M.M. Kumar; C.J.— 1. This petition filed under Section 11 of the Jammu and Kashmir Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1997 (for brevity 'the Act') prays for appointment of the Council of Architecture, India Habitat Centre New Delhi through its President for arbitration of the dispute between the petitioner- B. V. Sharma, who is an architect and Sher-e-Kashmir University of Agricultural Sciences and Technology Jammu-respondent no.1 (for brevity SKUAST). The dispute is claimed to have emerged from the alleged disengagement of the petitioner vide order dated 02.08.2006 in respect of the project under reference. A further prayer has been made for restoration of the engagement of the petitioner, payment of the outstanding professional fees for the work done, payment of damages and other related issues within specified time. A: Pleadings of the petitioner 2. The case of the petitioner, as pleaded and projected is as under:- 2.1 The SKUAST held an architectural competition for preparation of the Master plan and design of its proposed University Campus spread in the area of over 560 acres of land in village Chatha (Jammu). According to the conditions of the competition only those architects and their firms of architects, which were registered with the Council of Architectures New Delhi were eligible and invited to participate in the competition. The petitioner claimed that the terms and conditions governing the manner, scope and purpose of the competition and the follow-up thereof were incorporated in a document titled as Architectural Design Competition for the Campus of SKUAST (annexure A). The petitioner has banked upon this document to buttress his stand that the Architects Act, 1972 (for brevity 'Architect Act') and various provisions of the Architect Professional Conduct Regulation 1990 stand incorporated by reference in the competition document (Annexure A). Once the provisions of Architect Act are incorporated then disputes have to be referred to 'Arbitrator' because statute provides for arbitration. 2.1. The petitioner submitted his project design commensurating with the condition no. 24 of the Competition Document, depicting salient feature of the master plan of the project. The dimension and size of the project read with the Competition Document was a fire test for the selection of the architecture as well as the architect of the project. 2.1. The petitioner submitted his project design commensurating with the condition no. 24 of the Competition Document, depicting salient feature of the master plan of the project. The dimension and size of the project read with the Competition Document was a fire test for the selection of the architecture as well as the architect of the project. In that regard reference has been invited to condition no.2 (Character of the Campus), 3 (Approval of Conditions), 4 (Eligibility) and 7 (details of board of assessors) of the competition document. 2.3. The petitioner was adjudged as the winner of the competition by the Board of Assessors on 17.12.2003. In that regard reference has been invited to condition no. 7 and 9 of the Competition Document. Accordingly the design submitted by the petitioner for the master plan of the proposed campus was placed at No.1 earning him a cash prize of Rs. 3 Lacs in accordance with condition no. 9.1 of the Competition Document. The petitioner has claimed that declaration of the petitioner as the winner-architect brought into effect legal as well as contractual relationship inter-se the petitioner and SKUAST. 2.4. The award money of Rs. 3 Lacs, which was supposed to have been credited in favour of the petitioner within three months from the date of declaration of results as per the condition no. 9 of the Competition Document, was paid to the petitioner on 11.05.2005 (Annexure D) without explaining or regretting the delay of one and a half year. This is a pointer towards the mindset which attended the respondents to treat the petitioner in an unbecoming manner. 2.5. The Competition Document spelled out follow up obligation which were required to be fulfilled by SKUAST towards the winner-architect of the competition. In that regard reference has been invited to condition no. 9 (award of prizes), 10 (guidelines in respect of winning design), 14 (submissions of designs), 16 judging procedure), 19 (announcement of award), 20 (returning of entries), 21 (rights), 22(settlement of disputes through arbitration) and 24 (salient feature of the master plan of the project). 2.6. On the basis of winning the competition he was to be sole architect for the project to make final plans and render architectural/allied services towards the implementation of the project, preparation of the master plan and design of the proposed campus of SKUAST at Village Chatha. 2.6. On the basis of winning the competition he was to be sole architect for the project to make final plans and render architectural/allied services towards the implementation of the project, preparation of the master plan and design of the proposed campus of SKUAST at Village Chatha. The board of assessors was comprised of 11 members, to ensure independence of the judgment in conducting the competition and selecting the winner but it was also to assign some role which was extended to the stage of the project. A perusal of the Competition Document would establish that SKUAST is obliged and bound to use only the design and master plan based there upon which was submitted by the petitioner for the architecture, planning and development of the Campus. The SKUAST was further obliged to get the master plan worked upon by the petitioner alone towards the implementation of the project because the copy right of the design vests only in the petitioner. It was not within the domain of the SKUAST to facilitate the execution of the project on the designs and drawings submitted by the petitioner through any other architect or firms of architect's much less architectural concern Consulting Engineering Service (India) Pvt. Ltd., 57 Nehru Place New Delhi, who are the contractors and the executing agency as well. It is alleged that SKUAST has acted in blatant disregard to its obligation and is estopped from seeking the execution of the project through the aforesaid firm Consulting Engineering Services. The petitioner is well within his rights to seek restraint against SKUAST from indulging in breach of obligation till the adjudication of the matter by an appointed arbitrator and felt constrained to invoke Section 9 of the Act for grant of interim relief. 2.7. The SKUAST is alleged to have underscored and undermined the professional engagement of the petitioner and his consultation services towards the project because of an oblique expectation of sharing a cut in the petitioner's fee and remuneration package in corresponding proportion to the total project cost for ensuring his continuing engagement in the project. The petitioner has alleged that on account of the malafide objectives he was disengaged as an architect for the project by order No. AU/Es-tates/06-07/F-33/1403-11 dated 02.08.2006 (Annexure E). 2.8. The petitioner has alleged that on account of the malafide objectives he was disengaged as an architect for the project by order No. AU/Es-tates/06-07/F-33/1403-11 dated 02.08.2006 (Annexure E). 2.8. The alleged disengagement and disassociation of the petitioner as an architect from the project has afforded him a cause of action to invoke Section 11 of the Act; and to apply for appointment of an arbitrator and a reference to arbitration. It is alleged that a huge amount of work has been done and consultation has been provided by the petitioner in respect of the project. From 26.03.2004 till 24.7.2006 the petitioner had rendered consultancy services and had worked on the project entitling him professional fee of Rs. 1,27,12,014/- and the petitioner has been paid only a sum of Rs. 28 lacs by SKUAST after repeated reminders. A work fee statement has been furnished (Annexure F). The fee has been worked out strictly in accordance with the Conditions of Engagement and Scales of Professional Fees and Charges of the Council of Architecture as provided by condition no. 10 of the Competition Document. 2.9. The petitioner further alleged that after declaring the petitioner as winner architect for the project the respondents did not bother to invite the petitioner to settle and document the mode and manner and other miscellaneous aspects for carrying out the project work so as to ensure a time frame and efficiency oriented execution of the architectural work of the project and consultancy services there with. The corresponding obligations were required to be performed by the respondents so that nothing was left to the guess work. The required documentation was deliberately kept pending without giving it any priority. The letter of intent dated 26.03.2004 in terms of its context authored by the Estate Officer SKUAST Jammu-respondent nd.2 on his own without any consultation or concurrence from the petitioner was an act to over reach and overide the Competition Document meant for architectural design competition. The letter of intent sounded as if showering some personal favour by respondent no.2 upon the petitioner by assigning him the job for SKUAST Campus and that too for some piece meal items of work and not for the entire project as if to pre-test the petitioner's professional performance. The letter of intent sounded as if showering some personal favour by respondent no.2 upon the petitioner by assigning him the job for SKUAST Campus and that too for some piece meal items of work and not for the entire project as if to pre-test the petitioner's professional performance. It is appropriate to mention that vide letter of intent dated 26.03.2004 (Annexure C) SKUAST apprised the petitioner that it intends to award him the construction of Faculty Block, Library Block and the Student Centre Block. He was advised to proceed ahead with the preparation of working designs and other related services along with the schedule of qualities in respect of the above mentioned buildings and submit the same at the earliest but not later than 10th May, 2004. The formal allotment letter containing terms and conditions were to follow after receipt of clarification sought vide letter No. AU/Es-tates/03-04/F-133/1105-07 dated 09.12.2003. Before calling upon the petitioner to render consultation services and work on the project, the respondents deliberately avoided and failed to finalize the document containing therein essential terms and conditions of the petitioner. On the other hand respondent no. 3, S. Iqbal Singh, In-charge Estate Officer, assumed the character and status of employer than being a client of the petitioner. On 24.05.2006 he invited the petitioner to sign on unilateral draft agreement submitted on behalf of SKUAST which literally dictated the petitioner to sign the draft with disguised twin objective. Firstly an impression is created that the engagement and working of the petitioner on the project did not rest on the Competition Document read with Conditions of Engagement and Scale of Charges, Council of Architecture. Secondly to show that there was no contract between the petitioner and SKUAST with respect to the project in hand. 2.10. The respondents unhesitatingly, without following any selection procedure much less the one adopted for selection of the petitioner, manipulated backdoor entry of Consulting Engineering Services (India) Pvt. Ltd. 57, Nehru Palace New Delhi to work on the project and to substitute the petitioner. The aforesaid Consulting Engineering Services is not even eligible to use the title and style of architect and practice the profession of an architect. The aforesaid Consulting Engineering Services is not even eligible to use the title and style of architect and practice the profession of an architect. It is wholly illegal for the respondent No.1 to continue with the engagement in favour of Consulting Engineering Services and to permit them to work upon the design and drawings of the petitioner prepared by him for the project. Despite the fact of disapproval registered by the Council of Architecture vide letter dated 27.07.2006 (Annexure H). 2.11. The letter of disengagement dated 02.08.2006 would manifest that it has a tone and tanner of a letter rather than an order. It was passed at the back of the petitioner which has quoted the correspondence to disengage the petitioner as an architect of the project. The allegations are totally frivolous, baseless, extraneous and malafide. The disengagement is contrary to the terms and conditions of the competition document which govern the selection and engagement of the petitioner as an architect for the project and as such the petitioner is well within his rights to invoke appropriate legal course of action to seek restoration of his position so as to continue as an architect of the project. The respondents are answerable for attempting to malign the professional reputation of the petitioner. 2.12. The State of affair and the dispute, as it exists between the petitioner and SKUAST is referable for adjudication through arbitration before the Council of Architectures in terms of Condition no. 10 of the Competition Document read with Clause 15 of the Conditions of Engagement and Scales of Professional fee and Charges of the Council of Architect, entitling the petitioner to invoke the arbitration clause against SKUAST. Statutory notice dated 11.09.2006 has already been sent through registered post A/D (Annexure J). 2.13. That the petitioner has made tremendous efforts impressing upon SKUAST to attend to its misconduct unleashed against the petitioner and have also sought indulgence of the Vice Chancellor of SKUAST for withdrawal of letter dated 02.08.2006 disengaging the petitioner which resulted in frustration and has compelled him to take recourse to legal action. 2.14. 2.13. That the petitioner has made tremendous efforts impressing upon SKUAST to attend to its misconduct unleashed against the petitioner and have also sought indulgence of the Vice Chancellor of SKUAST for withdrawal of letter dated 02.08.2006 disengaging the petitioner which resulted in frustration and has compelled him to take recourse to legal action. 2.14. The legal notice dated 11.9.2006 sent by the petitioner requested for appointment of an arbitrator namely Council of Architecture India Habitat Centre, Core-A 1st Floor Lodhi Road New Delhi for arbitration in the matter with respect to the acts of omissions and commissions on the part of the respondents resulting in issuance of disengagement order dated 02.08.2006 as the architect for the project and matters incidental thereto. SKUAST had sent its reply dated 11.10.2006 rejecting the request (Annexure- L). 2.15. The petitioner again claimed that there is agreement between the parties which are borne out from the Competition Document read with Conditions of Engagement and Scale of Charges Council of Architecture and correspondences, which exchange inter-se between the petitioner and the respondents with respect to the project and its execution of master plan of SKUAST. The acts of omissions and commissions on the part of the SKUAST and its officers like respondent 2 and 3 and working with regard to the project has given rise to a dispute between the petitioner and SKUAST which qualify for reference to the Council of Architect in terms of condition no. 10.2 of the Competition Document read with Clause 15 of the Conditions of Engagement and Scales of Professional fee and Charges of the Council of Architect. B. Pleadings of the Respondent; 3. The case of the respondents is as under:- 3.1 The petition has been opposed by filing detailed objections. In preliminary objection No.1 respondents have submitted that existence of an arbitration agreement is a condition precedent for exercise of power by the High Court to appoint an arbitrator. According to respondents there is no specific agreement/con tract which might have been executed between the parties showing their intention to settle the disputes arising between them which might be referable to the arbitrator. The application seeking intervention for arbitration by the High Court is not maintainable. According to respondents there is no specific agreement/con tract which might have been executed between the parties showing their intention to settle the disputes arising between them which might be referable to the arbitrator. The application seeking intervention for arbitration by the High Court is not maintainable. 3.2 The credibility of the petitioner can be judged by the fact that Shri Mata Vaishno Devi University Katra had engaged his services for the University and after experiencing the inability/incompetence of the petitioner in carrying out the assignment he was disengaged within a span of six months. Likewise J&K Police Housing Corporation also disengaged him where he was engaged for rendering consultancy services. The reason for disengagement is his failure to show the desired progress. Similar development has taken place with the State Industrial Development Corporation Jammu. There also he has been disengaged due to poor progress. 3.3 The assertion of the petitioner based on condition no. 10.2 of the Competition Document read with clause 15 of the Architecture Practice of the conditions of engagement and scales of charges of the Council of Architecture has been rebutted because those conditions/clauses cannot be invoked as those clauses do not govern contractual/legal relationship of the petitioner with the respondents as an architect for the project. The aforesaid condition/clauses invoked by the petitioner were confined and limited to the competition level and not beyond that. 3.4 After the completion of the design and architectural competition for preparation of the Master Plan and design of the proposed University Campus at Chatha Jammu the respondents vide letter dated 09.12.2003 sought information from the petitioner regarding the availability of infrastructure sufficient to handle such a major project. The information has never been made available. While the necessary information from the petitioner was still awaited and on account of urgency involved to start the execution of the civil works, a letter of intent was issued in favour of the petitioner by the respondents to provide the designs of three buildings/blocks on an urgent basis. The petitioner lacked in every respect in furnishing the designs and even took more than two years to furnish the basic design. In the meanwhile a series of communications were addressed to the petitioner for drawal of agreement containing specific terms and conditions to govern the relations between the parties. The petitioner kept on dragging his feet on the matter. The petitioner lacked in every respect in furnishing the designs and even took more than two years to furnish the basic design. In the meanwhile a series of communications were addressed to the petitioner for drawal of agreement containing specific terms and conditions to govern the relations between the parties. The petitioner kept on dragging his feet on the matter. Some agreement on the rates of fee alone could reach. Eventually on 08.04.2005 the petitioner agreed and consented to provide consultancy for the project on the same scale of professional fees as he had agreed and charged from Shri Mata Vaishnu Devi University Katra. It has further been submitted that whatever had been agreed by the petitioner so far as professional fees, most of it stand already paid. The little amount which is due as per the rates consented, would also be paid. There is no live dispute between the parties regarding payment of professional fees. There is no arbitration agreement between the parties and, therefore, petition under Section 11 is not maintainable. 3.5 The respondents have further asserted that the design competition was conducted which was to be governed by the conditions contained in the Architectural Design Competition Document. The actual terms and conditions of engagement of the winning architect for consultancy services were left to be decided by the parties on the basis of their mutual consent which depended upon a number of factors. It is wholly incorrect that the parties were bound by the scale of professional fees as prescribed by the Council of Architecture which was only required to be taken into consideration as is evident from the perusal of the competition document. After the Letter of Intent was issued in favour of the petitioner on 26.3.2004 the respondent entered into series of correspondence asking the petitioner to 'draw an agreement with specific terms including the fee structure. The petitioner, on one pretext or the other, continued to avoid the same. Eventually it was mutually agreed between the parties that the terms and conditions with regard to charging of professional fees in the present contract would be the same as the petitioner has agreed to charge from Shri Mata Vaishno Devi University Katra. Accordingly the petitioner cannot be permitted to resile from the mutual consent/agreement (A and B). Eventually it was mutually agreed between the parties that the terms and conditions with regard to charging of professional fees in the present contract would be the same as the petitioner has agreed to charge from Shri Mata Vaishno Devi University Katra. Accordingly the petitioner cannot be permitted to resile from the mutual consent/agreement (A and B). 3.6 The respondents have further submitted that the petitioner is levelling wholly unfounded and unsubstantiated allegations with the object of hiding his own weaknesses and professional incompetence. The competition was held for all the buildings proposed under the project but the lackadaisical approach and lack of sufficient infrastructure to handle such a major project as reported by the works committee, the petitioner was issued with the assignment for three number of buildings only in order to adjudge his performance and professional commitment. It was not adequately responded because petitioner took more than a year to submit the basic designs of the proposed buildings which has resulted in inordinate delay to start the project. The designs submitted after a delay of more than a year were found to be faulty. On account of professional negligence on the part of the petitioner the foundation drawings have to undergo revision and work in fact could commence only on 21.11.2005. A project for which letter of intent was issued on 09.12.2003 was delayed by 20 months, which was wholly attributable to the petitioner. The allegation of extracting cut from the petitioner's fee and remuneration package is stated to be a total lie and has been vehemently denied. The record of the series of correspondence exchanged between the parties during the time the petitioner has remained engaged on the project is a tell tale story of total unprofessional aptitude of the petitioner and how the respondents were exasperated by the inordinate delay caused by the petitioner. 3.7 The petitioner has no cause of action to invoke section 11 of the Act. The fee of consultancy and work fee has been rightly calculated as consented by the petitioner himself that he was to charge the fees on the same scale as has been charged by him for rendering services to Shri Mata Vaishno Devi University Katra. The claim of the petitioner that he is entitled to a sum of Rs. The fee of consultancy and work fee has been rightly calculated as consented by the petitioner himself that he was to charge the fees on the same scale as has been charged by him for rendering services to Shri Mata Vaishno Devi University Katra. The claim of the petitioner that he is entitled to a sum of Rs. 1,27,12,014/- for the work done by him as per the conditions of engagement and scales of professional fees of the Council of Architecture has been controverted. 3.8 The respondents have alleged that the petitioner proceeded with the work in such a manner that all targets earmarked for completion of the project went haywire. He was himself responsible for acts of omission and commission in providing efficient consultancy services to the respondents. He failed to meet any of the deadlines, delaying the project inordinately and raising its cost. The whole project practically came to a grinding halt compelling the respondents to dispense with the services of the petitioner which has also been done by the other organizations of the State. 3.9 The respondents have also questioned the locus standi of the petitioner to raise the issue of newly appointed architect for consultancy services. The respondent claims that they are competent to appoint an architect of their own choice who is capable to deliver good. They have engaged the services of the same Firm who took over the work of Shri Mata Vaishno Devi University Katra and has substituted the petitioner there also. It has further been clarified that 2006-07 was the last financial and closing year of the tenth Finance Plan and funds if any remaining unutilized were required to be surrendered. Such funds were not to be revalidated and were about to lapse. It thus became essential to enhance the progress though reputed architect who is known in the country. After obtaining recommendations from Shri Mata Vaishno Devi University Katra, the professional services were assigned to M/S Consulting Engineering Services, New Delhi. They meet all the qualifications for being engaged for the work. 3.10 The terms and conditions enumerated in the Competition Document are concerning the Council of Architecture are wholly inapplicable and reliance of the petitioner is misplaced. C. Rival contentions: 4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties who has made following submissions. I have also perused the correspondence between the parties which has been placed on record. 3.10 The terms and conditions enumerated in the Competition Document are concerning the Council of Architecture are wholly inapplicable and reliance of the petitioner is misplaced. C. Rival contentions: 4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties who has made following submissions. I have also perused the correspondence between the parties which has been placed on record. (i) Counsel for the petitioner has placed firm reliance on clause 10 of the Competition Document and argued that SKAUST was obliged to confirm in writing the winner of the competition as the architect, taking into consideration the Charges of the Council of Architecture and the prize shall be deemed to be a payment on account. It has been insisted that clause 22 of the Competition Document contemplate that in the event of dispute the settlement has to be through arbitration without recourse to legal authority. Accordingly it has been submitted that the Competition Document by virtue of clause 22 postulates settlement of dispute by appointment of an arbitrator. A reference has also been invited to the document (annexure B) issued by Council of Architecture, Architectural Practice, as prescribed under Regulation 2(1) (xii) of the Architects Professional Conduct Regulation, 1989. The document talks of conditions of engagement and scales of charges. In that regard reference has been made to clause 15 which provides for resolution of dispute by arbitration and the arbitrator has to be appointed by the President of Council of Architecture. According to the counsel there is a legal and contractual relation between the parties which is recognised by the provisions of Architecture Act, 1972. Even the condition of engagement and scales of charges have been provided and regulated by the statutory provisions. It has been stressed that SKUAST is bound by the contractual relationship. It has a defined legal relationship on account of the fact that conditions and scales of charges which are statutory in nature, govern and guide the course of relationship of an architect and his client. (ii) It has also been submitted that both the parties had mutually agreed to be bound by the terms and conditions settled between the petitioner and Shri Mata Vaishno Devi University, Katra. According to the counsel for the petitioner it contains arbitration clause and therefore existing dispute between the parties is liable to be referred to an arbitrator. (ii) It has also been submitted that both the parties had mutually agreed to be bound by the terms and conditions settled between the petitioner and Shri Mata Vaishno Devi University, Katra. According to the counsel for the petitioner it contains arbitration clause and therefore existing dispute between the parties is liable to be referred to an arbitrator. (iii) The last submission made on behalf of the petitioner is that even when an arbitration clause is missing from the main agreement then it can be inferred from the correspondence and conduct of the parties. In that regard reliance has been placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Geo-Group Communications Inc. v. IOL Broadband Ltd. (2010) 1SCC 562 where the party claiming reference to arbitration has succeeded upon a Share Subscription and Shareholders Agreement which was merely a draft for discussion. On the basis of the nature of correspondence as well as the conduct of the parties the Supreme Court proceeded to hold that the reference to arbitration cannot be refused on the ground that the share holder's agreement was a tentative draft for discussion purposes. Reliance has also been placed on a 7-Judge Constitution Bench Judgment rendered by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in SBP and Company v. Patel Engineering Ltd. and anr, (2005) 8 SCC 618 which has been noticed in the case of Shakti Bhog Foods Limited v. Kola Shipping Limited (2009) 2 SCC 134 to argue that the issue concerning non-existence of the charter party agreement containing arbitration clause can be raised before the arbitrator. 5. On behalf of the respondents it has been submitted that for a reference to arbitration it has to be shown that there is a valid arbitration agreement in terms of Section 7 of the Act and that there is a dispute/live claim subsisting which is capable of being arbitrated. These are sine quo non for the Chief Justice or his Designate while functioning under Section 11(6). In that regard reliance has been placed on the provisions of Section 7 read with Section 6 of the Act and various paras of the judgment of the 7-Judge Constitution Bench in the case of Patel Engineering Ltd. (Supra). 5.1. It has further been submitted that the Chief Justice must decide the existence of arbitration agreement and it cannot be left for adjudication of the arbitrator. 5.1. It has further been submitted that the Chief Justice must decide the existence of arbitration agreement and it cannot be left for adjudication of the arbitrator. In that regard reliance has been placed on the observations of Hon'ble the Supreme Court made in paras 8, 9, 11, 17, 25, 31, 33, 39 and 47 (IV) in Patel Engineering Ltd. Case (supra). 5.2. Counsel has further argued that the Competition Document cannot be invoked to argue that it contains an arbitration clause in the form of clause 22 nor the provisions of clause 15 of the conditions of engagement and scale of charges could be invoked by arguing that these conditions has statutory rules in the provisions of Architect Act, 1972. According to the learned counsel these documents were confined to the competition alone and in order to succeed in appointment as architect of the project further steps were required to be taken in writing. . As per clause 10 the respondents were to confirm in writing the appointment of the petitioner as architect of the project, taking into consideration the provisions of engagement and scales of professional fees. However, it was subject to the provisions of clause 10.4 which provides that if the Board of accessors opined that the winner of the competition does not have adequate experience commensurate with the importance and complexity of the magnitude of the project, then he may be required to associate with an individual architect or architectural firm who in the opinion of the assessor would have requisite experience. 6. On behalf of respondents it has also been argued that from the correspondence nothing is discernible to conclude that arbitration agreement exists. On the contrary, various attempts made by the respondents, offering the petitioner to enter into agreement in wiring have failed as is evident from Letter of Intent (Annexure C) and draft agreement dated 24.05.2006. Both these documents have been admitted by the petitioner and despite efforts made by SKUAST the petitioner has failed to execute those documents bringing in existence a concluded contract containing an arbitration agreement. 7. The pleading of the parties as set out in the preceding paras spell out material fact that there was a architectural competition held by SKUAST for preparation of the master plan and design of its proposed University Campus. 7. The pleading of the parties as set out in the preceding paras spell out material fact that there was a architectural competition held by SKUAST for preparation of the master plan and design of its proposed University Campus. The terms and conditions governing the manner, scope and purpose of the competition were incorporated in a document titled as Architectural Design Competition for the Campus of SKUAST (Annexure A). The petitioner was winner of the competition and prize of Rs. 3 lacs in accordance with condition no. 9.1 of the Competition Document has already been paid to him although belatedly. The Competition Document also contained the arbitration clause in the form of Clause no. 22 providing for settlement of dispute through arbitration. According to guidelines in respect of winning design contained in clause 10, the winning designer was to be appointed as architect for the project to make final plans and render architectural and other allied services subject to certain other conditions. However, the appointment of the winner of the competition was required to be confirmed in writing by SKUAST, which in the present case did not happen. According to clause 10.4 if the winner of the competition in the opinion of board of assessors, does not have adequate experience commensurate with the importance, complexity and magnitude of the project he may be required to associate with an individual architect or an architectural firm. Thus it is evident that in the absence of confirmation in writing appointing the winner of the competition as the architect it cannot be assumed that the petitioner was ever appointed as such. The facts further show that a Letter of Intent dated 26.03.2004 was sent by SKUAST. A draft agreement dated 06.01.2006 was also sent to the petitioner but he did not sign the same bringing into existence a concluded contract with arbitration clause. A series of communications were addressed to the petitioner for drafting of the agreement containing specific terms and conditions regulating the contractual relationship between the parties. However, the petitioner kept on dragging his feet and no agreement as an architect of the project containing terms and conditions with an arbitration clause could be concluded. D: Principles laid down in Patel Engineering and Others (supra) 8. The law concerning appointment of an arbitrator is now well settled. However, the petitioner kept on dragging his feet and no agreement as an architect of the project containing terms and conditions with an arbitration clause could be concluded. D: Principles laid down in Patel Engineering and Others (supra) 8. The law concerning appointment of an arbitrator is now well settled. In the judgment rendered by 7-Judge Constitution Bench in Patel Engineering and ors (supra) Hon'ble the Supreme Court has laid down in unequivocal terms that while functioning under Section 11 (6) of the Act, the Chief Justice or his designate is bound to decide (a) whether he has the jurisdiction in the sense that the party laying motion has approached the right High Court; (b) whether there is a valid arbitration agreement in terms of Section 7; (c) whether the person before the Chief Justice for referring the dispute to arbitration is a party to the arbitration agreement; (d) whether there is a dispute/live claim subsisting which is capable of being arbitrated upon. To exercise powers under Section 11 (6) the Chief Justice is bound to apply his mind to the allegations and counter allegations of the parties. He is to form an opinion on the available material. Although Section 11 (7) uses the term decision but the satisfaction required at this stage is merely of a prima facie nature because the Chief Justice does neither decide a lis nor the contentious issues between the parties. Section 11 neither contemplates a detailed enquiry nor a trial nor finding on controversial or contested matters. The Chief Justice while performing functions under Section 11 (7) of the Act should be prima facie satisfied that the conditions laid down in Section 11 are fulfilled. 9. It has also been put beyond any doubt that Section 16 of the Act gives competence to Arbitral Tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction. However, because of the finality accorded by Section 11(8) of the Act the decision of the Chief Justice under Section 11(4) (5) and (6), the Arbitral Tribunal or the arbitrator cannot go behind the decision and rule on its own jurisdiction or on existence of an arbitration clause. Therefore, Section 16 has been permitted full play only when the Arbitral Tribunal is constituted without intervention under Section 11 (6) and (8) of the Act. Therefore, Section 16 has been permitted full play only when the Arbitral Tribunal is constituted without intervention under Section 11 (6) and (8) of the Act. The question whether the Chief Justice could entertain an application under Section 11 (6) of the Act cannot be left to the decision of the arbitral tribunal constituted by him on entertaining such an application. 10. The question whether there is an arbitration agreement is not merely a jurisdictional fact for commencing arbitration itself but it is also a jurisdictional fact for appointing an arbitrator on a motion laid by a party under Section 11 (6) of the Act. A Chief Justice can appoint an arbitrator in exercise of his power only if there is an arbitration agreement. In the absence of finding that there is an arbitration agreement it would not be open to him to appoint an arbitrator saying that he was appointing an arbitrator since he has been moved in that behalf and the applicant before him asserts that there is an arbitration agreement. Acceptance of such an argument would reduce the high judicial authority entrusted with power to appoint an arbitrator to an automation and subservient to the Arbitral Tribunal which he himself brings into existence. The decision of the Chief Justice on the issue of jurisdiction and existence of a valid arbitration agreement would be binding on the parties when the matter goes to Arbitral Tribunal and at subsequent stages of the proceedings except in an appeal to the Supreme Court. The argument to the contrary that there is exclusive conferment of jurisdiction on the Arbitral Tribunal to decide on validity of arbitral agreement was rejected in para 9 of the judgment. 11. When the aforesaid principles are applied to the facts of the present case then it becomes crystal clear that post architectural competition there is no confirmation in writing in terms of clause 10.2 of the Competition Document, conferring the appointment of the winner of the competition as the architect for the project. There is no concluded agreement between the parties with regard to terms and conditions which could regulate the few works of the project allocated to the petitioner. The Letter of Intent and the correspondence on record would show that the petitioner did not sign any of the draft terms and conditions at the instance of SKUAST. There is no concluded agreement between the parties with regard to terms and conditions which could regulate the few works of the project allocated to the petitioner. The Letter of Intent and the correspondence on record would show that the petitioner did not sign any of the draft terms and conditions at the instance of SKUAST. The draft agreement dated 06.01.2006 has remained at nebulous stage without maturity into a concluded contract. In the absence of any agreement between the parties confirming the petitioner to be architect of the project and finalizing the terms and conditions regulating the entrustment of work, it is not possible to reach a conclusion that the parties have concurred for referring the dispute to arbitration. 12. The arguments raised by Mr. P. N. Raina, in a complacent and xx passionate manner have not impressed me and I proceed to deal with the same. The first argument that the petitioner and the SKUAST are in a state of contractual relationship/legal relationship does not advance the case of the petitioner even a bit because the so-called contractual/legal relationship is founded upon terms and conditions postulated in Competition Document. Clause 22 of the Competition Document incorporates an arbitration clause providing settlement of disputes through arbitration. The clause would necessarily be confined to the disputes emerging from and relatable to competition. Any allocation of work to be given to the winner necessarily contemplates another stage of contractual relationship which has never come into existence. The terms and conditions postulated in Competition Document has worked themselves out and would not govern the terms of work allocated. Once this factual aspect is evident then another agreement was required to have come into existence for resolving dispute by reference to arbitration. Therefore, there is no arbitration agreement with regard to the dispute either concerning the nature of work to be entrusted, conditions for engagement and termination. 13. The other argument that dispute touching termination of the petitioner emanates from his engagement as an architect under the Competition Document (Annexure A) and also founded on Architecture Act, 1972 is wholly without substance because under clause 10(2) of the Architectural Design Competition (Annexure A) the petitioner was required to be confirmed in writing as the architect of the project. The other argument that dispute touching termination of the petitioner emanates from his engagement as an architect under the Competition Document (Annexure A) and also founded on Architecture Act, 1972 is wholly without substance because under clause 10(2) of the Architectural Design Competition (Annexure A) the petitioner was required to be confirmed in writing as the architect of the project. The provision further stipulated that the SKUAST shall take into consideration the conditions of engagement and scale of fee and charges of Council of Architecture. There is no mention that a party were under obligation to follow in all respects the provisions of Architect Act, 1972 resulting into incorporation of a provision of that Act which provide for arbitration. It will be profitable to extract clause 10 of the Architectural Design Competition Document which reads thus:- 10.1 It is the intention of SKUAST to build, and the author of the winning design will be appointed as the Architect for the project to make final plans and render architectural and other allied services for the successful implementation of the project. 10.2 As soon as possible and within a reasonable time SKUAST shall confirm in writing the appointment of the winner of the competition (subject to 10.4 applicable) as the Architect, taking into consideration the Conditions of Engagement and Scales of Professional Fees and Charges of the Council of Architecture and the prize shall be deemed to be a payment on account. 10.3 In the unusual event when the promoter decides no to appoint the winner of the competition as Architect to the project as per 10.1 he will grant him compensation equal to 0.25% of the cost of the project in addition to the prize money due to him as per 9.1. 10.4 If in the opinion of the Board of Assessors the winner of the competition does not have adequate experience commensurate with the importance, complexity of magnitude of the project, he may be required to associate with an individual architect or an architectural firm, who in the opinion of the Board of Assessors would have the requisite experience. 10.5 SKUAST will start the project as soon as it is possible. 10.5 SKUAST will start the project as soon as it is possible. If due to unforeseen circumstances and in spite of true intent the appointment referred to in 10.1 or the implementation of the project should be delayed and the winner of the competition is not given any further instructions to develop his design, SKUAST will pay him after one year from the date of the Award, in addition to the prize money an amount equivalent to 25% of the cost of project. 10.6 If, however the project is called off or cancelled after the winner of the competition has been appointed as Architect and he was rendered further services towards the implementation of the project, he shall be paid as per 10.6 or as per the Conditions of Engagement and Scales of Professional Fees and Charges of the Council of Architecture Whichever is more." 14. A perusal of guidelines in respect of winning design contained in clause 10 to 10.6 would not indicate that there is automatic appointment of the winner of the competition. It was required to be confirmed in writing by SKUAST. It does not provide anywhere that the provisions of Architect Act, 1972 would govern the contractual relationship of the parties which was to emerge after entrusting the whole project to the petitioner. It was only for Architectural Competition. Therefore, there is no incorporation of the provisions of 1972 Act by reference. 15. Another argument raised on behalf of the petitioner is based on the consensus reached between the parties on 08.04.2005 with regard to the scale of professional fee to be paid to the petitioner as has been charged by him from Shri Mata Vaishno Devi University Katra. The aforesaid letter, which has been placed on record, (G-25) makes an interesting reading and the same is set out below in extenso:- "Subject- Finalization of fee for providing Consultancy for designing of the Campus of Sher-e-Kashmir University of Agricultural Sciences and Technology for SKUAST-J at Chatha. Sir, With reference to above stated subject, we are ready to provide consultancy for SKUAST-J for the designing of above stated project on the same professional fee as we had already agreed to Shri Mata Vaishno Devi University at Kakrial, Katra. However the rest of the terms and conditions shall be as per the norms of Council of Architecture. Sir, With reference to above stated subject, we are ready to provide consultancy for SKUAST-J for the designing of above stated project on the same professional fee as we had already agreed to Shri Mata Vaishno Devi University at Kakrial, Katra. However the rest of the terms and conditions shall be as per the norms of Council of Architecture. Thanking you, Yours faithfully, For B. V. Sharma & Associates" 16. A perusal of the aforesaid letter would show that the petitioner had agreed to provide consultancy to the respondent-SKUAST for designing of its campus on the same professional fee as he had already agreed to charge from Shri Mata Vaishno Devi University at Katra. However, the rest of the terms and conditions were to be as per the norms of Council of Architecture. There is no corresponding acceptance of the above terms and conditions by SKUAST. Moreover this is only a communication sent by the petitioner to SKUAST. However, the correspondence dated 17.05.2005 entered by the SKUAST with Shri Mata Vaishno Devi University Katra would show that SKUAST was in the process of collecting documents with regard to providing rates of professional fees which have been charged from Shri Mata Vaishno Devi University Katra. There is no concluding contract between the parties. There is nothing on record to suggest that SKUAST ever accepted that norms of Council of Architect were to be the terms and conditions of contractual relationship of the petitioner as architect of the project. This is a self serving statement which has never been accepted by SKUAST. In any case this correspondence does not talk of any arbitration agreement. 17. The reliance of Mr. Raina on the judgment of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Geo Group Communication INC (supra), is that the draft agreement dated 06.01.2006 should be considered adequate for inferring the existence of an arbitration clause because according to him actual signing of the agreement was not necessary. In that regard the minutes of meeting of standing works committee held on 03.03.2006 (G-68) would need to be noticed. In that regard the minutes of meeting of standing works committee held on 03.03.2006 (G-68) would need to be noticed. To a query of the petitioner for non-payment of architectural services rendered by him the Estate Officer of the SKUAST has stated 'that the payment of the architect has been withheld for the reason that the architect has not signed the agreement so far with the University which is mandatory for any contractual business, although copy of the draft agreement has been sent to the architect vide this office letter dated 06.01.2006'. An additional copy of the draft agreement was to be supplied to the petitioner. A copy of the draft agreement is available at page 154 which contains an arbitration clause. However, the same has remained at the draft stage and has not been signed by the parties. The judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Geo Group proceeds on entirely different premise. In that case the draft agreement between a US Company and an Indian Company was construed as concluded for the reasons that the parties have proceeded and acted upon that agreement. The Court has recorded a categorical finding that the parties were adidem, therefore, the arbitration clause in that agreement was considered to be incorporated. In the present case no such inference could be raised on the basis of the draft agreement because the SKUAST has always desired that the terms and conditions proposed in the draft agreement must be signed by the petitioner as is evident from the minutes of the meeting dated 03.03.2006 (G-68). According to the proceedings the SKUAST has emphasised that the petitioner did not sign the agreement by 03.03.2006 although the draft agreement dated 06.01.2006 was sent to him and the University considered the signing of the draft agreement as mandatory for any contractual agreement. 18. Likewise, the reliance of Mr. Raina on the judgment in Shaki Bhog case (supra) is also wholly misplaced. There the Court has specifically noticed that a charter party agreement containing an arbitration clause existed and was duly signed by the party who had questioned the existence of such an arbitration clause. The Court went to the extent of observing that it was on the basis of the Charter Party Agreement that ship was loaded with 1100 Matric Tone of the Cargo. The Court went to the extent of observing that it was on the basis of the Charter Party Agreement that ship was loaded with 1100 Matric Tone of the Cargo. The Court also found that the Charter Party agreement between the parties could be identified by virtue of its reference in their correspondence which was to that effect and also from the fixture note and the bill of lading signed by the parties. It is also well settled that inference for existence of arbitration clause would depend upon the facts and circumstances of the each case. On the facts of the present case there is nothing to assume from the correspondence between the parties that they had agreed for settlement of their dispute by arbitration. The Chief Justice cannot impose an arbitration agreement on the parties if one does not exist despite engaged efforts. The petitioner has to work out his ordinary remedy if so advised. 19. As a sequel to the above discussion this petition fails and the same is dismissed with costs.