Judgment :- 1. The Petitioner/A.2 has focused the instant Criminal Revision Petition as against the Judgment dated 5/11/2012 in C.C.No.87 of 2012 passed by the Learned Judicial Magistrate, Mudukulathur, Ramanathapuram District and has prayed for expunging the remark of acquittal under 'Benefit of Doubt' and to modify the same to that “Honorary Acquittal'. 2. The Learned Judicial Magistrate, Mudukulathur, while passing the Judgment in C.C.No.87 of 2012 on 5/11/2012 has inter alia observed that the charges in respect of the Accused (A.1 and A.2) under Sections 294 (b), 323 and Section 4 of the Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Women Harassment Act have not been established on the side of the prosecution and acquitted them under Section 248 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. 3. The Learned Counsel for the Petitioner/A.2 urges before this Court that the Petitioner/A.2 along with A.1 has been acquitted in respect of the charges levelled against him by the prosecution and that the Petitioner apprehends that the Police authorities concerned would not select him, obviously mentioning Rule 14 (b) of the Tamil Nadu Special Police Subordinate Service Rules, since P.W.1/Defacto Complainant has turned hostile. 4. The Learned Counsel for the Petitioner contends that the Petitioner/A.2 has passed the written examination held during the year 2012 by security 60 marks and in the physical test conducted, he secured full fifteen marks and also that the Petitioner has undergone the medical test and has come out successful. 5. The plea taken on behalf of the Petitioner/A.2 is that inasmuch as P.W.1 has turned hostile before the trial Court in C.C.No.87 of 2012 and the Judgment of Acquittal finding rendered by the trial Court appears to be one under 'Benefit of Doubt' and thus operates as a stigma attached to the life of the Petitioner/A.2 and also it affects his future employment prospects. Therefore, on behalf of the Petitioner, it is prayed before this Court that the 'Finding of the Acquittal' rendered by the trial Court in C.C.No.87 of 2012 in respect of Petitioner/A.2 may be modified into that of 'Honorary Acquittal' to prevent an aberration of Justice and to promote substantial cause of Justice. 6. Therefore, on behalf of the Petitioner, it is prayed before this Court that the 'Finding of the Acquittal' rendered by the trial Court in C.C.No.87 of 2012 in respect of Petitioner/A.2 may be modified into that of 'Honorary Acquittal' to prevent an aberration of Justice and to promote substantial cause of Justice. 6. A cursory perusal of paragraph 13 of the Judgment in C.C.No.87 of 2012 dated 5/11/2012 passed by the trial Court proceeds to the effect that the trial Court has categorically observed that “the witnesses of Ex.P.3 Observation Mahazar have not been examined and further, P.W.2 (Sub-Inspector of Police) in his evidence has only deposed about the conduct of the investigation but he has not connected the Accused in his evidence in regard to the criminal action. Even P.W.1/Defacto Complainant has deposed before the trial Court as against the prosecution. Therefore, the trial Court has come to a clear cut conclusion that the date of occurrence, time, place and the criminal act of Accused have not been established by means of the evidence of P.W.1/Defacto Complainant tendered before the trial Court”. 7. The Learned Counsel for the petitioner/A.2 strenuously contends that 'Honorary Acquittal' may be accorded to the Petitioner/A.2 and to lend support to his contention, he relies on the order passed by this Court in Crl.R.C.(MD) No.1002 of 2008 dated 13/7/2010 between V.NAVANEETHAKRISHNAN Vs. THE STATE, THROUGH, THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE, SANKARANKOVIL POLICE STATION, TIRUNELVELI DISTRICT, wherein at paragraph No.5, it is observed hereunder'- “5. The learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his contention, would place reliance upon a decision of this Court in Crl.R.C.No.289 of 2008, Somasundaram Vs. The State, dated 28.02.2008, wherein after referring and following a decision of this Court, expunging the findings leading to acquittal of the petitioner, concluded that the petitioner has to be acquitted honourably. A Division Bench decision followed by the learned Judge reported in 2005 (5) CTC – 672 (The Deputy Superintendent of Police, Sriperumbudur Sub-Division, I/c. Chengalpattu Sub-Division, Kancheepuram District Vs. W.D.Sekaran and another is as follows:- “In the light of our discussion, it is clear that it is not axiomatic that in all cases where the criminal proceedings based on the very same set of facts ended in acquittal, the departmental action should not be proceeded with. As rightly observed by the earlier Division Bench of this Court in State of Tamil Nadu Vs. As rightly observed by the earlier Division Bench of this Court in State of Tamil Nadu Vs. H.A.Munaf and another, 2002 (3) LLJ 66, cited supra, if the acquittal in the criminal proceedings is not a honourable one, it is always open to proceed with the departmental proceedings. The Tribunal has not gone into the above relevant aspects and committed an error in quashing the charge memo at the threshold.” 8. The aforesaid decision in Somasundram's case has been later followed by this Court in Crl.R.C.No.400 of 2008 (Kasinathan Vs. The State through the Sub-Inspector of Police, Checkanurani Police Station, Madurai District) dated 27.08.2008 whereby and whereunder, it is held as follows:- “7. On a perusal of entire records and the judgment of the trial Court, this Court could not find any material against the petitioner. These circumstances of this case warrant expunging of findings available in the trial Court judgment as to the granting benefit of doubt for acquittal of this petitioner. In consonance with the earlier view of this Court in this regard and as to the circumstances available in this case, I am of the considered view that the petitioner has to be acquitted honourably and acquitted as such. The findings of the Court below as regards acquittal on the ground of benefit of doubt stands expunged. The revision deserves to be allowed and it is accordingly allowed.” 9. At this juncture, this Court deems it appropriate to point out that the Criminal Procedure Code speaks of 'Acquittal' under Sections 232, 235, 248, 255 and 300. Also that, the term 'discharge' is employed under Sections 227, 239 and 245 of the Criminal Procedure Code. It cannot be gain said that Section 227 of the Criminal Procedure Code enjoins a Court of Session to discharge an accused if upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted, it considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the Accused. As a matter of fact, Section 232 of the Criminal Procedure Code, enables a Court of Sessions to order the acquittal of a person if after taking the evidence for prosecution, examining the accused and hearing the prosecution and the defence on the point, the Judge considers that there is no evidence to show that the Accused committed the offence. As a matter of fact, Section 232 of the Criminal Procedure Code, enables a Court of Sessions to order the acquittal of a person if after taking the evidence for prosecution, examining the accused and hearing the prosecution and the defence on the point, the Judge considers that there is no evidence to show that the Accused committed the offence. As such, obviously 'Discharge Order' as per Section 227 of the Criminal Procedure Code may be passed by the Competent Court prior to the recording of evidence and the acquittal order under Section 232 of the Criminal Procedure Code may be passed after the evidence for the prosecution is adduced and recorded. 10. Likewise, Section 239 of the Criminal Procedure Code enjoins the Learned Judicial Magistrate to discharge the Accused, if after taking into account the Police Report and the documents transmitted along with it as per Section 173 of the Criminal Procedure Code, he opines that the charge against the Accused to be an otiose one. In respect of case instituted otherwise than on Police Report also, the Learned Judicial Magistrate is entitled to discharge the Accused, if after taking all the evidence as is referred to in section 244, he considers that no case against the accused has been made out. In regard to acquittal visualised under Sections 248 and 255 of the Criminal Procedure Code by a Magistrate in a warrant or summons case, the same is only after trial. 11. From the above conspectus, it is latently and patently evident that the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 refers only of 'Acquittal' and not as 'Honorary Acquittal' or Acquittal on 'Benefit of Doubt'. The said concepts have been developed by Law Courts due to efflux of time. The pivotal reason as to why the Criminal Procedure Code has not made a distinction between an Acquittal on 'Benefit of Doubt' and 'Honorary Acquittal' is to ensure that no person shall be tried for a second time for the same offence for which he is tried and convicted and acquitted once. The concept of acquittal is an acquittal is a development of the principle of 'Double Jeopardy', as per ingredients of Section 300 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, as opined by this Court. 12. At this stage, this Court worth recalls the decision HAFIZUDDIN INAYATULLAH KAZI Vs. The concept of acquittal is an acquittal is a development of the principle of 'Double Jeopardy', as per ingredients of Section 300 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, as opined by this Court. 12. At this stage, this Court worth recalls the decision HAFIZUDDIN INAYATULLAH KAZI Vs. J.C.AGARWAL AND OTHERS {1980 (Vol.41) INDIAN FACTORIES AND LABOUR REPORTS – 171, wherein at special page 172, whereby and whereunder, it is laid down as follows:- “It is very difficult to define what is the meaning of the word, 'honourable acquittal'. In my view it will depend on the fact and circumstances of each case as to whether a person can be said to have been discharged or acquitted honourably or not. In my view, though it is very difficult to define precisely what is meant by the words 'honourably acquitted', it is safe to say that if an accused is acquitted or discharged because of some technicality not having been complied with or on the ground that though there is some evidence against him, he must be acquitted by giving benefit of doubt, it may not amount to an honourable acquittal. However, if an accused is acquitted after full consideration of evidence because the prosecution witnesses were disbelieved and the prosecution had miserably failed to prove the charges it would amount to honourable acquittal. It is difficult to understand what more is required for honourable acquittal of the accused than acquittal of the accused on disbelieving the prosecution evidence in toto. In the present case, though there are some observations made at the end of the judgment by the High Court acquitting the petitioner which may appear to be ambiguous, if the judgment is read as a whole, there can be little doubt that the accused was acquitted not by giving benefit of doubt, in spite of there being some evidence against him, but because the prosecution failed to prove the case against him. In the instant case the judgment clearly acquits the accused not on some technical ground or not because there was evidence both ways but the evidence of prosecution being found slightly wanting, the benefit of doubt was given to petitioner. In the instant case the judgment clearly acquits the accused not on some technical ground or not because there was evidence both ways but the evidence of prosecution being found slightly wanting, the benefit of doubt was given to petitioner. The judgment clearly establishes that the prosecution had miserably failed to establish the case against accused No.3, the petitioner and if this is not honourable acquittal, it is difficult to say what can be said to be the honourable acquittal. The decision, if any, arrived in the facts of such a judgment cannot be said to be reasonable and therefore, cannot be said to be bona fide and it discloses non-application of mind. (1972 S.L.R. 44 and (1934) 61 I.L.R Cal.168 Followed.” 13. This Court points out the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court STATE OF ASSAM AND ANOTHER Vs. RAGHAVA RAJGOPALACHARI 1972 SLR – 44 at special page 47, wherein in paragraph 9, it is held as under:- “9. It seems to us that if on reading judgment and order which acquits as government servant it appears to the government or the competent authority that the government servant has not been fully exonerated of the charge levied (sic) to come to the conclusion that clause (b) would apply and not clause (a). This conclusion is strengthened by the wide discretion given to the competent authority under clause (b). Acting under clause (b) the competent authority is entitled to give if the circumstances so warrant, the whole of the pay and allowances and also treat the whole of the period of absence from duty as period spent on duty.” 14. Further, in paragraphs 10 to 13, it is held as follows:- “10. In this particular case if one reads the judgment of this Court is K.R.CHARI Vs. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH (supra) {1963 (1) SCR – 121}, it seems that the Government was entitled to come to the conclusion that the petitioner had not been honourably acquitted within the meaning of clause (a). This Court held that in the absence of valid sanction the charges against the petitioner under Section 161 and Section 165 could not have been tried and that it rendered the proceedings against the petitioner in respect of these two charges without jurisdiction. Accordingly his trial in respect of these two offences was held to be invalid and without jurisdiction. This Court held that in the absence of valid sanction the charges against the petitioner under Section 161 and Section 165 could not have been tried and that it rendered the proceedings against the petitioner in respect of these two charges without jurisdiction. Accordingly his trial in respect of these two offences was held to be invalid and without jurisdiction. Regarding the charge under Section 467 this Court held that the High Court erred in law in making a finding against the petitioner in respect of the charge under Section 467 as well as the alternative charge under the relevant Defence of India Rules because the finding the High Court on the essential part of the prosecution story in respect of the charge under Section 467 really rested on the evidence of the accomplice uncorroborated by any other evidence. This Court then considered the question as to whether a retrial of the petitioner for the offence under Section 161 should be ordered. In this connection, this Court refused to order a retrial because of the following reasons:- “Two facts have weighed in our minds in coming to the conclusion that a retrial need not be ordered in this case. The first consideration is that the accused has had to face a long and protracted criminal trial and the sword has been hanging over his head for 14 years. The accused was suspended in 1947 and since then these proceedings have gone on all the time. The second factor which has weighed in our minds is that though the prosecution began with a charge of a comprehensive conspiracy supported by several instances of bribery, on the finding of the High Court it is reduced to a case of bribery offered by two persons, and then again the substantial evidence is the evidence of accomplices supported by what the High Court thought to be corroborating circumstances. Accordingly, we hold that is clause (b) that applies. 11. There was some argument before us as to the interpretation of the word 'otherwise' occurring in clause (b). It seems to us that the word “otherwise” means, in the context 'in cases not covered by Cl (a)”. 12. If Clause (b) applies we can find no defect in the order of the Government dated January 28, 1964. 11. There was some argument before us as to the interpretation of the word 'otherwise' occurring in clause (b). It seems to us that the word “otherwise” means, in the context 'in cases not covered by Cl (a)”. 12. If Clause (b) applies we can find no defect in the order of the Government dated January 28, 1964. It was for the Government to consider what proportion of pay and allowances should be given and what period of absence from duty should be treated as period spent on duty. 13. The learned counsel for the State sought to argue before us that the date 16th March 1954' occurring in the order dated January 28, 1964, was mentioned due to mistake and the proper date which should have been mentioned was the date of superannuation, namely, June 30, 1953. He says that the order dated July 23 1953 continuing the services of the petitioner after the date of superannuation was bad in view of the ruling of this Court in State of Assam Vs. Padma Ram Borth AIR 1965 SC 473 . But we are unable to appreciate how he is entitled to raise the point. The Writ was brought to challenge this order. No such petition, even if it be competent, was filed by the State itself. The respondent to a Writ Petition cannot be allowed to attack its own order as a respondent.” 15. In the decision THE DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, SRIPERUMBUDUR SUB-DIVISION, I/C. CHENGALPATTU SUB-DIVISION, KANCHIPURAM DISTRICT Vs. W.D.SEKARAN AND ANOTHER {2006 (5) CTC – 672 (DB), it is inter alia held that “It is not axiomatic that in all cases where criminal proceedings based on very same set of facts ended in acquittal, departmental action should not be proceeded with.” Further, it is has also held that “If acquittal is not a honourable one, it is always open to employer to proceed with departmental proceedings.” 16. In the decision D.MAHADEVAN Vs. DIRECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE, MYLAPORE, CHENNAI 4 {(2008) 4 MLJ – 88}, it is held that “By virtue of Rule 13 (b) of the Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Service Rules, a person involved in a criminal case shall not be treated as involved in the criminal case if he had honourable acquittal”. 17. In the decision D.MAHADEVAN Vs. DIRECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE, MYLAPORE, CHENNAI 4 {(2008) 4 MLJ – 88}, it is held that “By virtue of Rule 13 (b) of the Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Service Rules, a person involved in a criminal case shall not be treated as involved in the criminal case if he had honourable acquittal”. 17. It is useful for this Court to make a reference to Rule 14 (b) of the Tamil Nadu Special Police Subordinate Service Rules, 1978, which reads thus:- “14 (b). No person shall be eligible for appointment to the service by direct recruitment unless he satisfies the appointing authority. (i). that he is of sound health, active habits and free from any bodily defect or infirmity unfitting him for such service; and (ii). that his character and antecedents are such as to qualify him for such service; and (iii). that such a person does not have more than one wife living. Explanation: (1) A person who is acquitted or discharged on benefit of doubt or due to the fact that the complainant “turned hostile” shall be treated as person involved in a criminal case. Explanation: (2) A person involved in a criminal case at the time of police verification and the case yet to be disposed of and subsequently ended in honourable acquittal or treated as mistake of fact shall be treated as not involved in a criminal case and he can claim right for appointment only by participating in the next recruitment.” 18. A reading of the aforesaid Rule shows that a person who is acquitted or discharged on 'Benefit of Doubt' or due to the fact that the Complainant has turned hostile shall be treated as one who is involved in a criminal case. It cannot be denied that many persons might have been roped in/implicated in criminal cases and finally acquitted by the trial Court will have to undergo the ordeal when they have been acquitted on the basis of showering of 'Benefit of Doubt' awarded by the trial Court and that operates as a stigma undoubtedly on them. Their reasonable and genuine apprehension of stigma/scar affecting their future prospects/future endeavours in seeking employment etc., are not to brushed aside in the considered opinion of this Court. Their reasonable and genuine apprehension of stigma/scar affecting their future prospects/future endeavours in seeking employment etc., are not to brushed aside in the considered opinion of this Court. Only, in this backdrop, the Revision Petitioner has approached this Court seeking the relief of modifying the order of acquittal into that of 'Honorary Acquittal'. 19. In the decision of Honourable Supreme Court MANAGEMENT OF RESERVE BANK OF INDIA, NEW DELHI Vs. BHOPAL SINGH PANCHAL {(1994) 1 SUPREME COURT CASES – 541}, wherein at special page No.542, it is held that “When the High Court acquitted the respondent-employee giving benefit of doubt, the bank rightly refused to reinstate him in service on the ground that it was not an honourable acquittal as required by Regulation 46 (4).” 20. This Court has also heard the Learned Government Advocate (Criminal Side). 21. At this stage, it is not out of place for this Court to make a significant mention that in the present case on hand, the trial Court in the Judgment in C.C.No.87 of 2012 dated 5/11/2012 in paragraph 11 has clearly observed that the evidence of P.W.1 (Defacto Complainant) has not been adduced so as to inspire evidence to its subjective satisfaction as regards the date of occurrence, time and place and further in paragraph 13 has observed that the evidence of P.W.2 (Sub-Inspector of Police) has not linked the Accused (A.1 and A.2 in regard to the criminal acts) and further, has come to a conclusion that the prosecution has not examined Ex.P.3 Observation Mahazar witnesses and in view of the light discrepancies of the witnesses evidence, the trial Court has rejected the evidence of P.W.2 (Investigation Officer) and acquitted the Accused (A.1 and A.20 under Section 248 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code by holding that both of them are not guilty under Section 294 (b), 323 of the Indian Penal Code and under Section 4 of the Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Women Harassment Act, since the prosecution side has not proved the charges. 22. As far as the present case is concerned, the trial Court while acquitting the Petitioner/A.2 along with another Accused (A.1) has not showered 'Benefit of Doubt', but simply observed that the charges levelled against the Petitioner/A.2 and another Accused/A.1 have not been established by the prosecution in the light of the discussions made in the Judgment delivered by it in C.C.No.87 of 2012 dated 5/11/2012. Even though the trial Court has not acquitted the Petitioner/A.2 and another Accused viz., A.1 by conferring the concept of 'Benefit of Doubt', yet fact remains that they have been acquitted in view of the fact that the prosecution has not proved charges levelled against them. The acquittal rendered by the trial Court stating that the prosecution has not established the case against the Petitioner/A.2 (about which we are concerned in this revision) in the considered opinion of this Court, it is to be construed as one of 'Honorary Acquittal'. Viewed in that perspective, the Criminal Revision Petition is allowed. Resultantly, the finding rendered by the trial Court in so far as the Petitioner/A.2 is concerned that he is acquitted of the charges levelled against him is modified to the effect that he shall stand acquitted 'Honorably.