Judgment 1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith and heard finally by consent of the parties. 2. By this petition, the petitioner assails the judgment and order of the Industrial Court, Ahmednagar dated 31/01/2011 delivered in Complaint U.L.P. No. 32/2001. 3. The petitioner workman, who had joined services of respondent No.2/Department of Social Forestry, was allegedly illegally terminated on 01/05/1987. Being aggrieved by such termination, he raised an industrial dispute under Section 2A of the I.D. Act, 1947. On failure of the conciliation proceedings, the appropriate Government referred the dispute to the 2nd Labour Court, Ahmednagar (Hereinafter referred to as a Labour Court) for adjudication. It was registered as Ref. IDA No.71/1988. 4. After the entire adjudicatory process was completed, the Labour Court delivered its award dated 23/07/1996, by which, the termination of the petitioner w.e.f. 01/05/1987, was held to be an act of retrenchment by the respondent employer. Since the Law of Retrenchment under the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (Hereinafter referred to as I.D. Act) was not complied with, the termination was set aside and the respondent employer was directed to reinstate the petitioner without continuity of service and without back wages. It is an admitted position that the said award was subsequently published in accordance with the provisions of the I.D. Act and the Industrial Disputes (Bombay) Rules, 1957. 5. The petitioner, claimed to have pursued the respondents for the implementation of the award after it was published on 02/01/1997. Since then the respondents kept on delaying the matter by keeping the petitioner under the hope that the said award would be implemented. During this period, the petitioner was also engrossed in pursuing some other cases against the same employer. 6. After a passage of almost about 4½ years, the petitioner filed Complaint U.L.P. No.32/2001 u/s 28(1) r/w items 9 and 10 of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (Hereinafter referred to as State Act) seeking implementation of the award and for declaration of commission of acts amounting to unfair labour practices (U.L.P.) at the hands of the respondents. An application for interim relief u/s 30(2) of the State Act was also filed. Neither does it emerge from the petition paper book nor have the respondents contended that the said award dated 23/07/1996 has been challenged by the respondents before any higher Court. 7. An application for interim relief u/s 30(2) of the State Act was also filed. Neither does it emerge from the petition paper book nor have the respondents contended that the said award dated 23/07/1996 has been challenged by the respondents before any higher Court. 7. The respondents had filed their written statement to the complaint as well as to the application for interim relief before the said Industrial Court, Ahmednagar. Contention of the respondents was that the award is sought to be implemented belatedly and the grievance about non implementation of the award is made after about 4½ years. Several other contentions were put forth by the respondents. It was prayed that the complaint be dismissed. 8. By its judgment and order dated 31/01/2011, the Industrial Court dismissed the complaint filed by the petitioner. It is this judgment that has been impugned by the petitioner employee in this petition. 9. The grounds for challenge have been set out by the petitioner under para No. 7 of the petition. The impugned judgment is assailed on several counts. The respondents (employer) have filed their affidavit-in-reply along with several documents. 10. I had heard the learned advocates for the respective parties on 04/12/2013. This Court noticed from the impugned order that the Industrial Court, by itself, went into the issue pertaining to the tenure of an award. Section 19(3) of the I.D. Act was considered and interpreted to mean that an award shall remain in operation for a period of one year from the date on which it becomes enforceable. Based on the same, the Industrial Court concluded that the award was published more than 4½ years ago and therefore, it is not permissible in the eyes of Law for the employee to seek implementation of the award, as the complaint is not within limitation. So also, the Court came to a conclusion that an employee can not approach the employer, as per his whims and wishes, and can not seek implementation of the award whenever he may desire. The Court, therefore, concluded that the complaint was untenable in Law. 11. So also, the Court came to a conclusion that an employee can not approach the employer, as per his whims and wishes, and can not seek implementation of the award whenever he may desire. The Court, therefore, concluded that the complaint was untenable in Law. 11. In view of the contents of the petition, grounds for challenge and the conclusions drawn by the Industrial Court in the impugned judgment, I felt that the issue, “Whether an award delivered in Reference Proceeding u/s 10(1) r/w 12(5) in relation to an industrial dispute u/s 2A of the I.D. Act has a tenure of one year?” needs consideration. With the consent of the learned Advocate for the petitioner, members of the bar, especially those who practice in the Labour and Industrial Field, were called upon to address the Court. Learned Advocate Mr. Barde for the petitioner supplied them copies of his petition and appraised them of the said issue. As such, some of the members of the Bar have graciously assisted the learned Advocate for the petitioner and the Court on the said issue. They were heard and their submissions have been considered in this judgment. Submissions of Adv. Mr. T.K. Prabhakaran 12. The Learned advocate has referred to Section 2A of the I.D. Act, which reads thus:- 2A. Dismissal, etc., of an individual workman to be deemed to be an industrial dispute – Where any employer discharges, dismisses, retrenches or otherwise terminates the services of an individual workman, any dispute or difference between that workman and his employer connected with, or arising out of, such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute notwithstanding that no other workman nor any union of workmen is a party to the dispute. 13. The said Section was inserted by Act No. 35 of 1965 w.e.f. 01/12/1965. Contention is that the Act of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or otherwise amounting to termination of service of an individual workman, if subjected to any dispute or grievance or difference between the workman and his employer, connected with the said Act, shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute. There is a deeming fiction in relation to the said section and therefore, on the strength of the same, a dispute under Section 2A would amount to a deemed industrial dispute. There is a deeming fiction in relation to the said section and therefore, on the strength of the same, a dispute under Section 2A would amount to a deemed industrial dispute. Therefore, the appropriate Government under the I.D. Act was empowered to resort to the process of conciliation on the said dispute with the intention of arriving at a resolution or settlement. 14. He referred to Section 2(b), which defines an award:- “(b) ‘Award’ means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under section 10A; ......." 15. As such, any interim or final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto, by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal would amount to an award. According to him, the deemed industrial dispute u/s 2A I.D. Act has been held to be an area in which an interim or final determination is legally permissible. 16. He has then adverted to Section 17A of the I.D. Act, which reads thus – “Commencement of the award: (1) An award (including an arbitration award) shall become enforceable on the expiry of thirty days from the date of its publication under section 17......” 17. He, therefore, canvasses that the mode of publication of the award is provided under the 4 clauses of Section 17A of the I.D. Act. As held by this Court in the case of Chhabada Petrol Pump Vs. Shaikh Hasan reported at 2007 II CLR 1080, if the award is of great importance, the same could be published in the official gazette. If an award is not of such importance and is restricted to the dispute between the parties, it will be published by the same Court or Tribunal which has delivered the said award. According to the scheme enshrined u/s 17A of the I.D. Act, an award becomes enforceable after 30 days of its publication by the Court which has delivered it. 18. He has then turned to sections 19(2), 19(3), 19(5) and 19(6) of the I.D. Act, which read as under:- 19. According to the scheme enshrined u/s 17A of the I.D. Act, an award becomes enforceable after 30 days of its publication by the Court which has delivered it. 18. He has then turned to sections 19(2), 19(3), 19(5) and 19(6) of the I.D. Act, which read as under:- 19. Period of operation of settlements and awards:- (2) Such settlement shall be binding for such period as is agreed upon by the parties, and if no such period is agreed upon, for a period of six months [from the date on which the memorandum of settlement is signed by the parties to the dispute], and shall continue to be binding on the parties after the expiry of the period aforesaid, until the expiry of two months from the date on which a notice in writing of an intention to terminate the settlement is given by one of the parties to the other party or parties to the settlement. (3) An award shall, subject to the provisions of this section, remain in operation for a period of one year from the date on which the award becomes enforceable under section 17A: Provided that the appropriate Government may reduce the said period and fix such period as it thinks fit: Provided further that the appropriate Government may, before the expiry of the said period, extend the period of operation by any period not exceeding one year at a time as it thinks fit so, however, that the total period of operation of any award does not exceed three years from the date on which it came into operation. (5) Nothing contained in subsection (3) shall apply to any award which by its nature, terms or other circumstances does not impose, after it has been given effect to, any continuing obligation on the parties bound by the award. (6) Notwithstanding the expiry of the period of operation under subsection (3), the award shall continue to be binding on the parties until a period of two months has elapsed from the date on which notice is given by any party bound by the award to the other party or parties intimating it intention to terminate the award. 19. He, therefore, submits that Section 19(3) of the I.D. Act indicates that an award shall remain in operation for a period of one year and will be enforceable and binding. 20. 19. He, therefore, submits that Section 19(3) of the I.D. Act indicates that an award shall remain in operation for a period of one year and will be enforceable and binding. 20. While adverting to Section 19(5) of the I.D. Act, he has stressed on the phraseology used therein to contend that Section 19(3) will not apply to any award which by its nature, terms or other circumstances do not impose, after it has been given effect to, any continuing obligation on the parties bound by the award. He, therefore, submits that an act of termination is a one time act and similar is the case with an act of reinstatement. 21. According to him, there is a slight distinction between these two acts, when it comes to the follow up action. Normally once termination on a particular date has occurred, the act of termination is complete and the limitation period begins. He clarifies that under the I.D. Act, there is no limitation for raising an industrial dispute. However, the act of reinstatement, though is a one time act, the obligation cast on the employer to cause re-instatement will be of continuous nature till re-instatement occurs. The moment, the employer reinstates an employee, the obligation ends with the re-instatement. He, therefore, lays emphasis on the words, “.....does not impose, after it has been given effect to, any continuing obligation on the parties bound by the award” in Section 19(5) of the I.D. Act. 22. He has then turned to Section 29 of the I.D. Act, which deals with a penalty for breach of settlement or award. Section 29 reads thus: “29. Penalty for breach of settlement or award – Any person who commits a breach of any term of any settlement or award, which is binding on him under this Act, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine, or with both, and where the breach is a continuing one, with a further fine which may extend to two hundred rupees for every day during which the breach continues after the conviction for the first and the Court trying the offence, if it fines the offender, may direct that the whole or any part of the fine realized from him shall be paid, by way of compensation, to any person who, in its opinion, has been injured by such breach.” 23. He, therefore, contended that the non-implementation of an award delivered with reference to Section 2A proceedings is of a continuous nature till it is implemented. Penalty for breach or non implementation will continue as long as non implementation continues. Submissions by Adv. Mr. Ashok Patil 24. He contended that an industrial dispute u/s 2(k) of the I.D. Act has used the words in plural tense. The phraseology of Section 2(k) necessarily imports a meaning in the plural tense. As such, for several decades, common demands on behalf of workers in togetherness, have been brought within the purview of the definition “industrial dispute” u/s 2(k) of the I.D. Act. Section 2A has been brought in as an amendment since the Legislature realized that industrial disputes pertaining to a personal cause of action and essentially of the nature of termination/removal etc. from service had not been specifically provided for in the I.D. Act. 25. By the amendment, in the form of Section 2A and 11A, this individual need of a workman was taken care of. The handicap that a worker faced before introduction of this amendment was that a union at times would not canvass or agitate a personal dispute of a workman of the nature of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination. The intent and object of introducing an amendment in the form of Section 2A was to take care of this personal need of a workman. However, neither Section 17A nor section 19 was amended. He, therefore, has urged that a harmonious interpretation of this position of law in light of Section 2A is needed so that the intent and object of introducing Sections 2A and 11A is not defeated. 26. He adopts the submissions of Adv. Mr. Prabhakaran and further submits that if Section 2A is given a life span of one year, the very purpose and object of its introduction by an amendment would be defeated. Any relief granted by the Court u/s 11A, cannot be taken away by an employer by terminating such an Award. This would amount to nullifying the powers of the Court u/s 11A. 27. However, while adverting to Section 29, his submissions are that after one year, an award will be operable but penalty for non implementation can not be awarded. According to him, it will assume the nature of a personal contract between the parties. This would amount to nullifying the powers of the Court u/s 11A. 27. However, while adverting to Section 29, his submissions are that after one year, an award will be operable but penalty for non implementation can not be awarded. According to him, it will assume the nature of a personal contract between the parties. The fact that an award becomes enforceable after 30 days of its publication, limitation u/s 19(3) can be applied here only to the extent of preventing the workman from seeking penalty for breach of the award beyond a year, u/s 29 of The I.D. Act, 1947. Submissions of learned Advocate Mr. S.V. Dankh 28. He has adopted the submissions of both the above mentioned advocates. While he is in agreement with the said submissions, he contends that though our Court has not handed down any such pronouncement on this issue, there have been occasions where other High Courts and the Hon’ble Apex Court have taken a view. He submits that for the reasons put forth by his colleague advocates, it can be safely deduced that Section 19(5) is a clear exception carved out from the ambit of Section 19(3) and 19(6) of the I.D. Act. 29. According to him, an award on an industrial dispute raised u/s 2A and in light of the powers duly vested in the concerned Tribunal u/s 11A, more so in light of catena of judgments, indicates that the Tribunal has been given exclusive jurisdiction to consider the proportionality of a punishment awarded to a workman, to set aside the order of discharge or dismissal, to direct re-instatement or to mold the relief. This clearly indicates that this adjudicatory process has to stand apart from the adjudicatory process involved in deciding wage rise demands. 30. The powers of the Tribunal in dealing with such cases is exclusive and distinct from the powers invoked while deciding a wage rise settlement. He further submits that in every wage rise settlement, the employer or the workman as the case may be, indicates a time period for which the said wage structuring is to be applied based on socio economic conditions prevailing in the society. Parties concerned urge the Tribunal to decide a tenure of the award. This is absolutely missing in an industrial dispute u/s 2A, where neither of the parties pray for limiting the award to a particular time period. Parties concerned urge the Tribunal to decide a tenure of the award. This is absolutely missing in an industrial dispute u/s 2A, where neither of the parties pray for limiting the award to a particular time period. Submissions of learned Advocate Mr. Y.I. Thole 31. He has, while adopting the submissions of his colleague advocates, highlighted an additional element involved in this case. He has drawn my attention to Section 19(2) which reads thus: “(2) Such settlement shall be binding for such period as is agreed upon by the parties, and if no such period is agreed upon, for a period of six months [from the date on which the memorandum of settlement is signed by the parties to the dispute], and shall continue to be binding on the parties after the expiry of the period aforesaid, until the expiry of two months from the date on which a notice in writing of an intention to terminate the settlement is given by one of the parties to the other party or parties to the settlement.” 32. He, therefore, submits that since in a settlement, a period is agreed upon, the settlement or award would be operable in that period. If no period is agreed upon, the settlement shall be operable for a period of 6 months from the date it is signed and shall continue to be binding on the parties until expiry of the period. Even after that, it will be binding up to the expiry of 2 months from the date on which notice in writing of the intention to terminate the settlement is given by one of the parties to the settlement. 33. He submits that an award in relation to an industrial dispute u/s 2A r/w 11A can not and ought not to be brought within the purview of Section 19(2) or else it would lead to an absurd situation. The losing party in such an adjudicatory process, would give notice of termination of the award and thereby intend to again terminate or discharge the workman on the pretext of having terminated the Award. According to him, this would result in travesty of justice and is bound to cause miscarriage of justice. 34. Learned Advocate Mr. The losing party in such an adjudicatory process, would give notice of termination of the award and thereby intend to again terminate or discharge the workman on the pretext of having terminated the Award. According to him, this would result in travesty of justice and is bound to cause miscarriage of justice. 34. Learned Advocate Mr. P.V. Barde for the petitioner, while adopting the submissions canvassed by his colleague advocates, stated that an award with reference to the removal from service of an employee needs to be treated differently and no time frame can be given to such an award. 35. In light of the grounds raised by the petitioner, the conclusions drawn by the Industrial Court in the impugned judgment and the submissions of the learned Advocates mentioned above, the following points arise for my consideration:- (a) Can an award in relation to an industrial dispute u/s 2A r/w Powers of the Court u/s 11A be held to be covered by section 19(3) and 19(6) of the I.D. Act? (b) Whether such an award can be terminated u/s 19(2) or deemed to have ended, after one year, by efflux of time OR would it fall u/s 19(5) of the I.D. Act? (c) Can a workman, upon being reinstated in employment, by virtue of such an award, be relegated to the earlier position of a terminated employee on the basis of the said award being covered u/s 19(3) and 19(6) of the I.D. Act ? 36. In the case of Velayudhan (M.) and State of Kerala and others, reported at 1960(1) LLJ 319, a similar situation was under consideration. The dispute between the parties is noted in para No.6 of the judgment, which reads thus:- “It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that under section 19(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the award continues to be in force only for a period of one year from the date on which it becomes enforceable under section 17(1) and that the proceedings taken after the expiry of the said term are therefore without jurisdiction.” While deciding the case, the Kerala High Court has come to a conclusion that where there is no continuing obligation on the parties to the award, such an award will be out of the purview of Section 19(3) of the I.D. Act. 37. 37. In the case of South Indian Bank Versus A.R. Chacko reported at 1964 SCR (5) 625, the Full Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court, while dealing with a somewhat similar situation, has concluded as under: “Quite apart from this, however, it appears to us that even if an award has ceased to be in operation or in force and has ceased to be binding on the parties under the provisions of S.19(6), it will continue to have its effect as a contract between the parties that has been made by industrial adjudication in place of the old contract. So long as the award remains in operation under S.19(3), S.23(c) stands in the way of any strike by the workmen and lockout by the employer in respect of any matter covered by the award. Again, so long as the award is binding on a party, breach of any of its terms will make the party liable to penalty under Section 29 of the Act, to imprisonment which may extend to six months or with fine or with both. After the period of its operation and also the period for which the award is binding have elapsed Ss. 23 and 29 can have no operation.” 38. In case of Annamma Thomas Vs. T. Joseph, reported at 1984(2) LLJ 208 , the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court was considering an almost similar case. The issue involved was with regard to an award directing re-instatement of an employee with back wages and whether such an award ceases to be in operation after a period of one year. 39. The observations of the said Court are thus: “In the Law of Industrial Disputes, Third Edition, Vol. I, by Malhotra and Malhotra, it is stated thus at page 1225:- There are two types of awards. The awards of the first type are which decide the questions under reference once and for all. For instance, the awards involving personal rights e.g. Upholding the discharge or dismissal of workmen or directing reinstatement of a discharged or a dismissed workman for victimization or any other unfair labour practice; or the awards dealing with questions like transfer, legality or justifiability of lock outs or strikes etc. (c). For instance, the awards involving personal rights e.g. Upholding the discharge or dismissal of workmen or directing reinstatement of a discharged or a dismissed workman for victimization or any other unfair labour practice; or the awards dealing with questions like transfer, legality or justifiability of lock outs or strikes etc. (c). In such cases, the question of period of operation of the award as contemplated by subs (3) does not arise as the dispute under reference is decided once and for all by the award of the adjudicator. Such awards do not cast any continuing obligation on the parties bound by the award. The awards of the second type are those which cast continuing obligations on the parties bound by them. For instance, the awards dealing with the wagestructure, dearness allowance, gratuity and other allowances and benefits etc. Subs (5) makes Subs.(3) applicable to the awards of the former type. From a combined reading of subs.(3) and (5) it is clear that these two provisions apply only to an award which, after pronouncement and publication, continues to impose obligations on the parties making it necessary to know for what period it would be in operation under subs. (3)(d). Furthermore, by implication of the words “subject to the provisions of this section” in subs.(3), subs(4) and subs.(6) also become inapplicable to such awards because in such awards there is no question of the period of operation as the questions in dispute have been decided once for all. Subsections (3), (4), (6) and (7) deal with the period of operation of the second type of awards because the obligation under such awards being of continuing nature, the period of their operation is a material consideration. After the period of operation of such awards is over, it is for the parties themselves to consider whether the obligations should be continued, revised or rescinded. 8. Where the termination of services of an employee is set aside, he should be deemed to be in continuous service is no longer open to doubt. In the decision of the Supreme Court in Mohan Lal Vs. 8. Where the termination of services of an employee is set aside, he should be deemed to be in continuous service is no longer open to doubt. In the decision of the Supreme Court in Mohan Lal Vs. The Management of M/s. Bharat Electronics Ltd., reported in ( AIR 1981 SC 1253 ), it is stated thus at page 1262: “But there is a catena of decisions which rule that where the termination is illegal especially where there is an ineffective order of retrenchment, there is neither termination nor cessation of service and a declaration follows that the workman concerned continues to be in service with all consequential benefits. No case is made out for departure from this normally accepted approach of the Courts in the field of social justice and we do not propose to depart in this case.” 9. From these authorities cited above, it is clear that an award of the Industrial Tribunal declaring the termination of service of an employee as invalid and inoperative and directing reinstatement with back wages does not cease to be in force after the period of one year mentioned in subs.(3) of S.19.” (emphasis supplied) 40. In the case of L.I.C. Of India Versus D.J. Bahadur, reported at 1981(1) LLJ 1 , Full Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court has considered the scope of Section 19(2) and 19(3) as well as the extent to which the obligations would remain on the parties to the award. Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer, as he then was, has held as under: 21. The I.D. Act is a benign measure which seeks to pre-empt industrial tensions, provide the mechanics of dispute resolutions and set up the necessary infrastructure so that the energies of partners in production may not be dissipated in counter-productive battles and assurance of industrial justice may create a climate of good-will. Industrial peace is a national need and, absent law, order in any field will be absent. Chaos is the enemy of creativity sans which production will suffer. Thus, the great goal to which the I.D. Act is geared is legal mechanism for canalizing conflicts along conciliatory or adjudicatory processes. The objective of this legislation and the component of social justice it enbodies were underscored in the Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board Vs. Chaos is the enemy of creativity sans which production will suffer. Thus, the great goal to which the I.D. Act is geared is legal mechanism for canalizing conflicts along conciliatory or adjudicatory processes. The objective of this legislation and the component of social justice it enbodies were underscored in the Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board Vs. Rajappa, [1978I L.L.J.349]; (1978) 2 S.C.C. 213 at 232 thus: To sum up, the personality of the whole statute, be it remembered, has a welfare basis, it being a beneficial legislation which protects labour, promotes their contentment and regulates situations of crisis and tension where production may be imperiled by untenable strikes and blackmail lock outs. The mechanism of the Act is geared to conferment of regulated benefits to workmen and resolution, according to a sympathetic rule of law, of the conflicts, actual or potential, between managements and workmen. Its goal is amelioration of the conditions of workers, tempered by a practical sense of peaceful co-existence, to the benefit of both – not a neutral position but restraints on laissez faire and concern for the welfare of the weaker lot. Empathy with the statute is necessary to understand not merely its spirit, but also its sense. 43. It is inconceivable that any other alternative subsists. For instance, imagine a case where for 30 years an award or settlement might have given various benefits to employees and at the end of 30 years a notice terminating the settlement were given by the employer. Does industrial law absurdly condemn the parties to a reversion to what prevailed between them 30 years ago? If the employees were given Rs.100 as salary in 1947 and, thereafter, by awards and settlements the salary scale was raised to Rs.1000 could it be the Management might, by unilateral yet disastrous action give notice under S.19(2) or (6) terminating the settlement or award, tell the workers that they would be paid Rs.100 which was the original contract although in law that contract had been extinguished totally by a later contract of settlement or by force of an award ? The horrendous consequences of such an interpretation may best be left to imagination. Moreover, if industrial peace is the signature tune of industrial law, industrial violence would be the vicious shower of consequences if parties were relegated either to an ancient and obsolete contract or to a state of lawless hiatus. The horrendous consequences of such an interpretation may best be left to imagination. Moreover, if industrial peace is the signature tune of industrial law, industrial violence would be the vicious shower of consequences if parties were relegated either to an ancient and obsolete contract or to a state of lawless hiatus. No cannon of interpretation of statutes can compel the Court to construe a statutory provision in this matter. We have, no doubt, that the precedents on the point, the principles of industrial law, the constitutional sympathy of part IV and the sound rules of statutory construction converage to the same point that when a notice intimating termination of an award or settlement is issued the legal import is merely that the stage is set for fresh negotiations or industrial adjudication and until either efforts ripens into a fresh set of conditions of service the previous award or settlement does regulate the relations between the employer and the employees. The Court never holds justice as hostage with law as janitor Law, if at all liberates justice through the judicial process. Fundamental error can be avoided only by remembering fundamental values.” 41. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Mangaldas Narandas and Payment of Wages Authority, reported at (1957) II LLJ 256 Bombay had an occasion to consider the scope of Section 19(3) and 19(6). It was concluded that the effect of the termination of the award is only to prevent enforcement of the obligations under the Award in the manner prescribed, but the rights and obligations which flow from the award are not wiped out. Termination of the award or lapsing of the award does not have effect of wiping out the liabilities flowing from the award. 42. It was held thus: "When an award is delivered by the industrial tribunal it has the effect of imposing a statutory contract governing the relations of the employer and the employee. It is true that statutory contract may be terminated in the manner prescribed by Subsection (6) of Section 19. After the statutory contract is terminated by notice the employer by failing to abide by the terms of the award does not incur the penalties provided by the Industrial Disputes Act, nor can the award be enforced in the manner prescribed by Section 20 of Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950. After the statutory contract is terminated by notice the employer by failing to abide by the terms of the award does not incur the penalties provided by the Industrial Disputes Act, nor can the award be enforced in the manner prescribed by Section 20 of Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950. But the termination of the award has, in our judgment, not the effect of extinguishing the rights flowing therefrom. Evidently by the termination of the award the contract of employment is not terminated. The employer and the employee remain master and servant in the industry in which they are engaged, unless by notice the employer has also simultaneously with the termination of the award terminated the employment of the employee. If the employment is not terminated, it is difficult to hold that the rights which had been granted under the award automatically cease to be effective from the date on which notice of termination of the award becomes effective. In our judgment, the effect of termination of the award is only to prevent enforcement of the obligations under the award in the manner prescribed, but the rights and obligations which flow from the award are not wiped out. In taking that view we are supported by a judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Judhisthir Chandra v. Mukherjee. That was a case in which an award was made under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, on 25 May 1948, under the provisions of Subsection (3) of Section 19. As it then stood, the award was to remain in operation for one year. A subsequent award was made on 20 May 1949 and by that award the previous award was modified retrospectively. An application was made to set aside the subsequent award and it was contended that the modification did not affect the interests of the workers as the original award had ceased to be effective after 25 May 1949. Mr. Justice Banerjee, in rejecting the contention, observed that the contention raised by the employer was not correct as it overlooked the fact that though the previous award had become ineffective by the passage of time, the rights flowing therefrom had not been wiped out. Mr. Justice Banerjee, in rejecting the contention, observed that the contention raised by the employer was not correct as it overlooked the fact that though the previous award had become ineffective by the passage of time, the rights flowing therefrom had not been wiped out. The award directed payment of certain dearness allowance which, if not paid, created a debt in favour of the workmen and it was a binding debt which could be enforced by a civil suit and that the penalty clause in the Act did not bar such a suit. This case is evidently an authority for the proposition that the termination of the award or the lapsing of the award has not the effect of wiping out the liabilities flowing from the award. Mr. Bhabha, on behalf of the employer, contended that this case was decided under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, under Subsections (3) and (4) of Section 19, before those Subsections were amended. It is undoubtedly true that by Act 48 of 1950, Subsections (3) and (4) have been amended and Subsections (5), (6) and (7) have been added. Under the Act, as it originally stood, every award lapsed at the expiry of one year; by amended Act every award becomes quasi-permanent, subject to termination by either party by giving notice of two months' duration. But whether the award lapses at the expiry of the period provided under the Act or is terminated by notice served by the employer or the employee, the consequence of termination must in our judgment be the same. If the rights flowing from the award are not wiped out even after it has lapsed, it is difficult to appreciate why they are wiped out when the award is terminated by notice under Subsection (6) of Section 19." 43. In the case of Banaras Ice Factory Limited Versus the Uttar Pradesh Government, reported at 1956, Allahabad 730 (AIR), the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court has considered the submissions of the counsel and observed as under:- “.......and the argument of learned counsel is that the absence of any such provision in the Government’s Order of 15-03-1951, makes it clear that cl.17 applies to all decisions or awards of an Industrial Tribunal or an Adjudicator. The question is not free from difficulty but we have come to the conclusion that the submission of learned counsel is one which should not be accepted. The award of an Industrial Tribunal or an Adjudicator may impose upon an employer the duty of doing some act which extends over a period of time, such for example as the re-instatement of dismissed employees, or it may impose upon the employer an obligation to pay a sum of money. In the first case the obligation is one of a continuing nature, in the second it is not; and in our opinion the terms of Cl.17 are such as to make its provisions applicable to obligations of the first kind only. We think that subs.(5) of S.19 of the (Central) Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, explains and does not modify the provisions of subs.(3). Subsection (5) is not in form nor, we think, in effect, a proviso to subs. (3).” 44. In the case of Sri Krishnarajendra Mills Workers Unions and Assistant Labour Commissioner, reported at 1967 (15) FLR 2, the Court has held as under:- “In considering the intendment of subsections (3) and (6) of Section 19, the distinction between the expressions ‘in force” and ‘in operation’ has to be borne in mind. While subsection (3) lays down that an award shall be in operation for the different periods mentioned in that subsection whenever action has been taken by the Government after the expiry of the period of operation, the award does not automatically cease, but it continues to be in force and binds the parties until it is terminated by a notice and such termination takes effect two months after the notice. The words ‘in operation’ have reference to the period fixed by law or by the parties according to law while the words ‘in force’ have reference to the period (subsequent to the period of operation) during which it will statutorily be binding on the parties to the award or settlement.” 45. The Full Bench of this Court in the case of M.S.R.T.C. Nagpur Vs. Premlal Khatri Gajbhiye, reported at 2003(3) All M.R. 1022 has held has under : "24. The decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Regional Manager, Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation, Nagpur and another is also of no help to the appellants. The Full Bench of this Court in the case of M.S.R.T.C. Nagpur Vs. Premlal Khatri Gajbhiye, reported at 2003(3) All M.R. 1022 has held has under : "24. The decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Regional Manager, Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation, Nagpur and another is also of no help to the appellants. Therein it was specifically ruled that "the respondent has invoked Item 9 of Schedule IV of the Act No. 1 of 1972, which entry relates to failure of implementing the settlement which according to both the parties is still in force and binding upon them. Therefore, in our opinion the unfair labour practice will continue to recur so long as the settlement remains unimplemented." As already held above, Clause 49 of 1956 settlement is still in force and, therefore, non-compliance thereof would amount to unfair labour practice by the appellants and it will continue to recur till and until the appellants grant the benefit under said Clause 49 of 1956 settlement to the respondents. 25. Similarly the decision in M. S.R.T.C 's case by the Division Bench of this Court clearly assist the respondents. The Division Bench therein has held thus: "In order to ascertain whether the limitation has expired, it is necessary to find out whether the activities complained of as unfair labour practices are of the recurring nature, or whether the occurrence of the unfair labour practices were over once it was engaged in and only the effect continues to flow therefrom. Where the occurrence is of recurring nature, the limitation would continue to extend as long as the occurrence continues. In other words, if the acts of partiality and favouritism continue from time to time the occurrence of unfair labour practice would be of a recurring nature, in which case the limitation will not come to an end on expiry of the ninety days from the date when the unfair labour practices were first committed. For this proposition reliance can be placed on the decision of this Court in Regional Manager, M. S. R. T. C. v. Regional Secy., Maharashtra S. T. Kamgar Sanghatana, 1984 LIC 1721." 26. It is well settled that as long as the default in performance of obligation continues, the wrong is deemed to have continued and therefore, it is to be taken as a continuing wrong. It is well settled that as long as the default in performance of obligation continues, the wrong is deemed to have continued and therefore, it is to be taken as a continuing wrong. If the duty continues from day to day, the non-performance of that duty from day to day is a continuing wrong. (Vide Smt. Maya Rani Punj Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi. (1986) 1 SCC 445 ). 27. In the case in hand as already observed above, the unfair labour practice by the appellants in continuing the denial of the benefits under Clause 49 of 1956 settlement to the respondents is of recurring nature and till and until such benefits are given, it will continue to recur and, therefore, there is no substance in the contention of the appellants that the complaints were barred by Law of Limitation.” 46. Termination of a wage revision award is solely with an intention for raising new/further demands. This concept of giving a life span to an award and seeking its termination is necessarily aimed at facilitating the raising of further or new demands after a passage of time because a wage rise settlement or an award pertaining to wage rise demands are meant for particular periods. Changing socio and economic conditions prevailing in the society compel a revision of wage structuring along with allied demands. The said concept can not be read into an award delivered after adjudicating a personal cause of action u/s 2A of the I.D. Act. 47. The adjudicatory power u/s 11A indicates that it is an adjudication of a personal cause of action in the nature of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination. A judicial pronouncement is handed down, either upholding the removal from service or holding it illegal. This is a one time adjudication of such a dispute and there is neither a variation in the dispute nor is there any further/new demand to be made against an employer. A judicial pronouncement on such a cause of action can not be limited to a particular period. For the same reasons, there can not be any termination of such an award under Section 19(2) of the I.D. Act, 1947. 48. The adjudicatory process dealing with such an industrial dispute takes years. A judicial pronouncement on such a cause of action can not be limited to a particular period. For the same reasons, there can not be any termination of such an award under Section 19(2) of the I.D. Act, 1947. 48. The adjudicatory process dealing with such an industrial dispute takes years. After the award and relief of re-instatement has attained finality, an employer cannot be permitted to resort to Section 19(2) of the I.D. Act for terminating the award. This, also runs counter to Section 17B of the I.D. Act which provides for payment of full wages to a workman pending proceedings in Higher Courts. If the intent and object of introducing Section 2A, 11A and 17B as amendments and the scheme of the I.D. Act is considered, it would clearly indicate that the Legislature never intended to limit an award in relation to an industrial dispute u/s 2A and much less to a particular period of one year or the like. 49. As discussed above, an award in relation to the termination of services of a workman can lead to grant of relief of re-instatement in service with consequential benefits. It is clearly an adjudication of a personal cause of action which leads to the judgment of the adjudicating authority. It is also clear that the relief granted creates an obligation on the employer to reinstate an employee with other benefits as may be granted. When Law mandates an employer to implement an award, it amounts to an obligation and the obligation will continue till such an award is implemented. Once an employee is reinstated in employment by virtue of an award, the obligation ends and the status of the said workman would then be that of a workman being in the employment of the concerned employer. It creates a fiction that there was no termination in the eyes of Law. Therefore, the action of re-instatement completes the process of implementation of the award and leaves no continuing obligation. 50. Therefore, in the light of the provisions of the I.D. Act referred and the authorities cited, I do not have any doubt that an award allowing a reference and directing the re-instatement of an employee falls u/s 19(5), since the continuing obligation cast on the employer ends with the act of re-instatement. Section 19(6) of the I.D. Act is supplementary to Section 19(3). Section 19(6) of the I.D. Act is supplementary to Section 19(3). Section 19(2), (3) and (6) would therefore not be applicable to those cases which are covered under Section 19(5) of the I.D. Act. Section 19(5) is neither in form nor in effect, a proviso to Section 19(3), as observed in the case of Mangaldas (supra). 51. However, to strike a note of caution. it is desirable that a workman should resort to an appropriate and expeditious remedy to have the Award implemented. Nevertheless, his laxity will not disentitle him from seeking its implementation. Similarly employer would be equally accountable for its non-implementation and will be precluded from invoking Section 19(2) or 19(3) of the I.D. Act. Section 29 of the I.D. Act can very well deal with such non-implementation. 52. For the above said reasons, the impugned judgment of the Industrial Court is quashed and set aside. Complaint U.L.P. No. 32/2001 is allowed and respondent No.2 / Employer is held to have committed unfair labour practices under Item No.9 of Schedule IV of the State Act. Respondent No.2 / employer is directed to implement the said award dated 23/07/1996, passed by the Labour Court in Ref. (I.D) No.71/1988. This petition is, therefore, allowed and Rule is made absolute with no order as to costs. 53. Before I part with the judgment, I wish to place on record my gratitude to all the learned Advocates who have taken pains and graciously assisted the Court along with the learned Advocate for the petitioner and the learned A.G.P. for the respondents in the proper adjudication of the issue.