JUDGMENT Mr. Ajay Kumar Mittal, J.: - This order shall dispose of a bunch of 24 cases being Civil Writ Petition Nos.12780 to 12787, 16025 to 16034, 4842 to 4845 of 1996, 4688 of 1997 and 2865 of 1998 as learned counsel for the parties are agreed that identical question of law and facts are involved in all these cases. However, the facts are being extracted from CWP No.16032 of 1996, which may be briefly noticed. 2. The relevant facts as narrated in CWP No.16032 of 1996 are that the petitioner – Bhiwani Improvement Trust, Bhiwani framed a scheme No.5 namely Kamla Nagar for an area measuring 17180 square yards in the year 1970. Notification under Section 36 of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922 (in short, “the Act”) was published in Part III of the Haryana Government Gazette in three consecutive issues dated 18th August, 25th August and Ist September 1970. The said scheme was sanctioned by the State Government under Section 41 of the Act which was followed by notification under Section 42(1) of the Act on 26.7.1971. Thereafter, the scheme was sent to the Land Acquisition Collector for acquisition of land. A survey plan of the area under acquisition was prepared by the petitioner which was published for invitation of objections. Compensation at the rate of Rs.20/- per square yard was claimed by respondent Nos. 2, 5,6 and 7 for acquisition of their land. The Land Acquisition Collector after examining the matter in detail announced the award dated 10.1.1973 fixing compensation at the rate of Rs.1/- per square yard plus 15% on account of compulsory acquisition and left the question of title to be determined by the Court under section 30 of the Act. Thereafter, the land owners submitted their references under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to the Tribunal constituted under Section 60 of the Act for the purpose of performing the function of Court. The Tribunal gave its award dated 4.8.1995, Annexure P.3, enhancing the compensation from Rs.1/- per square yard to Rs.20/- per square yard alongwith 30% solatium on the amount increased alongwith interest at the rate of 9% per annum for the first year from the date of taking possession of the land and at the rate of 15% per annum from the subsequent period till the date of payment alongwith other statutory benefits and costs. Aggrieved thereby, the Bhiwani Improvement Trust, Bhiwani is before this Court through the present petition alongwith connected petitions seeking quashing of the said award. In some of the writ petitions, award had been announced on 24.7.1995 by the Tribunal which has been assailed therein on similar grounds. Not satisfied with the awards, the claimants have also filed separate writ petitions. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner – Bhiwani Improvement Trust, Bhiwani submitted that the awards dated 24.7.1995 and 4.8.1995 were passed by an authority who was not competent to pass the same as under the Act, the Tribunal which is empowered to adjudicate the reference is consisted of the President and two assessors as required under Section 60 of the Act. Learned counsel for the petitioner while relying upon Division Bench judgment of this Court in Avtar Singh and others v. The District Judge, Rupnagar and others, [2011(4) Law Herald (P&H) (DB) 3795] : 2012(1) PLR 581 submitted that the issue stands concluded by the aforesaid decision. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submitted that the two assessors were nominated by the trust namely Shri Amar Lal Hans and Shri Sham Lal Sharma. The appointment of Shri Sham Lal Sharma had been duly made and accordingly the notification was issued in his name. According to the learned counsel, the awards which had been signed were by Shri Sham Lal Aggarwal who was a different person. 4. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents with reference to Section 65 of the Act submitted that the President was authorised and competent to adjudicate the reference and therefore, the plea of the petitioner requires to be rejected. It was argued that the assessor who had signed the award was validly appointed assessor and he had rightly exercised that jurisdiction. 5. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, the writ petitions deserve to succeed. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner referred to the orders attached collectively as Annexure P.6. Interim order dated 4.8.1995 reads thus:- “Arguments completed. I have also consulted the Assessors. Vide separate judgment of even date, the claim of Govind Ram and Shayam Sunder is dismissed, while LRs of Ram Sarup namely Sushila etc. and claimants Ram Piari and Shiv Narain and rival claimant Amar Nath awarded compensation at a rate of Rs.20/- per square yard alongwith interest and solatium mentioned in the judgment. I have also consulted the Assessors. Vide separate judgment of even date, the claim of Govind Ram and Shayam Sunder is dismissed, while LRs of Ram Sarup namely Sushila etc. and claimants Ram Piari and Shiv Narain and rival claimant Amar Nath awarded compensation at a rate of Rs.20/- per square yard alongwith interest and solatium mentioned in the judgment. Memo of costs be prepared and the file be consigned to the record room.” 7. Examining relevant provisions of the Act, reference is made to Sections 60 and 65 of the Act which read thus:- “60. Constitution of Tribunal.-(1) The tribunal shall consists of a president and two assessors. (2) The president of the tribunal shall be a person qualified for appointment as a Judge of the High Court. (3) The president of the tribunal and one of the assessors shall be appointed by the State Government and the other assessors shall be appointed by the municipal committee or, in default of appointment by the municipal committee within two months of their being required by the State Government to make such appointment, by the State Government: xx xx xx xx xx xx (4) xx xx xx xx (5) xx xx xx xx (6) xx xx xx xx” “65. Award to tribunal how to be determined. (1) For the purpose of determining the award to be made by the tribunal under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. (a) If there is any disagreement as to the measurement of land, or to the amount of compensation or costs to be allowed, the opinion of the majority of the members of the tribunal shall prevail; (b) notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing clause, the decision on all questions of law and title and procedure shall rest solely with the president of the tribunal and such questions may be tried and decided by the president in the absence of assessors unless the president considers their presence necessary. (c) The President of the Tribunal may record evidence on any matter in the absence of assessors unless he considers their presence necessary (2) Every award of the tribunal, and every order made by the tribunal for the payment of money, shall be enforced by a Court of Small Causes, or if there be no such Court, by the Senior Sub-Judge within the local limits of whose jurisdiction it was made as if it were a decree of that Court.” 8. Section 60 of the Act provides for the constitution of the Tribunal. According to it, the Tribunal is to consist of a President and two assessors. Under Sub-section (2), the President of the Tribunal shall be a person qualified for appointment as a Judge of the High Court. Sub-section (3) mandates that the President and one of the assessor shall be appointed by the State Government whereas the other assessor shall be appointed by the Municipal Committee. However, when Municipal Committee defaults in appointing the assessor within two months on being required by the State Government, the State Government is empowered to make appointment of the second assessor as well. 9. Under Section 65 of the Act, the procedure for pronouncing the award has been enumerated. Wherever there is any disagreement relating to the measurement of the land or the amount of compensation or the costs to be allowed, the opinion of the majority of the members shall prevail. However, on the question of law, title and procedure, the decision of the President of the Tribunal shall be final. The President of the Tribunal can validly try and decide all such questions and record evidence on any matter even in the absence of the assessors unless the President considers their presence as necessary. 10. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Paras 7, 8 and 9 of the judgment in Karnal Improvement Trust, Karnal v. Parkash Wanti (dead), 1995(5) SCC 159 recorded as under:- “7. The award of the Tribunal has been designated to be the award of the Court and the Tribunal is the Court and each member is entitled to his own opinion in determination of the compensation or measurements of the land. The Chairperson as a Civil Judge is empowered to sign the award on behalf of the Tribunal. In case of difference of opinion, the majority opinion of the members shall be the decree of the Tribunal. The Chairperson as a Civil Judge is empowered to sign the award on behalf of the Tribunal. In case of difference of opinion, the majority opinion of the members shall be the decree of the Tribunal. The mandatory quorum, therefore, is three members and the award of the Tribunal is a decree of a civil court. The President also is a member of the Tribunal and everyone of them is liable to be removed for any of the grounds enumerated in s.10.Each member qua discharge of the functions is an independent member. Mere fact that the President will record the evidence, in the absence of the assessors, or that he is given power to preside over the Tribunal and to compel the presence of the witnesses or to secure the evidence does not per force minimise or undermine the composition of, continuance and functions of the assessors as members of the Tribunal. Temporary absence of a member including President, may entail, by implication, his removal and appointment of a substitute member, which would reinforce that in the discharge of the functions as a member, the presence and participation of each member of the Tribunal should be mandatory, unless his absence becomes unavoidable and beyond his control. Take for instance, absence due to being out of station. The power to record evidence in the absence of the assessors does not clothe the President with the power to decide himself the question of compensation or measurement of land as sole member Tribunal. When the Tribunal consists of three members, the opinion has to be of the composite body, and not of the sole President. The power vested in the President to decide questions of law and title and procedure does not undermine the position of assessor members of the Tribunal and other matters. The President need not necessarily be a local man. He may be a judicial office drafted from the service of the respective State; and the assessors, by implication, may be only local men having acquaintance with the prevailing prices of the land. The President must be necessity be either judicial trained or administratively experienced person. When the Tribunal determines compensation or dispute as the extent of the land acquired or of the quality of the land under acquisition, the decision is that of the Tribunal. In case of difference of opinion, the majority view would be the executable decree. The President must be necessity be either judicial trained or administratively experienced person. When the Tribunal determines compensation or dispute as the extent of the land acquired or of the quality of the land under acquisition, the decision is that of the Tribunal. In case of difference of opinion, the majority view would be the executable decree. In other words, it indicates that it is a three-member statutory body and does not consist of the presiding Judge only. He is left with no option but has to associate the other member in determining the compensation of the acquired land for the trust or its nature or extent. Any other interpretation would be inconsistent with and derogatory to the scheme, purpose and intendment of the Act. The presence and participation of each member in the adjudication of the compensation or measurement or quality of land, is of necessity mandatory. The Tribunal will have the assistance of the counsel for the trust and of the claimant or/and counsel for the claimant, if any, engaged by the claimant in determining the compensation or for the measurement and quality of the land. It would, therefore, be clear that all the three members should be present and should participate at the time of enquiry unless unavoidable, hear the matter on merits and the decision of the Tribunal, if not unanimous and if there be difference of opinion, be as per the majority. 8. In other words, the award and the decree are that of the Tribunal and not that of the Presiding Judge alone, though the President signs the award. In case of difference of opinion, the opinion of each member is a judgment but the enforceable award and decree are that of the majority. 9. Admittedly, the assessors did not take any active part in the cases at hand in hearing the argument and President has recorded that “they told the undersigned that I should hear the arguments by myself. Today neither of these two assessors is present. It appears they are not interested in hearing the arguments”. This is dereliction of the statutory duty enjoined by the Act defeating the purpose of the Act. The award prepared and signed by the President is that of the President, as he says, it is not an award of the Tribunal. Today neither of these two assessors is present. It appears they are not interested in hearing the arguments”. This is dereliction of the statutory duty enjoined by the Act defeating the purpose of the Act. The award prepared and signed by the President is that of the President, as he says, it is not an award of the Tribunal. Thus the decree is not that of the Tribunal, which alone is executable in a Court of Small Causes or senior Sub- Judge.” 11. Further, the issue was finally settled with the following observations:- “11. There is distinction between ministerial acts and statutory or quasi-judicial functions under the statute. When the statute requires that some-thing should be done or in a particular manner or form, without expressly declaring what shall be the consequence of noncompliance, the question often arise; What intention is to be attributed by inference to the legislature? It has been repeatedly said that no particular rule can be laid down in determining whether the command is to be considered as a mere direction or mandatory involving invalidating consequences in its disregard. It is fundamental that it depends on the scope and object of the enactment. Nullification is the natural and usual consequence of disobedience, if the intention is of an imperative character. The question in the main is governed by considerations of the object and purpose of the Act; convenience and justice and the result that would ensue. General inconvenience or injustice to innocent persons or advantage to those guilty of the neglect, without promoting the real aim and object of the enactment would be kept at the back of the mind. The scope and purpose of the statute under consideration must be regarded as an integral scheme. The general rule is that an absolute enactment must be obeyed or fulfilled exactly but it is sufficient if a directory enactment be obeyed or fulfilled substantially. When a public duty, as held before, is imposed and statute requires that is shall be performed in a certain manner or within a certain time or under other specified conditions, such prescriptions may well be regarded as intended to be directory only in cases when injustice or inconvenience to others who have no control over those exercising the duty would result if such requirements are not essential and imperative. 12. 12. The question thus arises whether the function by the Tribunal as a body is mandatory or directory? The discharge of the duties under the Act are quasi-judicial. The power to determine compensation and other questions involves adjudication. The discharge of the functions by the Tribunal being quasi-judicial cannot be regarded as ministerial. When the statute directs the Tribunal consisting of three members to determine compensation etc., and’ designates the award as judgment and decree of the civil court, it cannot be held that the quasi-judicial functions of the Tribunal would be considered as directory, defeating the very purpose of the Act. Though inconvenience and delay may occasion in some cases by holding the provisions to be mandatory, but that is an inescapable consequence. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, it must be held that the adjudication by the three-member Tribunal is imperative and mandatory. Determination of the compensation in disregard thereof renders the adjudication void, invalid and in operative.” 12. In Avtar Singh’s case (supra), identical issue was considered by this Court and following the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Karnal Improvement Trust, Karnal’s case (supra), this Court took the view that the President alone was not competent to pass the award. It was held as under:- “8. In view of the binding precedent of Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Parkash Wanti’s case (supra) while interpreting Sections 60 and 65 of the Act as also the aforementioned Division Bench judgments of this Court, we are constrained to hold that the award did not satisfy the requirement of law. The President alone who has announced the award was not competent to do so.” 13. Admittedly, in the present case, the President of the Tribunal had recorded the evidence and had also heard the arguments. The award was also announced by him alone. The President had only made discussion with the assessors. A perusal of the interim order dated 4.8.1995 quoted above shows that the President had only consulted the assessors and had not decided the issue alongwith them as constituting the Tribunal. 14. In view of the above, all the writ petitions are allowed. The impugned awards dated 24.7.1995 and 4.8.1995 are set aside. The matter is remanded to the Tribunal for passing fresh order in accordance with law. 14. In view of the above, all the writ petitions are allowed. The impugned awards dated 24.7.1995 and 4.8.1995 are set aside. The matter is remanded to the Tribunal for passing fresh order in accordance with law. Since the matter is old, it is directed that the Tribunal shall decide the same afresh expeditiously within six months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order. ---------0.B.S.0------------