Judgment: 1. Rule, with the consent of the parties made returnable forthwith and heard. 2. The Writ Jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is invoked against the order dated 3-3-2009 passed by the Divisional Joint Registrar in Revision Applications Nos.140 of 2006 to 145 of 2006. The said Revision Applications arose out of the certificates issued under Section 101 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960. The said provision was invoked by the Respondent No.4 Credit Society in view of the alleged default committed by the Petitioners in repayment of the loans taken by them. 3. It is not necessary to go into unnecessary details considering the nature of the order that is to be passed. Amongst the grounds which have been urged in challenging the said order is the ground that the said order has been passed after more than one year after arguments were concluded. It seems that the arguments were concluded towards the end of the year 2007 and the order has been passed by the Revisional Authority on 3-3-2009. It is the contention of the Learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioners that in view of the long time lag between the hearing of the arguments and passing of the order, the order stands vitiated on the said ground. The Learned Counsel relies upon the Judgment of the Apex Court reported in 2001 (7) SCC 318 in the matter of Anil Rai Vs. State of Bihar. The Apex Court was concerned with the issue of delay in pronouncement of Judgments by the Courts. The Apex Court in paragraph 8 has observed that the pronouncement of Judgment in civil cases should not be permitted to go beyond two months. In the instant case, the Judgment has been pronounced after a period of almost more than a year. The impugned Judgment of the Revisional Authority is therefore not in keeping with the pronouncement of the Apex Court in Anil Rai’s case (supra). It is required to be noted that Rule 1 of Order 20 of the Civil Procedure Code postulates the period within which the Judgment in a Suit has to be pronounced, the said period should not be more than 60 days and that to in exceptional and extraordinary circumstances. It is required to be noted that Rule 1 of Order 20 of the Civil Procedure Code postulates the period within which the Judgment in a Suit has to be pronounced, the said period should not be more than 60 days and that to in exceptional and extraordinary circumstances. The Apex Courts observations in Anil Rai’s case in respect of civil cases were probably made on the basis of the period prescribed by Rule 1 of Order 20. Though stricto senso the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code may not be applicable to the proceedings before the Revisional Authority as contended by the Learned Counsel for the Respondent Nos.3 and 4 nevertheless the Judgment ought to be pronounced within a reasonable time, the period of more than a year by no stretch of imagination can be said to be a reasonable time within which the Judgment can be said to have been pronounced. The adverse effect of pronouncement of Judgments belatedly has been considered by the Apex Court from time to time and the said judgments have also been referred to in the Judgment in Anil Rai’s case (Supra). A useful reference could be made to the Judgment of the Apex Court reported in (1976) 3 SCC page 574 in the matter of R.C.SharmaVs. Union of India. Paragraph 12 of the said report is material and is reproduced herein under: “Nevertheless, we think that an unreasonable delay between hearing of arguments and delivery of a judgment unless explained by exceptional or extraordinary circumstances, is highly undesirable even when written arguments are submitted. It is not unlikely that some points which the litigant considers important may have escaped notice. But, what is more important is that litigants must have complete confidence in the results of litigation. This confidence tends to be shaken if there is excessive delay between hearing of arguments and delivery of judgments. Justice, as we have often observed, must not only be done but must manifestly appear to be done.” Reference could also be made to another Judgment of the Apex Court reported in (2000) 2 SCC 13 in the matter of BhagwandasFatechand Daswani Vs. H.P.A. International the Apex Court observed in paragraph 3 that “a long delay in delivery of the judgment gives rise to unnecessary speculation in the minds of parties to a case”. H.P.A. International the Apex Court observed in paragraph 3 that “a long delay in delivery of the judgment gives rise to unnecessary speculation in the minds of parties to a case”. It is noticed by this Court on numerous occasions that the authorities exercising powers under the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act are unduly delaying the pronouncement of Judgment after they have heard the matter. 4. In my view therefore, the authorities would be well advised to pronounce the Judgment immediately after the arguments have concluded so as to avoid giving rise to unnecessary speculation and complications. As indicated above, since in the instant case the Judgment has been delivered after more than a year, the same would have to be set aside on the said ground and the matter would have to be relegated back to the Revisional Authority for a de novo consideration of the above mentioned 5 Revision Applications. On remand the Revisional Authority to hear and decide the Revision Applications within a period of 3 months of the parties appearing before it, bearing in mind the observations made herein above. The parties to appear before the Revisional Authority on 11th February, 2013. It is made clear that the contentions of the parties are explicitly kept open to be urged before the Revisional Authority. The Revisional Authority to decide the Revisions on their own merits and in accordance with law by giving proper opportunity to the parties. It is further made clear that in view of the order of the Division Bench dated 1-2-2006, the accounts in question for the relevant period cannot be called in question by the Petitioners. 5. Rule is accordingly made absolute in the aforesaid terms with parties to bear their respective costs.