L.K. Mohapatra, A.C.J. Heard Sri Shashi Nandan, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Udayan Nandan, learned counsel appearing for the appellant and Sri R.B. Singhal, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Satish Kumar Rai, learned counsel appearing for the respondents. 2. This special appeal has been filed questioning the legality of the order dated 22.8.2013 passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No. 39732 of 1996. The writ application and this special appeal arise out of a proceeding under provisions of The Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (for short 'Act 40 of 1971'). 3. The disputed premises is a part of Bungalow No. 49, Taj Road, Agra. The appellant who was the petitioner in the writ petition is a tenant and Sri N.K. Patni is the landlord. Notice was issued to both of them under Section 5-A of Act 40 of 1971 for removal of construction made on a portion of land of the said bungalow on the allegation that the petitioner-appellant had raised the above unauthorised construction without obtaining sanction of Union of India. Notice was issued by the Estate Officer on 10.10.1994 under Section 5-B of Act 40 of 1971 to both, the petitioner-appellant as well as the landlord N.K. Patni inviting objection. It appears that the petitioner-appellant had constructed a hall-cum-shop measuring 41 X 31 ft. covering an area of 1271 sq. ft. 4. Objection was filed on behalf of the petitioner-appellant and it was contended in the objection that the allegation of unauthorised construction was not correct and initiation of the proceeding under Act 40 of 1971 was without jurisdiction. According to the petitioner-appellant, the disputed premise lies within the Cantonment Area and as such the Estate Officer acting under the provision of Act 40 of 1971 in issuing notice has no jurisdiction to issue such notice. It was further contended that since the disputed premise is located within the Cantonment Area, the provisions of The Cantonments Act, 1924 are applicable and no proceeding under Section 5-A(2) of Act 40 of 1971 could be initiated. 5. Union of India also filed the reply to the objection of the petitioner-appellant and stated that the land is vested in the Ministry of Defence, Government of India though it lies within the Cantonment limits of Agra. 5. Union of India also filed the reply to the objection of the petitioner-appellant and stated that the land is vested in the Ministry of Defence, Government of India though it lies within the Cantonment limits of Agra. Therefore, before making any kind of construction, the landlord N.K. Patni was required to obtain sanction from the competent authority under the provisions of The Cantonments Act, 1924. It was also stated that the disputed premise belongs to Union of India and therefore is a 'public premise' as defined under Act 40 of 1971 and therefore, a proceeding under Section 5-A of Act 40 of 1971 was maintainable. 6. The proceeding initiated by the Estate Officer was registered as Case No.4/314/PPE Act/49 and Estate Officer after consideration of the objection filed by the petitioner-appellant, the reply to the said objection filed by the Union of India, passed an order in terms of Section 5-A(2) of Act 40 of 1971. Challenging the said order of the Estate Officer, the petitioner-appellant preferred an appeal under Section 9 of the said Act 40 of 1971. Though, the Appellate Court held that such an appeal was not maintainable against the order passed under Section 5-A(2) of Act 40 of 1971, it also decided the case on merit against the petitioner-appellant. Challenging the order of the Estate Officer as well as the Appellate Court, writ application was filed by the appellant. 7. A preliminary objection was raised by Sri R.B. Singhal, learned Senior Advocate appearing for Union of India assisted by Sri Satish Kumar Rai, learned counsel with regard to maintainability of the special appeal. It was contended by Sri Singhal, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Union of India that the petitioner-appellant having filed an appeal against the order of the Estate Officer and thereafter having filed a writ application challenging the order of the Estate Officer as well as the Appellate Court, no further appeal is provided for and accordingly special is not maintainable. Sri Shashi Nandan, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Udai Nandan appearing for the petitioner-appellant submitted that the appeal under Section 9 of Act 40 of 1971 was not maintainable as no such appeal is provided for against an order passed under Section 5-A(2) of Act 40 of 1971. Therefore, the special appeal is maintainable. 8. Sri Shashi Nandan, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Udai Nandan appearing for the petitioner-appellant submitted that the appeal under Section 9 of Act 40 of 1971 was not maintainable as no such appeal is provided for against an order passed under Section 5-A(2) of Act 40 of 1971. Therefore, the special appeal is maintainable. 8. On merit, Sri Shashi Nandan, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant raised only one legal question as had been taken by the appellant before the Estate Officer. It was contended by Sri Shashi Nandan, the learned Senior Counsel that undisputedly, the disputed premise is located within the cantonment area of Agra and therefore the provisions of The Cantonments Act, 1924 are applicable. Referring to certain provisions of the said Act, it was further contended that the said Act of 1924 provides for grant of permission for making constructions and also provides for action against any illegal construction made by a landlord within the cantonment area without obtaining due permission from the competent authority under the Act. Accordingly, it is contended that the provisions of Act 40 of 1971 have no application and the entire proceeding initiated by the Estate Officer under Section 5-A of Act 40 of 1971 was without jurisdiction. 9. Sri Singhal, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of Union of India in reply submitted that the land on which such construction had been made illegally belongs to Union of India and is a 'public premise' as defined under Act 40 of 1971. Even if, the land is located within the cantonment area, it shall come within the definition of 'public premise and therefore the proceeding under Section 5-A of Act 40 of 1971 was maintainable. Admittedly, no permission having been obtained for making such illegal construction, proceeding for eviction/removal could be initiated under the said provision. The learned Single Judge taking into consideration the above submissions made on behalf of both the learned Senior Counsel came to a conclusion that Act 40 of 1971 shall have an overriding effect considering the object and reasons behind enactment of Act 40 of 1971 and accordingly, a proceeding under Act 40 of 1971 was maintainable. On merits, the learned Single Judge found that such construction having been made without obtaining permission from the Competent Authority, was liable to be removed and accordingly dismissed the writ application. 10. On merits, the learned Single Judge found that such construction having been made without obtaining permission from the Competent Authority, was liable to be removed and accordingly dismissed the writ application. 10. The preliminary objection relating to maintainability of special appeal is required to be addressed first. The proceeding was initiated by the Estate Officer under Section 5-A(2) of the said Act. No appeal is provided for against the said order under Section 9 of the said Act. Even though, no such appeal is provided for, undisputedly, the petitioner-appellant preferred an appeal and the Appellate Court not only held the appeal to be not maintainable but also decided on merit against the appellant. Therefore, irrespective of the fact that such an appeal was not maintainable, the appellant preferred an appeal and the said appeal was decided not only on the question of maintainability but also on merit. In this connection reference may be made to a Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Sheet Gupta Vs. State of U.P. And Others reported in 2010 (1) ESC 273 (All) (FB). The Full Bench was called upon to decide the following reference: "Whether a special appeal under the provisions of Rule 5 of Chapter VIII of the Rules of the Court lies in a case where the judgement has been given by a learned Single Judge in a writ petition directed against an order passed in an appeal under paragraph 28 of the U.P. Scheduled Commodities Distribution Order, 2004?" In Paragraph 15, the Full Bench made the following observation: "Having given our anxious consideration to the various plea raised by the learned counsel for the parties, we find that from the perusal of Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Rules a special appeal shall lie before this Court from the judgement passed by one Judge of the Court. However, such special appeal will not lie in the following circumstances: 1. The judgement passed by one Judge in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction, in respect of a decree or order made by a Court subject to the Superintendence of the Court; 2. the order made by one Judge in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction; 3. the order made by one Judge in the exercise of the power of Superintendence of the High Court; 4. the order made by one Judge in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction; 5. the order made by one Judge in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction; 3. the order made by one Judge in the exercise of the power of Superintendence of the High Court; 4. the order made by one Judge in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction; 5. the order made by one judge in the exercise of jurisdiction conferred by Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution of India in respect of any judgement, order or award by (i) the tribunal, (ii) Court or (iii) statutory arbitrator made or purported to be made in the exercise or purported exercise of jurisdiction under any Uttar Pradesh Act or under any Central Act, with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the State List or the Concurrent List in the Seventh Scheduled to the Constitution of India 6. the order made by on Judge in the exercise of jurisdiction conferred by Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India in respect of any judgement, order or award of (i) the Government or (ii) any officer or (iii) authority, made or purported to be made in the exercise or purported exercise of appellate or revisional jurisdiction under any such Act, i.e. under any Uttar Pradesh Act or under any Central Act, with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the State List or the Concurrent List in the Seventh Scheduled to the Constitution of India" 11. In Paragraph 19, the Full Bench concluded that the law laid down in the case of Ram Dhyan Singh Vs. State of U.P. and others, reported in 2004 (3) AWC 2559 , holding that a special appeal would lie against the judgement and order of a learned Single Judge wherein the appellate order passed under the Government Order issued in exercise of the power under the Act does not lay down the correct law. In the present case, though no appeal was provided for against the order passed by the Estate Officer in exercise of his jurisdiction under Section 5-A(2) of Act 40 of 1971, an appeal was preferred, the same was decided by the Appellate Authority on question of maintainability as well as on merit and the said appellate order was also challenged in the writ petition. We, therefore are of the prima facie view that the special appeal is not maintainable in view of the above decision of Full Bench. 12. We, therefore are of the prima facie view that the special appeal is not maintainable in view of the above decision of Full Bench. 12. So far as merit is concerned, the only question raised by Sri Shashi Nandan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner-appellant is with regard to maintainability of the proceeding under the provisions of Act 40 of 1971. It was contended by Sri Shashi Nandan, learned Senior Counsel that admittedly the disputed premise is located within the cantonment area, therefore the provisions of The Cantonments Act, 1924 shall apply and Act 40 of 1971 shall have no application. In reply, it was submitted by Sri Singhal, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Union of India that the land on which illegal construction has been made belongs to Union of India even though located within the cantonment area and comes within the definition of 'public premise'. Therefore, the proceeding under Act 40 of 1971 was maintainable. "Public Premise" has been defined under Section 2(e) of Act 40 of 1971. Part of the provision relevant for the purpose of the case is quoted below: "[(e) " public premises" means-- (1) any premises belonging to, or taken on lease or requisitioned by, or on behalf of, the Central Government, and includes any such premises which have been placed by that Government, whether before or after the commencement of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Amendment Act, 1980 (61 of 1981 ), under the control of the Secretariat of either House of Parliament for providing residential accommodation to any member of the staff of that Secretariat; (2) any premises belonging to, or taken on lease by, or on behalf of.-- (i) any company as defined in section 3 of the Companies Act. 1956 (1 of 1956 ), in which not less than fifty-one per cent. 1956 (1 of 1956 ), in which not less than fifty-one per cent. of the paid-up share capital is held by the Central Government or any company which is a subsidiary (within the meaning of that Act) of the first-mentioned company, (ii) any corporation (not being a company as defined in section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956 ), or a local authority) established by or under a Central Act and owned or controlled by the Central Government, (iii) any University established or incorporated by any Central Act, (iv) any Institute incorporated by the Institutes of Technology Act, 1961 (59 of 1961), (v) any Board of Trustees constituted under the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963 (38 of 1963 ), (vi) the Bhakra Management Board constituted under section 79 of the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966 (31 of 1966 ), and that Board as and when re-named as the Bhakra-Beas Management Board under sub- section (6) of section 80 of that Act; (vii) any State Government or the Government of any Union territory situated in the National Capital Territory of Delhi or in any other Union territory; (viii)any Cantonment Board constituted under the Cantonments Act, 1924 (2 of 1924); and] (3) .............................................................." 13. is evident from the definition, 'public premises' means any premise belonging to or taken on lease by, or on behalf of any Cantonment Board constituted under the Cantonments Act, 1924. Therefore, even if, the land is located within the cantonment area in respect of which, the Cantonment Board exercises power is a 'public premise' as defined under Act 40 of 1971. Section 5-A of Act 40 of 1971 empowers the Estate Officer to remove unauthorised construction and under sub-section (2) of the said Section where any building or other immovable structure or fixture has been erected, placed or raised on any public premises in contravention of the provisions of sub-section (1), of the said section, the estate officer can direct removal of such unauthorised construction. Under the Cantonments Act, 1924, the Board may direct to stop erection or re-erection or to demolish any buildings, trees, boundaries etc. under Chapter XI of the Act. Sections 184 and 185 relate to illegal erection and re-erection. Section 184 only provides for punishment in case of a construction being made when the sanction has been refused or has ceased to be available or has has been suspended under Section 185. under Chapter XI of the Act. Sections 184 and 185 relate to illegal erection and re-erection. Section 184 only provides for punishment in case of a construction being made when the sanction has been refused or has ceased to be available or has has been suspended under Section 185. The Board has also the authority to direct demolition of any erection made in contravention of the provisions contained in the Act. Both the Acts are special statutes. Question, therefore, that comes up for consideration is as to whether Act 40 of 1971 shall have an overriding effect. The learned Single Judge, on this issue placed reliance on a judgement of the Apex Court in the case of Ashoka Marketing Ltd. And Another Vs. Punjab National Bank And Others reported in (1990) 4 SCC 406 , where the issue was as to whether Act, 1940 of 1971 would override the Rent Control Act. The Apex Court in the said judgement held that provisions of Public Premises Act to the extent they cover premises falling within the ambit of Rent Control Act override the provision of Rent Control Act and a person in unauthorised occupation of 'public premises' under Section 2(e) of the Act cannot invoke the jurisdiction of Rent Control Act. Since there is no dispute that the land belongs to Union of India, though located within the cantonment area, it comes within the definition of 'public premises' as defined under Act 1940 of 1971. The Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971, provides for a speedy process for eviction of unauthorised occupants from 'public premises'. The Act as it stood did not debar the Government from taking course to seek aforesaid relief. In view of the judgement of the Apex Court in case of Northern India Caterers Private Ltd. and Another Vs. State of Punjab and Another reported in AIR 1967 SC 1581 , declaring Section 5 of Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1959 to be void on the ground that section has lent itself open to the charge of discrimination and as being violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution, there was risk of the Central Act also being struck down by the Supreme Court under challenge on similar ground of discrimination. Therefore, the Act was re-enacted and Act 40 of 1971 was brought into existence. Therefore, the Act was re-enacted and Act 40 of 1971 was brought into existence. As held by the Supreme Court in the case of Ashoka Marketing Ltd. (supra), the aim and object of Act 40 of 1971 is to provide for a speedy machinery for the eviction of unauthorised occupants of public premises and also for removal of structures made unauthorisedly. On consideration of such aim and object and the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Ashoka Marketing Ltd. and Another Vs. Punjab National Bank & Others (supra), we are in agreement to the learned Single Judge that considering the aim and object of Act 40 of 1971, it shall have overriding effect on the Cantonments Act, 1924. 14. For the reasons stated above, we find no infirmity in the order impugned passed on merit also. We, therefore, are of the view that neither the special appeal is maintainable nor is there any merit in the said appeal. The special appeal is accordingly dismissed. ________________