Judgment :- 1. The petitioners seek to declare the notification issued under Section 6 in G.O.Ms.No.1497, Agriculture Department dated 19.8.88 and the notification issued under Section 6 in G.O.Ms.No.865, Agriculture Department dated 15.11.89 by the Government of Tamil Nadu as illegal, incompetent and lapsed in view of Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 2. The learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that the petitioners are residing in a village called "Jagadab" and they are basically agriculturists and small farmers. Being aggrieved by the notification issued by the Government of Tamil Nadu in G.O.Ms.No.865 dated 15.11.89 that was published under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act (for short, "the Act") and also came to be again published in "Dinakaran" Tamil daily on 7.12.89 seeking to acquire the lands belonging to them for expansion of Tamil Nadu Agricultural Research Centre, Paiyur in accordance with the notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Act, they have filed the present writ petition. It was also submitted that on an earlier occasion, the petitioners were constrained to challenge the Section 4(1) notification on the ground that the lands sought to be acquired are agricultural and cultivable lands and they had not been properly shown or described either in the notification issued under Section 4 or in the declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act and that the names of the pattadars and owners had not also been correctly shown. The said writ petition was dismissed by this Court on 9.9.99 accepting the stand of the respondents that they had followed the relevant procedure required for issuance of notification. After the dismissal of the writ petition, the respondents should have passed the award within two years from the date of Section 6 declaration. But no such steps were taken as per the mandatory conditions mentioned under Section 11-A of the Act. When the lands of the petitioners were acquired and the respondents, as per Section 11-A of the Act, neglected to pay even the compensation, it is a well settled legal position that the respondent-Government, having acquired the valuable land from the land owners, cannot withhold indefinitely the payment of compensation, as they should settle the compensation within two years from the date of declaration. It was further submitted that the Land Acquisition Officer, who failed to pay the compensation within two years from the date of declaration, cannot proceed further with the acquisition, since the land acquisition proceeding will automatically get lapsed in view of Section 11-A of the Act, and thereafter the Land Acquisition Officer becomes functus officio on the expiry of two years, that is after Section 6 declaration. On this basis, it was submitted that this Court should declare the impugned notifications issued by the respondents as illegal, incompetent and lapsed in view of Section 11-A of the Act. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel relied upon a judgment of this Court in C. Jayarama Reddy (died) and others v. The Land Acquisition Officer reported in 1998-I-MLJ 85, wherein this Court has held that since an award valid in the eye of law was not passed within the period prescribed, the entire acquisition proceedings would lapse. In State of U.P. and others v. Rajiv Gupta and another, (1994) 5 SCC 686 , it was further held that the award passed without the approval of the authorities would mean that there was no award made by the Land Acquisition Officer in the eye of law and since Section 11-A is mandatory in nature, on the expiry of two years from the date of declaration, the entire proceedings under the Act would lapse. On the same lines, one another judgment in Ravi Khullar and another v. Union of India and others, AIR 2007 SC 2334 was also pressed into service. 3. A detailed counter affidavit has been filed by the second respondent-Revenue Divisional Officer and Land Acquisition Officer, Krishnagiri. 4. Opposing the above pleaded arguments, the learned Additional Government Pleader appearing for the respondents would submit that the present writ petition to issue a writ of declaration is untenable and unjustifiable, since the same prayer was already considered in their earlier Writ Petition No.3025 of 1990 when this Court passed an order on 9.9.99. A perusal of the detailed order passed by this Court negativing their prayer goes to show that the petitioners repeatedly come to this Court even after their prayer to set aside the acquisition proceedings initiated by the Government in G.O.Ms.No.865 dated 15.11.89 was turned down. A perusal of the detailed order passed by this Court negativing their prayer goes to show that the petitioners repeatedly come to this Court even after their prayer to set aside the acquisition proceedings initiated by the Government in G.O.Ms.No.865 dated 15.11.89 was turned down. Therefore, the second writ petition again asking the same prayer is barred by the principles of res judicata, as the doctrine of res judicata will not only apply to civil proceedings, but also to writ proceedings. It was also argued that the second respondent, having initiated the land acquisition proceedings to acquire 20.71.0 hectares of land in Survey No.42/1 etc., Jagadab village in Krishnagiri district for expansion of Tamil Nadu Agricultural Research Centre, Paiyur, thought it fit to dedicate to the nation an agricultural research centre. Such a move of the State Government as a part of scientific welfare scheme for conducting research in agriculture for improvement and development of agricultural schemes in the State cannot be given a go-by accepting the hyper-technical stand taken by the petitioners whose writ petition was already dismissed. After the dismissal of the earlier writ petition, the Land Acquisition Officer has passed the award. In fact, the Land Acquisition Officer and the Revenue Divisional Officer, after conducting enquiry as per the Act and Rules, prepared the award and the same was also approved on 30.9.2001. The said award was also approved by the District Revenue Officer on 1.10.2001 and the award was pronounced on 3.10.2001. Therefore, the Land Acquisition Officer, Krishnagiri has rightly followed the provisions of the Act and hence there is no violation as alleged by the petitioners. When the petitioners have unsuccessfully challenged the Section 4(1) notification and the Section 6 declaration in the earlier writ petition and thereby delayed the proceedings, after the dismissal of the writ petition, the respondents, by again adopting the procedure under the Land Acquisition Act, have passed the award within the stipulated time. Therefore, it is not legally correct to quash the award. Finally, it was pleaded that the award under Section 11 of the Act has been passed within two years from the date of declaration and after the declaration under Section 6, notices under Sections 9 & 10 of the Act were also served on the land owners before the passing of the award. Finally, it was pleaded that the award under Section 11 of the Act has been passed within two years from the date of declaration and after the declaration under Section 6, notices under Sections 9 & 10 of the Act were also served on the land owners before the passing of the award. In support of his submissions, the learned Additional Government Pleader relied upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Ramalingam and others v. State of Tamil Nadu rep. by the Secretary to the Industries Department and others, 2005 (3) CTC 1 , wherein this Court while dismissing the writ petition which challenged the acquisition proceedings as not maintainable in the light of the law laid down by the Apex Court that no writ petition should be entertained after the award was passed under Section 11 of the Act, prayed this Court to dismiss the second writ petition of the petitioners also, as the writ petition was admittedly filed after the award was passed. 5. Heard the submissions of the respective learned counsel and perused the materials available on record. Admittedly, the lands of the petitioners having an extent of 20.71.0 hectares in Survey No.40/1 in Jagadab village in Krishnagiri District were sought to be acquired for expansion of Tamil Nadu Agricultural Research Centre, Paiyoor. The initiation of land acquisition proceeding is a scientific welfare scheme for conducting research in agriculture and for improvement of agricultural schemes in the State. On an earlier occasion, the very same petitioners filed Writ Petition No.3025 of 1990 under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for issuance of writ of certiorarified mandamus to call for the records in G.O.Ms.No.865 dated 15.11.89 issued by the first respondent and also to quash all the proceedings in relation thereto including the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. This Court, by giving a clear cut finding in the said order, concluded that the contention of the petitioners that no opportunity was given to them before acquiring the land was not correct, as could be seen from the materials available on record. One another finding of this Court, as seen from the order dated 9.9.99, also clearly shows that only after due service of publication of notice as contemplated under the Act, Section 5-A enquiry was conducted by the then Revenue Divisional Officer on 20.2.89. One another finding of this Court, as seen from the order dated 9.9.99, also clearly shows that only after due service of publication of notice as contemplated under the Act, Section 5-A enquiry was conducted by the then Revenue Divisional Officer on 20.2.89. Further, it may be noted that all the pattadars and interested persons have appeared before the enquiry officer and raised their objections in writing. Thereafter, the objections were examined by the Revenue Divisional Officer and on proper consideration only, the objections were overruled by the Revenue Divisional Officer by giving his own reasons. In view of the above detailed reasons, when the writ petition of the petitioners to quash G.O.Ms.No.865 dated 15.11.89 was negatived, the respondents, who are bound to pass the award within two years, have miserably failed to comply with the mandatory conditions mentioned under Section 11-A of the Act. In this context, Section 11-A of the Act can be extracted and the same reads as follows:- "11-A. Period within which an award shall be made.--The Collector shall make an award under section 11 within a period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration and if no award is made within that period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse: Provided that in a case where the said declaration has been published before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, the award shall be made within a period of two years from such commencement. Explanation.--In computing the period of two years referred to in this section, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration is stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded." 6. A reading of the above section goes to show that Section 11-A is an important section introduced by the Amendment Act No.68 of 1984. Before inserting this section, there was no provision in the Act prescribing the limitation for making an award. For the first time, this section has prescribed two years time for the award to be passed after section 6 declaration. This section is intended to safeguard the land owners, so that unnecessary delay in acquisition proceedings may be avoided. Before inserting this section, there was no provision in the Act prescribing the limitation for making an award. For the first time, this section has prescribed two years time for the award to be passed after section 6 declaration. This section is intended to safeguard the land owners, so that unnecessary delay in acquisition proceedings may be avoided. The respondents who have won the battle against the petitioners in the earlier writ petition No.3025 of 1990 dated 9.9.99 should not have waited for two more years to pass the award after the dismissal of the writ petition. The order dated 9.9.99 passed in W.P.No.3025 of 1990 clearly shows that the petitioners and the respondents have heavily contested the matter. Therefore, the respondents were aware of the dismissal of the writ petition on 9.9.99. When no writ appeal was also filed against the said order, the respondents should have passed the award at the earliest possible time. But in the present case, they waited for the receipt of the order. In fact, Section 4(1) notification was published in the village on 23.12.88 and thereafter, Section 5-A enquiry was conducted on 20.2.89. Immediately on completion of the enquiry, the draft declaration under Section 6 of the Act was approved in G.O.Ms.No.865 dated 15.11.89 and the same was also published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette on 6.12.89 followed by the publication of the contents of the draft declaration in the dailies on 18.12.89. Therefore, the award should have been passed on or before 17.12.91. But the respondents, by filing a counter affidavit, have stated that they received the order of vacation of stay viz., the order of dismissal of the writ petition, only on 8.1.2000. Therefore, their stand that from the date of receipt of the order copy the award was passed on 3.10.2001 and the same cannot be beyond the period of limitation, is absolutely untenable in the light of the judgment of the Apex Court in Ravi Khullar and another v. Union of India and others, AIR 2007 SC 2334 . Paragraph-54 of the said judgment needs to be perused to answer the argument advanced by the respondents herein. The said paragraph reads as follows:- "54. Paragraph-54 of the said judgment needs to be perused to answer the argument advanced by the respondents herein. The said paragraph reads as follows:- "54. In the matter of computing the period of limitation three situations may be visualized, namely (a) where the Limitation Act applies by its own force; (b) where the provisions of the Limitation Act with or without modifications are made applicable to a special statute; and (c) where the special statute itself prescribes the period of limitation and provides for extension of time and or condonation of delay. The instant case is not one which is governed by the provisions of the Limitation Act. The Land Acquisition Collector in making an award does not act as a Court within the meaning of the Limitation Act. It is also clear from the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act that the provisions of the Limitation Act have not been made applicable to proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act in the matter of making an award under Section 11A of the Act. However, Section 11A of the Act does provide a period of limitation within which the Collector shall make his award. The explanation thereto also provides for exclusion of the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the declaration is stayed by an order of a court. Such being the provision, there is no scope for importing into Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act the provisions of Section 12 of the Limitation Act. The application of Section 12 of the Limitation Act is also confined to matters enumerated therein. The time taken for obtaining a certified copy of the judgment is excluded because a certified copy is required to be filed while preferring an appeal/revision/review etc., challenging the impugned order. Thus a court is not permitted to read into Section 11A of the Act a provision for exclusion of time taken to obtain a certified copy of the judgment and order. The court has, therefore, no option but to compute the period of limitation for making an award in accordance with the provisions of Section 11A of the Act after excluding such period as can be excluded under the explanation to Section 11A of the Act." 7. The court has, therefore, no option but to compute the period of limitation for making an award in accordance with the provisions of Section 11A of the Act after excluding such period as can be excluded under the explanation to Section 11A of the Act." 7. A careful reading of Section 11-A along with paragraph-54 of the aforesaid judgment clearly goes to show that in the matter of computing the period of limitation, three situations should be kept in mind, namely (a) where the Limitation Act applies by its own force; (b) where the provisions of the Limitation Act with or without modifications are made applicable to a special statute; and (c) where the special statute itself prescribes the period of limitation and provides for extension of time and or condonation of delay. In the present case, the provisions of the Limitation Act cannot be applied. The reason being that the land acquisition officer, in making the award, does not act as a Court within the meaning of the Limitation Act. It can be clearly seen from the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act that the provisions of the Limitation Act have not been made applicable to the provisions under the Land Acquisition Act in the matter of making an award under Section 11-A of the Act. But Section 11-A of the Act provides a period of limitation within which the Collector shall make his award. Further, another aspect of the matter is that even the explanation to Section 11-A of the Act provides for exclusion of the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the declaration is stayed by an order of a court. Such being the position, there is no scope for importing into Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act the provisions of Section 12 of the Limitation Act. In view of that, the time taken for obtaining the certified copy of the order passed by this Court in Writ Petition No.3025 of 1990 dated 9.9.99 cannot be excluded to bring the case of the respondents for passing the award beyond the period of two years. Therefore, the argument of the respondents that three and half months time to receive the order of the Court should be excluded is far from acceptance. Therefore, the argument of the respondents that three and half months time to receive the order of the Court should be excluded is far from acceptance. As I have already held, when Section 11-A of the Act clearly gives a time of two years from the date of publication of the declaration to pass the award including the exclusion of the period of stay, if any, obtained by the landlord, the respondents have miserably failed to pass the award within two years. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the award to be valid in the eye of law was not passed in the present case within the statutory period prescribed under the Act, the entire land acquisition proceedings would lapse, inasmuch as there was no award in the eye of law. Accordingly, the writ petition stands allowed as prayed for and there shall be no order as to costs.