec. 630 of the Companies Act against respondent, Atul Kalara. The High Court had held that "even if Mr. Atul Mathur did not have the requisite competence to file the complaint, the irregularity was curable one under Sec. 465 of the Code of Criminal Procedure." The contention came to be raised before Hon'ble Supreme Court too and the Hon'ble Court in paragraphs 20 and 21 observed: "20. The power of attorney, read as a whole, is seen to confer general powers on Mr. Atul Mathur and not merely special powers. It has been engrossed on stamp papers of the value of Rs. 50 and it is indicative of the nature of the deed. Though specific reference is made in the power of attorney only to the filing of suits and to matters relating to sales tax and central excise, there is a general clause which reads as follows: "AND THE COMPANY HEREBY agrees that all acts, deeds and things lawfully done by the attorney shall be construed as acts, deeds and things done by it and the company undertakes to ratify and confirm all and whatsoever that its said Attorney shall do or cause to be done by virtue of powers hereby given." 21. The power of attorney, has been executed just before the complaint was filed and it is stated in the complaint that Mr. The power of attorney, has been executed just before the complaint was filed and it is stated in the complaint that Mr. Atul Mathuer was filing the complaint on behalf of the company and he was duly authorized to do so. The High Court was therefore, not right in construing the power of attorney as conferring only special powers and not general powers on Mr. Atul Mathur. Be that as it may, the High Court has held, and very rightly, that as Mr. Atul Mathur was the Divisional Sales Manager of the company at Bombay, he was certainly competent to file the complaint on behalf of the company as per instructions given to him from the Head Office of the company. We do not therefore find any substance in the contention of respondent 1 that the complaint suffered from a material irregularity not curable under Section 465 CrPC. Incidentally, we may observe that in spite of contending that the complaint suffered from an irregularity, respondent 1 has neither pleaded nor proved that a failure of justice has been occasioned on account of the alleged irregularity. 27. Facts and ratio of Atul Mathur's case have sufficient application to the case in hand and it can be safely concluded that prima facie under the power-of-attorney executed by the complainant, the attorney holder had the authorization to file the complaints in question on behalf of the complainant. 28. The actual purport and scope of Power of Attorney however could be taken up during trial and decided on the basis of the evidence led by both the sides. 29. The Id. trial Court in this case on the basis of Attorney Holder's statement read with statement of witness produced by him was satisfied about the prima facie strength of complainant's case in each case. It is not indicated from the impugned orders that prima facie satisfaction was wrongly recorded. Once that satisfaction was recorded, the complaints should not have been dismissed by giving a particular interpretation to the instrument of power-of -Attorney at the threshold stage. 30. Viewed, thus, in my considered view, the Id. trial Court has fallen into error in interpreting the Power of Attorney and dismissing the complaints on that count without having regard to the jurisdiction of the Court to dismiss the complaint at that stage. 31. 30. Viewed, thus, in my considered view, the Id. trial Court has fallen into error in interpreting the Power of Attorney and dismissing the complaints on that count without having regard to the jurisdiction of the Court to dismiss the complaint at that stage. 31. Matter, however, cannot be closed simply by setting aside the impugned order without looking to the jurisdictional aspect of the impugned order. The question raised is; Whether it is open to trial Court, having issued process on a complaint filed before him, to reconsider his decision at the instance of the summoned accused and dismiss the complaint at threshold stage? 32. This question was sure to have arisen before and should have been taken up by the Id. trial Court in view of the objection taken on behalf of the petitioner/complainant that there is no provision in the Code allowing the accused to move such application. Ld. trial Court, as the impugned order would show, has ignored this objection, which should not have been, because had this question been considered and examined perhaps the complaints would not have been dismissed like that. 33. The Id. counsel for the petitioner/complainant would say that it is not open to the Magistrate to dismiss the complaint on any ground whatsoever after cognizance has been taken. In that he relied upon decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Adalat Prasad v. Roop Lal Zindhal and others, 2004 (7) SCC 338 and submitted that the earlier decision in K.M. Mathew v. State of Kerala, 1992 (1) SCC 217 , which empowered a Magistrate to dismiss a complaint even after issuing process against the accused has been overruled and settled position now is that it is not open to the Magistrate to dismiss the complaint on any ground whatsoever at the request of the accused. 34. Per contra, Id. counsel for the respondent/accused would say that the judgment passed in Mathew's case (supra) still holds good if after issuing the process 1d trial Court is apprised and finds that the cognizance of the complainant was wrongly taken and in that case the Magistrate can dismiss the complaint in view of the law laid down in Mathew's case (supra). 35. Procedure for taking cognizance of offence(s) on a complaint is provided under chapters XVI and XVII (sees. 202-204) of the Code. 35. Procedure for taking cognizance of offence(s) on a complaint is provided under chapters XVI and XVII (sees. 202-204) of the Code. It starts with taking of cognizance of a complaint under sec. 202 and ends with issuing of process (summons or warrants as the case may be) under sec. 204. The Magistrate, before issuing the process under sec. 204 may, however, under sec. 202 order inquiry or investigation for the purpose of ascertaining the truthfulness or otherwise of the complaint and may dismiss the complaint under sec. 203 if to his judgment no prima facie case is made out against the accused. After issuing the process under sec. 204 scene shifts to commencement of trial under relevant provisions of the Code. 36. There is no provision under the Code to provide for or allow dismissal of the complaint or drop the proceedings at the request of the summoned accused or otherwise after process under sec. 204 of the Code has been issued. In this statutory scenario, Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mathew's case (supra) was pleased to hold that after issuing summons under sec. 204 of the Code, it was open to the Magistrate on being satisfied at the instance of the summoned accused to reconsider its decision of issuing summons under sec. 204. Hon'ble Court also held that the Magistrate issuing summons can do so only on there being material to issue summons hence summons erroneously issued can be recalled by the Magistrate for which no specific provision is required. 37. However, correctness of law laid down in Mathew's case (Supra), came up for consideration on reference before Hon'ble three Judge-Bench of the Supreme Court in Adalat Prasads's case (supra), wherein the Hon'ble Court held: "..It is true as held by this Court in Mathew's case before issuance of summons the Magistrate should be satisfied that there is sufficient ground for proceeding with the complaint but that satisfaction is to be arrived at by the inquiry conducted by him as contemplated under sections 200 and 202, and the only stage of dismissal of the complaint arises under section 203 of the Code at which stage the accused has no role to play. Therefore the question of the accused on receipt of summons approaching the court and making an application for dismissal of the complaint under section 203 of the Code for a reconsideration of the material available on record is impermissible because by then Section 203 is already over and the Magistrate has proceeded further to Section 204 stage. It is true that if a Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence, issues process without there being any allegation against the accused or any material implicating the accused or in contravention of provision of Sections 200 and 202, the order of the Magistrate may be vitiated, but then the relief an aggrieved accused can obtain at that stage is not by invoking section 203 of the Code because the Criminal Procedure Code does not contemplate a review of an order. Hence in the absence of any review power or inherent power with the subordinate criminal courts, the remedy lies in invoking Section 482 of Code. Therefore, in our opinion the observation of this Court in the case of Mathew (supra) that for recalling in order of issuance of process erroneously, no specific provision of law is required would run counter to the scheme of the Code which has not provided for review and prohibits interference at interlocutory stages. Therefore, we are of the opinion, that the view of this Court in Mathew's case(supra) that no specific provision is required for recalling an erroneous order, amounting to one without jurisdiction, does not lay down the correct law." 38. The legal position arising after decision in Adalat Prasad's case is that it is not open to a Magistrate (trial Court), having issued process on a complaint filed before him, to reconsider his decision at the instance of the summoned accused and dismiss the complaint on any ground without entering into the trial of the case. 39. Ld. trial Court has thus acted without jurisdiction in dismissing the complaints. 40. hi view of all what has been discussed and said above, the impugned orders in both the cases are set aside and Id. trial Court is directed to go ahead with trial in the complaints. Both the parties shall appear before the trial Court on 20.5.2013. 41. Record of the trial Court be remitted back.