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2013 DIGILAW 253 (KAR)

Mohamad Shafiq Bagadadi v. State of Karnataka

2013-02-27

N.KUMAR

body2013
ORDER N. Kumar, J.—The purchasers of lands after Section 4(1) Notification under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 have preferred these writ petitions seeking a declaration that the acquisition proceedings have lapsed and also as no award is passed within the stipulated period under Section 11-A of the Act, acquisition has lapsed and for other consequential reliefs. Petitioners claims to be the owners of properties mentioned herein below by virtue of registered sale deeds obtained by them from their respective owners of the said properties in question. The particulars as under: 2. All these lands are carved out of Sy. Nos. 315 and 318 of Mahalbagayath Village, Bijapur Hobli, Bijapur. The mutation entry has been effected in their names on the basis of the sale deeds. They claim that they are in possession of these lands. Originally, the said lands were sought to be acquired by the respondents-authorities for the purposes of providing house sites to the public of the area. Petitioners contend that the very object for which the acquisition is sought to be made was itself was not as per the scheme of the Act. There was no legal sanction for the said scheme and therefore, the very acquisition proceedings are not maintainable in law and are liable to be quashed. The preliminary notification was issued on 3-5-2006. The final notification under Section 6(1) of the Act has been issued on 6-2-2006. As the authorities have given up several survey numbers covered under the said scheme, it shows even the petitioners' lands are not essential and not necessary for the authorities. Award has not yet been passed till the date of filing of the writ petitions. Two years is the period prescribed for passing of such an award under Section 11-A of the Act. As no award has been passed within the stipulated period, the acquisition has lapsed. The representation was made to the authorities for dropping the acquisition proceedings. The second respondent-authority on consideration of various aspects passed a resolution on 23-1-2010 resolving to send a proposal to the Government to withdraw the acquisition of the said lands for the reasons described in the resolution. Ignoring all these aspects, the Assistant Commissioner is attempting to take possession of the lands on the direction issued by the second respondent. The said direction is contrary to law. Ignoring all these aspects, the Assistant Commissioner is attempting to take possession of the lands on the direction issued by the second respondent. The said direction is contrary to law. In view of the fact that the acquisition has lapsed, authorities have no right to take possession of the land and therefore, the writ petitions are filed for the aforesaid reliefs. 3. Learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted when no award is passed within two years as stipulated under Section 11-A of the Act, the acquisition proceedings has become void. It is thereafter, petitioners have purchased the properties from the owners. The second respondent beneficiary has passed a resolution requesting the Government to drop acquisition proceedings therefore, the purpose for which the acquisition was initiated does not exist today. In fact, the lands which are similarly situated and notified for acquisition under the very same notification has already been denotified. Under those circumstances, not only the purchaser can maintain the writ petition seeking for the declaration that the acquisition proceedings has lapsed, they are also entitled to the benefit of the lapsed acquisition. 4. Per contra, learned Government Advocate submits petitioners being the purchasers of the land subsequent to Notification under Section 4(1) have no locus standi to prefer writ petitions challenging the acquisition. Award is passed after filing of the writ petition. The reason for the delay in passing the award is that the owners of lands which are the subject-matter of notification had preferred writ petition before this Court in which there was an interim order and the said writ petition came to be dismissed on 19-11-2010 and thereafter, within the stipulated period award is passed. The contention that award is not passed within two years as stipulated under Section 11-A of the Act has no substance. Even if the beneficiary does not need this land that does not mean that automatically acquisition lapsed or it is to be dropped. In fact, the original owners did prefer writ petitions before this Court after the lands were notified seeking for sites, they never challenged the acquisition proceedings therefore, the purchaser from them has no right to challenge the acquisition proceedings and therefore, he submits that there is no merit in these writ petitions. 5. In fact, the original owners did prefer writ petitions before this Court after the lands were notified seeking for sites, they never challenged the acquisition proceedings therefore, the purchaser from them has no right to challenge the acquisition proceedings and therefore, he submits that there is no merit in these writ petitions. 5. The Apex Court had an occasion to consider the question whether the subsequent purchaser can challenge the acquisition proceedings in the case of V. Chandrasekaran and Another v Administrative Officer and Others (2012)12 SCC 133 : 2012(9) SCALE 142 . After review of the entire case law on the point, they answered the said question as under: In view of the above, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that a person who purchases land subsequent to the issuance of a Notification under Section 4 with respect to it, is not competent to challenge the validity of acquisition proceedings on any ground whatsoever for the reason that the sale deed executed in his favour does not confer upon him, any title and at the most he can claim compensation on the basis of his vendor's title. 6. Learned Counsel for the petitioners contended as the acquisition had lapsed by the time the petitioners purchased the property, the said judgment has no application. 7. The original owners filed writ petitions before the Court in W.P. No. 12748 of 2006 and other connected matter seeking for a direction to the authorities to allot one 30' X 40' site per acre since they have lost the lands under the acquisition by the authorities. As the earlier request for the said prayer is rejected, this Court allowed the writ petitions, set aside the endorsement and directed the authorities to consider the case of the petitioners in the light of the rules governing the same and pass appropriate orders within a period of three months from the date of receipt of copy of the order. Therefore, the original owners have not chosen to challenge the acquisition. Even after the so called lapse of acquisition, they have not chosen to challenge the acquisition. It is in this context, the Apex Court has the categorically stated that a purchaser of a land after Section 4(1) Notification is not competent to challenge the validity of the acquisition proceedings on any ground whatsoever. Therefore, there is no merit in the said substance. It is in this context, the Apex Court has the categorically stated that a purchaser of a land after Section 4(1) Notification is not competent to challenge the validity of the acquisition proceedings on any ground whatsoever. Therefore, there is no merit in the said substance. 8. Next it was contended that lands which are similarly situated are denotified. The second respondent beneficiary has passed a resolution stating these lands are not required by them. Under those circumstances, petitioners also should be extended the same benefit. As the petitioners are not the owners of the land as on the date of Notification under Section 4(1), it is they alone who are entitled to the benefit of denotification. The Apex Court in the case of Jharkhand State Housing Board and Another Vs. Akhileshwar Singh and Others, 2011 (6) SCALE 458 has held such a purchaser after Section 4(1) Notification instead of purchasing the property, purchased a litigation and therefore, they are not entitled not only to maintain the writ petition but also not entitled to any order denotifying the said land. In that view of the matter, these writ petitions are liable to be dismissed solely on the ground of want of locus standi on the part of the petitioners to challenge the acquisition proceedings on any ground whatsoever. In that view of the matter, it is unnecessary to go into the other points urged on behalf of the petitioners. Accordingly, these writ petitions are dismissed.