FOOD CORPORATION OF INDIA v. ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, DEHRADUN
2013-01-15
B.S.VERMA
body2013
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT Hon’ble B.S. Verma, J. Since the controversy involved in all the four writ petitions is similar, between the same parties, therefore, for the sake of convenience, they are being decided by this common judgment. 2. By means of these writ petitions, the petitioner- Food Corporation of India has sought writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing the impugned orders passed by the appellate Court as well as the Prescribed Authority. 3. Learned counsel for both the parties have agreed that these petitions be disposed of at admission stage since there is no factual dispute and only legal questions are to be decided. 4. Briefly stated the facts giving rise to the present writ petition are that proceeding against the respondent no. 3 Umesh Chandra Gupta was initiated under Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, who was working as Assistant Grade II (D) in Depot Rishikesh, district Dehradun. He was suspended by the order dated 31-3-1986 and he remained under suspension with effect from 1-4-1986 to 16-3-1987 when he joined his service in pursuance to the order passed by the Allahabad High Court dated 12-3-1987 by which the suspension order was quashed. 5. The respondent no. 3 joined on 17-3-1987 and he was transferred from Rishikesh to Gorakhpur by order dated 20-6-1987. Instead of joining at his new place of posting, the respondent no. 3 proceeded on leave and he made a representation for amendment in his transfer order. 6. Again, he was transferred from Rishikesh to Hapur and thereafter he was compulsorily retired from service on 29-12-1990. 7. According to the petitioners, the respondent no.3 Sri Umesh Chandra Gupta filed four cases before the Prescribed Authority/Deputy Labour Commissioner under the Payment of Wages Act and claimed his entitlement including arrears of pay etc. under different heads as mentioned in the applications. 8. It appears that the employer/F.C.I. did not put in appearance after filing its written statement in the case before the learned Labour Commissioner, therefore, the cases proceeded ex parte against the petitioners and, ultimately, by order dated 22-11-1991, the Prescribed Authority allowed the applications moved by the respondent no.3 and directed the F.C.I. to pay the amounts as detailed in the order. 9. Aggrieved by the order passed by the Prescribed Authority, the petitioners filed recall application, which too was dismissed by order dated 29-7-1992. Further aggrieved, the petitioners preferred Misc.
9. Aggrieved by the order passed by the Prescribed Authority, the petitioners filed recall application, which too was dismissed by order dated 29-7-1992. Further aggrieved, the petitioners preferred Misc. Civil Appeals bearing M.C.A. Nos. 108 of 1992, 110 of 1992 101 of 1993 and 103 of 1993 before the appellate Court and assailed the order passed by the Prescribed Authority as well as the order of rejection of recall applications, which were ultimately heard by and decided by the Additional District Judge Dehradun. The learned appellate Court did not find favour with the petitioners and by a detailed judgment dismissed the appeals by order dated 28-2-1995 and upheld the orders appealed against, which gave rise to the present writ petitions. 10. Counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondent no. 3. In paragraph no. 5 thereof, the respondent no. 3 has stated that after the judgment in appal by the court of Additional District Judge, Dehradun, the answering respondent has received the payment claimed by him from the office of Deputy Labour Commissioner Dehradun as the petitioner has not raised any objection against the release of the payment to the answering respondent. In paragraph no. 13 which is in reply to contents of paragraph no. 15 of the writ petition, the answering respondent has stated that in fact Section 18 of the U.P. Shops and Commercial Establishment Act 1962 has a provision that the payments deducted or not paid to any employee shall be dealt with according to the provision of Payment of Wages Act and therefore, the claim of the respondent no. 3 has been rightly decreed in his favour. It was further stated that there is no such limit of Rs. 1600 in the U.P. Shops and Commercial Establishment Act. 11. Despite sufficient opportunity granted to the petitioners, no rejoinder affidavit has been filed on behalf of the petitioners. As such the counter version on material issue has remained uncontroverted in the present writ petitions particularly so far as applicability of Section 18 of the U.P. Shops and Commercial Establishsment Act is concerned. 12. During the course of arguments, learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr. Yogesh Pande, Advocate has not given much emphasis on the ex parte order passed by the Prescribed Authority.
12. During the course of arguments, learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr. Yogesh Pande, Advocate has not given much emphasis on the ex parte order passed by the Prescribed Authority. Even otherwise since the petitioners have put in appearance and filed their written statement but thereafter, the petitioners-defendants did not contest the cases any more. In such circumstances, the Prescribed Authority has rightly decreed the claim of the respondent no.3 and also rightly dismissed the recall application. The learned appellate Court has affirmed the orders passed by the learned Prescribed Authority. 13. In the last the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has raised a legal question, which had already been raised before the learned appellate Court and has contended that since the wages of the respondent no.3 were more than Rs. 1,600/-per month, therefore, the proceedings could not be initiated under the Payment of Wages Act against the employer. Learned counsel in support of his argument has placed reliance upon the case of Merind Ltd. and another Vs. Prescribed Authority (Under Payment of Wages Act) and Assistant Labour Commissioner and another [ 2009(122) FLR, 272]. In that case the Allahabad High Court has considered the provisions of Payment of Wages Act, 1936. The Allahabad High Court in paragraph no. 14 has observed as under: “14. From perusal of provisions of Section 1 of the 1936 Act it appears that by virtue of Sub-section (4) of the said Section the provisions of the 1936 Act applied in the first instance to the payment of wages to persons employed, in any factory, to persons employed otherwise than a factory, upon any railway by a Railway Administration either directly or through a sub-contractor and to persons employed in an industrial or other establishment specified in sub-clause (a) to (g) to Clause (ii) of Section 2 of the said Act. Besides this, Clause (5) of Section 1 of the 1936 Act further authorizes the State Government to extend the provisions of said Act or any of them to the payment of wages to any class of persons employed in any establishment or class of establishment specified by Central Government or State Government under sub-clause (h) of Clause (ii) of Section 2 of the 1936 Act. However, Sub-section (6) of Section 1 prescribes wage limit for applicability of the provisions of the 1936 Act to the employees drawing wages to the extent of Rs.
However, Sub-section (6) of Section 1 prescribes wage limit for applicability of the provisions of the 1936 Act to the employees drawing wages to the extent of Rs. 1600/- per month and class of employees referred hereinbefore drawing wages exceeding sixteen hundred rupees per month are excluded from the operation of the provisions of the 1936 Act.” 14. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent no.3 in reply has submitted that it is the positive case of the respondent no. 3 that the respondent is a workman and the defendant-petitioners are an industry and the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act and U.P. Dookan Evam Vanijya Adhishan Adhiniyam 1962 are applicable to the claimant-respondent no.3. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 3 has contended that only the recovery of the arrears of salary and other dues has to be made under the Payment of Wages Act. Section 18 of U.P. Shops and Commercial Establishment Act reads as under: “18. The wages of an employee, if not paid as provided by order this Act, shall be recoverable in the manner as provided in the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 as if the same wages were payable under that Act.” 15. Learned counsel for the respondent no.3 further submitted that in the Shops and Commercial Establishment Act it is specifically provided under Section 3(1) of that Act that the payment of wages Act does not apply to the employees governed by the same. Learned counsel for the respondent no.3 thus argued that only for the purposes of recovery of arrears of salary and other dues the provisions of the Payment of Wages Act can be invoked. 16. In support of his argument, learned counsel for the respondent no.3 has placed reliance upon the case of Life Insurance Corporation of India Vs. Special Judge (Anti-Corruption), Varanasi and others [2000(84) FLR, 147] decided on 1-10-1999. In that case, the Allahabad High Court had occasion to consider the provisions of Section 1(6) of the Payment of Wages Act and Section 18 of the U.P. Dookan Aur Vanijya Adhisthan Adhiniyam, 1962.
Special Judge (Anti-Corruption), Varanasi and others [2000(84) FLR, 147] decided on 1-10-1999. In that case, the Allahabad High Court had occasion to consider the provisions of Section 1(6) of the Payment of Wages Act and Section 18 of the U.P. Dookan Aur Vanijya Adhisthan Adhiniyam, 1962. Before the Allahabad High Court it was stated on behalf of the respondents that entitlement was under the U.P. Dukan Aur Vanijya Adhishthan Adhiniyam, 1962 and that the said Act in its Section 18 provides that wages of an employee if not paid as provided by or under the said Act, shall be recoverable in the manner provided in the Payment of Wages Act, as if the same wages were payable under that Act. 17. In that case, in paragraph no.11 it has been observed as under: “11. With regard to third objection of the petitioner also I find force in the contention of the learned counsel for respondent. A perusal of the relevant provision of Payment of Wages Act and those of U.P. Dookan Aur Vanijya Adhisthan Adhiniyam, 1962 clearly indicates that in view of wages payable to the workman concerned, Payment of Wages Act even if not applicable, the same does not render the concerned proceeding irregular. 18. The Allahabad High Court also observed in paragraph 12 as under: “12. The provision of Section 18 of U.P. Dookan Aur Vanijya Adhisthan Adhiniyam clearly shows that wages of the employees, if not paid, shall be recoverable in the manner provided in the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 as if the same wages were payable under that Act. There in the present case application under the Payment of Wages Act was very much available to the workman and upon his death to his heirs.” 19. It may be mentioned here that in the case of Merind Ltd. (supra), the Allahabad Hitgh Court has considered the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, Minimum Wages Act and that of Payment of Wages Act but the provisions of Section 18 of the U.P. Shops and Commercial Establishment Act were not considered. Therefore, this Court is of the view that the case-law relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners is of no help to them. 20.
Therefore, this Court is of the view that the case-law relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners is of no help to them. 20. It is also pertinent to mention here that it is not the case or objection of the petitioners that the respondent no.3 was not governed by the provisions of the U.P. Dookan Aur Vanijya Adhishthan Adhiniyam, 1962. Even in these writ petitions no such ground has been taken on behalf of the petitioners that provisions of Section 18 of the said Act are not applicable to the case of the respondent no.3. The main ground of challenge raised in the petitions is that the salary of the respondent no.3 was more than Rs. 1600/- per month, therefore, the provisions of the Payment of Wages act are not applicable and the Prescribed Authority should not have entertained the applications of the respondent No.3. 21. I have pondered over the matter. 22. From a bare perusal of the order dated 26-4-1993 it is evident that after filing the written statement, none has turned up from the side of the petitioners to contest the cases before the Prescribed Authority despite the fact that as many as 28 dates were fixed in the matter. Moreover, the learned appellate Court has elaborately dealt with the entire controversy involved in the present writ petitions and in paragraph no. 26 the appellate Court has held as under: “26. In view of the discussions made above, it is clear that the claimant being the drawer of salary of Rs. 1600/- in a month is entitled to file the suit under the Payment of Wages Act.” 23. Having considered the relevant provisions of Section 18 of the U.P. Dookan Aur Vanijya Adhishthan Adhiniyam, 1962 read with Section 1(6) of the Payment of Wages act, 1936, and on perusal of the entire material placed before this Court, I am of the view that the respondent no.3 was entitled to file a suit under the Payment of Wages Act irrespective of the fact that he was drawing salary of more than Rs. 1600/- per month in view of the provisions of Section 18 of the U.P. Shops and Commercial Establishment Act. The impugned orders passed by the two courts below do not suffer from any perversity or manifest error of law or jurisdictional error. 24.
1600/- per month in view of the provisions of Section 18 of the U.P. Shops and Commercial Establishment Act. The impugned orders passed by the two courts below do not suffer from any perversity or manifest error of law or jurisdictional error. 24. For the reasons and discussion above, the writ petitions being devoid of merit are liable to be dismissed outright. 25. The writ petitions are dismissed. Costs easy.