ORDER By the Court. – Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. By the impugned order contained in Reference No. 1841 dated 11th August, 2006 (Annexure-8), the application for compassionate appointment of the original petitioner, Dhan Soy, husband of the deceased lady employee, Sahatarin Bai has been rejected on the grounds that none of the basic records maintained in the office of the competent authority/employer bears the name of the said Dhan Soy, the original petitioner, as the husband of the deceased employee. During the pendency of the writ application the original petitioner died and one Manoj Kumar stood substituted claiming himself to be the sole heir and son of the deceased petitioner. He has perused this writ application with a claim for appointment on compassionate ground on the death of his mother on 6th February, 2003 in harness invoking the provisions of National Coal Wage Agreement-VI. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the grounds for rejection are wholly unreasonable and contrary to their on averments in the counter-affidavit as they have accepted that in the CMPF records, the name of the petitioner did appear, but it has been stated that the same cannot be relied upon, as no date of signing does exist. According to the petitioner, the reasons in the impugned order cannot be supplemented by statements made in the counter-affidavit based upon the judgment rendered in the case of Mohinder Singh Gill and another v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and others, reported in (1978) 1 SCC 405 and reiterated in the case of East Coast Railway and another v. Mahadev Appa Rao and others, reported in (2010) 7 SCC 6718. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon the judgment rendered in the case of Syed Khadim Hussain v. State of Bihar and others, reported in (2006) 9 SCC 195 , to submit that in similar circumstances when the claim of the son of the original employee for compassionate appointment was refused by the employer after the death of the surviving spouse and was not entertained by the High Court, the Hon’ble Supreme Court remanded the matter for reconsideration. In the said case, it is submitted that the son was minor at the time of his death and had made an application after majority. 4.
In the said case, it is submitted that the son was minor at the time of his death and had made an application after majority. 4. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents-CCL submits that after the death of the original employee who himself was appointed on compassionate ground on the death of her mother, the case of the original petitioner claiming himself to be husband of the deceased-employee, was considered but none of the records in the office of the employer bears the name of the applicant and as such his application was rejected by the impugned order contained at Annexure-9. Learned counsel for the respondents has refuted the stand of the petitioner based upon CMPF document by submitting that the marriage card of the husband of the deceased employee showed that he got married to lady in November, 1992 but the declaration contained in Form-PS-3 and maintained in the office of CMPF showed that one of his sons i.e. present petitioner was already aged 6 years on 28th May. 1988 i.e. he was born before marriage of the original petitioner to the deceased employee. It is further submitted that the certificates submitted by the petitioner. Manoj Kumar also shows that his date of birth as 5th June, 1991 which is Annexure-8 to the Interlocutory Application No. 3454/11. annexed to the substitution petition. Accordingly, it is submitted that the present case discloses serious disputed questions of fact relating to the claim of the present petitioner also as being borne out of the marriage of the deceased employee and the original petitioner, Dhan Soy. Both the documents i.e. marriage card (Annexure-2) brought on record by the petitioner, showing marriage taking place in November, 1992 and the date of birth of the present petitioner claiming himself as son vide certificate contained at Annexure8 as showing his date of birth as 5th June, 1991 contradict to each other, 5. In these circumstances, while exercising discretionary jurisdiction, this Court would refrain from passing any order on disputed questions of facts. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the relevant records. The facts which are revealed on the record as having been narrated hereinabove shows that the original petitioner was married in December. 1992 while the deceased employee had got employment in the month of May, 1992 itself.
6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the relevant records. The facts which are revealed on the record as having been narrated hereinabove shows that the original petitioner was married in December. 1992 while the deceased employee had got employment in the month of May, 1992 itself. It is the case of the respondents that none of the records maintained in their office do reflect the name of original petitioner as husband of the deceased employee. That is why the impugned order was passed rejecting the claim for compassionate appointment. Even the claim of the present petitioner claiming as the son of the deceased employee is not tenable on facts as the school leaving certificate annexed as Annexure-A to the said IA, discloses that as he was born on 5th June. 1991, much prior to the alleged marriage between the original petitioner and the deceased employee in November, 1992. The employee had died in the year 2003 and the writ petition was preferred in the year 2006 upon passing of the impugned order and the facts which-have been brought on record, do not make out a case for any interference or direction upon the respondents to consider or grant compassionate appointment to the petitioner. The judgments relied upon by the petitioner, are not applicable to the facts of the instant case as the very existence of petitioner's claim as the son of the deceased employee is in doubt on the basis of the marriage between the original petitioner and the deceased employee on the basis of the records produced by the petitioner himself. 7. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed. Petition dismissed.