Judgment : 1. The Revision Petitioner is the petitioner in M.C.No.40/2011 on the files of Judicial 1st Class Magistrate, Muvattupuzha as well as the respondent in Criminal Appeal No.679/2011 on the files of Additional District and Sessions Judge, Muvattupuzha. The Revision Petitioner is the wife of the 2nd respondent herein. She filed the petition under Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 against the husband. Three daughters born in their wedlock are married and they are residing in their matrimonial home. The petitioner is undergoing treatment for cancer for the last two years. The 2nd respondent is a drunkard and he used to manhandle and abuse the petitioner using filthy words frequently. Recently, he made an attempt to sell the said residential property for his spendthrift needs and petitioner objected it. The respondent is not taking care of the affairs of the petitioner and she is even struggling to meet the expenses for her treatment. Hence the petitioner filed a petition u/s 12 of the DV Act seeking protection against the respondent and an order restraining alienation of the shared household and also directing the 2nd respondent to pay an amount of Rs.5,000/-per month towards maintenance expenses for food, clothing and treatment. 2. After appreciating the facts, the learned Magistrate by order dated 02/11/2011 allowed the petition directing the respondent not to cause physical hurt to the petitioner and dispossess her, once she returns to the shared household. The respondent was also directed to pay an amount of Rs.1,000/-per month as interim maintenance to the petitioner and restrained the respondent from alienating the residential property having an extent of 42 cents belonging to him. 3. Aggrieved by the said order, the respondent filed Criminal Appeal No.679/2011 before the Additional Sessions Court, Muvattupuzha. The main ground raised in this Revision Petition is that the appellate court modified the order of the Magistrate by limiting the restriction of alienation to the residential house and adjoining area having an extent of 20 cents alone and vacated the interim order against alienation of the remaining 22 cents of property which stands in the name of respondent. The main ground raised in this Revision Petition is that the appellate court modified the order of the Magistrate by limiting the restriction of alienation to the residential house and adjoining area having an extent of 20 cents alone and vacated the interim order against alienation of the remaining 22 cents of property which stands in the name of respondent. The learned counsel for the Revision Petitioner submits that the court below overlooked the fact that even though 42 cents of land and the building there is in the name of respondent, he purchased the said property using the money and gold given by the father of the Revision Petitioner as her family share. Therefore, she has right over the entire property and the finding of the appellate court that the Revision Petitioner has no serious contention that she has exclusive right over the landed property now in possession of the respondent, is wrong and unsustainable. If the interim order is limited to 20 cents and house therein, the respondent would alienate the remaining 22 cents so as to cause hardships to the petitioner and the same would amount to an 'economic abuse' as defined u/s 3(iv)(b) of the DV Act. 4. In fact, there is no serious dispute with regard to the directions except the direction restraining the respondent from alienating 42 cents of his property and further modification of limiting the same to 20 cents in appeal. According to the learned counsel for the respondent, the learned Magistrate should have passed an order in respect of the shared household only and the interim order restraining the appellant from alienating entire 42 cents of property passed by the Magistrate is not legally sustainable. 5. In view of the rival contentions, the question to be considered is whether the entire property of the respondent would come under the definition of shared household defined u/s 2(s) of the DV Act. 5. In view of the rival contentions, the question to be considered is whether the entire property of the respondent would come under the definition of shared household defined u/s 2(s) of the DV Act. The definition of shared household contemplated under 2 (s) of the DV Act reads as follows: (s) "shared household" means a household where the person aggrieved lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship either singly or along with the respondent and includes such a household whether owned or tenanted either jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent, or owned or tenanted by either of them in respect of which either the aggrieved person or the respondent or both jointly or singly have any right, title, interest or equity and includes such a household which may belong to the joint family of which the respondent is a member, irrespective of whether the respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title or interest in the shared household." Going by the definition of shared household, it could be seen that entire property of husband will not come under the definition of shared household. The shared household means a "household" where the person aggrieved lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship either singly or along with the respondent and includes such household whether owned or tenanted either jointly or by the aggrieved person and the respondent. 6. Coming to the facts of these case, out of 42 cents of property, 20 cents of property is lying separately and it was purchased by sale deed of 1976 and the remaining 22 cents of property was obtained by a partition deed of 1973. The household where the Revision Petitioner lived in a domestic relationship with the respondent is situating in 20 cents of property only. The learned counsel for the respondent pointed out that in view of definition of 'shared household', the right to reside in shared household will be confined to that 20 cents of property and the residential building thereon. The Revision Petitioner has every manner of right to reside in the said house and enjoy the property wherein that shared household is situating; whereas the respondent cannot be restrained from alienating another property ie; 22 cents which is lying separately. The Revision Petitioner has every manner of right to reside in the said house and enjoy the property wherein that shared household is situating; whereas the respondent cannot be restrained from alienating another property ie; 22 cents which is lying separately. In short, he cannot be restrained from alienating 22 cents, under the cover of shared household defined u/s 2(s) of the DV Act. Put it differently, the right of the Revision Petitioner is limited to the shared household and its adjoining area having 20 cents only. Therefore, the learned family court judge has rightly limited the injunction order to the said property and there is no illegality or impropriety in the impugned order under challenge. 7. Per contra, the learned counsel for the Revision Petitioner drew my attention to Section 23 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. The learned counsel submits that according to that Section, if the Magistrate is satisfied that an application prima facie discloses that the respondent is committing, or has committed an act of domestic violence or that there is a likelihood that the respondent may commit an act of domestic violence, he may grant an ex parte order on the basis of the affidavit in such form, as may be prescribed, of the aggrieved person under Section 18, Section 19, Section 20, Section 21 or, as the case may be, Section 22 against the respondent. Thus the Magistrate has power to issue an order under Section 18. The learned counsel for the Revision Petitioner further submits that according to Section 18, the Magistrate may, after giving the aggrieved person and the respondent an opportunity of being heard and on being prima facie satisfied that domestic violence has taken place or is likely to take place, pass a protection order in favour of the aggrieved person and prohibit the respondent from the act enumerated under Clauses 'a' to 'g' of Section 18. The learned counsel drew my attention to Clause 'e'. The learned counsel drew my attention to Clause 'e'. According to Clause 'e', the Magistrate has power to pass a protection order prohibiting the respondent from alienating any assets, operating bank lockers or bank accounts used or held or enjoyed by both the parties jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent or singly by the respondent including her stridhan or any other property held either jointly by the parties or separately by them without the leave of the Magistrate. Therefore, the Magistrate is empowered to pass an order prohibiting the respondent from alienating any assets enjoying singly by the respondent. The property which in exclusive possession and ownership of the respondent would come under the sweep of "any property". In short, a property which is in exclusive possession and enjoyment of the respondent as a single owner also can be prohibited from alienation. Therefore, the learned Magistrate is empowered to pass an order prohibiting the respondent from alienating his own property other than shared house hold. At this juncture, it also to be noted that the residence order under section 19 of the DV Act is confined to shared house hold only; whereas any property other than shared house hold also will come under the ambit of protection order under Section 18 of the DV Act. But the learned Sessions Judge has not considered the wide power provided under Section 18(e) in its correct perspective and vacated prohibitory order with respect to 22 cents of property. Therefore, the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge is illegal with respect to 22 cents of property. Hence I set aside the impugned order under challenge passed by Additional District and Sessions Judge and the orders passed by the learned Magistrate would stand restored. The Revision Petition is allowed accordingly.