Research › Search › Judgment

Madras High Court · body

2013 DIGILAW 2524 (MAD)

A. Munusamy v. Labour Inspector, Chennai

2013-07-18

D.HARIPARANTHAMAN

body2013
JUDGMENT :- 1. The petitioners are all working in the lorries carrying Garbage for disposal by the Corporation of Chennai. 2. According to the petitioners, they are working from 2008 onwards. They are not regularized in service. They moved the Inspector of Labour, the first respondent, under the Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishments (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act, 1981, claiming permanency. The first respondent dismissed the application in Na.Ka.No.1982/2011, seeking permanency by an order dated 27.7.2012 on the ground that he is not the competent authority and on the other hand, the Deputy Chief Inspector of Factories is the competent authority under the aforesaid Act to adjudicate the matter relating to permanency. 3. In view of the aforesaid order of the first respondent, the petitioners approached the Deputy Chief Inspector of Factories by their application, dated 13.8.2012. The Deputy Chief Inspector of Factories rejected their application by his order, dated 11.10.2012 on the ground that he is not the competent authority to enquire into the matter. It is stated that the petitioners are not employees covered under the Factories Act. 4. In the circumstances, the petitioners once again approached the first respondent on 30.4.2013. The first respondent passed the impugned order in Na.Ka.No.240/13, dated 5.7.2013 rejecting the application stating that already he rejected the application on an earlier occasion by order dated 27.7.2012 and therefore, this application cannot be entertained. 5. This writ petition is filed against the aforesaid order, dated 5.7.2013 of the first respondent. 6. Heard both sides. 7. Section 2(3) of the Act defines "industrial establishment". As per Section 2(3)(c), a motor transport undertaking as defined in clause (g) of section 2 of the Motor Transport Workers Act is an industrial establishment. The establishment, wherein the petitioners are working, is a motor transport undertaking as per Section 2(g) of the Motor Transport Workers Act. 8. The notification issued by the Government in G.O.Ms.No.134, Labour and Employment, dated 16.8.1999 under Section 4(1) of the Act is produced. As per the notification, the first respondent is the Inspector to enquire into the matter of permanency for the Chennai area. 9. The learned counsel for the petitioners has relied on a judgment of the Apex Court in Municipal Council, Raipur and another Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh reported in 1970 II LLJ 40 (SC). As per the notification, the first respondent is the Inspector to enquire into the matter of permanency for the Chennai area. 9. The learned counsel for the petitioners has relied on a judgment of the Apex Court in Municipal Council, Raipur and another Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh reported in 1970 II LLJ 40 (SC). Hence it is submitted that the impugned order is bad and the matter has to be remitted back to the first respondent to entertain the application of the petitioners on merits and in accordance with law and to pass orders thereon. 10. The learned Special Government Pleader has no objection for sending the matter to the first respondent to decide in accordance with law. 11. Though the learned counsel for the Corporation has initially opposed, later he also has no objection for remitting the matter back to the first respondent to decide the matter in accordance with law. 12. I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioners. 13. Section 2(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishments (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act, is extracted hereunder : "2(3)(c) a motor transport undertaking as defined in clause (g) of section 2 of the Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961 (Central Act 27 of 1961); or" 14. Section 2(g) of the Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961, is also extracted hereunder : "2(g) "motor transport undertaking" means a motor transport undertaking engaged in carrying passengers or goods or both by road for hire or reward, and includes a private carrier;" 15. As per Section 2(3)(c) of the Act, the establishment wherein the petitioners are working is covered under Section 2(3)(c) of the Act. 16. The G.O.Ms.No.134, Labour and Employment, dated 16.8.1999 is produced before me. As per the Government Order, the first respondent is the Inspector appointed under Section 4(1) of the Act to enquire into the matter of permanency as far as Chennai area is concerned. 17. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners, the Supreme Court has held that the vehicle owned by the Municipal Council for transporting sick or injured persons and for carrying night-soil and distributing water is governed by the provisions of the Motor Transport Workers Act. 18. 17. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners, the Supreme Court has held that the vehicle owned by the Municipal Council for transporting sick or injured persons and for carrying night-soil and distributing water is governed by the provisions of the Motor Transport Workers Act. 18. The following passage relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner in 1970 II LLJ 40 (SC) at page 42 is extracted hereunder : "Coming to the second point, it seems to us that the High Court was right in holding that the Municipal Council is a motor transport undertaking as defined in the Act. It is necessary to set out the relevant definitions in Section 2 of the Act : 2(g) "motor transport undertaking" means a motor transport undertaking engaged in carrying passengers or goods or both by road for hire or reward, and includes a private "carrier";" 19. Hence the respondent establishment is covered under Section 2(3)(c) of the Act. 20. For the aforesaid reasons, I am of the view that the first respondent is the competent authority to decide the permanency issue as far as the petitioners herein are concerned. Hence I have no hesitation to quash the impugned orders dated 27.7.2012 and 5.7.2013 of the first respondent. Accordingly, they are quashed and the matter is remitted back to the first respondent to decide the matter in accordance with law. The first respondent is directed to pass orders thereon within a period of six months from the date of receipt of copy of this order. 21. Accordingly, this writ petition is allowed. No costs.