Judgment B.R. Gavai, J. 1. The petitioner has approached this Court praying for a declaration that Rule 5 of the Goa Minor Mineral Concession (Amendment) Rules, 2002 is unconstitutional, illegal and ultra vires Section 15(1)(1A)(d)(h) of The Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulations) Act, 1957. The petitioner has also prayed for a writ of mandamus, commanding respondents No.1 and 2 to cancel the quarry lease executed between them and respondents No.3 and 4 on 28th September, 2000. The petitioner has also prayed for quashing the order dated 12th October, 2004 in interlocutory proceedings in Civil Suit No.133/2004. However, it is submitted at the Bar that now the civil suit itself has been dismissed and first appeal challenging the same has been filed before this Court. In that view of the matter, it would not be appropriate for us to consider the relief in so far as prayer clause (c) is concerned. 2. The facts, in brief, giving rise to the present petition, are as under: The petitioner claims to be owner of a landed property surveyed under No.213/1 of Revenue Village Morombi-O-Grand, described under No.3066 of Book B-33 old. (hereinafter, referred to as “the said property”). It is the contention of the petitioner that on 12.7.1986, the petitioner's husband entered into an agreement, granting quarrying lease with respondent No.3, in respect of an area admeasuring 40,000 sq. metres with effect from 1st October, 1998. With effect from 28th July, 1986, the State Government brought into force the Goa Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as “the said Rules”) pursuant to the powers vested in it under Section 15 of The Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as “the said Act”). In so far as Chapter III of the said Rules is concerned, the same was relating to grant of quarrying lease in respect of land in which minor minerals belong to persons other than the State Government. The same stood deleted by Rule 5 of Goa Minor Mineral Concession (Amendment) Rules, 2002. That on 17th September, 1988, the petitioner's husband expired. Thereafter, in the month of May, 1997, the petitioner gave three months' notice to respondent No.2, before expiry of 10 years' period of lease. On 3rd August, 1997, respondent No.1 executed an agreement of lease with respondent No.3. That on 17th September, 1988, the petitioner's husband expired. Thereafter, in the month of May, 1997, the petitioner gave three months' notice to respondent No.2, before expiry of 10 years' period of lease. On 3rd August, 1997, respondent No.1 executed an agreement of lease with respondent No.3. On 28th August, 1997, the petitioner informed respondent No.2 that no consent is given by the petitioner to respondent No.1 or any other person to explore the minerals in her property. The petitioner also made further correspondence, opposing the grant of lease for mining purposes in favour of respondent No.3. It is the case of the petitioner that though certain amount was sought to be paid, she returned the cheque. On 28th September, 2000, respondent No.2 again renewed the lease in favour of respondent No.3 for a period of 10 years with effect from 4th August, 1997. A legal notice was addressed by the petitioner to respondent No.1. A notice was issued to the petitioner to accept the rent for the period 1999 – 2000, which she refused. On 18th April, 2002, the said Rules were amended by Section 5 of the Amendment Rules, thereby deleting Chapter III from the said Rules. The petitioner, thereafter, filed a suit for eviction and injunction against the respondents and interim injunction was also prayed in the said suit. However, the said prayer was rejected. It is informed at the Bar that subsequently, the suit has been dismissed and the order of dismissal has been carried by way of first appeal in this Court. In this background, the petitioner has approached this Court for the reliefs as aforesaid. 3. Shri Usgaonkar, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has raised the following propositions in support of the petitioner's case: (I) That the deletion of Chapter III from the said Rules is derogatory to the power enured to the State Government under Section 15(1)(1A) of the said Act. (II) Article 465 of the Portuguese Civil Code, 1867 recognizes right to prospect and explore the mines in the land possessed by them, without permission from the Government. Article 466 also recognizes right of the owner to grant lease for prospect and explore the mines on his land; whereas Article 467 empowers to enact special legislation to regulate prospecting and exploration and to lay down formalities and conditions for exercise of said right. Article 466 also recognizes right of the owner to grant lease for prospect and explore the mines on his land; whereas Article 467 empowers to enact special legislation to regulate prospecting and exploration and to lay down formalities and conditions for exercise of said right. (III) That such a right which is vested in the owner of the land and which was recognized in Chapter III of the said Rules, could not have been taken away by deleting the said chapter of the said Rules. The learned Counsel relies on following judgments of the Apex Court and various High Courts, in support of his submissions: (1) Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi vs. State of Bombay, 1959 SCR (S) 489; (2) GulabahiVallabhai Desai vs. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 1110 ; (3) ShanthiSaroop Sharma vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1969 PH 79; (4) BalmadiesPlantations Ltd. and anr. vs. State of Tamil Nadu, 1973 SCR (1) 258, (5) State of Tamil Nadu vs. Hind Stone etc. 1981 SCR (2) 742; (6) State of Punjab vs. Vishwakarma & Co., 1993 SCC Suppl.(3) 62; (7) State of Karnataka Vs. Subhash Rukmayya Guttedar, AIR 1993 SC 860 ; (8) State of Karnataka Vs. Dundamada Shetty, 1994 (3) Kar.LJ 378 ; (9) RanjanaGranites P. Ltd. vs. State of Andhra Pradesh; 1996 (3) ALT 121 ; (10) PallavaGranites Industries vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh, 1996 (4) ALT 706 ; (11) PallavaGranite Industries India Pvt. Ltd. vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1997 SC 2098 ; (12) Smt. Kunda Raghuvir Gharse vs. Timble Planting Private Ltd., 1998 (4) Bom CR 520; (13) SaurashtraCement and Chemical Inds. and another Vs. Union of India and ors. decided on 17th October, 2000. (14) Enterprising Enterprises vs. Government of A.P. And ors., 2003(4) ALD 510 ; (15) Sri Raja Veligoti Venkata Sesha vs. The Union of India, AIR 2004 AP 179 (16) State of West Bengal and another vs. Kesoram Industries Ltd., and others, 2004 AIR SCW 5998; (17) State of H.P. And ors. vs. Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd., and another, decided on 18th July, 2005; (18) Bengal Bricksfield Owners vs. State of West Bengal & ors, 2006(2) CHN 577 ; and (19) ThreesiammaJacob and ors. vs. Geologist Department of Mining and Geology and others., AIR 2013 SC 3251 . 4. vs. Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd., and another, decided on 18th July, 2005; (18) Bengal Bricksfield Owners vs. State of West Bengal & ors, 2006(2) CHN 577 ; and (19) ThreesiammaJacob and ors. vs. Geologist Department of Mining and Geology and others., AIR 2013 SC 3251 . 4. Shri A.N.S. Nadkarni, learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of respondents No.1 and 2, on the contrary submits that the petition is totally without any foundation. The learned Advocate General submits that even prior to deletion of Chapter III, during the period when agreements were entered into by the husband of the petitioner with respondent No.3, it is the State Government which has been giving lease of the mining rights. The learned Advocate General submits that the petitioner, at the most, may have right over the surface land. The learned Advocate General, however, submits that in so far as the title to mines and minerals is concerned, the same would exclusively vest with the State Government. The learned Advocate General relies on the provisions of Sections 14 and 36 the Goa, Daman and Diu Land Revenue Code, 1968 (hereinafter referred to as “the Land Revenue Code”) in support of the proposition that title to mines and minerals vests exclusively in the State Government. The learned Advocate General further submits that under the provisions of Section 24A of the said Act, it is lawful for the holder of such reconnaissance permit, prospecting licence or mining lease to enter into the land over which such permit is granted. It is submitted that at the most, the petitioner would be entitled to the compensation as provided under sub-section (2) of Section 24A of the said Act. The learned Advocate General in support of his submissions relies upon the following judgments of the Apex Court and a judgment of the Division Bench of this Court: (1) State of Tamil Nadu vs. M/s. Hind Stone etc. etc. AIR 1981 SC 711 ; (2) State of T.N. vs. M.P.P. Kavery Chetty, (1995) 2 SCC 402 ; (3) ShriQucxova Sinai Cundo, through his Power of Attorney Shri Naraina Sinai Kirtany & ors. vs. Union of India and ors., 1998(2) Bom. C.R. 87; and (4) Quarry Owners' Association vs. State of Bihar and ors. (2000) 8 SCC 655 . 5. AIR 1981 SC 711 ; (2) State of T.N. vs. M.P.P. Kavery Chetty, (1995) 2 SCC 402 ; (3) ShriQucxova Sinai Cundo, through his Power of Attorney Shri Naraina Sinai Kirtany & ors. vs. Union of India and ors., 1998(2) Bom. C.R. 87; and (4) Quarry Owners' Association vs. State of Bihar and ors. (2000) 8 SCC 655 . 5. Shri S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No.3 has adopted the contentions raised by the learned Advocate General. 6. From the tenor of the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it appears that it is the basic contention that since the petitioner owns surface soil of the land in question, the ownership of the minerals and sub-soil below it also vests in her. It further appears to be the contention that by deleting Chapter III from the said Rules, pursuant to rule making power available to it under Section 15 of the said Act, the right to minor minerals beneath surface of such land has been taken away by the State which, according to the petitioner, is not permissible in law. 7. For appreciating the rival controversy, it will be necessary to refer to Sections 4, 15 and 24A of the said Act. They read thus : “4 Prospecting or mining operations to be under licence or lease. 7. For appreciating the rival controversy, it will be necessary to refer to Sections 4, 15 and 24A of the said Act. They read thus : “4 Prospecting or mining operations to be under licence or lease. - (1) [No person shall undertake any reconnaissance, prospecting or mining operations in any area, except under and in accordance with the terms and conditions of a reconnaissance permit or of a prospecting licence or, as the case may be, a mining lease, granted under this Act and the rules made thereunder]: Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall affect any prospecting or mining operations undertaken in any area in accordance with the terms and conditions of a prospecting licence or mining lease granted before the commencement of this Act which is in force at such commencement: [Provided further that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to any prospecting operations undertaken by the Geological Survey of India, the Indian Bureau of Mines, 1[the Atomic Minerals Directorate for Exploration and Research] of the Department of Atomic Energy of the Central Government, the Directorates of Mining and Geology of any State Government (by whatever name called ), and the Mineral Exploration Corporation Limited, a Government Company within the meaning of Section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956:] [Provided also that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to any mining lease (whether called mining lease, mining concession or by any other name) in force immediately before the commencement of this Act in the Union territory of Goa, Daman and Diu.] [(1A) No person shall transport or store or cause to be transported or stored any mineral otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder.] (2) [No reconnaissance permit, prospecting licence or mining lease] shall be granted otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder. [(3) Any State Government may, after prior consultation with the Central Government and in accordance with the rules made under Section 18, 5[ undertake reconnaissance, prospecting or mining operations with respect to any mineral specified in the First Schedule in any area within that State which is not already held under any reconnaissance permit, prospecting licence or mining lease.]] 15. [(3) Any State Government may, after prior consultation with the Central Government and in accordance with the rules made under Section 18, 5[ undertake reconnaissance, prospecting or mining operations with respect to any mineral specified in the First Schedule in any area within that State which is not already held under any reconnaissance permit, prospecting licence or mining lease.]] 15. Power of State Governments to make rules in respect of minor minerals - (1) The State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, make rules for regulating the grant of quarry leases, mining leases or other mineral concessions in respect of minor minerals and for purposes connected therewith. Power of State Governments to make rules in respect of minor minerals - (1) The State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, make rules for regulating the grant of quarry leases, mining leases or other mineral concessions in respect of minor minerals and for purposes connected therewith. [(1A) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such rules may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely:- (a) the person by whom and the manner in which, applications for quarry leases, mining leases or other mineral concessions may be made and the fees to be paid therefor; (b) the time within which, and the form in which, acknowledgment of the receipt of any such applications may be sent; (c) the matters which may be considered where applications in respect of the same land are received within the same day; (d) the terms on which, and the conditions subject to which and the authority by which quarry leases, mining leases or other mineral concessions may be granted or renewed; (e) the procedure for obtaining quarry leases, mining leases or other mineral concessions; (f) the facilities to be afforded by holders of quarry leases, mining leases or other mineral concessions to persons deputed by the Government for the purpose of undertaking research or training in matters relating to mining operations; (g) the fixing and collection of rent, royalty, fees, dead rent, fines or other charges and the time within which and the manner in which these shall be payable; (h) the manner in which the rights of third parties may be protected (whether by way of payment of compensation or otherwise) in cases where any such party is prejudicially affected by reason of any prospecting or mining operations; (i) the manner in which the rehabilitation of flora and other vegetation, such as trees, shrubs and the like destroyed by reasons of any quarrying or mining operations shall be made in the same area or in any other area selected by the State Government (whether by way of reimbursement of the cost of rehabilitation or otherwise) by the person holding the quarrying or mining lease; (j) the manner in which and the conditions subject to which, a quarry lease, mining lease or other mineral concession may be transferred; (k) the construction, maintenance and use of roads, power transmission lines, tramways, railways, aerial ropeways, pipelines and the making of passage for water for mining purposes on any land comprised in a quarry or mining lease or other mineral concession; (l) the form of registers to be maintained under this Act; (m) the reports and statements to be submitted by holders of quarry or mining leases or other mineral concessions and the authority to which such reports and statements shall be submitted; (n) the period within which and the manner in which and the authority to which applications for revision of any order passed by any authority under these rules may be made, the fees to be paid therefor, and the powers of the revisional authority; and (o) any other matter which is to be, or may be prescribed. (2) Until rules are made under sub-section (1), any rules made by a State Government regulating the grant of quarry leases, mining leases or other mineral concessions in respect of minor minerals which are in force immediately before the commencement of this Act shall continue in force. (3) The holder of a mining lease or any other mineral concession granted under any rule made under subsection (1) shall pay royalty or dead rent, whichever is more in respect of minor minerals removed or consumed by him or by his agent, manager, employee, contractor or sub-lessee at the rate prescribed for the time being in the rules framed by the State Government in respect of minor minerals: Provided that the State Government shall not enhance the rate of royalty or dead rent in respect of any minor mineral for more than once during any period of [three] years.] [24A. Rights and liabilities of a holder of prospecting licence or mining lease. - (1) On the issue of a 4 [reconnaissance permit, prospecting licence or mining lease] under this Act and the rules made thereunder, it shall be lawful for the [holder of such permit, licence or lease], his agents or his servants or workmen to enter the lands over which [such permit, lease or licence had been granted] at all times during its currency and carry out all such [reconnaissance, prospecting or mining operations] as may be prescribed: Provided that no person shall enter into any building or upon an enclosed court or garden attached to a dwelling-house (except with the consent of the occupier thereof) without previously giving such occupier at least seven days' notice in writing of his intention to do so. (2) The holder of a 4[reconnaissance permit, prospecting licence or mining lease] referred to in sub-section (1) shall be liable to pay compensation in such manner as may be prescribed to the occupier of the surface of the land granted under 5[such permit, licence or lease] for any loss or damage which is likely to arise or has arisen from or in consequence of the [reconnaissance, mining or prospecting operations]. (3) The amount of compensation payable under sub-section (2) shall be determined by the State Government in the manner prescribed.]” 8. (3) The amount of compensation payable under sub-section (2) shall be determined by the State Government in the manner prescribed.]” 8. A perusal of Section 4 would reveal that it specifically prohibits any person from undertaking any reconnaissance, prospecting or mining operations in any area, except under and in accordance with the terms and conditions of reconnaissance permit or a prospecting licence, as the case may be of mining lease, granted under the said Act and the rules made thereunder. The third proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 4 provides that nothing contained in this sub-section shall apply to any mining lease in force immediately before the commencement of the said Act for the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu. Sub-section (2) thereof specifically prohibits grant of reconnaissance permit, prospecting licence or mining lease otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the said Act and the rules made thereunder. Sub-section (3) thereof provides that the State Government may, after prior consultation with the Central Government and in accordance with the Rules made under Section 18, undertake reconnaissance, prospecting or mining operations with respect of any mineral specified in the First Schedule in any area within that State which is not already held under any reconnaissance permit, prospecting licence or mining lease. 9. Sections 5 to 13 of the said Act are concerning major minerals and Section 14 specifically provides that Sections 5 to 13 of the said Act would not apply to minor minerals. Section 15 enables the State Governments to make rules in respect of minor minerals. Subsection (1A) provides for various matters in respect of which rules can be framed by the State Government. Sub-section (3) thereof provides that a holder of a mining lease or any other mineral concession granted under any rule made under sub-section (1) shall pay royalty or dead rent, whichever is more in respect of minor minerals removed or consumed by him or by his agent, etc., at the rate prescribed for the time being in the rules framed by the State Government in respect of minor minerals. 10. 10. Sub-section (1) of Section 24A makes it lawful for the holder of reconnaissance permit, prospecting licence or mining lease, his agents, or his servants, etc., to enter the lands over which such permit, lease or licence had been granted at all times during its currency and carry out all such reconnaissance, prospecting or mining operations. The proviso thereof is concerned with entry into any building, or upon an enclosed court or garden attached to a dwelling house, except with the consent of the occupier thereof, without previously giving such occupier at least seven days' notice to be given in writing for the said purpose. Sub-section (2) thereof provides that the holder of a reconnaissance permit, prospecting licence or mining lease, shall be liable to pay compensation in such manner as may be prescribed, to the occupier of the surface of the land granted under such permit, licence or lease for any loss or damage arisen from or in consequence of the reconnaissance, mining or prospecting operations. Sub-section (3) thereof provides that the amount of compensation payable under sub-section (2) shall be determined by the State Government in the manner prescribed. 11. It would also be relevant to refer to sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 14 of the Land Revenue Code and Section 36 thereof. They read thus: “14. Title of Government to lands, etc.— (1) All lands, public roads, lanes and paths and bridges, ditches, dikes and fences on or beside the same, the bed of the sea and of harbours and creeks below the high water mark, and of rivers, streams, nallas, lakes and tanks, and all canals and water courses, and all standing and flowing water and all rights in or over the same or appertaining thereto, which are not the property of any person, are and are hereby declared to be the property of the 7[ ] Government subject to right of way, and all other rights, public and individual, legally subsisting. Explanation:— In this section, "high watermark" means the highest point reached by ordinary spring tides at any season of the year. Explanation:— In this section, "high watermark" means the highest point reached by ordinary spring tides at any season of the year. (2) Unless it is otherwise expressly provided in any law for the time being in force or in the terms of a grant made by the Government, the right to mines, minerals and mineral products shall vest in the 8[ ] Government and it shall have all the powers necessary for the proper enjoyment of such rights 36. [ ] Government title to mines and minerals. — (1) Unless it is otherwise expressly provided by the terms of the grant made by the Government, the right to all minerals at whatever place found, whether on surface or underground, including all derelict or working mines and quarries, old dumps, pits, fields, bandhas, nallas, creeks, river-beds and such other places, is and is hereby declared to be expressly reserved and shall vest in the [ ] Government which shall have all powers necessary for the proper enjoyment of such right: Provided that nothing in this Code shall be deemed to affect any subsisting rights of any person in respect of such mines or minerals in his land. (2) The right to all mines and quarries includes the right of access to land for the purpose of mining and quarrying and the right to occupy such other land as may be necessary for purposes subsidiary thereto, including the erection of offices, workmen's dwellings and machinery, the stacking of minerals and deposit of refuse, the construction of roads, railways or tram-lines, and any other purposes which the Government may declare to be subsidiary to mining and quarrying. (3) If the Government has assigned to any person the right over any minerals, mines or quarries, and if, for the proper enjoyment of such right, it is necessary that all or any of the powers specified in sub-sections (1) and (2) should be exercised, the Collector may, by an order in writing, subject to such conditions and reservations as he may specify, delegate such powers to the person to whom the right has been assigned: Provided that no such delegation shall be made until notice has been duly served on all persons having rights in the land affected, and their objections have been heard and considered. (4) If, in the exercise of the right herein referred to over any land, the rights of any person are infringed by the occupation or disturbance of the surface of such land, the Government or its assignee shall pay to such persons compensation for such infringement and the amount of such compensation shall, in the absence of agreement, be determined by the Collector or, if his award is not accepted, by the civil court, in accordance with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. (5) No assignee of the Government shall enter on or occupy the surface of any land unless compensation has been determined and tendered to the persons whose rights are infringed: Provided that it shall be lawful for the Collector to grant interim permission pending the award of the civil court it cases where the question of determining the proper amount of compensation is referred to such court under sub-section (4). (6) If an assignee of the Government fails to pay compensation as provided in sub-section (4), the Collector may recover such compensation from him on behalf of the persons entitled to it, as if it were an arrear of land revenue. (7) Any person who without lawful authority extracts, removes, collects, replaces, picks up or disposes of any mineral from working or derelict mines, quarries, old dumps, fields, bandhs (whether on the plea of repairing or construction of bunds of the fields or on any other plea), nallas, creeks, riverbeds, or such other places wherever situate, the right to which vests in the [ ] Government, and has not been assigned by the Government, shall, without prejudice to any other mode of action that may be taken against him, be liable, on the order in writing of the Collector, to pay penalty not exceeding a sum determined at three times the market value of the minerals so extracted, removed, collected, replaced, picked up or disposed of, as the case may be: Provided that, if the sum so determined is less than one thousand rupees, the penalty may be such larger sum not exceeding one thousand rupees as the Collector may impose. (8) Without prejudice to the provision in subsection (7), the Collector may seize and confiscate any mineral extracted, removed, collected, replaced, picked up or disposed of from any mine, quarry or other place referred to in sub-section (7), the right to which vests in the [ ] Government and has not been assigned by the Government. (9) The Government may make rules to regulate the extraction and removal of minor minerals required by inhabitants of a village, town or city for their domestic, agricultural or professional use on payment of fees or free of charge, as may be specified in the rules. Explanation:— For the purposes of this section, “minor minerals” means the minor minerals in respect of which the Government is empowered to make rules under section 15 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957.” 12. It can thus be seen that sub-section (2) of Section 14 clearly provides that unless it is otherwise expressly provided in any law for the time being in force or in terms of a grant made by the Government, the right to mines, minerals and mineral products shall vest in the Government and it shall have all the powers necessary for the proper enjoyment of such rights. 13. Section 36 of the Land Revenue Code makes it clear that unless it is otherwise expressly provided by the terms of the grant made by the Government, the right to all minerals at whatever place found, whether on the surface or underground, including all derelict or working mines and quarries, old dumps, pits, fields, bandhas, nallas, creeks, river-beds and such other places, is and is hereby declared to be expressly reserved and shall vest in the Government which shall have all powers necessary for the proper enjoyment of such right. Subsection (4) of Section 36 provides that if, in the exercise of the right herein referred to over any land, the rights of any person are infringed by the occupation or disturbance of the surface of such land, the Government or its assignee shall pay to such persons compensation for such infringement and such amount of compensation is required to be determined by the Collector and if his award is not accepted, then by the civil court, in accordance with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. Sub-section (5) thereof provides that no assignee of the Government shall enter on or occupy the surface of any land unless compensation has been determined and tendered to the person whose rights are infringed. However, proviso thereof empowers the Collector to grant interim permission, pending the award of the civil court in cases where the question of determining proper amount of compensation is referred to such court under sub-section (4). Sub-Section (6) provides that if an assignee of the Government fails to pay compensation as provided in sub-section (4), the Collector may recover such compensation from him on behalf of the persons entitled to it, as if it was an arrear of land revenue. 14. It would also be relevant to refer to Article 2 of Decree dated 20.09.1906 which was a Portuguese Colonial Mining Law in force during the erstwhile regime, which reads thus: “The proprietorship of deposits of metals and metalliferous minerals, including bismuth, arsenic, antimony, sulphur, graphite, combustible minerals with the exception of peat, bituminous substances and mineral oils, precious stones, alkalis, phosphates, mica and amianthus belongs to the State; such beds cannot be prospected or worked without licence and concession by Government in the terms of the present Decree.” A perusal of Article 2 of the aforesaid decree would reveal that all metals and metal-liferous minerals belong to the State and such beds cannot be prospected or worked without licence and concession by the Government. 15. It can thus clearly be seen that a conjoint reading of subsections (1) to (6) of Section 36 of the Land Revenue Code, along with Article 2 of Decree dated 20.09.1906, would clearly reveal that rights to all minerals at whatever place found, are expressly reserved and vest in the Government, which shall have all powers necessary for the proper enjoyment of such right. 16. In this background, we will have to consider the submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioner. 17. In the case of GulabahiVallabhai Desai vs. Union of India (supra), decided by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court, on which the learned Counsel for the petitioner heavily relies, the Apex Court was considering the validity of Daman (Abolition of Properties of Villages) Regulation, 1962 which provided for abolition of properties of villages in Daman District. 17. In the case of GulabahiVallabhai Desai vs. Union of India (supra), decided by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court, on which the learned Counsel for the petitioner heavily relies, the Apex Court was considering the validity of Daman (Abolition of Properties of Villages) Regulation, 1962 which provided for abolition of properties of villages in Daman District. The Apex Court in the said case was considering as to whether right held by the petitioner in the land in question could come within the definition “estate”. The Apex Court observed thus : “14. It will thus be clear that before an “estate” or its equivalent can be found there must be land which pays land revenue and is held in accordance with a law relating to land tenures. The lands with which we are concerned in these petitions cannot be said to be held in this way. Nor can they be said to pay land revenue as such. Daman District, as we have seen, had several kinds of lands. There were perpetual and period leases from Government. Villages and lands were sold or were granted for life or lives which later became hereditary possessions. This made little difference, in so far as Government was concerned, because there was neither a tenure nor payment of land revenue. No condition on which the land was held could properly be said to be a condition denoting tenure and the payment to Government was either rent or a percentage of the presumable income from land. As all lands belonged to the Crown, Portuguese law contemplated only three kinds of dealing with the land: (a) grant of a permanent lease (b) grant of a period lease, and (c) sale. There was no difference between land revenue and a tax on income whether of urban or agricultural property and the tax was in every case a percentage of the income. In our jurisdiction we distinguish between land revenue and agricultural income tax and if any resemblance is to be found, it exists on the side of agricultural income tax. The holders were paying a kind of income tax which only distantly resembled land revenue such as we know. Even if it be regarded as land-revenue it is clear enough that there was no law of land tenures because all the property, urban or agricultural, was held alike on lease or as owner by purchase. The holders were paying a kind of income tax which only distantly resembled land revenue such as we know. Even if it be regarded as land-revenue it is clear enough that there was no law of land tenures because all the property, urban or agricultural, was held alike on lease or as owner by purchase. The expression “estate” thus cannot be said to have had an equivalent in Daman District.” (emphasis supplied) It can be seen that the Apex Court in the aforesaid case has found that as all lands belonged to the Crown, Portuguese law contemplated only three kinds of dealing with the land, namely grant of permanent lease, grant of a period lease, and sale. It can thus be seen that the aforesaid judgment rather than supporting the case of the petitioner, it would be against the proposition advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that all the land belonged to private owner. 18. In so far as the judgment in the case of Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi vs. State of Bombay (supra), is concerned, the challenge therein was to the constitutional validity of Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment) Act, 1956. We find that the said judgment will have no bearing on the facts of the present case. As a matter of fact the Apex Court dismissed the petition and rejected the contentions raised by the petitioner therein regarding validity of the said Act. 19. In so far as the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of BalmadiesPlantations Ltd. and anr. vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (supra), the Apex Court was considering the virus of Gudalur Janmam Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwani) Act, 1969. The contention raised by the petitioner therein was that the lands held by the petitioner in the Gudalur Taluke, in the State of Tamil Nadu were previously Janmam estate, but, subsequently became ryotwari estates, especially after the Resettlement of 1926 and, as such, the provisions of the Act, were not applicable to these lands. The Apex Court in the said case, though held that provisions of Section 3 in so far as they related to transfer of forests in Janmam estates to the government were not protected by Article 31A and as such, was liable to be struck down, however, upheld the vires of the Act in other respects. The Apex Court in the said case, though held that provisions of Section 3 in so far as they related to transfer of forests in Janmam estates to the government were not protected by Article 31A and as such, was liable to be struck down, however, upheld the vires of the Act in other respects. It would be relevant to refer to the following observations of the Apex Court. “We have referred in the earlier part of this judgment to the various provisions of the Act, and it is manifest from their perusal that the object and general scheme of the Act is to abolish intermediaries between the State and the cultivator and to help the actual cultivator by giving him the status of direct relationship between himself and the State. The Act, as such, in its broad outlines should be held to be a measure of agrarian reform and would consequently be protected by Article 31-A of the Constitution. The said article provides that notwithstanding anything contained in Article 13, no law providing for the acquisition by the State of any estate or of any rights therein or the extinguishment or modification of any such right shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by Article 14, Article 19 or Article 31, provided that where such law is a law made by the Legislature of a State, the provisions of Article 31-A shall not apply thereto unless such law, having been reserved for the consideration of the President, has received his assent. The impugned Act, as stated earlier, received the assent of the President on December 6, 1969. As the Act is protected by Article 31-A of the Constitution, it is immune from attack on the ground of being violative of Article 14, Article 19 or Article 31. The impugned Act, as stated earlier, received the assent of the President on December 6, 1969. As the Act is protected by Article 31-A of the Constitution, it is immune from attack on the ground of being violative of Article 14, Article 19 or Article 31. This fact would not, however, stand in the way of the court examining the constitutional validity of any particular provision of the Act.” It can thus be clearly seen that the Apex Court in unequivocal terms held that since the object and general scheme of the Act was to abolish intermediaries between the State and the cultivator and to help the actual cultivator by giving him the status of direct relationship between himself and the State, and since the said Act had received assent of the President, the same was protected by Article 31A of the Constitution, and was immune from the attack on the ground of being violative of Articles 14, 19 or Article 31 of the Constitution. We are unable to appreciate as to how the said judgment would support the case of the petitioner. 20. In so far as the judgment of the apex Court in the case of the case of State of Tamil Nadu vs. Hind Stone etc. (supra) is concerned, the said judgment would also not support the case of the petitioner. In the said case, Rule 8-C of the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1959, provided for banning of leases for quarrying black granite in favour of private persons and provided that the leases could only be granted in favour of any Corporation wholly owned by the State Government. The Madras High Court had struck down Rule 8-C on the ground that it exceeded the rule making power given to the State Government under Section 15 of the said Act and took a view that the said section only enabled the State Government to frame rules to regulate and not to prohibit grant of mining licence. An argument was advanced by the State that the minerals belonged to the Government and the respondents had no vested or indefeasible right to obtain a lease or renewal to quarry the minerals. The Apex Court set aside the judgment of the High Court and upheld the validity of the Rule. 21. An argument was advanced by the State that the minerals belonged to the Government and the respondents had no vested or indefeasible right to obtain a lease or renewal to quarry the minerals. The Apex Court set aside the judgment of the High Court and upheld the validity of the Rule. 21. In so far as the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of PallavaGranites Industries vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh, (supra) is concerned, the question that fell for consideration therein was as to whether the State Government as a condition precedent for execution of the lease deed for excavation of a minor mineral, can insist upon the lessee to obtain consent of the pattedar (surface owner) in absence of specific statutory rule enjoining the Government to do so ? The Division Bench of the High Court found that though there was no specific provision either requiring the consent of the pattedar or dispensing with such consent for execution of the lease deed in favour of the lessee, the State Government with a view to facilitating smooth working of the mines, has been insisting upon the requirement of the consent of the pattedars. It held that such a requirement cannot be construed as impermissible in law. The said judgment has been upheld by the Apex Court. It is pertinent to note that in the said case, what was challenged was the policy of the State Government to insist upon obtaining prior consent of the pattedar (occupier of the surface). It was held that such a requirement cannot be said to be arbitrary. However the question that requires to be considered is as to whether this Court, while exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution, can direct the State Government to formulate such a policy which requires a consent to be taken of the landowner while granting lease for extraction of minor minerals, when by fiction of statute the ownership of the mineral vests in it ? 22. In so far as the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Sri Raja Veligoti Venkata Sesha vs. The Union of India (supra) is concerned, the State Government had rejected the renewal of grant of lease of the petitioner on the ground that the consent of the landowner was not obtained at the time of renewal. In so far as the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Sri Raja Veligoti Venkata Sesha vs. The Union of India (supra) is concerned, the State Government had rejected the renewal of grant of lease of the petitioner on the ground that the consent of the landowner was not obtained at the time of renewal. The question that fell for consideration before the Court was as to whether the consent of the landowner would be required in case of mining lease where the consent had already been obtained at the time of grant of lease. The Division Bench, after considering the provisions of section 24A of the said Act and the Rules framed thereunder by the State of Andhra Pradesh under the provisions of the said Act, came to the conclusion that consent of the land owner was not required at the stage of renewal of licence. As such, the said judgment rather supports the case of the respondents, than that of the petitioner. 23. Rest of the judgments which are relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner delivered by various High Courts, in our considered view do not have bearing on the issue involved in the present petition and as such, reference to the same would not be necessary. 24. We find that only two other judgments which are relied upon by the petitioner, delivered by Their Lordships of the Apex Court, are required to be considered. In so far as judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in the case of State of West Bengal and another vs. Kesoram Industries Ltd., and others, 2004 (supra), is oncerned, in the said case, the petitioners therein had challenged the cess levied under the U.P. Special Area Development Authorities Act on minor minerals. The Apex Court, by majority judgment on the ground of legislative competence upheld the validity of the Act. In that view of the matter, the said judgment will have no application to the facts of the present case. 25. Petitioner heavily relies on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of ThreesiammaJacob and ors. vs. Geologist Department of Mining and Geology and others., (supra). It would be appropriate to refer to the following observations of the Apex Court: “39. 25. Petitioner heavily relies on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of ThreesiammaJacob and ors. vs. Geologist Department of Mining and Geology and others., (supra). It would be appropriate to refer to the following observations of the Apex Court: “39. In view of BSO No. 10 referred to above, we need not unduly trouble ourselves with the metaphysical analysis whether jenmomrights still subsist in lands of Malabar area or whether they are converted into ryotwarilands. Apart from the legal implication of BSO No. 10 with respect to Malabar, this Court had already opined that British never claimed proprietary rights over the soil and jenmiswere recognised to be the absolute owners of the soil. It is obvious from the BSO No. 10 that the British never claimed any proprietary right in any land in the Old Madras Province whether estate land and therefore both ryotwaripattadars and jenmismust also be held to be the proprietors of the subsoil rights/minerals until they are deprived of the same by some legal process. Even if we accept the conclusion recorded in the judgment under appeal that the lands in question have been converted to be lands held on ryotwarisettlement, the conclusion recorded by us above w.r.t. Subsoil/mineral rights will still hold good for the reason that even in the lands held on ryotwaripatta the British did not assert proprietary rights. 40. Nothing is brought to our notice which indicates that the British intended and in fact did deprive the ryotwari land holders of the right to subsoil/minerals. Subsequent to 19th March, 1888, no law to the contra is brought to our notice. Nor any law made by the Republic of India is brought to our notice. Though we notice laws to the contra w.r.t. The lands held under landlords tenures.” 26. It can thus be clearly seen that the Apex Court found that in view of BSO No.10 the British never claimed any proprietory rights in any land in the Old Madras Province, whether estate land and therefore, both ryotwari pattadars and jenmis must also be held to be the proprietors of the subsoil rights/minerals until they were deprived of the same by some legal process. The Apex Court has clearly observed that nothing was brought to their notice which indicated that the British intended and in fact did deprive the ryotwari land holders of the right to subsoil/minerals subsequent to 19th March, 1888. It is further observed that nor any law made by the Republic of India was brought to their notice. It has been further observed by Their Lordships that Their Lordship noticed laws to the contra with effect to the lands held under landlords tenures. It is further pertinent to note the observations made by the Apex Court in paragraph 23 of the said judgment, which reads as under: “23. Similarly, it can also be noticed that under various enactments abolishing the various lands tenures in South India such as inams etc., express provisions were made that the mines and minerals existing in such abolished tenures shall stand transferred to the Government and vest in the Government. See for example, Section 2-A[9) of the The Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1956. We must remember that Andhra area of the present State of Andhra Pradesh was part of the old Madras Province.” 27. It can, thus, be seen that the Apex Court has taken notice of various enactments abolishing lands tenures in South India wherein express provisions were made to the effect that the mines and minerals existing in such abolished tenures shall stand transferred to the Government and vest in the Government. It can further be seen that the Apex Court itself has observed that the ryotwari pattadars and jenmis were held to be owners of the subsoil/ minerals until they were deprived of the same by legal process. It can thus be clearly seen that the Apex Court in the peculiar facts of the case found that in view of BSO No.10 in respect of Malabar area, the British never claimed proprietory rights over the soil and jenmis, were recognised to be the absolute owners of the soil and further their being no law made, depriving the landholders of the right to subsoil/minerals, held that the ownership of the subsoil/minerals should normally follow the ownership of the land, unless the owner of the land is deprived of the same by some valid process. However, as already discussed hereinabove, in view of sub-section (2) of Section 14 and Section 36 of the Land Revenue Code, right to minerals at wherever place found, has been expressly reserved and shall vest in the Government which shall have all powers necessary for the purpose of enjoyment of such right. It can thus be seen that in view of specific statutory provision which has reserved right in mines and minerals at all places in the State and also providing that the said mines and minerals shall vest in the State, the petitioner cannot claim to have right over the mines and minerals. The rights would be restricted only to surface soil. 28. In the case of State of Tamil Nadu vs. M.P.P. Kavery Chetty, (supra), the challenge was to the amendment of Rule 19A of the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1959. One of the challenges, which is raised in the present petition, that the consent of landlord was necessary for grant of lease, was also raised therein. The High Court had allowed the petition. However, the Apex Court upheld Rule 19A and partly allowed the petition. It would be appropriate to refer to paragraph 14 of the judgment of the Apex Court, which reads thus: “Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that under the first proviso of Rule 19-A the consent of the owner of the land was not made a condition and it was bad in law on that account. The submission does not take note of Section 24-A of the said Act. Thereunder the holder of a mining lease under the said Act or rules made under it is empowered to enter the land on which the lease has been granted and carry out mining operations. He is obliged to compensate the landowner for any loss or damage that his operations may cause. Consent of the occupier is required only when the holder of the lease desires entry into any building or enclosed court or garden.” 29. It can thus be clearly seen that the Apex Court has in unequivocal terms held that in view of Section 24A of the said Act, holder of a mining lease under the said Act and Rules made thereunder, is empowered to enter the land on which the lease has been granted and carry out mining operations. It can thus be clearly seen that the Apex Court has in unequivocal terms held that in view of Section 24A of the said Act, holder of a mining lease under the said Act and Rules made thereunder, is empowered to enter the land on which the lease has been granted and carry out mining operations. The Apex Court has observed that the holder of the mining lease is obliged to compensate the landowner for any loss or any damage that his operations may cause. 30. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of QucxovaSinai Cundo vs. Union of India, 1998 (2) Bom.C.R. 87 was considering the validity of the Goa, Daman and Diu Mining Concessions (Abolition and Declaration as Mining Leases) Act, 1987. In the said case, the Division Bench of this Court while considering the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of VinodKumar Shantilal Gosalia vs. Gangadhar Narsingdas Agarwal, AIR 1981 SC 1946 , upheld the validity of the Goa, Daman and Diu Mining Concessions (Abolition and Declaration as Mining Leases) Act, 1987. No doubt, this was a case concerning major minerals, however, on the basis of what has been held by the Apex Court, this Court has held that merely because the existing laws are continued, it does not mean that the existing rights are recognized. This is apart from the question as to whether the petitioner has any existing right or not? 31. We are, therefore, of the considered view that in view of the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 14 and Section 36 of the Land Revenue Code, read with the provisions of Article 2 of Decree dated 20.09.1906 which was a Portuguese Colonial Mining Law, the right in the minor minerals vests solely in the State Government and the State Government has all powers necessary for the purpose of enjoyment of such rights. We find that this position is fortified by the provisions of Section 24A of the said Act, which is applicable to all minerals, including minor minerals. 32. In view of the provisions of Section 24A of the said Act, a holder of a prospecting licence etc., is empowered to enter the lands over which such permit, etc. has been granted, at all times during its currency and carry out all such operations. 32. In view of the provisions of Section 24A of the said Act, a holder of a prospecting licence etc., is empowered to enter the lands over which such permit, etc. has been granted, at all times during its currency and carry out all such operations. The limited right in view of sub-section (2) of Section 24A of the said Act and sub-section (4) of Section 36 of the Land Revenue Code, is that the land owner will have right of compensation for such infringement. 33. Apart from that, even on facts, we find that the contention of the petitioner that only on account of deletion of Chapter III, her rights to the minerals have been taken away, is not borne out from the record. It can be seen from the averments in the petition itself that even prior to the deletion of the said chapter in 2002, the State Government was executing mining leases in favour of respondent No.3 during the period when her husband was alive. 34. In that view of the matter, we find that the petition is without any substance and deserves to be dismissed, and is hereby dismissed. Rule discharged. However, we make it clear that the decision of the present petition would not come in the way of adjudication of the rights of the parties in first appeal filed at the behest of the petitioner in this Court, nor would the same come in the way of the petitioner in raising claim for compensation as provided under sub-Section (2) of Section 24A of the said Act or sub-section (4) of Section 36 of the Land Revenue Code. In the circumstances, no order as to costs.