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2013 DIGILAW 254 (CHH)

Samaru Miri v. State of C. G.

2013-08-29

RADHE SHYAM SHARMA, SATISH K.AGNIHOTRI

body2013
JUDGMENT 1. This appeal is directed against judgment dated 08-02-2008 passed by the First Additional Sessions Judge, Raigarh in Sessions Trial No. 51/2007. By the impugned judgment, accused/appellant Samaru Miri has been convicted under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay fine of Rs. 500/-, in default of payment of fine, to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for 5 months. The facts, briefly stated, are as under: Deceased Laxmin Bai was wife of the appellant Purnima (PW-4) is daughter and Dinesh Miri (PW-5) is son of the deceased and the appellant. The deceased was residing in the house of the appellant along with their children. The relation between the appellant and the deceased was not cordial and they used to quarrel with each other. Two and half months prior to the incident, the deceased had gone to Village Latiyadih and was residing there near the hut of Sadanand. Two days prior to the date of incident, the appellant came to the deceased and began to reside with her. The appellant used to suspect chastity of the deceased. He had bitten the cheek of the deceased. On the intervening night of 4th and 5th of February, 2007, after taking meal, the appellant assaulted the deceased. The incident, was witnessed by Purnima (PW-4) and Dinesh Miri (PW-5) who are children of the deceased and the appellant. The appellant threatened them also of their lives. The appellant gagged month of the deceased with her saree, dragged her out to the field, threw her down on the ground and assaulted her. Purnima (PW-4) and Dinesh Miri (PW-5) went behind the deceased and the appellant and they saw the incident. The appellant informed Fakirchand Sahu (PW-7) by telephone that he killed his wife (deceased). Fakirchand Sahu (PW-7) informed Angadram (PW-1). Angadram (PW-1) lodged a report in Police Station Sariya where Merg Intimation (Ex-P/2) was recorded. Investigating Officer reached the place of occurrence, took the appellant in custody, recorded memorandum statement of the appellant under Section 27 of the Evidence Act vide Ex.-P/5 and at the instance of the appellant, the dead body of the deceased was recovered near the brick clin (inta-Bhatthi) and shav baramadagi panchnama (dead body recovery panchnama) was prepared vide Ex.-P/1. The Investigating Officer gave notice (Ex.-P/4) to panchas and prepared inquest (Ex.-P/3) on the dead body of the deceased. The Investigating Officer gave notice (Ex.-P/4) to panchas and prepared inquest (Ex.-P/3) on the dead body of the deceased. The dead body of the deceased was sent to Kirodimal Govt. Hospital, Raigarh for postmortem examination vide Ex.-P/14A. Doctor Anil Kumar Tirki (PW-10) conducted postmortem on the dead body of the deceased and gave his report (Ex.-P/15) finding:-- (i) multiple injuries on the dead body of the deceased, (ii) 3 abrasions on the left side of the neck, (iii) abrasion on the Clavicle bone, (iv) abrasion on the right side of the neck, (v) abrasion of ½ inch x ½ inch x skin deep on the right forearm, (vi) abrasion 1 inch x 1 inch x skin surface, (vii) abrasions on both the knees. In internal examination, blood was oozing out of retromeritonial space. He opined that the cause of death was shock due to excessive bleeding as a result of rupture of blood vessels and the death was homicidal in nature. In further investigation, blood stained soil and plain soil, blouse and underwear were seized from the place of occurrence vide Ex.-P/6. Spot map (Ex. P-7) was prepared. Tauliya (towel) and underwear of the appellant were seized vide Ex.-P/11. The appellant was also sent to Kirodimal Govt. Hospital, Raigarh for medical examination vide Ex.-P/13A. Doctor Anil Kumar Kushwah (PW-9) examined him and gave his report (Ex.-P/13) finding abrasion 1 c.m. x ½ c.m. on right testicle. Thereafter, regular Merg Intimation No. 5/2007 (Ex.-P/16) and First Information Report (FIR) No. 27/2007 (Ex.-P/17) were recorded in Police Station Kotara Road. The appellant was arrested vide Ex.-P/18. The seized articles were sent to Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL), Raipur for chemical examination vide Ex.-P/20. A report (Ex.-P/24) was received therefrom. In Ex.-P/24, it is mentioned that article A - soil, article C - blouse of the deceased, article D - tauliya of the appellant, article E - underwear of the appellant, article F1 - underwear of the deceased, article F2 - petticoat of the deceased and article F3 - saree of the deceased were stained with blood. In Ex.-P/24, it is mentioned that article A - soil, article C - blouse of the deceased, article D - tauliya of the appellant, article E - underwear of the appellant, article F1 - underwear of the deceased, article F2 - petticoat of the deceased and article F3 - saree of the deceased were stained with blood. After completion of the investigation, charge sheet was filed against the appellant in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Raigarh, who, in turn, committed the case to the Court of Session, Raigarh, from where it was received on transfer by the First Additional Sessions Judge, Raigarh who conducted the trial and convicted and sentenced the appellant as mentioned above. 2. Shri Sunil Sahu, learned counsel for the appellant argued that the finding of guilt recorded on the basis of evidence of Purnima (PW-4) and Dinesh Miri (PW-5) is not reliable. He further argued that the appellant was not present in the house at the time of the incident. Purnima (PW-4) and Dinesh Miri (PW-5) are child witnesses and they did not disclose the incident to anybody and they are tutored witnesses. Therefore, their evidence is not cogent and reliable and cannot be the basis for conviction. Had Purnima (PW-4) and Dinesh Miri (PW-5) witnessed the incident, they would have disclosed the name of the assailant to Sadanand and other villagers. He further argued that the prosecution has not been able to prove extrajudicial confession. Ahgadram (PW-1) denied lodging of the report and Angadram (PW-1), Kanhaiya (PW-2), Hemram (PW-3), Ramkalesh (PW-6) and Fakirchand Sahu (PW-7) did not support the prosecution case. He further argued that it is well settled law that a strong suspicion is not a substitute for a proof. Therefore, the finding recorded by the learned Additional Sessions Judge is not sustainable and the appellant deserves to be acquitted. 3. Shri Adil Minhaj, learned Panel Lawyer for the State/respondent, supporting the impugned judgment, submitted that the conviction and sentence awarded by the learned Additional Sessions Judge do not warrant any interference by this Court. 4. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and have also perused the record of Sessions Trial No. 51/2007. The conviction of the appellant is based on the evidence of Purnima (PW-4), Dinesh Miri (PW-5) and recovery of the dead body of the deceased on the basis of memorandum statement of the appellant. 5. 4. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and have also perused the record of Sessions Trial No. 51/2007. The conviction of the appellant is based on the evidence of Purnima (PW-4), Dinesh Miri (PW-5) and recovery of the dead body of the deceased on the basis of memorandum statement of the appellant. 5. Purnima (PW-4) and Dinesh Miri (PW-5) deposed that the appellant was their father and the deceased was their mother. The appellant used to abuse and assault the deceased. Due to which, they had come to the house of their maternal uncle Sadanand 8 days prior to the date of incident. The deceased was working in a brick clin (Inta-Bhatthi). On Friday, the appellant came to their house at Village Kalmi. In the night, the appellant abused and beat the deceased. In the night of Sunday also, the appellant beat the deceased, gagged her mouth with her saree, dragged her to the brick clin (Inta-Bhatthi) and caused her to fall down near a Farsa Tree. Thereafter, the appellant sat over the chest of the deceased and again beat her. They further deposed that the appellant threatened them of their life in case of disclosure of the incident to anyone. Therefore, they came to the house of their maternal uncle and slept there silently. On the next day, they asked their maternal uncle to take them to Village Pihara. 6. Purnima (PW-4), in cross-examination, in para. 7, deposed that when the appellant was dragging the deceased, she and her brother had gone behind him and they witnessed the incident. It is true that she had not disclosed the incident to her maternal uncle, Dinesh Miri (PW-5) also deposed that he did not disclose the incident to his maternal uncle. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that Purnima (PW-4) and Dinesh Miri (PW-5) are child witnesses and their case diary statements were recorded belatedly, therefore, their evidence is not reliable. The above argument is not acceptable. 8. In Dattu Ramrao Sakhare Vs. State of Maharashtra (1997) 5 SCC 341 , it was held that "A child witness, if found competent to depose to the facts and reliable one, such evidence could be the basis of conviction. The above argument is not acceptable. 8. In Dattu Ramrao Sakhare Vs. State of Maharashtra (1997) 5 SCC 341 , it was held that "A child witness, if found competent to depose to the facts and reliable one, such evidence could be the basis of conviction. In other words, even in the absence of oath, the evidence of a child witness can be considered under Section 118 of the Evidence Act provided that such witness is able to understand the questions and able to give rational answers thereof. The evidence of a child witness and credibility thereof would depend upon the circumstances of each case. The only precaution which the court should bear in mind while assessing the evidence of a child witness is that the witness must be a reliable one and his/her demeanour must be like any other competent witness and there is no likelihood of being tutored." The same view has been further reiterated in Nivrutti Pandurang Kokate and others Vs. State of Maharashtra AIR 2008 SC 1460 . 9. In State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Ramesh and another (2011) 4 SCC 786 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows: 7. In Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1952 SC 54 : 1952 Cri.L.J. 547, this Court examined the provisions of Section 5 of the Oaths Act, 1873 and Section 118 of the Evidence Act, 1872 and held that (AIR p. 55 7) every witness is competent to depose unless the court considers that he is prevented from understanding the question put to him, or from giving rational answers by reason of tender age, extreme old age, disease whether of body or mind or any other cause of the same kind. There is always competency in fact unless the court considers otherwise. The Court further held as under: (AIR p. 56, para. 11) 11. .....It is desirable that Judges and Magistrates should always record their opinion that the child understands the duty of speaking the truth and state why they think that, otherwise the credibility of the witness may be seriously affected, so much so, that in some cases it may be necessary to reject the evidence altogether. But whether the Magistrate or Judge really was of that opinion can, I think, be gathered from the circumstances when there is no formal certificate. 8. But whether the Magistrate or Judge really was of that opinion can, I think, be gathered from the circumstances when there is no formal certificate. 8. In Mangoo v. State of M.P., AIR 1995 SC 959 : 1995 Cri.L.J. 1461, this Court while dealing with the evidence of a child witness observed that there was always scope to tutor the child, however, it cannot alone be a ground to come to the conclusion that the child witness must have been tutored. The Court must determine as to whether the child has been tutored or not. It can be ascertained by examining the evidence and from the contents thereof as to whether there are any traces of tutoring. 9. In Panchhi v. State of U.P., (1998) 7 SCC 177 : 1998 SCC (Cri.) 1561 : AIR 1998 SC 2726 , this Court while placing reliance upon a large number of its earlier judgments observed that the testimony of a child witness must find adequate corroboration before it is relied on. However, it is more a rule of practical wisdom than of law. It cannot be held that the evidence of a child witness would always stand irretrievably stigmatized. It is not the law that if a witness is a child, his evidence shall be rejected, even if it is found reliable. The law is that evidence of a child witness must be evaluated more carefully and with greater circumspection because a child is susceptible to be swayed by what others tell him and thus a child witness is an easy prey to tutoring" (SCC p. 181, para. 11) 10. In Nivrutti Pandurang Kokate v. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 12 SCC 565 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri.) 454 : AIR 2008 SC 1460 , this Court dealing with the child witness has observed as under: (SCC pp. 567-68, para 10) 10. .............. The decision on the question whether the child witness has sufficient intelligence primarily rests with the trial Judge who notices his manners, his apparent possession or lack of intelligence, and the said Judge may resort to any examination which will tend to disclose his capacity and intelligence as well as his understanding of the obligation of an oath. The decision of the trial Court may, however, be disturbed by the higher court if from what is preserved in the records, it is clear that his conclusion was erroneous. The decision of the trial Court may, however, be disturbed by the higher court if from what is preserved in the records, it is clear that his conclusion was erroneous. This precaution is necessary because child witnesses are amenable to tutoring and often live in a world of make-believe. Though it is an established principle that child witnesses are dangerous witnesses as they are pliable and liable to be influenced easily, shaped and moulded, but it is also an accepted norm that if after careful scrutiny of their evidence the court comes to the conclusion that there is an impress of truth in it, there is no obstacle in the way of accepting the evidence of a child witness. 11. The evidence of a child must reveal that he was able to discern between right and wrong and the court may find out from the cross-examination whether the defence lawyer could bring anything to indicate that the child could not differentiate between right and wrong. The Court may ascertain his suitability as a witness by putting questions to him and even if no such question had been put, it may be gathered from his evidence as to whether he fully understood the implications of what he was saying and whether he stood discredited in facing a stiff cross-examination. A child witness must be able to understand the sanctity of giving evidence on oath and the import of the questions that were being put to him. (Vide Himmat Sukhadeo Wahurwagh v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 6 SCC 712 ). 12. In State of U.P. v. Krishna Master, (2010) 12 SCC 324 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri.) 381 : AIR 2010 SC 3071 , this Court held that there is no principle of law that it is inconceivable that a child of tender age would not be able to recapitulate the facts in his memory. A child is always receptive to abnormal events which take place in his life and would never forget those events for the rest of his life. The child may be able to recapitulate carefully and exactly when asked about the same in the future. In case the child explains the relevant events of the crime without improvements or embellishments, and the same inspire confidence of the court, his deposition does not require any corroboration whatsoever. The child may be able to recapitulate carefully and exactly when asked about the same in the future. In case the child explains the relevant events of the crime without improvements or embellishments, and the same inspire confidence of the court, his deposition does not require any corroboration whatsoever. The child at a tender age is incapable of having any malice or ill will against any person. Therefore, there must be something on record to satisfy the court that something had gone wrong between the date of incident and recording evidence of the child witness due to which the witness wanted to implicate the accused falsely in a case of a serious nature. 10. In Mohd. Kalam Vs. State of Bihar (2008) 7 SCC 257 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows: 7. In Panchhi v. State of U.P., (1998) 7 SCC 177 , it was observed by this Court that the evidence of a child witness cannot be rejected outright but the evidence must be evaluated carefully and with greater circumspection because a child is susceptible to be swayed by what others tell him and thus a child witness is an easy prey to tutoring. The court has to assess as to whether the statement of the victim before the court is the voluntary expression of the victim and that she was not under the influence of others. 11. In Banti Vs. State of M.P. (2004) 1 SCC 414 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus: As regards the delayed examination of certain witnesses, this Court in several decisions has held that unless the investigating officer is categorically asked as to why there was delay in examination of the witnesses the defence cannot gain any advantage therefrom. It cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that if there is any delay in examination of a particular witness, the prosecution version becomes suspect. It would depend upon several factors. If the explanation offered for the delayed examination is plausible and acceptable and the Court accepts the same as plausible, there is no reason to interfere with the conclusion (See Ranbir v. State of Punjab [ (1973) 2 SCC 444 : ( AIR 1973 SC 1409 )] and Bodhraj v. State of J & K ( (2002) 8 SCC 45 : (AIR 2002 SC 3164 : 2002 AIR SCW 3655))). 12. In Surajit Sarkar Vs. 12. In Surajit Sarkar Vs. State of West Bengal 2013 AIR SCW 648, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed thus: 49. In State of U.P. v. Satish (2005) 3 SCC 114 : ( AIR 2005 SC 1000 : 2005 AIR SCW 905) relied on by learned counsel for the State, the reason for the delay in examination of the witnesses is not quite clear. But, this Court reiterated the two principles earlier recognized, namely, that mere delay in examination of a witness does not make the prosecution version suspect and that the investigating officer must be asked the reason for the delay in examination of the witness. Ganesh Bhavan Patel ( AIR 1979 SC 135 ) was explained by observing that delay in examination of the witnesses was not the only determinative factor in fact, there were several factors taken together along with the delayed examination of witnesses that provided the basis for acquittal. 50. Finally, reference was made by learned counsel for the State to Shyamlal Ghosh v. State of W.B., (2012) 7 SCC 646 : ( AIR 2012 SC 3539 : 2012 AIR SCW 4162) to contend that the delayed examination of a witness will not vitiate the prosecution case. We agree that delay per se may not be a clinching factor but when there is a whole range of facts that need to be explained but cannot, then the cumulative effect of all the facts could have an impact on the case of the prosecution. 13. In the instant case, Purnima (PW-4) and Dinesh Miri (PW-5) have not offered any explanation relating to delayed recording of statement. ASI R.R. Manhar (PW-12) deposed that he had recorded statements of Purnima (PW-4) and Dinesh Miri (PW-5) on 14-02-2007. The date and time of the incident was 05-02-2007 at about 2 am (midnight). It appears that statements of the above witnesses were recorded after 9 days of the incident. No single question was put to ASI R.R. Manhar (PW-12) regarding delayed recording of statements of Purnima (PW-4) and Dinesh Miri (PW-5). The appellant is father of Purnima (PW-4) and Dinesh Miri (PW-5). Purnima (PW-4) and Dinesh Miri (PW-5) had no motive to falsely implicate their father. They had already lost their mother (deceased) and in this circumstance, they would try to save their father (appellant) instead of implicating him. The appellant is father of Purnima (PW-4) and Dinesh Miri (PW-5). Purnima (PW-4) and Dinesh Miri (PW-5) had no motive to falsely implicate their father. They had already lost their mother (deceased) and in this circumstance, they would try to save their father (appellant) instead of implicating him. Nothing has been brought on record by the defence which could show that the evidence of Purnima (PW-4) and Dinesh Miri (PW-5) is tutored. Therefore, their evidence is reliable and can form basis for conviction of the appellant. 14. The prosecution adduced evidence of memorandum and on the basis thereof, recovery of the dead body. 15. Sub-Inspector Kishore Kumar Kerketta (PW-13) deposed that he had recorded memorandum statement of the appellant vide Ex.- P/5 on 05-02-2007 and on the same day, at the instance of the appellant, he had recovered dead body of the deceased. Angadram (PW-1) deposed that memorandum statement of the appellant was recorded vide Ex.-P/5 by the police, dead body of the deceased was recovered and recovery panchnama (Ex.-P/11) was prepared, which bears his signature. It appears that the dead body was recovered in furtherance of information furnished by the appellant. 16. Inspector C.P. Bhatt (PW-11) deposed that he had seized blouse, button, underwear and pieces of bangles from the place of occurrence vide Ex.-P/6. He had also seized the clothes worn by the appellant. He further deposed that the seized articles were sent to Forensic Science Laboratory, Raipur vide Ex.-P/22 and a report (Ex-P/24) was received therefrom. 17. In Ex.-P/24, article C - blouse of the deceased, article D - towel of the appellant, article E - underwear of the appellant, article F1 - underwear of the deceased, article F2 - petticoat of the deceased, article F3 - saree of the deceased were found stained with blood. 18. In Trimukh Maroti Kirkan Vs. State of Maharashtra (2006) 10 SCC 681 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed thus: 14. If an offence takes place inside the privacy of a house and in such circumstances where the assailants have all the opportunity to plan and commit the offence at the time and in circumstances of their choice, it will be extremely difficult for the prosecution to lead evidence to establish the guilt of the accused if the strict principle of circumstantial evidence, as noticed above, is insisted upon by the courts. A judge does not preside over a criminal trial merely to see that no innocent man is punished. A judge also presides to see that a guilty man does not escape. Both are public duties. (See Stirland v. Director of Public Prosecutions 1--quoted with approval by Arijit Pasayat, J. in State of Punjab v. Karnail Singh 2.) The law does not enjoin a duty on the prosecution to lead evidence of such character which is a most impossible to be led or at any rate extremely difficult to be led. The duty on the prosecution is to lead such evidence which it is capable of leading, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. Here it is necessary to keep in mind Section 106 of the Evidence Act which says that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.......... 15. Where an offence like murder is committed in secrecy inside a house, the initial burden to, establish the case would undoubtedly be upon the prosecution, but the nature and amount of evidence to be led it to establish the charge cannot be of the same degree as is required in other cases of circumstantial evidence. The burden would be of a comparatively lighter character. In view of Section 106 of the Evidence Act there will be a corresponding burden on the inmates of the house to give a cogent explanation as to how the crime was committed. The inmates of the house cannot get away by simply keeping quiet and offering no explanation on the supposed premise that the burden to establish its case lies entirely upon the prosecution and there is no duty at all on an accused to offer any explanation. 19. In State of Rajasthan Vs. Kashiram (2006) 12 SCC 254 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed thus: 19. .......... whether an inference ought to be drawn under Section 106 Evidence Act is a question which must be determined by reference to proved. It is ultimately a matter of appreciation of evidence and, therefore, each case must rest on its own facts. 23. .......... The principle is well settled. .......... whether an inference ought to be drawn under Section 106 Evidence Act is a question which must be determined by reference to proved. It is ultimately a matter of appreciation of evidence and, therefore, each case must rest on its own facts. 23. .......... The principle is well settled. The provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act itself are unambiguous and categories in laying down that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of a person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. Thus, if a person is last seen with the deceased, he must offer an explanation as to how and when he parted company. He must furnish an explanation which appears to the court to be probable and satisfactory. If he does so he must be held to have discharged his burden. If he fails to offer an explanation on the basis of facts within his epical knowledge, he fails to discharge the burden cast upon him by Section 106 of the Evidence Act. In a case resting on circumstantial evidence if the accused fails to offer a reasonable explanation in discharge of the burden placed on him, that itself provides an additional link in the chain of circumstances proved against him. Section 106 does not shift the burden of proof in a criminal trial, which is always upon the prosecution. It lays down the rule that when the accused does not throw any light upon facts which are specially within his knowledge and which could not support any theory or hypothesis compatible with his innocence, the court can consider his failure to adduce any explanation, as an additional link which completes the chain. ................... These principles have been further reiterated in the matter of State of Rajasthan Vs. Parthu AIR 2008 SC 10 . 20. In the instant case, when the appellant was examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and questions were put to him, he simply stated that he is innocent and has been falsely implicated by his brothers. 21. In the instant case, cumulative effect of the circumstances are brought by way of evidence and direct evidence adduced by the prosecution. Purnima (PW-4) and Dinesh Miri (PW-5) have clearly deposed that the deceased was wife of the appellant. 21. In the instant case, cumulative effect of the circumstances are brought by way of evidence and direct evidence adduced by the prosecution. Purnima (PW-4) and Dinesh Miri (PW-5) have clearly deposed that the deceased was wife of the appellant. The appellant assaulted the deceased, dragged her from the house to the Farsa Tree, caused her to fall down, sat over her chest and again beat her. 22. Doctor Anil Kumar Tirki (PW-10) deposed that he had conducted postmortem on the dead body of the deceased and given his report (Ex.-P/14), finding:-- (i) multiple injuries on the dead body of the deceased, (ii) 3 abrasions on the left side of the neck, (iii) abrasion on the clavicle bone, (iv) abrasion on the right side of the neck, (v) abrasion of ½ inch x ½ inch x skin deep on the right forearm, (vi) abrasion 1 inch x 1 inch x skin surface, (vii) abrasions on both the knees. In internal examination, blood was oozing out of retroperitoneal space. He opined that the cause of death was shock due to excessive bleeding as a result of rupture of blood vessels and the death was homicidal in nature. 23. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, it is established as follows: (1) the occurrence took place at about 2 am (midnight) in the house of the appellant, (2) the appellant and the deceased were present in the house along with their children, (3) the appellant assaulted the deceased and dragged her, (4) the appellant made statement under Section 27 of the Evidence Act and led the police to recover dead body of the deceased, (5) the appellant could not explain as to how the deceased was killed and in what circumstances the incident took place in which the deceased died homicidal death. 24. The appellant miserably failed to prove his defence. The appellant failed to offer any reasonable and proper explanation in discharge of burden placed on him and he did not throw any light upon the facts which were in his knowledge. The appellant could not explain as to how the deceased was killed and in what circumstances the incident took place in which the deceased died homicidal death. 25. The appellant failed to offer any reasonable and proper explanation in discharge of burden placed on him and he did not throw any light upon the facts which were in his knowledge. The appellant could not explain as to how the deceased was killed and in what circumstances the incident took place in which the deceased died homicidal death. 25. In the light of above discussion, we do not find any infirmity in the finding recorded by the learned Additional Sessions Judge that it was the appellant who caused the injuries on the body of the deceased and the deceased succumbed to those injuries. In the result, the appeal, being devoid of any merit, is liable to be and is hereby dismissed.