JUDGMENT : S.G. Shah, J. The petitioners have preferred these petitions under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code for quashing the complaint filed against them, which is registered as FIR No. I- 1160/2004 with Navrangpura Police Station on 18/12/2004 for the offences punishable under sections 403, 406, 416, 417, 420 and 424 of the Indian Penal Code [IPC]. 2. Heard Ld. Advocate Mr. Naveen Pahwa, appearing for Mrs. Sangeeta Pahwa, for the petitioners and Mr. NJ Shah, Ld. APP for respondent no. 1 - State and Mr. M. Iqbal A Shaikh, Ld. Counsel for the respondent no. 2 - Registrar of companies. 3. The allegations levelled by the complainant being Assistant Registrar of Companies, Ahmedabad in the aforesaid complaint are to the effect that the Directors of one public limited company, namely M/s. Lyons Industrial Enterprises Ltd., had floated the public issue of equity shares of their company by signing prospectus, wherein they have shown false and improper information and thereby they have given false promise based upon false and concocted information in the prospectus of the company and collected huge amount as value of equity shares from the investors and thereby they have cheated public at large and hence they have committed offences under the IPC as quoted hereinabove as well as under sections 63, 68 and 628 of the Indian Companies Act. The respondent no. 2 has, therefore, filed one another complaint before the Ld. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate at Ahmedabad on 19/4/2002, which is registered as Criminal Case No. 91/2002, wherein the Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Ahmedabad has passed an order to issue warrant against the petitioners. Though name of any of the accused is not disclosed in the FIR I-1160/2004, which is filed at later stage, the respondent no. 2 has, while filing the complaint under the Companies Act on 19/4/2002, disclosed the names of these persons as accused. 4. On perusal of record, it seems that one Mr. V G Pendharkar is probably expired pending the trial and, therefore, the complaint against him was endorsed as abated. Whereas out of remaining five accused, one K S Ranganathan has filed Misc. Criminal Application No. 5534/2008; whereas accused no. 5 Ashwin J Bhatt has preferred Misc. Criminal Application No. 5537/2008. 5. Since both the petitioners have challenged the same complaint and practically on same facts and grounds, both the petitions are disposed of by this common judgment. Whereas out of remaining five accused, one K S Ranganathan has filed Misc. Criminal Application No. 5534/2008; whereas accused no. 5 Ashwin J Bhatt has preferred Misc. Criminal Application No. 5537/2008. 5. Since both the petitioners have challenged the same complaint and practically on same facts and grounds, both the petitions are disposed of by this common judgment. 6. It is contended by Mr. Pahwa, Ld. Counsel for the petitioners that except the date of resignation by both the petitioners, all other facts and grounds are common in both the petitions. The petitioner of Misc. Criminal Application No. 5534/2008, Mr. K.S. Ranganathan has resigned as Director of the company working effect from 1/8/1996; whereas the petitioner of Misc. Criminal Application No. 5537/2008, Mr. Ashwin J Bhatt has resigned as a Director of the company working effect from 1/10/1996. The ingredients of offences for sections under the IPC, namely 403, 406, 415, 418, 420, 424 are not there in the first complaint filed in the year 2002 before the Metropolitan Magistrate, except that, there is inordinate delay of 8 years in filing FIR and, therefore, second complaint in the year 2004 with such allegation is not maintainable. There cannot be two prosecutions for the same allegations and same offences. The FIR No. I-1160/2004 is the subsequent i.e. second complaint by the same complainant for the same offences and, therefore, it could not sustain since it would amount to abuse of process of law. 7. With above general grounds for quashing the FIR in question, both the petitioners have pleaded in detail about their activities and they relied upon several judgments and unreported judgment and order dated 13/4/1994 passed in Criminal Misc. Application No.2123/90, wherein it is held that the offences under Sections 406 and 420 of the IPC cannot go altogether since petitioners had never promised anything either to the complainant or to anybody, that petitioners had never cheated the complainant nor had dishonestly induced the complainant or anybody to deliver any property to them and, therefore, there cannot be an offence of cheating and breach of trust, which otherwise also could not go altogether. The petitioners have also relied upon the decision rendered in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajanlal, reported AIR 1992 SC 604 and quoted the grounds confirmed by the Hon’ble Apex Court for consideration in such type of cases. The petitioners have also relied upon the decision rendered in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajanlal, reported AIR 1992 SC 604 and quoted the grounds confirmed by the Hon’ble Apex Court for consideration in such type of cases. It is further contended by the petitioners that practically they have resigned as Directors of the company in the year 1996 and proof of such resignations is produced on record at Annexure-C in both petitions. It is also contended by both the petitioners that since they had remained as Directors of the company for very short tenure, they have never attended any board meeting or general meeting of the company and they have never received any sitting fee or remuneration or any kind of benefits from the company. It is also contended that they are not subscribers to Memorandum of Association and they have not played any role either direct or indirect into the affairs of the company at any stage. It is further contended that in response to the notice issued by respondent no. 2 regarding such offences, both the petitioners have submitted their detailed reply, copies of which are produced at Annexures - D and E respectively in both the petitions, wherein it is categorically conveyed to the respondent by both the petitioners that practically they are Chartered Accountants and they were non-active and non-executive Directors and they have also conveyed the actual names of Directors, who are actually promoters and dealing with day-to-day activities, namely Manoj Sharma and Maliram Sharma. 8. Ld. APP Mr. NJ Shah for respondent no. 1 - State and Ld. Advocate Mr. M. Iqbal A Shaikh for respondent no. 2 - Registrar of Companies, have submitted that since there is clear offence committed by the petitioners, both under the Companies Act and under the Indian Penal Code, the FIR cannot be quashed, as prayed for. In support of their submissions, respondent no. 1 - State and Ld. Advocate Mr. M. Iqbal A Shaikh for respondent no. 2 - Registrar of Companies, have submitted that since there is clear offence committed by the petitioners, both under the Companies Act and under the Indian Penal Code, the FIR cannot be quashed, as prayed for. In support of their submissions, respondent no. 2 has filed counter affidavit on 9/4/2013, wherein they have reiterated that prospectus of the company was signed by all the Directors including present petitioner and they have collected Rs.363.60 lacs and ultimately it is found that the documents and balance-sheet, etc., with the prospectus were misguiding the financial position of the company and thereby since the petitioners have committed offences as alleged under the Companies Act as well as under the IPC, the complaints were filed in accordance with law and, therefore, such complaint could not be quashed. In support of their submissions, respondent no. 2 is relying upon the decision rendered in the case of Radhey Shyam Khemka v. State of Bihar, reported in 1993 CRI. L.J. 2888, State of Andhra Pradesh v. Goloconda Linga Swamy, reported in AIR 2004 SC 3967 and State of A.P. v. Bajjoori Kanthaiah, reported in AIR 2009 SC 671 . 9. In general, it can be said that once an offence has been committed by any-one, then the culprit must be subject to the legal proceedings including investigation and trial by the competent Court. However, such general rule has several exceptions. Thereby even if there is a complaint either regarding the offence only or even against the particular person as an offender, the basic principle of criminal jurisprudence is quite clear and simple that no- one can be punished without inquiry, investigation and trial, no trial can be initiated without having prima-facie evidence against such person and in the present case, the third principle applies that there cannot be multiple trial for the same offences against the same person. Meaning thereby, if any crime is committed, the person against whom there are allegations regarding commission of such crime, is to be punished only once and not repeatedly for the same set of crime and evidence even if the alleged act results into different offences or offence under the different provisions of law. 10. In the present case, irrespective of factual details and its merits, the fact remains that though respondent no. 10. In the present case, irrespective of factual details and its merits, the fact remains that though respondent no. 2 has filed first complaint on 19/4/2002 before the Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Ahmedabad, which is registered as Criminal Case No. 91/2002, disclosing the names of all the Directors of the company, namely M/s. Lyons Industrial Enterprises Ltd., alleging the same set of facts regarding alleged mis-deeds by such Directors in floating the public issue for the company by preparing improper prospectus, there is not a whisper in such a complaint that how the accused in such complaint had committed the offences, if any, under the IPC. It is certain that in such complaint, the Court has issued summons and there is no whisper in the affidavit-in-reply filed by the respondent no. 2 on 9/4/2013 about such complaint, which was filed before the Competent Court. Surprisingly, pending such criminal complaint before the competent Court, instead of disclosing relevant fact regarding commission of offences under the IPC on the same set of allegations and evidence and thereby instead of requesting the same Court to add such additional charge and additional sections in the pending complaint, respondent no. 2 has selected to file one another complaint directly before the Police Authority on 18/12/2004 i.e. after more than two years and surprisingly, without disclosing the names and addresses of the Directors - accused whose names and addresses are very well within the knowledge of the respondent no. 2. Thereby prima-facie this is nothing but an attempt by the respondent no. 2 to harass several persons treating them as Directors of the company, namely, M/s. Lyons Industrial Enterprises Ltd. It could not be ignored that the notice and its reply, as referred to by the petitioners at Annexure-D, were quite prior to both the complaints since it is of the months of March and April 2002, the respondent no. 2 has failed to disclose such communication i.e. their notice and reply by the present petitioners in both the complaints. This is also nothing but a selectiveness of the respondent no. 2 so as to choose any one to be harassed through the investigating agency. 11. All above observations make it clear that prima-facie, the second complaint is certainly deserves to be condemned and quashed. However, before concluding, I have to answer the issues raised by the respondent no. 2. This is also nothing but a selectiveness of the respondent no. 2 so as to choose any one to be harassed through the investigating agency. 11. All above observations make it clear that prima-facie, the second complaint is certainly deserves to be condemned and quashed. However, before concluding, I have to answer the issues raised by the respondent no. 2. The sum and substance of the affidavit-in-reply filed by the respondent no. 2 is nothing but repetition of the contents of the complaint that petitioners being Directors of the company, are also equally responsible and liable for the false promises and projection of false financial status of the company under the prospectus which were signed by them. It is alleged that by such false projection of the financial status of the company, the petitioners had recovered substantial amount of public money through public issue and have blocked such amount for years without any returns, which is total diversion and misuse of public money. It is also argued that there is no difference between the Directors, as suggested by the petitioners i.e. active or non-active or non-executive Directors. The respondent no. 2 has also relied upon the provisions of section 2[13] and 5 of the Companies Act so far as the nature and character of the Directors and their liability are concerned. It is contended that since the present petitioners have also signed the prospectus, they cannot escape from their liability as of Directors. With this reference, if we peruse both the complaints, copies of which are on record at Annexures- A and E, it becomes clear that practically there are no whisper or allegations so far as the ingredients of cheating, etc., are concerned, on the contrary, what is alleged is to the effect that the company has failed to file complaint with the provisions of sections 129, 162 and 200 of the Companies Act from the year 2002 and onwards. Even in the first complaint before the Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate being Criminal Case No. 91/2002, the allegation is mainly regarding subsequent balance-sheets filed by the company with the complainant. 12. In support of their submission, they have relied upon the above referred three decisions of Radhey Shyam Khemka [supra], Bajjoori Kanthaiah [supra] and Goloconda Linga Swamy [supra]. Even in the first complaint before the Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate being Criminal Case No. 91/2002, the allegation is mainly regarding subsequent balance-sheets filed by the company with the complainant. 12. In support of their submission, they have relied upon the above referred three decisions of Radhey Shyam Khemka [supra], Bajjoori Kanthaiah [supra] and Goloconda Linga Swamy [supra]. On perusal of such judgments, though it is clear that failure of promoters for repayment to investors, entitles the investors to prosecute the promoters under the Indian Penal Code and thereby it would not be advisable for the High Court to quash and set aside such complaint, such observation and determination in the case of Radhey Shyam Khemka [supra] was mainly because of the reason that promoters of the company in such reported case, had retained public money illegally. Moreover, it was made clear in such judgment that promoters or those in-charge of the managing affairs of the company are responsible, but at the same time while taking cognizance of the said offence, in connection with the registration, issuance of prospectus, collection of moneys from the investors and the misappropriation of the fund collected from the share-holders, which constitute one offence or other under the Penal Code, Court must be satisfied that prima facie an offence under the Penal Code has been disclosed in the materials produced before the Court. Further it is also stated that prosecution for offence under the Penal Code is to be initiated if it is established in the complaint that primary object of the incorporation and existence of the company is to defraud public. It is also further stated that for framing charges in respect of acts and omissions, in many cases, mens-rea is not an essential ingredient; but for framing a charge for an offence under the Penal Code, the traditional rule of existence of means rea is to be followed. The careful reading of the decision in Radhey Shyam Khemka [supra], makes it clear that there was typical evidence before the Court that the appellants in that case were never intend to carry on any business, but inspite of rejection of application by Stock Exchange, Calcutta, they retained the share moneys of the applicants with dishonest intention and those allegations were investigated by the CBI before filing the charge-sheet. Therefore, in absence of such evidence, case of Radhey Shyam Khemka [supra] would not help the respondent no. 2 in any manner. 13. Observations and decision in Goloconda Linga Swamys case [supra] is also not helpful to the respondents, inasmuch as, in the said judgment, it is categorically confirmed that though Court should normally refrain from giving prima-facie decision when entire facts of case are incomplete and hazy, it is clear that there cannot be any hard and fast rule so far as exercise of powers under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code is concerned. On the contrary, observations made in para 12 of such judgment makes it clear that when FIR is not disclosing commission of an offence without anything being added or subtracted from the recitals therein, quashing of the FIR would be proper. However, Ld. Advocate Mr. M. Iqbal A Shaikh has relied upon the observations with reference to the case of R. P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, reported in AIR 1960 SC 866 in para 6 of such case under reference, wherein also practically the Hon'ble Apex Court has summarised some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings. It is submitted that the present case does not fall within the scope of cases which is considered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in such case. However, it goes without saying that in addition to the cases listed in such reported case, if there is more than one complaint for the same set of allegations and for the same offence, then certainly, since multiple complaint for the same offence cannot be continued, Court can quash and set aside such second or next complaint. It is simple and clear that while deciding any particular case unless the Court has come across all type of irregularities that may be decided either by investigating agency or by the concerned Criminal Courts, all such probable examples can never be visualised and listed in a given case. Therefore, only because the Hon’ble Apex Court listed few examples in the case of R P Kapur [supra], it cannot be held that any irregularity in complaint or investigation could not be set right by quashing such complaint. 14. Therefore, only because the Hon’ble Apex Court listed few examples in the case of R P Kapur [supra], it cannot be held that any irregularity in complaint or investigation could not be set right by quashing such complaint. 14. By referring the case of Bajjoori Kanthaiah [supra], it is contended that the Hon’ble Apex Court has repeatedly confirmed that such powers should be exercised sparingly and that too in rarest of rare cases and there for again the Hon’ble Apex Court has given some illustrative categories, submitting that when present case does not fall within any type of such category, complaint cannot be quashed. It is sufficient to say that even in this judgment the Hon’ble Apex Court has not said that power under section 482 of the Cr. P.C., is not to be exercised at all, when the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed in clear words in para 8 that the powers possessed by the High Court under section 482 of the Cr. P.C., are very wide and the very plenitude powers with only rider that it requires great caution in its exercise. Whereas in para 7 the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed that when exercising jurisdiction under section 482 of the Code, the High Court would nor ordinarily embark upon the inquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether any reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained, which is the function of the trial Judge. Thus, practically the High Court has got inherent powers to quash the FIR on the ground of insufficiency of material as well as several other grounds as pointed out by the Hon’ble Apex Court in above judgments. However, while disclosing the guidelines and relevant factors, even the Hon’ble Apex Court has to say that the category listed by them are illustrative and not the final. At the cost of repetition, it is to be reconfirmed that case of second complaint for the same set of allegations against person by same complainant would have never reached to the Hon’ble Apex Court so as to add such type of cases in such illustrative list. 15. As against that, Ld. At the cost of repetition, it is to be reconfirmed that case of second complaint for the same set of allegations against person by same complainant would have never reached to the Hon’ble Apex Court so as to add such type of cases in such illustrative list. 15. As against that, Ld. Advocate for the petitioners is relying upon the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala, reported in (2001) 6 SCC 181 , wherein it is made clear that there can be no second FIR and fresh investigation on receipt of every subsequent information in respect of the same offence or same occurrence even if it is giving rise to one or more cognizable offences and that only first information about commission of an offence which is under consideration can be regarded as FIR and all such subsequent information will be covered by section 162 of the Code. Even if after conclusion of first investigation, any further information pertaining to same incident is brought out, the same is to be produced with the initially instituted complaint and not in a second complaint. 16. The petitioners are also relying upon the decision rendered in the case of G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P., Reported in 2000 SC (Criminal) 513 wherein it is held that the High Court can quash the criminal proceedings even when application for discharge of accused is pending with the Trial Judge though it is stated that such powers should be exercised cautiously, the Hon’ble Apex Court has stated that when complaint under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is pending, second complaint under sections 406/420 of the IPC would amount to abuse of process of law and hence the proceedings of second complaint is liable to be quashed. 17. It is not disputed that the petitioners were only professionals and non-executive Directors and thereby they were not promoters or subscribers or not in-charge or responsible for day to day management, business and affairs of the company and that the petitioners have already signed in the year 1996 itself, whereas complaint is filed in the years 2002 and 2004 though company has filed audited balance-sheet upto financial year ending in March 2000, which was adopted by the Annual General Meeting. It is also admitted fact that the respondents could not negative such factual details. 18. It is also admitted fact that the respondents could not negative such factual details. 18. The petitioners have also relied upon the judgment and order dated 17/4/2012 passed in Criminal Misc. Application No. 2403/2005 with Criminal Misc. Application No. 12430/2005 [unreported], wherein in the similar set of facts i.e. when Director has resigned from the company, the Court has quashed the complaint. The petitioners have also relied upon the judgment and order dated 28/12/2012 in Criminal Misc. Application No. 1032/2007 [unreported] rendered by this Court, wherein also in the similar set of facts and circumstances and details i.e. considering the resignation of non-executive director of the company, the second complaint under the sections of the IPC was quashed when first complaint for the offences under the Companies Act was pending. 19. We are having the similar situation in the present case, inasmuch as the company, namely M/s. Lyons Industrial Enterprises Ltd., was incorporated in the year 1993. Its public issue was in the month of February 1996 and before the amount received through such public issue can be managed, present petitioners have resigned from the company in the same year i.e. 1996, just within 6 to 8 months. Whereas alleged application or communication, if any, under the Companies Act by the remaining Directors, as alleged by the respondent no. 2 in their complaint itself, is for the year 2002 and onwards and more particularly complaint filed in the year 2002 does not say anything about misappropriation or cheating, etc. as alleged in the second complaint, which is filed after more than two years from the first complaint and after more than eight years from the date of resignation i.e. in December, 2004 before the Navrangpura Police Station. Thus, the impugned FIR is the second one and more particularly the complainant, respondent no. 2 was very much aware about the acceptance of resignation by petitioners in the year 1996 and activities of the company right from the year 1993. However, it seems that the complainant had waited upto the year 2002 for filing the first complaint and upto the year 2004 for filing second complaint by disclosing same set of information in two similar complaints. However, it seems that the complainant had waited upto the year 2002 for filing the first complaint and upto the year 2004 for filing second complaint by disclosing same set of information in two similar complaints. Therefore, when the complainant does not have any better or correct information or evidence for lodging the second complaint, it would be proper and appropriate for the complainant to take appropriate steps in the first complaint itself for addition of new sections and charges. Instead of requesting the competent Court where first complaint is pending, the action of the complainant to file second complaint without disclosing the names of the accused, though such names are already disclosed in the first complaint, before the police authority, so as to enable them to call upon different persons as Directors of the company, without confirming that whether they are actually involved in the commission of offences or not, would certainly amount to taking disadvantage of harassing the accused and, therefore, such activities of the complainant inclined the Court to allow the present petitions. To arrive at such conclusion, the Court has relied upon the citations referred by the petitioners. However, relevant portions of such reported judgments are avoided to reproduce herein. 20. For being more precise on law point, it would be relevant to recollect several observations of the Hon’ble Apex Court in some of the reported cases as under : 20.1 in G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P. [supra], the Hon’ble Apex Court has categorically observed that it was not explained by the complainant in that case as to why offences under sections 406 - 420 of the IPC were not added in the complaint under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and why resort was had to filing of the separate First Information Report. It is also categorically stated that there is nothing said as to what were those misrepresentations and how complainant was duped. It is further stated that there is nothing stated in the counter affidavit about the role, if any, played by the appellant. So far as the business transactions are concerned, the Hon’ble Apex Court has categorically observed that business of the finance company is essentially a commercial transaction. It is further stated that there is nothing stated in the counter affidavit about the role, if any, played by the appellant. So far as the business transactions are concerned, the Hon’ble Apex Court has categorically observed that business of the finance company is essentially a commercial transaction. Again it is observed that none of the respondent has been able to explain as to why offences under the IPC were not added in the first complaint and why resort was had to filing of separate First Information Report, with clear statement that certain motive has been attributed to the Investigating Officer, but the Hon’ble Apex Court had disclosed that they need not go into such issue. However, the Hon'ble Apex Court had agreed that the submission of the appellant that the whole attempt of the complainant is evidently to rope in all the members of the family. 20.2 Except the change in nature of the first complaint being under the Negotiable Instruments Act, in such reported case and under the Companies Act in our case, all other factual details and observations made by the Hon’ble Apex Court are almost similar and, therefore, the same position would apply to the present case as in the reported case when the Hon’ble Apex Court has finally observed that when first criminal complaint is already pending against the appellant and other accused, they would suffer consequences of such offence, if it is proved against them. However, if we go one step ahead, at-least it can be said that even if the complainant is of the view that the petitioners have committed several other offences under the IPC or any other Act, then they could proceed with the first complaint itself instead of filing second complaint. 20.3 In All Cargo Movers [I] Pvt. Ltd. v. Dhanesh Badarmal Jain, reported in AIR 2008 SC 247 the Hon’ble Apex Court has again categorically observed and held that when complaint is filed after a year of filing first litigation, in this case civil suit, without entering into the factual details of previous litigation and the complaint, the substance of the complaint is to be seen and mere use of the expression cheating in the complaint is of no consequence. 20.4 In the present case also, except mentioning of the certain words including word cheating in the complaint filed before the Police, there is no averments about deceive, cheating or fraudulent intention of the accused at the time of issuing prospectus where-from it can be inferred that the petitioners had intention to deceive the public. Therefore, even if given face value to the allegations made in the complaint, if it does not disclose any offence, such complaint deserves to be quashed, as done by the Hon'ble Apex Court. 20.5 In Hira Lal Hari Lal Bhagwati v. CBI, reported in (2003) 5 SCC 257 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has opined that it is settled law, by a catena of decisions, that for establishing the offence of cheating, the complainant is required to show that the accused had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making promise or representation. From making failure to keep promise subsequently, such a culpable intention right at the beginning that is at the time when the promise was made cannot be presumed. Based upon such observation, the Hon’ble Apex Court has set aside the cognizance taken against the appellant before it. 20.6 In Ashim K. Roy v. Bipinbhai Vadilal Mehta, reported in AIR 1997 SC 3976 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has considered the controlling power of the accused in the management of the company. Therein the Hon'ble Apex Court has quashed the complaint. Even after referring the case of R.K. Kapur [supra] and even after observing that though power under section 482 of the Cr. P.C., should be sparingly invoked, the Hon'ble Apex Court has consistently taken the view that it should be exercised to see that the process of law is not abused or misused. With reference to R.K. Kapurs case [supra], the Court has reconfirmed that it is well established that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to quash proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice and that it is not possible, desirable or expedient to law down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction, while indicating some categories of cases. In such reported case also, the Hon’ble Apex Court has quashed the complaint because the accused were not de-facto Directors and according to the Memorandum of Understanding, the accused came into picture only after discharge of the liability. In other words, accused were not in control or management of the company at the relevant time. 20.7 Similar is the fact in our case and I am of a firm view that all above observations apply to the facts of the present case also. 21. Reading the complaint and other material on record, it appears that the second complaint being FIR No. I -1160/2004 before the Navrangpura Police Station is filed based upon the same set of allegations and factual details for which already one Criminal Case is pending before the Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. Therefore, submission of the respondent no. 2 that in addition to offences under the Companies Act, when petitioners have committed offences under the IPC, they are entitled to file separate complaints, cannot be accepted if at all the respondent no. 2 is of the opinion that the petitioners shall be charged and tried for the offences under the IPC also, then they could have certainly taken appropriate steps to add such charges in the complaint being Criminal Case No. 91/2002, which is already pending before the Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Ahmedabad. It is clear and certain that when the entire allegations are based upon the factual details for which documentary evidence is already available with the complainant/ respondent no. 2, there is no reason for filing fresh complaint before the police authority for further investigation as alleged. 22. Therefore, both the petitions are allowed, as prayed for. Thereby complaint being C.R. No. I-1160/2004 pending with the Navrangpura Police Station upon complaint by respondent no. 2 on 18/12/2004 is hereby quashed and set aside qua the present petitioners. Thereby, it is made clear that the quashing is with reference to the present petitioners only and that original complainant - respondent no. 2 has right to take action against the company or its Directors even in the first complaint in accordance with law for any other allegation if it constitutes any other offence in any other law including Indian Penal Code. Rule is made absolute accordingly.