JUDGMENT 1. This is defendants Second Appeal filed under Section 100 of CPC against the judgment and decree dated 2-1-2001 passed by the Additional District Judge, Baikunthpur in Civil Appeal No. 3-A/99 reversing the judgment and decree dated 29-8-1997 passed by the Civil Judge, Class-1, Baikunthpur in Civil Suit No. 05-A/1991. 2. One Nandlal was the owner of the suit land total area 16.29 situated in village Kochila and 1.30 acres situated in village Patna, district Korea. Plaintiff No.1 is his grandson, the appellant and respondent No.4 Nankibai are his daughters, respondent No.3 Ramsai is his son and Phoolkunwar (since deceased) was his widow. 3. Plaintiff/respondent No. 1 filed a suit for declaration of his title based on a Will deed dated 13-4-1983 allegedly executed by Nandlal in his and his brother Sugrivs (since deceased) favour, possession and mesne profits. It is the plaintiffs case that pursuant to Will deed, he and his brother Sugriv became its owner and after the death of Nandlal and Sugriv, he became the sole owner. 4. The defendant No.1, widow of Nandlal and Ramsai, son of Nandlal supported the plaintiffs case. One of the daughters Nanki Bai did not appear in the case and remained ex parte. 5. Plaintiffs case was contested by the appellant herein by denying the execution of Will deed in plaintiffs favour. It is the case of the appellant that the Will was not executed by Nandlal and is a forged and fabricated document. 6. The trial Court dismissed the suit, finding inter alia, the Will deed (Ex. P.1) is a forged and fabricated document. 7. The plaintiff preferred first appeal there-against, which was allowed by the Court below. Hence, this second appeal. 8. This Court, vide order dated 6-2-2008, admitted the appeal on the following substantial question of law: Whether the lower appellate Court was justified in reversing the finding recorded by the trial Court regarding execution of Will by Nandlal on 13-4-1983?†9. Counsel for both the parties have filed their written synopsis. 10. As per Ms. Sharmila Singhai and Shri Sanjay Agrawal, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, the Will deed (Ex. P.1) is invalid and shrouded by several unexplained suspicious circumstances, (i) presence of Ramsai, father of the plaintiff, at the time of execution of Will (Ex. Counsel for both the parties have filed their written synopsis. 10. As per Ms. Sharmila Singhai and Shri Sanjay Agrawal, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, the Will deed (Ex. P.1) is invalid and shrouded by several unexplained suspicious circumstances, (i) presence of Ramsai, father of the plaintiff, at the time of execution of Will (Ex. P.1), whose relations were not cordial with deceased Nandlal, (ii) at the time of execution of Will, testator Nandlal was ill and was not in sound disposition state of mind and was not in a position to understand the nature and effect of the disposition, (iii) stamp paper, on which, Will was executed was purchased on 22-3-1982 whereas the Will was executed on 13-4-1983, (iv) from the stamp used in execution of Ex. P.1, it is not clear who has purchased the stamp, (v) the Will was a conditional Will and suit filed before death of Phoolkunwar was premature, (vi) at the time of execution of Will and at the time of mutation, Ramsai was present but he did not disclose the fact of execution of Will by late Nandlal, (vii) the plaintiff and Sugriv (since deceased) were minors, and therefore, it is impossible that due to their care and affection Nandlal had executed the Will in their favour, (viii) the Will was executed at Patna whereas one of the witnesses was belonging to Rampur, (ix) Phoolkunwar, widow of Nandlal, was also not examined; (x) the appellate Court also ignored the statement of Sonsai P.W.2, who has stated that Nandlal was not in fit condition at the time of execution of Will. It was further contended, the Court below has grossly erred in reversing the findings recorded by the trial Court regarding execution of Will by meeting the reasons assigned by the trial Court, and therefore, the judgment of Court below is not sustainable in law. 11. It was further contended, the Court below has grossly erred in reversing the findings recorded by the trial Court regarding execution of Will by meeting the reasons assigned by the trial Court, and therefore, the judgment of Court below is not sustainable in law. 11. On the other hand, as per Shri A. K. Prasad, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.1, the Will is not shrouded with any suspicious circumstances; the wife of testator has supported the execution of Will by her husband - Nandlal in her written statement; other daughter of Nandlal, i.e., Nankibai, also remained ex parte; there is no material discrepancies in the evidence of witnesses examined in the case and on the basis of minor contradictions, the execution of Will cannot be discarded; the testator himself has assigned reasons for not giving any share to his son and daughters; the trial Court ignoring the fact that the signature of the testator was not denied by the appellant, the appellant also failed to prove the fact that the Will is forged and fabricated, has held the Will as forged and fabricated without any rhyme or reason; the above finding of the trial Court has been rightly set aside by the lower appellate Court after meeting the reasons and no substantial question of law arises for determination in the instant case and the appeal deserves to be dismissed. 12. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the records of both the Courts below. 13. Section 63 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 (for short, the Act of 1925) lays down the mode and manner of execution of an unprivileged Will. Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (for short, the Act of 1872) postulates the mode and manner and proof of execution of document, which is required by law to be attested. It in unequivocal terms states that execution of Will must be proved at least by one attesting witness, if an attesting witness is alive and subject to the process of the Court and capable of giving evidence. Will being a document has to be proved by primary evidence except when the Court permits a document to be proved by leading secondary evidence. 14. Will being a document has to be proved by primary evidence except when the Court permits a document to be proved by leading secondary evidence. 14. The burden of proof that the Will has been validly executed in terms of Section 63 of the Act of 1925 and is a genuine document is on the propounder. The propounder is further required to remove the suspicion by leading sufficient and cogent evidence, if there exists any. However, if a defence of fraud, coercion or undue influence is raised, the burden would be on the caveator. Subject to above, proof of a Will does not ordinarily differ from that of proving any other document. 15. The Supreme Court, in the case of H. Venkatachala Iyengar v. B. N. Thimmajamma & others, AIR 1959 SC 443 has dealt with the subject regarding the mode of proof of will elaborately which has been consistently relied upon by the Supreme Court in its subsequent pronouncements including Rama-chandra Rambux v. Champabai and others, AIR 1965 SC 354 and Smt. Jaswant Kaur v. Smt. Amrit Kaur and others, AIR 1977 SC 74 . The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the above cases, has summarized the position of law on the subject as under: 1. Stated generally, a Will has to be proved like any other document, the test to be applied being the usual test of the satisfaction of the prudent mind in such matters. As in the case of proof of other documents, so in the case of proof of Wills, one cannot insist on proof with mathematical certainty. 2. Since section 63 of the Succession Act, requires a Will to be attested, it cannot be used as evidence until, as required by Section 63 of the Evidence Act, one attesting witness at least has been called for the purpose of proving its execution, if there be an attesting witness alive and subject to the process of the Court and capable of giving evidence. 3. Unlike other documents, the Will speaks from the death of the testator and therefore the maker of the Will is never available for deposing as to the circumstances in which the Will came to be executed. This aspect introduces an element of solemnity in the decision of the question whether the document propounded is proved to be the last Will and testament of the testator. This aspect introduces an element of solemnity in the decision of the question whether the document propounded is proved to be the last Will and testament of the testator. Normally, the onus which lies on the propounder can be taken to be discharged on proof of the essential facts which go into the making of the Will. 4. Cases in which the execution of the Will is surrounded by suspicious circumstances stand on a different footing. A shaky signature, a feeble mind, an unfair and unjust disposition of property, the propounder himself taking leading part in the making of the Will under which he receives a substantial benefit and such other circumstances raise suspicion about the execution of the Will. That suspicion cannot be removed by the mere assertion of the propounder that the Will bears the signature of the testator or that the testator was in a sound and disposing state of mind and memory at the time when the Will was made, or that those like the wife and children of the testator who would normally receive their due share in his estate were disinherited because the testator might have had his own reasons for excluding them. The presence of suspicious circumstances makes the initial onus heavier and therefore, in cases where the circumstances attendant upon the execution of the Will excite the suspicion of the Court, the propounder must remove all legitimate suspicions before the document can be accepted as the last Will of the testator. 5. It is in connection with Wills, the execution of which is surrounded by suspicious circumstance that the test of satisfaction of the judicial conscience has been evolved. That test emphasises that in determining the question as to whether an instrument produced before the Court is the last Will of the testator, the Court is called upon to decide a solemn question and by reason of suspicious circumstances the Court has to be satisfied fully that the Will has been validly executed by the testator. 6. If a caveator alleges fraud, undue influence, coercion etc. in regard to the execution of the Will, such pleas, have to be proved by him, but even in the absence of such pleas, the very circumstances surrounding the execution of the Will may raise a doubt as to whether the testator was acting of his own free Will. 6. If a caveator alleges fraud, undue influence, coercion etc. in regard to the execution of the Will, such pleas, have to be proved by him, but even in the absence of such pleas, the very circumstances surrounding the execution of the Will may raise a doubt as to whether the testator was acting of his own free Will. And then it is a part of the initial onus of the propounder to remove all reasonable doubts in the matter. 16. The Supreme Court, in the case of Lalitaben Jayantilal Popat v. Pragnaben Jamnadas Kataria & Ors., 2009 AIR SCW 828: ( AIR 2009 SC 1389 ), has held in para - 16: Section 68 of the Act of 1872 gives a concession to those who want to prove and establish a Will in a Court of law by examining at least one attesting witness even though Will has to be attested at least by two witnesses mandatorily under Section 63(c) of the Act of 1925. But what is significant and to be noted is that that one attesting witness examined should be in a position to prove the execution of a Will. To put in other words, if one attesting witness can prove execution of the Will in terms of Clause (c) of Section 63, viz., attestation by two attesting witnesses in the manner contemplated therein, the examination of other attesting witness can be dispensed with. The one attesting witness examined, in his evidence, has to satisfy the attestation of a Will by him and the other attesting witness in order to prove there was due execution of the Will. 17. The Supreme Court, in the case of Bharpur Singh & Ors. v. Shamsher Singh, 2009 AIR SCW 1338 : ( AIR 2009 SC 1766 ), has held in para - 11 as under: 11. The legal principles in regard to proof of a Will are no longer res interga. A Will must be proved having regard to the provisions contained in clause (c) of Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 and Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, in terms whereof the propounder of a Will must prove its execution by examining one or more attesting witnesses. Where, however, the validity of the Will is challenged on the ground of fraud, coercion or undue influence, the burden of proof would be on the caveator. Where, however, the validity of the Will is challenged on the ground of fraud, coercion or undue influence, the burden of proof would be on the caveator. In a case where the Will is surrounded by suspicious circumstances, it would not be treated as the last testamentary disposition of the testator. 18. A Division Bench of Patna High Court, in the case of Dulhin Ful Kueri and another v. Moti Jharo Kuer, AIR 1972 Patna 214, has held in para-2 of its judgment: Signatures of witnesses at the end or somewhere on the instrument are sufficient to show, without any explanation, that the witnesses put their signatures by way of saying that they had seen the document being executed and had received an acknowledgment. It is not necessary for them to state on the document that they put their signatures in presence of the testator. 19. The Supreme Court in the case of Madhukar D. Shende v. Tarabai Aba Shedage, (2002) 2 SCC 85 : ( AIR 2002 SC 637 ) has held: the law of evidence does not permit the conjecture or suspicion having the place of legal proof nor permit them to demolish a fact otherwise proved by legal and convincing evidence. Well founded suspicion may be a ground for closer scrutiny of evidence but suspicion alone cannot form the foundation of a judicial verdict - positive or negative and observed in paragraphs 8 and 9 as under: 8. The requirement of proof of a Will is the same as any other document excepting that the evidence tendered in proof of a Will should additionally satisfy the requirement of Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 and Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. If after considering the matters before it, that is, the facts and circumstances as emanating from the material available on record of a given case, the Court either believes that the Will was duly executed by the testator or considers the existence of such fact so probable that any prudent person ought, under the circumstances of that particular case, to act upon the supposition that the Will was duly executed by the testator, then the factum of execution of Will shall be said to have been proved. The delicate structure of proof framed by a judicially trained mind cannot stand on weak foundation nor survive any inherent defects therein but at the same time ought not to be permitted to be demolished by wayward pelting of stones of suspicion and supposition by wayfarers and waylayers. What was told by Baron Alderson to the Jury in R. v. Hodge 1838, 2 Lewis CC 227 may be apposite to some extent: The mind was apt to take a pleasure in adapting circumstances to one another and even in straining them a little, if need be, to force them to form parts of one connected whole; and the more ingenuous the mind of the individual, the more likely was it, considering such matters, to overreach and mislead itself, to supply some little link that is wanting to take for granted some fact consistent with its previous theories and necessary to render them complete. The conscience of the Court has to be satisfied by the propounder of Will adducing evidence so as to dispel any suspicions or unnatural circumstances attaching to a Will provided that there is something unnatural or suspicious about the Will. The law of evidence does not permit conjecture or suspicion having the place of legal proof nor permit them to demolish a fact otherwise proved by legal and convincing evidence. Well founded suspicion may be a ground for closer scrutiny of evidence but suspicion alone cannot form the foundation of a judicial verdict positive or negative. 9. It is well-settled that one who propounds a Will must establish the competence of the testator to make the Will at the time when it was executed. The onus is discharged by the propounder adducing prima facie evidence proving the competence of the testator and execution of the Will in the manner contemplated by law. The contestant opposing the Will may bring material on record meeting such prima facie case in which event the onus would shift back on the propounder to satisfy the Court affirmatively that the testator did know well the contents of the Will and in sound disposing capacity executed the same. The factors, such as the Will being a natural one or being registered or executed in such circumstances and ambience, as would leave no room for suspicion, assume significance. The factors, such as the Will being a natural one or being registered or executed in such circumstances and ambience, as would leave no room for suspicion, assume significance. If there is nothing unnatural about the transaction and the evidence adduced satisfies the requirement of proving a Will, the Court would not return a finding of not proved merely on account of certain assumed suspicion or supposition. Who are the persons propounding and supporting a Will as against the person disputing the Will and the pleading of the parties would be relevant and of significance. 20. The plaintiff examined attesting witness - Umashankar Sahu (P.W.3). Umashankar Sahu, in his deposition para -3, has stated, the Will deed was executed in his presence. The Will was earlier read over by document writer - Subhraj to late Nandlal. After finding it proper, late Nandlal signed the Will in his presence. Thereafter, he and Sobhitram (the other attesting witness) have put their signatures over the Will deed as witnesses. Further, he has deposed in para -4, at the time of execution of the Will, late Nandlal was also mentally and physically fit and was in sound disposing state of mind (Vernacular matter omitted. Ed.). Thus, the Will deed has been duly proved by the attesting witness in accordance with the provisions contained in Section 63 (c) of Indian Succession Act, 1925 and Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. 21. The appellant has further not stated anything about the signature of Nandlal to be forged and fabricated. The only suspicion raised by the appellant in her testimony was that his father has not informed her about the execution of the Will, therefore, according to her, the Will is wrong. By the above piece of evidence adduced by the appellant/defendant No. 4 in the light of evidence of the attesting witness, it cannot be said that the appellant has proved the Will as forged and fabricated. 22. Admittedly, both the daughters including the appellant were married and are living separately in their matrimonial home. Vide applications dated 2-11-1988, they have relinquished their right in favour of their brother and mother. The filing of above applications is not much in dispute. 22. Admittedly, both the daughters including the appellant were married and are living separately in their matrimonial home. Vide applications dated 2-11-1988, they have relinquished their right in favour of their brother and mother. The filing of above applications is not much in dispute. From the Will itself, it appears, Nandlal was living with his son and grandsons but his son Ramsai was not taking his care, therefore, out of natural love and affection, he executed the Will in favour of his both grandsons with a condition that they Will look after his wife -Phoolkunwar and also perform their last rites. It is not the case of the appellant that they have not taken care of Phoolkunwar in her life time or that they have not performed their last rites. On the other hand, the widow of Nandlal supported the plaintiff’s case and also execution of the Will by her husband Nandlal in their favour. 23. P.W. 1 - Umashankar has clearly deposed in para - 4 that after death of his grandfather, the Will was in possession of his grandmother and when the property was mutated in the name of his father and grandmother, the Will was not shown to him by them. Therefore, it cannot be said that why non-disclosure of Will by the plaintiff at the time of mutation was not explained by him, particularly, in a case where at the time of mutation, i.e., on 8-9-1993, the plaintiff was minor and was aged about 14 years (please see Ex. P.1). 24. Sonsai (P.W.2), in his statement, nowhere has stated that Nandlal was not in fit condition at the time of execution of the Will. He has only stated that Nandlal was suffering from cough and fever and, in substance, has denied the suggestion put forth by the appellant that late Nandlal was not in disposing state of mind, therefore, the above contention raised by the appellants counsel is factually incorrect and has no bearing over the validity of the Will. 25. The law of evidence does not permit conjecture or suspicion having the place of legal proof nor permit them to demolish a fact otherwise proved by the legal and convincing evidence. 25. The law of evidence does not permit conjecture or suspicion having the place of legal proof nor permit them to demolish a fact otherwise proved by the legal and convincing evidence. Well founded suspicion may be a ground for closer scrutiny of evidence but suspicion alone cannot form the foundation of a judicial verdict - positive or negative, as held by the Supreme Court in the case of Madhukar D. Shende v. Tarabai Aba Shedage ( AIR 2002 SC 637 ) (supra). 26. Thus, the appellant utterly failed to establish the fact that Will is shrouded with the well founded suspicious circumstances and is also not duly proved in accordance with the law to hold the same as in valid. 27. In view of above, in my opinion, respondent No.1/plaintiff has fully discharged his burden to prove the Will as duly executed and is also not shrouded by well founded suspicious circumstances. On the other hand, the appellant failed to prove the Will as forged and fabricated. Therefore, the first appellate Court, after meeting the reasons assigned by the trial Court, has rightly reversed the finding regarding execution of Will by Nandlal on 13-4-1983 and has rightly decreed the plaintiffs suit. The substantial question of law is answered in plaintiffs favour. 28. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. 29. No order as to costs. 30. A decree be drawn accordingly. Appeal dismissed.