JUDGMENT (A.S. Oka, J.) Rule. The learned APP waives service for the Respondents. Forthwith taken up for final disposal. The challenge in this petition is to the order dated 22nd April, 2013 passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Police under clause (b) of Subsection (1) of Section 56 of the Bombay Police Act, 1951 (for short “the said Act”). The challenge is also to the order dated 15th July, 2013 passed by the Appellate Authority by which the order of the Deputy Commissioner has been confirmed. By the impugned order of the Deputy Commissioner, the Petitioner has been ordered to be externed from Pune City and Pune District for a period of two years. 2. The first submission of the learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner is that there is no subjective satisfaction recorded by the Deputy Commissioner that due to prejudicial activities of the Petitioner, witnesses are not willing to depose against the Petitioner. He relied upon a decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Yashwant Damodar Patil Vs. Hemant Karkare, Deputy Commissioner of Police, Thane and another (1989 Mh.L.J.)1111). Secondly, he submitted that the alleged prejudicial activities of the Petitioner are confined to the area falling within the jurisdiction of Wanavadi Police Station and, therefore, the order of externment which extends to the entire Pune District is certainly excessive. He placed reliance on an unreported Judgment of this Court in the case of AmjadAfjal Hussein Shaikh Vs. The State of Maharashtra (Cr. Writ Petition No.2930 of 2013). His third submission is based on the reliance placed in the show cause notice under Section 59 of the said Act on the in-camera statement of two witnesses. He urged that the date on which the in-camera statements have been recorded has not been disclosed both in the show cause notice and in the impugned order of externment passed by the Deputy Commissioner. He placed reliance on a decision of Division Bench of this Court in the case of Sunil Mani Shetty Vs. The Deputy Commissioner of Police and others (Cr. Writ Petition No.1583 of 2013). 3. We have given careful consideration to the submissions. The Deputy Commissioner has exercised power under clause (b) of Subsection (1) of Section 56 of the said Act. The Deputy Commissioner of Police and others (Cr. Writ Petition No.1583 of 2013). 3. We have given careful consideration to the submissions. The Deputy Commissioner has exercised power under clause (b) of Subsection (1) of Section 56 of the said Act. We have perused the show cause notice under Section 59 of the said Act issued by the Assistant Commissioner of Police on the basis of which impugned order of externment has been passed. In the said show cause notice, reliance has been placed on in-camera statements of two witnesses. It is alleged that considering the prejudicial activities of the Petitioner, members of the public are not willing to come forward as the witness to depose in public against the Petitioner. In the case of Yashwant Damodar Patil (Supra), in paragraph 5 of the said decision it is stated as thus : “5. ....... (1) If action is proposed to be taken against him on the ground that the proposed externee is engaged or is, about to be engaged in the commission of an offence involving force or violence, then he must be told so and he must also be informed that in the opinion of the officer witnesses are not willing to come forward to give evidence in public against him. (2) Similarly, if an action is proposed to be taken against the proposed externee on the ground that he is engaged or is likely to be engaged in the commission of offences punishable under Chapter XII or Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code, then he must be informed about the same and he must also be necessarily informed that witnesses are not coming forward to depose against him. (3) The fact that the proposed externee is engaged or is about to be engaged in one or the other type of the activity or movements in clauses (a) and (b) of Section 56(1) of the Bombay Police Act, is not sufficient by itself to warrant an order of externment. That fact, coupled with the opinion formed by the designated officer that witnesses are not willing to come forward to give evidence in public for the reasons mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) of section 56(1) of the Bombay Police Act, will provide a proper basis for the exercise of the power of externment under the provisions of the Act. That fact, coupled with the opinion formed by the designated officer that witnesses are not willing to come forward to give evidence in public for the reasons mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) of section 56(1) of the Bombay Police Act, will provide a proper basis for the exercise of the power of externment under the provisions of the Act. Thereafter, in paragraph 9, the Division Bench held thus:- “9. We have already, after examining the provisions of section 56(1) of the Bombay Police Act, held that in every case of acts involved on the part of the proposed externee, where an order of externment is proposed to be passed it is necessary that the officer concerned must be satisfied that witnesses are not willing to come forward to give evidence against him.” (underline added) 4. We have perused the impugned order dated 22nd April, 2013. Perusal of the impugned order shows that the Deputy Commissioner has not recorded the subjective satisfaction that the witnesses are not coming forward to give evidence in public against the Petitioner for the reasons mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) of Subsection (1) of Section 56. Satisfaction recorded by him is that due to terror created by the Petitioner, members of public are not showing courage of filing complaints with the police. This satisfaction recorded is completely different from the one which is required to be recorded while passing order on the grounds mentioned in Clauses (a) and (b) of Subsection (1) of Section 56 of the said Act. In fact, in the impugned order, there is no specific reference at all to the two in-camera statements which are referred to in the show cause notice which are based on allegation in the show cause notice. Therefore, in absence of satisfaction recorded as aforesaid, the impugned order is vitiated. Unless such subjective satisfaction is recorded, the exercise of powers of passing of order of externment under clauses (a) or (b) of Subsection (1) of Section 56 cannot be made. We have perused the order of the Appellate Authority. In clause (g) of the said judgment and order, the Appellate Authority has relied upon the on in-camera statements of the witnesses. We have perused the order of the Appellate Authority. In clause (g) of the said judgment and order, the Appellate Authority has relied upon the on in-camera statements of the witnesses. Though the Deputy Commissioner who passed the order of externment has not at all referred to the in-camera statements of the two witnesses in his order, the Appellate Authority has chosen to rely upon the in-camera statements of the witnesses. Therefore, approach of the Appellate Authority is completely erroneous. The duty of the Appellate Authority was to test whether the subjective satisfaction recorded by the Externing Authority was legal and proper. The Appellate Authority could not have supplemented his own reasons for upholding the order of the Deputy Commissioner. 5. The other contention is that the date on which in-camera statements were recorded is not set out in the show cause notice and the impugned order. Reliance has been placed on the decision of the Division Bench in the case of Sunil Mani Shetty (Supra). Paragraph 7 of the said decision reads thus :- “7. It is seen from the impugned order that its foundation is constituted by statements of three witnesses recorded confidentially and some criminal cases pending against the petitioner. Show cause notice, a copy of which is available vide Exhibit-A, page 13 of the record, also refers to the same material. It is no where mentioned in either the show cause notice or the impugned order as to on what date the statements of witnesses (A), (B) & (C) were recorded. It is also particularly seen that the places of incidents as referred by these three witnesses have not been either properly described or have been described in such a manner as to lead no clue whatsoever regarding the exact area or the location where the alleged incidents took place. These inadequacies, in our opinion, are material in nature and have caused prejudice to the defence of the petitioner. In the absence of dates on which the statements of witnesses were recorded, it cannot be said that sufficient opportunity was given to the petitioner to meet out case sought to be made against him.” (underline added) 6. In the present case, perusal of the show cause notice shows that all material particulars including the date and time of alleged incidents have been incorporated in the in-camera statements. In the present case, perusal of the show cause notice shows that all material particulars including the date and time of alleged incidents have been incorporated in the in-camera statements. The incidents are of 15th December, 2012 and 31st December, 2012 respectively and the show cause notice has been issued on 28th January, 2013. We find that all material particulars of the alleged prejudicial activities forming part of the in-camera statements of the witnesses have been set out in the show cause notice. In the facts of the case, the show cause notice has been given within a period of a month or so from the specific dates of the incidents mentioned in the in-camera statements. Whether the failure to give particulars such as date on which in-camera statements are recorded in the show cause notice will by itself amount to breach of principles of natural justice will depend on facts of each case. In the present case, the show cause notice has been issued in reasonable proximity of the dates of incidents specifically mentioned in the in-camera statements. The dates of the alleged incidents and material particulars have been set out in the show cause notice. Therefore, in the facts of the case, on this ground, the impugned order of externment cannot be set aside. 7. Now, we deal with the third ground, based on the submission that the order is excessive. The submission of the learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner is that all the prejudicial activities alleged against the Petitioner are confined to territorial limits of Wanavadi Police Station at Pune and, therefore, there is no reason to extend the order of externment to a very large area of Pune District. Reliance has been placed on the unreported decision of this Court in the case of Shri Amjad Afjal Hussein Shaikh Vs. The State of Maharashtra and others and in particular what is held in paragraph 8 of the said Judgment and order. The relevant part of paragraph 8 of the said decision reads thus :- “8. There remains the question of the territorial extent of the Externment Orders. All six offences said to have been registered against the Petitioner are only at Wanwadi Police Station. Yet the Petitioner has been purported to be externed from Pune City and Pune District. We find this to be excessive and wholly unjustified. There remains the question of the territorial extent of the Externment Orders. All six offences said to have been registered against the Petitioner are only at Wanwadi Police Station. Yet the Petitioner has been purported to be externed from Pune City and Pune District. We find this to be excessive and wholly unjustified. There is nothing in either the Externment Order or the Appellate Order to show that the Petitioner's externment from such a large area was necessary.” (underline added) 8. The law on this aspect has been laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Pandharinath Shridhar Rangnekar Vs. Deputy Commissioner of Police (AIR 1973 S.C.630) Paragraphs 15 and 16 of the said decision read thus :- “15. As regards the last point, it is primarily for the externing authority to decide how best the externment order can be made effective, so as to sub-serve its real purpose. How long, within the statutory limit of 2 years fixed by Section 58, the order shall operate and to what territories, within the statutory limitations of Section 56 it should extend, are matters which must depend for their decision on the nature of the data which the authority is able to collect in the externment proceedings. There are cases and cases and therefore no general formulation can be made that the order of externment must always be restricted to the area to which the illegal activities of the externee extend. A larger area may conceivably have to be comprised within the externment order so as to isolate the externee from his moorings. 16. An excessive order can undoubtedly be struck down because no greater restraint on personal liberty can be permitted than is reasonable in the circumstances of the case. The decision of the Bombay High Court in 71 Bom LR 79 = ( AIR 1969 Bom 351 ) is an instance in point where an externment order was set aside on the ground that it was far wider than was justified by the exigencies of the case. The activities of the externee therein were confined to the city of Pandharpur and yet the externment order covered an area as extensive as the districts of Sholapur, Satara and Poona. These areas are far widely removed from the locality in which the externee had committed but two supposedly illegal acts. The activities of the externee therein were confined to the city of Pandharpur and yet the externment order covered an area as extensive as the districts of Sholapur, Satara and Poona. These areas are far widely removed from the locality in which the externee had committed but two supposedly illegal acts. The exercise of the power was therefore arbitrary and excessive, the order having been passed without reference to the purpose of the externment.” (underline added) 9. Thus, the law laid down by the Apex Court is that no general principle can be laid down that an order of externment must always be restricted to the area in which the externee is indulging in the illegal activities. In a given case, depending upon the peculiar facts of the case, the order of externment need not be restricted to the area in which the externee is carrying on prejudicial activities. There may be cases where prejudicial activities are being carried out in a particular district and a geographically contiguous district is shown to be intimately connected to the said district. Considering the propensity of the externee and the nature and extent of prejudicial activities carried out by him, the order of externment can be extended to such intimately connected area provided subjective satisfaction is recorded by the Externing Authority of existence of necessity of extending the order to the larger area. In the case of Pandharinath Shridhar Rangnekar (supra), while making a reference to the city of Mumbai, in paragraph 17, the Apex Court observed thus :- “17. But Balu Shivling's case furnishes no analogy in the instant matter. A vast city like Bombay presents its own peculiar problems of law and order. It has an ever-growing industrial complex and the city has spread its arms far and wide. A fair proportion of its teeming population is mobile, with large multitudes streaming in and out of the city in the pursuit of their daily avocations. An order of externment restricted to the particular area chosen by the externee for his unlawful activities and to a small periphery thereof would in such circumstances fail of its true purpose. It would be impossible to secure obedience to such an order and its enforcement would raise practical problems which would impair the efficacy of the order. An order of externment restricted to the particular area chosen by the externee for his unlawful activities and to a small periphery thereof would in such circumstances fail of its true purpose. It would be impossible to secure obedience to such an order and its enforcement would raise practical problems which would impair the efficacy of the order. An order in the instant case if restricted, say, to the areas within the jurisdiction of the Vile Parle police station and its periphery would not serve its purpose. Rather than solving a problem of law and order, it would create yet one more.” (underline added) 10. The observations made by the Apex Court above about 40 years back will now apply to the City of Pune as well. In fact, the Apex Court quoted with approval to the orders passed by this Court by which the orders of externment extending to Bombay and Thane Districts were upheld on the ground that the said two districts were intimately connected by several fast and easy modes of transport. 11. In the facts of the case, the Competent Authority has recorded in the impugned order that for the period between 23rd December, 2011 to 23rd September, 2012, the Petitioner was externed from Pune city and Pune district. During the said period of externment, he entered the district and city and five offences have been recorded against him during the period of externment. Therefore, in the facts of the case, the order cannot be said to be excessive. Moreover, the observations of the Apex Court in the case of Pandharinath(Supra) in paragraph 17 thereof will certainly apply with all force to the city of Pune. During the last two decades, the City of Pune has spread its arms far and wide. Contiguous to Pune City is the Municipal Corporation area of Pimpri and Chinchwad, which is a growing industrial area. The growth of Pune City has now crossed beyond the Municipal Corporation limits. Therefore, in the facts of the case, the view taken by the Authority to extend the order to entire Pune district cannot be faulted with. In the facts of the case, restricting the order to a smaller area would impair the efficacy of the order. The growth of Pune City has now crossed beyond the Municipal Corporation limits. Therefore, in the facts of the case, the view taken by the Authority to extend the order to entire Pune district cannot be faulted with. In the facts of the case, restricting the order to a smaller area would impair the efficacy of the order. We find that the decision in the case of AmjadAfjal Hussein Shaikh (supra) has been rendered by the Division Bench in the facts of the case before it and what continues to bind this Court is the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Pandharinath. Therefore, on the ground of being excessive, the impugned order of externment cannot be set aside. 12. However, on the ground of failure to record subjective satisfaction as required by Subsection (1) of Section 56 of the said Act, the impugned order will have to be quashed and set aside. Accordingly, we pass the following order:- ORDER (i) Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer clause (B) which reads thus:- “(B) After perusing the records and proceedings the Order dated 15.7.2013 passed by the Respondent No.3 i.e. the Learned Principal Secretary, Home Department, Mumbai arising out of the Externment Order No.11 of 2013 dated 22.04.2013 passed by the Respondent No.2 i.e the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Zone IV, Pune City be quashed and set aside.” (ii) All concerned to act upon an authenticated copy of this order.