JUDGMENT Mr. A.N. Jindal, J.: - This order of mine shall dispose of the afore-mentioned seven revision petitions as the same have arisen out of the similar nature of facts and law. However, for the sake of convenience, the facts have been culled out from Civil Revision No. 1003 of 2012. 2. The precise question involved in the case is as to what is the status of a licencee? 3. The petitioner claiming himself to be in possession over the property in dispute for the last 30 years on monthly rental basis, filed a suit for declaration to the effect that the notice dated 7.10.2010 issued by the respondent-Municipal Council is without passing any resolution, illegal, void, no-nest and do not affect the rights of the petitioner. Alongwith the suit, the petitioner filed an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure for restraining the respondents from dispossessing him from suit property. 4. The suit is being contested by the respondents, wherein they pleaded that the property in dispute was given to the petitioner on teh bazari basis, and their licences have been revoked. Therefore, they could not stay over the property without the wish of the respondent-Committee and they could be evicted at any time after giving notice to that effect. 5. The trial court, after hearing learned counsel for the parties, granted injunction as prayed for. However, the first appellate court, while allowing the appeal, preferred by the respondents, set aside the order of the trial court, giving rise to these petitions. 6. Heard. 7. License is defined in Section 52 of the Easements Act, which reads as under:- “where one person grants to another, or to a definite number of other persons, a right to do, in or upon the immovable property of the grantor, something which would, in the absence of such right, be unlawful, and such right does not amount to an easement or an interest in the property, the right is called a license.” 8. On perusal of this provision, it transpires that the licence only makes an action lawful which without it would be unlawful but does not transfer any interest in favour of the licensee in respect of the property. 9. While distinguishing lease from licence, the Apex Court in The New Bus Stand Shop Owners Association Vs. On perusal of this provision, it transpires that the licence only makes an action lawful which without it would be unlawful but does not transfer any interest in favour of the licensee in respect of the property. 9. While distinguishing lease from licence, the Apex Court in The New Bus Stand Shop Owners Association Vs. Corporation of Kozhikode & Anr., [2010(1) Law Herald (SC) 366] : 2010 (1) Civil Court Cases, 294 (SC) also took the view that the difference between a tenancy and license is that, in case of tenancy an interest passes in the land, whereas, in a licence it does not pass an interest. The crucial test between the two is the nature of possession. If the occupier has been given exclusive possession, then he could be treated as a tenant or a tenant at will. It was observed in the case of Errington v. Errington and Woods, 1952 (1) K.B. 290, wherein Lord Denning in deciding the issue, whether an agreement is a lease or licence referred to the decision given by Chief Justice Vaughan in the seventeenth century in Thomas v. Sorrell (1673) Vaughan 351. In the said judgment, Chief Justice Vaughan outlined certain features of lease which are as follows:- “A dispensation or licence properly passeth no interest nor alters or transfers property in anything, but only makes an action lawful, which without it had been unlawful.” The difference between a tenancy and a licence is, therefore, that, in a tenancy, an interest passes in the land, whereas, in a licence, it does not. In distinguishing between them, a crucial test has sometimes been supposed to be whether the occupier has exclusive possession or not. If he was let into exclusive possession, he was said to be a tenant, albeit only a tenant at will (see Doe v. Chamberlaine and Lynes v. Snaith), whereas if he had not exclusive possession he was only a licensee.” [(Peakin v. Peakin) 1895 - 2 I.R. 359] 10. In The New Bus Stand Shop Owners Association’s case (supra), the Apex Court observed as under:- “In a rather recent judgment of this Court in the case of C.M. Beena and another Vs. P.N. Ramachandra Rao - 2004 (3) SCC 595 , the learned Judges relied on the ratio in Associated Hotels of India Ltd. (supra) in deciding the difference between lease and licence. P.N. Ramachandra Rao - 2004 (3) SCC 595 , the learned Judges relied on the ratio in Associated Hotels of India Ltd. (supra) in deciding the difference between lease and licence. In paragraph 8 of the said judgment, learned Judges held that difference between lease and the licence is to be determined by finding the real intention of the parties from a total reading of the document, if any, between the parties and also considering the surrounding circumstances. The learned Judges made it clear that use of terms “lease” or “licence”, “lessor” or “licencor”, “rent” or “licence fee” by themselves are not decisive. The conduct and intention of the parties before and after the creation of relationship is relevant to find out the intention. The learned Judges quoted from the treaties of Evans and Smith on “The Laws of Landlord and Tenant” and of Hill & Redman on “Law of Landlord and Tenant” in support of their proposition.” 11. In another judgment delivered in the case of Capt. B. V. D’Souza versus Antonio Fausto Fernandes 1989 HRR 655, it was also observed that if an interest in the property is created by the deed, it is lease but if the document only permits another person to make use of the property of which the legal possession continues with the owner, it is a license. 12. In the instant case also, no written document was prepared between the parties for creating any interest in the property and the receipts issued in favour of the petitioners clearly indicate that the amount was received as licence fee and the parties were well aware that no exclusive possession was given to them, but they were allowed to make use of the land by placing kiosks over the same and the legal possession was to continue with the owners. The petitioners also never asked for execution of any such document for creation of their rights over the property. Rather they made temporary structures that could be used temporarily till the same are removed. The temporary occupation and haphazard placement of kiosks cannot be allowed to continue in the larger interest of the society where only regulated and planned township is required. Rather they made temporary structures that could be used temporarily till the same are removed. The temporary occupation and haphazard placement of kiosks cannot be allowed to continue in the larger interest of the society where only regulated and planned township is required. In these days of planned and organized development, keeping in view the environmental and traffic pollution, the local bodies are duty bound to take necessary steps in order to save such occupations from being converted into slums. The licence has been duly cancelled by the Municipal Council and notices of removal were issued. 13. This Court had also taken cognizance of such temporary occupation by the occupants and took the view that such occupation can be treated as licencee creating no right in them. It being permissible use, the petitioners could not be allowed to remain in occupation against the interest and wishes of the society and they cannot seek any injunction. 14. Similar view was taken in the case of Municipal Council, Palwal Versus Lekh Raj and others, [2010(3) Law Herald (P&H) 2419] : 2010 (4) Civil Court Cases 712, wherein the this Court held as under:- “The Teh Bazari, is nothing but a licence to remain in occupation of the land on payment of requisite fee. It is not a tenancy as it is only permissible use. This Court in Pritam Kumar’s case (supra) has held to the following effect:- “5. I have duly considered the argument but regret my inability to accept it. It is not disputed that the plaintiffs were paying Rs. 60/- and Rs. 36/- per mensem respectively to the defendant as Teh Bazari which is evident from the receipts produced by them on the record. It has been settled by a Division Bench of this Court in Sardar Singh v. New Delhi Municipal Committee and another, 1966 P.L.R. 169 (Delhi Section) that where some sort of permission or licence is given by the Committee by accepting teh bazari fee it cannot be held that any legal right was granted. The licence is not of the nature which cannot be revoked. It is further held that bare licence without more was revocable at the Will and pleasure of the licensor. The licence is not of the nature which cannot be revoked. It is further held that bare licence without more was revocable at the Will and pleasure of the licensor. The learned Bench placed reliance on Administration Municipal Committee v. Milap Chand Lurinda Ram, AIR 1953 Punjab 260, wherein Kapur, J. (as he then was) held that when the permission was withdrawn, the licensee became a trespasser and the structure which was erected with permission on the public road became one without permission of the Committee in writing. It was also observed that the Committee could then remove that construction without any delay by resorting to the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 173 of the Punjab Municipal Act. Same view was taken by Goyal, J. in Smt. Geeta and another v. Ashok Kumar, 1982 P.L.R. 291. The learned Judge observed that the licensee after revocation of the licence would have no right to seek temporary or permanent injunction against the licensor restraining him from entering upon the property.” 16. The Full Bench of the Delhi High Court in Chandu Lal v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, AIR 1978 Delhi 174 : 1979(1) R.C.R. (Rent) 62 also elaborated about the status of the licencee. In that case the Delhi Municipal Corporation held an auction for the grant of licence of Kiosks and the petitioner was given the same in that auction. One of the terms of the auction was that the licence would be for 11 months in the first instance and thereafter for such term of renewal as may be mutually agreed from time to time. It was further mentioned that the licence was liable to be cancelled without assigning any reason and the Corporation was entitled to resume possession after revocation of the licence. The Municipal Corporation of Delhi cancelled the licence of the petitioner who instituted a suit for the grant of decree for permanent injunction restraining the Corporation for interfering, disturbing or dispossessing him from the Kiosks. He also filed an application for ad interim injunction. The Municipal Corporation of Delhi cancelled the licence of the petitioner who instituted a suit for the grant of decree for permanent injunction restraining the Corporation for interfering, disturbing or dispossessing him from the Kiosks. He also filed an application for ad interim injunction. The Full Bench, after considering the matter, observed thus : “Temporary injunction sought by the petitioners could be granted, if their case was covered by the three well-established principles, namely, (1) on making out a prima facie case, (2) on showing balance of convenience in their favour, in that the refusal of the injunction would cause greater inconvenience to them, and (3) whether on refusal of the injunction they would suffer irreparable loss. Granting an injunction is a matter of discretion and in its exercise the Court has to satisfy itself whether the petitioners have a triable case. Before invoking the jurisdiction of the Court to seek temporary injunction the petitioners are bound to show that they have a legal right and that there was an invasion of that right. They have failed to show a legal right. Facts and circumstances, on the contrary, prima facie show that the petitioners on the revocation of the licence are trespassers, there exists no justification for allowing them to continue perpetuating their unlawful act.” (emphasis supplied)” 17. The Full Bench in Chandu Lal’s case (supra) further observed as under:- “After the termination of the license, the licensor is entitled to deal with the property as he likes. This right he gets as an owner in possession of his property. He need not secure a decree at the Court to obtain this right. He is entitled to resist in defence of his property the attempts of a trespasser to come upon his property by exerting the necessary and reasonable force to expel a trespasser. If, however, the licensor uses excessive force, he may make himself liable to be punished under a prosecution, but he will infringe no right of the licensee.” 18. In Chandu Lal’s case (supra) also, the petitioners had placed kiosks on the land of the Municipal Council, Palwal. In view of the above fact, the Court had further observed that the petitioners being in occupation of the kiosks cannot be held in conclusive evidence of their being a lessee as the grant was not coupled with an interest in the property. In view of the above fact, the Court had further observed that the petitioners being in occupation of the kiosks cannot be held in conclusive evidence of their being a lessee as the grant was not coupled with an interest in the property. The principle once a licensee always a licensee applies proprio vigore in these cases. 19. This Court in a recent judgment delivered in Civil Revision No. 5892 of 2012 titled Bhagwanti Versus Municipal Council, Phagwara and another (decided on 8.10.2012), while elaborating in detail the status of a licencee and relying upon Pritam Kumar and another, Milap Chand Lurinda Ram, Smt. Geeta and another, and Sardar Singh’s cases (supra) observed as under:- 6. From the aforesaid cases, it emerges that in case of a licence,if the licensor revokes the licence, the licensee is left with no legal right in the property and is, therefore, not entitled to temporary or permanent injunction against the licensor. Sadhu Ram’s and Madan Mohan’s cases (supra) to which reference has been made by the learned counsel for the petitioners do not relate to the licensees. Thus, they are distinguishable and the ratio therein is not applicable to the facts of the present case.” 20. From the above discussion, it is apparent that the provisions of granting premises on licence by the public authorities have been enacted in order to avoid grabbing of the land by the occupants to whom, such premises are given. The granting of licence does not give the licencee any right to stay over it and he can stay on the wish of the public authorities and after the expiry of the period of licence, he becomes an unauthorized occupant and has to vacate the same. After all, the public interest at large has to be protected, lest the public properties are saved and not grabbed by its occupants with the connivance of the public persons, under the garb of licence. If the licencees are allowed to stay forever, then it may cause huge loss to the State exchequer. 21. As such, this Court declines to grant injunction in favour of the petitioners. 22. Consequently, these revision petitions are dismissed. ---------0.B.S.0------------