JUDGMENT 1. The Appellant was appointed distributor of Indane Gas under an agreement dated 29th February, 2001 admittedly executed between the parties. The parties were bound by its terms and conditions. The Appellant is stated to have breached certain conditions. He was stated to have carried out certain acts and omissions which tantamounts to misconduct. Certain complaints were filed before the Respondent. The Appellant was suspended and thereafter his distributorship agreement was terminated on 26th November, 2008. The termination was disputed by the Appellant. The Appellant challenged the termination and claimed compensation and damages for loss of business and reputation with interest. Since the agreement dated 29th February, 2001 has an arbitration clause the Appellant lodged the claim in arbitration. The arbitrator has rejected his claim against termination as also for compensation. He has held that distributorship agreement is rightly terminated and that he was not entitled to any compensation. 2. The Appellant challenged the award U/s.34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (the Act) in the above Misc. Civil Application No.53 of 2011 before the Principal District Judge, Kolhapur. His appeal / application has been dismissed. He has appealed therefrom U/s.37 of the Act. 3. What the arbitrator has seen and what must be seen by this Court is whether a case is made out against the Appellant to allow the Respondent to terminate his dealership agreement. It must be remembered that the Appellant was the claimant. He has claimed that there was no gross act or omission which would merit termination. It is for him to prove that. It is further claimed on his behalf that he cannot prove a negative and hence the Respondent in the arbitration must show acts or omissions of the Appellant as distributor of Indane Gas. Be that as it may, the Respondent has in fact shown certain acts and omissions. The Respondent has also shown the arbitrator the steps taken by the Respondent upon the complaints received by it under letters of various persons including Senior Govt. Officers such as the Addl. Be that as it may, the Respondent has in fact shown certain acts and omissions. The Respondent has also shown the arbitrator the steps taken by the Respondent upon the complaints received by it under letters of various persons including Senior Govt. Officers such as the Addl. Collector, Kolhapur, Sarpanch, the Panchayat, the Superintendent of Police, Budhargad Police Station in addition to other numerous letters and complaints of the customers which came to be made that there was no system of refill booking, diversion of domestic cylinders for non domestic use, overcharging on refills, not giving rebates on non home delivery, non delivery of cylinders, over charging while releasing new connection, not giving proper official documents i.e. subscription voucher (SV) etc. People resorted to agitation including road blocking and calling of bandh. 4. More than hundred complaints were received. A meeting was arranged by the Sarpanch in which the Tahasildar, District Supply Officer also remained present and received a number of complaints, newspapers carried out several articles in respect of the Bandh which was declared. The Senior Inspector of Police registered two FIRs starting the criminal machinery. An explanation was sought by the Respondent from the Appellant. The Appellant denied the contentions by letter dated 7th November, 2008. The Appellant did not offer explanation or justification. Consequently the distributorship agreement was terminated. 5. The Appellant contends that no sufficient opportunity has given for explanation. It may be mentioned that hearing upon a show cause notice has been held to be sufficient upon a reply of the notice (see SopanMaruti Thopte Vs. Pune Municipal Corporation, AIR 1996 Bom 304 ). When a show cause notice was issued and reply is sought the party is put to notice and is free to explain, justify or merely deny any of the contentions. If the party only denies the allegations, when he would have produced positive evidence to substantiate his denials. It would only be seen that the opportunity was not claimed though given and hence the noticee has nothing more to state. 6. It may also be mentioned that upon a case of a particular complaint the allegations would require to be proved by the complainant. It would only be seen that the opportunity was not claimed though given and hence the noticee has nothing more to state. 6. It may also be mentioned that upon a case of a particular complaint the allegations would require to be proved by the complainant. However the expanse of the case under which hundreds of complaints are received leads one to conclude that each of them cannot be false and in arbitration proceedings the Arbitrator is free to follow his own procedure without any recourse to CPC or Indian Evidence Act. In this case the receipt of numerous complaints was accompanied by the declaration of bandh, articles in newspapers as also criminal complaints which would be separately prosecuted. The arbitrator has rightly rubbished the claim of the Appellant that all these were politically motivated. He has considered sufficient opportunity of hearing being given which stands to reason. 7. The complaints about the acts of omissions of the Appellant would lend themselves to be proved only by the Appellant. It would be interesting to consider several types of complaints. a) One of the complaints was that there was no system of refill booking prepared by the Appellant as required. It would be for the Appellant to show the system of refill booking that he had prepared if it was prepared. Such evidence is only in the domain of the Appellant and in fact U/s.106 of the Indian Evidence Act also the Appellant who claimed that the termination was invalid was enjoined to show that there was system of refill booking which he scrupulously prepared. b) Similar is the complaint that cash memos for new connection were not prepared. If the complaints are erroneous, false or motivated it is for the Appellant to show his documentary evidence kept in the normal course of the business evidencing cash memos prepared from time to time. That is not done. c) Another complaint was that adhesive stamp amounts collected from customers were not affixed. Here again record could have been produced by the Appellant himself to show the adhesive stamps affixed as required in law. d) There is similar complaint that 1160 dead cards were activated by the appellant. This would be a criminal offence. It would tantamount to forgery and fabrication of documents. Here again record could have been produced by the Appellant himself to show the adhesive stamps affixed as required in law. d) There is similar complaint that 1160 dead cards were activated by the appellant. This would be a criminal offence. It would tantamount to forgery and fabrication of documents. It is for the Appellant to show that the cards which were prepared by producing them since they would be only in his custody. e) Even the complaint relating to forgery could have been largely countered by showing the account kept in the normal course of his business (if at all they were so kept) showing no forgery. f) Similarly complaints that SV papers were not issued can be simplicitor falsified by production of SV papers. None of which is produced. 8. Upon an analysis of the complaints relating to the various aspects stated above it may be stated that even if some of the complaints were motivated and could not be disproved by the Appellant who was himself the claimant, several others could have disputed by him by production of the evidence in his charge and control. This he failed to do in reply to the Respondent's notice as also in the arbitration. 9. The award shows inter-alia the consideration of such pleadings and evidence. The learned arbitrator recorded evidence that was led before him. He has appreciated that evidence in the light of the claimant's admissions. This shows that enquiry officers came to visit him at his office. The claimant offered his explanation. He replied by his letter dated 2nd October, 2008 in reply to the Respondent's letter dated 3rd September, 2008 specifying 107 complaints made against him. The arbitrator has rightly considered that opportunity was sufficiently given. Hence the explanation, if any, would show his defence to the disputed termination. 10. In fact the claimant admitted that 50% of the complaints were of his customers during his cross examination. He could not give any response or justification in respect of those complaints. 11. The complaints made by various authorities including the Respondent have been produced before the arbitrator and have been shown to this Court also. It is futile for the claimant to only contend that he was not heard when he has nothing further to state. Even before the arbitrator nothing whatsoever is stated or produced showing his acts as per the agreement. 12. It is futile for the claimant to only contend that he was not heard when he has nothing further to state. Even before the arbitrator nothing whatsoever is stated or produced showing his acts as per the agreement. 12. In an arbitration proceeding the lack of such evidence coupled with the case of the Respondent of such complaints would seal the claimant's fate. The lack of documentary evidence as also the admissions of the enquiry and the complaints of 50% of persons who are his customers would make the case so gross as not deserving any interference with the termination. The learned arbitrator has correctly held that the dealership agreement is determinable by the Respondents and thus specific performance cannot be granted as claimed by the Appellant. 13. Further the Appellant made a tall claim of monetary loss incurred by him for loss of business and reputation of a total of Rs.2.26 Crores without any documentary proof. He claimed losses upon cheques of Rs.5.75 but did not show any cheque. He also made a claim of Rs.4.2 lacs on account of transportation which is held not maintainable. The learned Arbitrator has called the bluff of the claimant for the gross amount of claim made for monetary losses and loss of business upon seeing his income tax returns showing only income of Rs.5.03 lacs. Consequently he has rightly rejected the entire claim. Indeed it is seen to be false and frivolous. 14. The learned Principal District Judge, Kolhapur in the impugned judgment has considered each of the aforesaid claims of the applicant with regard to the negative burden of proof, the aspect of natural justice and the proof of falsity of the complaints on merits. He has rightly considered that the arbitrator has given a fair opportunity to the parties for leading evidence which the Appellant / Claimant has availed of and led. He has also considered the paramount importance of the agitation, road blocking and the declaration of Bandh which are out of the ordinary acts which would require immediate steps to be taken and which cannot be done in a normal case where the business affairs of the claimant would be clear and proper. He has, therefore, rightly considered that the award is not against public policy and not against any provision of law. He has, therefore, rightly considered that the award is not against public policy and not against any provision of law. The aspect of negative burden made out by the complainant himself who made claim and had to positively prove his business affairs has also been considered. Nothing further need be done on merits. The termination is, therefore, seen to be validly made. In fact it was most opportune and the Respondent would have failed in its duty as a public corporation if it had allowed the acts and omissions of the Appellant to continue. 15. It may be stated that the Respondent was, under the agreement with the Appellant not even bound to give reasons for the termination that it has given. The Respondent has set out a list of complaints received, agitations of the public, and enquiries by public officer which it was not even enjoined to do. Common law relating to contracts allows termination of such contracts even without notice. This would allow one party to terminate the contract as stated in the agreement between the parties without the other party having done anything wrong. The Law of Contract by Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston's, Twelfth edition at page 551 sets out the termination without cause as one of the contractual provisions of termination thus: It is not unusual for contracts to contain provisions entitling one party to terminate without the other party having done anything wrong. At first sight this seems strange, but there are many situations where it makes excellent sense. …. Contracts often contain provisions permitting cancellation without charge where the contract is wholly executory. Even where work has been done, it is not unusual to find provisions for cancellation in return for payment of compensation. The most common examples are in the field of government contract, where the need to be able to cancel weapon projects, or motorway schemes makes such provisions easily understandable. The most obvious example, however, is in long-term contracts of indefinite duration, such as contracts of employment. Here it is common to make express provision for termination by notice and usually easy to infer that the contract is terminable by notice, even in the absence of express provision. 16. The most obvious example, however, is in long-term contracts of indefinite duration, such as contracts of employment. Here it is common to make express provision for termination by notice and usually easy to infer that the contract is terminable by notice, even in the absence of express provision. 16. In the case of Staffordshire Area Health Authority v. South Staffordshire Waterworks Co., The All England Law Reports, 1978 (3) relating to termination of contract the contract was determinable by a reasonable notice. The water company was to supply water at a specified rate to a hospital. The contract was to continue “at all times hereafter” Inflation increased the normal water charges twentyfold since the contract was made. It was to be seen whether the water company could terminate the contract by reasonable notice. It was held Per Lord Denning MR that only because of a fall in the value of money circumstances arose which were not foreseen by the parties and the parties were no longer bound by the contract which could be terminated on reasonable notice even without the fault of the other party. It was held Per Goff and Cumming-Bruce LJJ at Pg.769 that the higher rates of water showed that water company could not afford to supply water to the hospital on the terms fixed once and for all and since there was no provision in the contract for variation of the charge of water and the increase of the water charges would have resulted in repeated arbitrations, Court would infer a power to terminate the agreement on reasonable notice despite the contract being “at all times hereafter”. It was seen that the water company has given reasonable notice of termination for terminating the agreement even though the hospital was not at fault. It may, therefore, be seen that the contract such as one for distributorship of gas which is for an indeterminate period, both parties would reasonably be entitled to terminate the contract by giving reasonable notice to the other party. Hence even without the various complaints and agitations, upon seeing that various statutory and contractual requirements were not maintained by the Appellant / Claimant the Respondent could have even otherwise terminated his contract. 17. In the case of Food Corporation of India & Ors. Vs. Hence even without the various complaints and agitations, upon seeing that various statutory and contractual requirements were not maintained by the Appellant / Claimant the Respondent could have even otherwise terminated his contract. 17. In the case of Food Corporation of India & Ors. Vs. Jagannath Dutta & Ors., 1993 Supp (3) Supreme Court Cases 635, the agreement between the parties specifically provided in Section 37 that it can be terminated without assigning any reason by giving two months notice in writing. Notice of termination was given which came to be quashed by the High Court. The Supreme Court held that quashing was improper. 18. The contract between the parties, under which arbitration was sought, allows termination with as well as without cause in clauses 27 & 28 thereof. It is contended on behalf of the Appellant that termination without cause should have been non-stigmatic. That cannot take out of the purview the termination sought for such gross cause. 19. It is also contended that whereas no inquiry was earlier held, with a separate right to cross examine, it is conceded that the arbitrator himself conducted such inquiry but it is argued that such process could not have been undertaken by the Arbitrator. This argument may have been plausible; but for the fact that the Appellant himself resorted to arbitration and hence called up the Arbitrator to enter upon such inquiry. 20. Even the contention that unproved papers of the Respondent were alone considered by the Arbitrator is no good in view of the total lack of any evidence which was material, relevant and required but not led by the Appellant himself. 21. The parties must, therefore, be left to their volition to terminate the contract just as they would contract upon their own volition. They must be held entitled to terminate the contract also by a reasonable notice. Hence even otherwise the case of the Respondent that the contract cannot be terminated and the termination was bad would imply that he wanted the contract to continue ad infinitum and an order in that behalf would be in the nature of mandatory relief and the grant of specific performance of that contract which could not have been done. Hence even otherwise the case of the Respondent that the contract cannot be terminated and the termination was bad would imply that he wanted the contract to continue ad infinitum and an order in that behalf would be in the nature of mandatory relief and the grant of specific performance of that contract which could not have been done. However in this case even on merits the learned Arbitrator and the learned Principal District Judge have seen the lack of bonafides of the case of the claimant to continue as the contractual party and the reasonable case of the Respondent to have terminated the contract. 22. In the Judgment in the case of Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. Vs. Amritsar Gas Service & Ors., (1991) 1 Supreme Court Cases 533, it is held that the distributorship agreement for sale of gas is the one for rendering personal services. Such agreement is revocable in terms of the agreement. Hence the relief granting restoration of distributorship was an error in law. This judgment has been rightly considered in the award itself. 23. It is seen that the award does not suffer from the vice of being against public policy or any of the statutory provisions of any law nor it is against justice of morality or illegal. It certainly does not shock the conscience of the Court. In fact the Court's conscience would be shocked if a licencee, such as the Appellant herein against whom so many complaints were filed, was allowed to continue as licencee undeterred by the complaints. If in the light of the circumstances shown by the Respondent against the claim the learned arbitrator had upheld the agreement allowing it to continue and had set aside the termination lawfully, justifiably and even morally made in the interest of a public and upon the complaints of various illegalities committed by the claimant, the parameters laid down in the case of Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. Vs. Saw Pipes Ltd., (2003) 5 Supreme Court Cases 705, would have compelled this Court to set aside such award. The impugned award and the impugned order do not fall foul of the parameters in the case of ONGC (Supra). 24. Hence the impugned order of the learned Principal District Judge, Kolhapur dated 9th February, 2012 is confirmed. Consequently the arbitration award dated 3rd January, 2011 is also confirmed.