Judgment : Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. The petition is heard finally with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties. By this petition, the petitioner impugns the judgment passed by the first appellate Court on 09/07/2012 rejecting an application filed by the petitioner for condonation of delay in filing the miscellaneous civil appeal. The petitioner is the original plaintiff. A suit was instituted by the petitioner against the respondent Nos.1 to 3 for preemption. The petitioner filed an application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure restraining the respondent Nos.1 to 3 from developing the suit property. The trial Court by the order dated 14/10/2011, rejected the application for grant of temporary injunction. The petitioner filed a miscellaneous civil appeal on 12/01/2012 against the order dated 14/10/2011 along with an application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. It was the case of the petitioner in the application for condonation of delay that the petitioner had applied for grant of certified copy of the order dated 14/10/2011 on 19/10/2011, the certified copy was ready on 21/11/2011 and the petitioner obtained the same on 21/11/2011. It was stated that though the petitioner wanted to file the miscellaneous civil appeal within the prescribed period of limitation, the petitioner could not do so as he was arrested for the offence punishable under Sections 302 and 506B of the Penal Code on 07/12/2011. The petitioner had applied for grant of bail on 14/12/2011 and the same was granted on 22/12/2011. Though the petitioner was released on 23/12/2011, the petitioner could not approach his counsel till 09/01/2012 as according to one of the conditions of bail, the petitioner was required to reside at Zadasi till the trial was over, barring the dates on which his presence was necessary in the concerned Court. On 09/01/2012 the petitioner attended the Court in connection with the offence registered against him and gave instructions to his counsel for filing the miscellaneous civil appeal. The miscellaneous civil appeal was filed on 12/01/2012. According to the petitioner, the delay was bona fide, and the petitioner was prevented by sufficient cause, from filing the miscellaneous civil appeal within the prescribed period. The petitioner sought for the condonation of delay of twenty five days in filing the appeal. The respondent Nos.1 to 3 opposed the prayer made in the application for condonation of delay. According to the petitioner, the delay was bona fide, and the petitioner was prevented by sufficient cause, from filing the miscellaneous civil appeal within the prescribed period. The petitioner sought for the condonation of delay of twenty five days in filing the appeal. The respondent Nos.1 to 3 opposed the prayer made in the application for condonation of delay. It was admitted by the respondent Nos.1 to 3 that the petitioner was arrested in connection with the offence punishable under Sections 302 and 506B of the Indian Penal Code. It was stated in the reply that the petitioner had shot the driver of the defendant No.2, driving a JCB vehicle on the construction site, from a point blank range. It was stated that the petitioner had failed to explain why he had not preferred an appeal after obtaining the certified copy on 21/11/2011 till he was arrested on 07/12/2011. The respondent Nos.1 to 3 sought for the dismissal of the application. The first appellate Court, by the judgment dated 09/07/2012, dismissed the application filed by the petitioner. Shri Dhumale, the learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the first appellate Court could not have rejected the application on the ground that the petitioner could have filed the appeal during the period between 24/12/2011 to 09/01/2012. The learned counsel submitted that the first appellate Court was not justified in holding that there was no justification for not filing the appeal during the period between 24/12/2011 and 09/01/2012 as there was no condition in the bail order that the petitioner should not leave village Zadasi for attending the Court matters till the trial was over. It is submitted that the first appellate Court took a highly pedantic approach while deciding the application. According to the petitioner, there was a delay of 25 days only and the petitioner had satisfactorily explained the delay. It is submitted that it was impossible for the petitioner to file the appeal after he was arrested on 07/12/2011, till he was released on 24/12/2011. ShriAgnihotri, the learned counsel for the respondent Nos.1 and 2, submitted that the petitioner was involved in the offence punishable under Sections 302 and 506B of the Penal Code as the petitioner had shot the driver of the respondent No.2 on the construction site and no relief can be granted in favour of an offender. ShriAgnihotri, the learned counsel for the respondent Nos.1 and 2, submitted that the petitioner was involved in the offence punishable under Sections 302 and 506B of the Penal Code as the petitioner had shot the driver of the respondent No.2 on the construction site and no relief can be granted in favour of an offender. It is submitted that if the petitioner could attend the criminal Court on 09/01/2012, he could have as well attended the Court earlier, for the purpose of filing the miscellaneous civil appeal as he was not prevented by the conditional bail order to appear in the Court proceedings. It is submitted that there was absolutely no justification for not filing the miscellaneous civil appeal during the period between 24/12/2011 and 09/01/2012 and hence, the first appellate Court rightly held that the delay was not liable to be condoned. The learned counsel submitted that this Court may not condone the delay, specially when the construction on the suit site is complete and third party rights are created. It is submitted that no fruitful purpose could be served even if the delay is condoned and the miscellaneous civil appeal is registered. The learned counsel sought for the dismissal of the writ petition. The learned Assistant Government Pleader for the respondent No.4 supported the order passed by the first appellate Court. The learned counsel for the respondent No.3 had nothing to add in the matter as the respondent No.3 is a formal party. On hearing the learned counsel for the parties and on a perusal of the impugned order as also the application and the reply, it appears that the first appellate Court was not justified in rejecting the application for condonation of delay solely on the ground that the petitioner could have filed the appeal during the period between 24/12/2011 and 09/01/2012. As rightly submitted on behalf of the petitioner the first appellate Court took a highly pedantic approach in deciding the application for condonation of delay though in such cases a pragmatic approach is expected. It cannot be said as submitted on behalf of the respondent Nos.1 and 2 that the delay should not be condoned only because the petitioner is involved in the commission of a serious offence. Merely because a person is accused or convicted of an offence, he cannot be deprived or denuded of his civil rights. It cannot be said as submitted on behalf of the respondent Nos.1 and 2 that the delay should not be condoned only because the petitioner is involved in the commission of a serious offence. Merely because a person is accused or convicted of an offence, he cannot be deprived or denuded of his civil rights. In English Law, under the Forfeiture Act, 1870 a convict was not permitted to sue for an injury to his property but this disability was removed by the Criminal Justice Act. In Indian Law, however, the accused and convicts are not denuded of their civil rights merely because they are charged or have been guilty of commission of an offence. Hence, the submission made on behalf of the respondent Nos.1 and 2 that relief must be denied to the petitioner only because the petitioner has been accused of an offence punishable under Sections 302 and 506B of the Penal Code is liable to be rejected. It would now be necessary to consider whether there was sufficient cause for not filing the miscellaneous civil appeal within the prescribed period of limitation. Though “sufficient cause” has not been explained or defined, it must mean a cause which is beyond the control of the party. It is not in dispute that the petitioner was arrested on 07/12/2011 in connection with a crime and though he had applied for bail on 14/12/2011, the bail was granted on 21/12/2011 and the petitioner was released on 23/12/2011. A copy of the order granting bail is placed on record. One of the conditions of bail is that the petitioner, immediately after his release, would start residing at village Zadasi, Tahsil Seloo, District Wardha and would continue to stay there till the trial was over, barring the dates on which his presence was necessary in the concerned Court. On a bare perusal of the condition, it is apparent that the petitioner could not have visited Nagpur except on the dates on which his presence was necessary in the concerned Court for trial purpose. The presence of the petitioner was necessary in the concerned Court for trial purpose on 09/01/2012 and hence, the petitioner could leave Zadasi village for attending the Court only on 09/01/2012. The petitioner attended the criminal Court and then gave instructions to his counsel for filing the miscellaneous civil appeal. Immediately on 12/01/2012 the miscellaneous civil appeal was filed. The presence of the petitioner was necessary in the concerned Court for trial purpose on 09/01/2012 and hence, the petitioner could leave Zadasi village for attending the Court only on 09/01/2012. The petitioner attended the criminal Court and then gave instructions to his counsel for filing the miscellaneous civil appeal. Immediately on 12/01/2012 the miscellaneous civil appeal was filed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, it is apparent that the petitioner was prevented by sufficient cause in filing the appeal within the prescribed period of limitation. The reason recorded by the first appellate Court that the petitioner had failed to make out sufficient cause for not filing the appeal during the period between 25/12/2011 and 09/01/2012 is incorrect and since the impugned order is solely based on the said reason, the impugned order cannot be sustained. The delay in filing the appeal was beyond the control of the petitioner. The submission made on behalf of the respondent Nos.1 and 2 that this Court may dismiss the writ petition as no purpose could be served by registering the miscellaneous civil appeal because the construction is complete and third party rights are created, cannot be accepted for dismissing the application as that issue could be considered by the first appellate Court. For the reasons aforesaid, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned order is quashed and set aside and the application is allowed subject to payment of costs of rupees seven thousand and five hundred to the respondent No.1 within a period of two weeks. The costs may be deposited in the first appellate Court for the respondent Nos.1, for the sake of convenience. Rule is made absolute in the aforesaid terms with no order as to costs.