JUDGMENT : This appeal under Section 96, CPC has been filed by 8th and 9th defendants feeling aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 24-7-1995 passed by learned 3rd additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Sagar in Civil Suit No. 90-A/1991 thereby partly decreeing the suit of the plaintiffs. 2. The plaintiffs respondents, namely, Jeewanlal, Shaligram and Bhagwatibai have also filed cross-objections praying to decree the suit in toto. During the pendency of the suit second and third plaintiffs (respondents 2 and 3) have died. The respondents 2(a) to (d) are the L. Rs. of second respondent and they were brought on record on 30-9-2011 while the name of third respondent-plaintiff was deleted from the cause title as per order dated 15-4-2009. 3. A suit for declaration that the plaintiffs are the owner of the entire suit house, the description whereof has been given in para 3 of the plaint and further that defendants 1 to 7 are not having any right, title and interest in the suit house therefore, the sale-deed dated 22-12-1989 executed by them in favour of defendants 8 and 9 (appellants herein) is ineffective and by virtue of the said deed the defendants 8 and 9 did not acquire any right, title and interest in the suit property. The plaintiffs also claimed possession of the suit house from the defendants and they further sought a decree of permanent injunction that after delivering possession to the plaintiffs they shall not interfere in their possession. 4. Instead of writing the pleadings of the parties pleaded in the plaint and written-statement, since during the course of arguments learned counsel for the plaintiffs and defendants have agreed and admitted the family tree as well as the execution of certain documents which are being narrated hereinafter in this para, therefore, the pleadings of the parties are not being written here. The family tree which has been admitted by learned counsel for both the parties is mentioned and described as under : (Family tree Diagram is omitted...ed) 5. During the course of argument this has also been admitted by learned counsel for the parties that vide registered sale-deed dated 22-9-1934 (Ex. P-1) one Bhagwandas sold the entire suit house to Lalaram s/o Khoobchand and Narbada Prasad s/o Chhotelal Tiwari and they became joint owner of the entire suit house having half share each. During the course of argument this has also been admitted by learned counsel for the parties that vide registered sale-deed dated 22-9-1934 (Ex. P-1) one Bhagwandas sold the entire suit house to Lalaram s/o Khoobchand and Narbada Prasad s/o Chhotelal Tiwari and they became joint owner of the entire suit house having half share each. This is also admitted to learned counsel for the parties that on 2-7-1940 (Ex. P2C) Lalaram sold half portion (Northern side) to Bhari Dullaiya and that Northern portion was sold vide registered sale-deed dated 22-12-1989 by defendants 1 to 7 to defendants 8 and 9 (the appellants here in this appeal). The learned Trial Court decreed the suit partly holding that : (i) The plaintiffs No.1 and 3 namely, Jeevanlal and Bhagwati Bai respectively are the owners of 1/3 portion each of the ½ portion of the Northern side of the suit house; (ii) remaining ½ portion of the Northern side of the suit house is owned and possessed by defendants 1 to 7; (iii) the Southern portion of the suit house is owned and possessed by defendants 1 to 7; (iv) the sale-deed dated 22-12-1989 executed by the defendants 1 to 7 showing the owner of the entire suit property in favour of defendants 8 and 9 is declared to be illegal and contrary to the law; (v) the defendants 8 and 9 did not acquire the title of entire house on the basis of sale- deed dated 22-12-1989; (vi) because partition has not taken place between plaintiffs and defendants therefore, the plaintiffs are not entitle for a decree of possession and declaration and the suit of plaintiffs is hereby dismissed in this regard; (vii) the plaintiffs are not entitled to decree of injunction; (viii) the parties are directed to bear their own costs. Advocate’s fee Rs. 1,500/-, if precertified; (ix) The plaint map shall be the part of the decree. 6. Advocate’s fee Rs. 1,500/-, if precertified; (ix) The plaint map shall be the part of the decree. 6. The contention of Shri Ravish Agarwal, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants/defendants 8 and 9 who are the transferee pendente lite of defendants 1 to 7 is that as per the case of the defendants in their written statement, the first defendant Poonabai is the widow of Narbadaprasad and her second marriage was solemnised by her father-in-law Chhotelal Tiwari somewhere in between 1952-53 with Badriprasad who was the younger brother of his son-in-law and Devar (husband’s younger brother) of his daughter Badki because she became widow in very young age, even if she was not a Balvidhwa (child widow). But, as per the plaintiffs own case in paras 5 and 7 of their plaint, said Poonabai kept Badriprasad as her kept husband and from whom the children (defendants 2 to 5) were born. By inviting my attention to the evidence of the plaintiffs witnesses and particularly putting emphasis to the evidence of plaintiff No.3 Smt. Bhagwati Bai (PW-3) that in Brahmins there is no custom of widow marriage and she has deposed that Badriprasad was living with Poonabai as her kept husband and eight days before her marriage said Poonabai kept said Badriprasad as her kept husband. According to the learned senior counsel, since it is born out from her testimony that Saptpadi before the fire did not take place, therefore, according to the Hindu rites, custom and law it cannot be said that she was the legally wedded wife of Badriprasad. 7. By inviting my attention to Section 2 of the Hindu Widow’s Remarriage Act, 1856 (in short the Act of 1856 repealed on 1-9-1983) it is submitted by learned senior counsel that after remarriage of the widow all rights and interest which she was having in her deceased husband’s property, would cease and determine as if she had then died and therefore, since it is plaintiffs own case that there was no legal marriage between first defendant Poonabai and Badriprasad, therefore, under the law she is still a widow of Narbadaprasad and if that would be the position, since the suit house was purchased jointly by Lalaram and Narbadaprasad on 22-9-1939 and thereafter on 2-7-1940 (Ex. P2C) said Lalaram sold half portion (Northern side) to Bhari Dulaiya (mother-in-law of first defendant Poonabai), the remaining half portion (i.e. Southern side) upon the death of her husband Narbadaprasad she became the owner of the house in question because in the year 1939 when her husband Narbada-prasad died, the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act, 1937 (for short the Act of 1937) with all its amendment in the year 1938 was already in force. Thus, the first defendant Poonabai would get the share as if a son gets upon the death of his father. After the death of Bhari Dulaiya (mother of Narbadaprasad) in the year 1947 said Poonabai became absolute owner of half portion of the suit house because throughout she was possessing the entire suit house in her possession even on the date when the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (in short the Succession Act) came into force. Learned senior counsel has placed heavy reliance upon the Division Bench decision of this Court Damroolal Harchand and others v. Laxminarayan Ramanujdas Brijpuria and others, 1976 MPLJ 518 , and two decisions of Madras High Court Lakshmi Ammal and others v. Thangavel Asari, AIR 1953 Madras 977 and Thangavelu Asari (died) and others v. Lakshmi Ammal and others, AIR 1957 Madras 534 on the point that if the Saptadi has not taken place then the marriage is not a valid marriage. 8. Learned senior counsel further submits that because Bhari Dulaiya purchased the Northern portion of suit house from Lalaram on 2-7-1940 vide registered sale-deed (Ex. P-2) after her death in 1947 the succession of Northern portion of her suit house opened and Poonabai being daughter-in-law and a reversionist, closer to Bhari Dulaiya, therefore, she would become the owner of the house in question in comparison to other plaintiffs because the first plaintiff Jeevanlal is the sister’s son of Narbadaprasad and daughter’s son of Bhari Dulaiya while Bhagwati Bai is the sister’s daughter of Narbadaprasad and daughter’s daughter of Bhari Dulaiya. Hence, it has been prayed that by allowing this appeal the impugned judgment be set aside and the suit of plaintiffs may be dismissal in toto. 9. Hence, it has been prayed that by allowing this appeal the impugned judgment be set aside and the suit of plaintiffs may be dismissal in toto. 9. On the other hand, Shri Atulanand Awasthy, learned counsel for the plaintiffs argued in support of the impugned judgment and submitted that there is admission of first defendant Poonabai that she was a legally wedded wife of Badriprasad and therefore, as soon as she got married with him she would lose all her interest from the suit property under Section 2 of the Act of 1856. In support of his contention learned counsel has placed heavy reliance upon the decision of Supreme Court, Velamuri Venkata Siva-prasad (dead) by LRs v. Kothuri Venkateswarlu (dead) by LRs. and others, AIR 2000 SC 434 and submits that because it is obvious from defendants own case that first defendant Poonabai became unchaste in 1952-53, therefore, she had ceased all her rights in the suit property and hence it has been prayed that this appeal be dismissed and the cross objections filed by plaintiffs be allowed and the suit be decreed in toto. 10. Having heard learned counsel for the parties I am of the view that this appeal deserves to be allowed and the cross-objections deserves to be dismissed. 11. The main controversy which is to be decided by this Court is whether Poonabai (first defendant) solemnised a valid second marriage according to Hindu rites and custom with her second husband Badriprasad and became stranger to her nuptial property because it is borne out from the pleadings that she remarried with said Badriprasad somewhere in between 1952-53. 12. Looking to the admitted position and the family tree which I have narrated hereinabove, the first defendant Poonabai is the widow of Narbadprasad who had died in the year 1939 and Bhari Dulaiya is the mother of Narbadprasad, meaning thereby she was the mother-in-law of first defendant Poonabai. Admittedly, Bhari Dullaiya died in the year 1947. As per plaintiffs own case, the second marriage of Poonbai with Badriprasad was not a valid marriage and it would be condign to quote paras 5 and 7 of the plaint, which read, thus : (Vernacular matter omitted .....Ed.) Thus, it transpired from the pleading of the plaintiffs that Badriprasad was the kept husband of Poonabai which would mean that she did not solemnise a valid marriage according to Hindu rites and customs. 13. First plaintiff Jeewanlal s/o Lalaram was examined as PW-1. In his testimony (para-6) he has specifically stated in examination-in-chief that Poonabai was living with Badriprasad as her kept after 14-15 years of the death of her first husband Narbadaprasad. According to this witness, Badriprasad was living with Poonabai as her kept husband. In para -16 of his cross examination this witness has stated that in his presence Poonabai married to her first husband Narbadaprasad in the year 1938 and in the year 1939 he (Narbadaprasad) died on account of the disease of tuberculosis. At that juncture the age of first defendant Poonabai was in between 14-15 years. In para-19 of his cross-examination the suggestion put to him that after the death of Narbadaprasad because her widow was a Balwidhwa (child widow), therefore, her marriage was solemnised with Badriprasad. Thus, according to this witness said Badriprasad was the kept husband of first defendant Poonabai and the suggestion given to him that on account of her widowhood her second marriage was solemnised with Badriprasad, has been denied by this witness. 14. Another witness is plaintiff No.2 Shaligram Tiwari (PW-2) who is the husband of third plaintiff Bhagwatibai. This witness is the son-in-law of Badki, who was the daughter of Bhari Dulaiya. In cross-examination para-5 this witness in corroboration to the evidence of PW-1 has repeated the same version by saying that Poonabai kept Badriprasad as her kept husband and this occurred in between 1952-53. In para-8 of his cross-examination he has specifically admitted that since 1954 the name of first defendant Poonabai is recorded in the Municipal record as owner and it continued throughout and nobody tried to get it deleted or changed. He has further admitted that before Poonabai sold the suit house in favour of defendants 8 and 9 in the year 1989, her name as owner was recorded in the Municipal record. In para-14 of his cross-examination this witness has admitted that during lifetime of first husband Narbadaprasad, Poonabai did not solemnise any second marriage, but, after 14-15 years of the death of her first husband (Narbadaprasad), first defendant Poonabai kept Badriprasad. In para-15 he has admitted that Badriprasad also died in the year 1989. This witness has admitted that since 1953 the entire suit house is in possession of first defendant Poonabai. 15. The last witness of plaintiffs side is plaintiff No. 3 Bhagwatibai (PW-3). In para-15 he has admitted that Badriprasad also died in the year 1989. This witness has admitted that since 1953 the entire suit house is in possession of first defendant Poonabai. 15. The last witness of plaintiffs side is plaintiff No. 3 Bhagwatibai (PW-3). This witness is the daughter of Badki and is the wife of PW-2. This witness is the real sister of Poonabai’s first husband Narbadaprasad who died in the year 1939 and she is the daughter of Bhari Duliaya. According to this witness, her marriage has been solemnised 40 years ago (on 5-1-1995 the age of this witness has been mentioned in the deposition-sheet to be 60 years) which would mean that somewhere in the year 1955 her marriage was solemnised with PW-2. In para-1 of her examination-in-chief this witness is saying that when her age was 10-12 years, at that time, Narbadaprasad passed away. Her mother Bhari Dullaiya died earlier to her marriage. Needless to say, as admitted by learned counsel for the parties Narbadaprasad died somewhere in the year 1939. In examination-in-chief para-2 this witness is saying that in her marriage first defendant Poonabai was present. In cross-examination para-3 this witness has admitted that after her marriage she is seeing Poonabai’s possession over the suit house and since then Badriprasad was also living with Poonabai as her kept husband. Further she has admitted that Badri-prasad was a bachelor and he was not having any other wife. In cross-examination para-6 this witness has admitted that eight days before her marriage, Poonabai kept Badriprasad. Firmly she says that Poonabai never soleminsed a valid second marriage with Badriprasad and she only kept him. In very specific words this witness is saying that there was no Saptpadi in the marriage of Poonabai and Badriprasad. The suggestion put to her that legal marriage was solemnised by Poonabai with Badriprasad has also been emphatically denied by her. 16. Thus, the stand of the plaintiffs in the plaint (paras 5 and 7) which they have taken that valid second marriage of Poonabai was never solemnised with Badriprasad, has also been proved from their evidence. Very elaborately and specifically and in very clear terms plaintiff No.3 Bhagwatibai in her testimony has deposed that no Saptpadi in the second marriage of Poonabai with Badriprasad took place and Badriprasad was her kept husband. Very elaborately and specifically and in very clear terms plaintiff No.3 Bhagwatibai in her testimony has deposed that no Saptpadi in the second marriage of Poonabai with Badriprasad took place and Badriprasad was her kept husband. According to me, to constitute a valid marriage in Hindus two essential ceremonies are required. Firstly, invocation before the sacred fire and secondly Saptadi i.e. taking of seven steps by the bridegroom and the bride jointly before the sacred fire. The marriage becomes valid and complete when the seventh step is taken before the sacred fire and till then it is imperfect and revocable. In this regard it would be germane to quote para 434 of Mulla’s Hindu Law 21st Edition 2010 page 650: 434. Marriage ceremonies:(1) There are two ceremonies essential to the validity of marriage, whether the marriage be in the brahma form or the asura form, namely: (1) Invocation before the sacred fire: and (2) Saptapadi, i.e. the taking of seven steps by the bridegroom and the bride jointly before the sacred fire. The marriage becomes complete when the seventh step is taken, till then, it is imperfect and revocable. Consummation is not necessary to make a marriage complete and binding. To me, there is no deviation from this law if a remarriage of widow is taken place. In this regard, Section 6 of Act of 1856 is quite material and it would be fruitful to quote the said provision, which reads, thus : 6. Ceremonies constituting valid marriage to have same effect on widow’s marriage. Whatever words spoken, ceremonies performed or engagements made on the marriage of a Hindu female who has not been previously married, are sufficient to constitute a valid marriage, shall have the same effect if spoken, performed or made on the marriage of a Hindu widow; and no marriage shall be declared invalid on the ground that such words, ceremonies or engagements are inapplicable to the case of a widow. Hence, to constitute a valid marriage even of a widow, the performance of Saptadi before the sacred fire must be proved. 17. It is borne out from the evidence and it is proved that from 1952-53 first defendant Poonabai is possessing the entire suit house (Northern as well as Southern portion of the suit house) as owner. Hence, to constitute a valid marriage even of a widow, the performance of Saptadi before the sacred fire must be proved. 17. It is borne out from the evidence and it is proved that from 1952-53 first defendant Poonabai is possessing the entire suit house (Northern as well as Southern portion of the suit house) as owner. The plaintiffs own witnesses whose evidence I have already marshalled hereinabove, in singular voice are saying that Poonabai is possessing the suit property from 1952-53 and thereafter it has been sold to defendants 8 and 9 on 22-12-1989 and the possession of the house in question was also given to them. It has also been admitted by the plaintiffs witnesses (see the evidence of Shaligram Tiwari PW-2) that the name of first defendant Poonabai was also mutated as an owner in the Municipal record in the year 1954 and it is still continuing. According to me, in a suit based upon title for declaration and possession, the plaintiffs have to prove their own case and they cannot take any advantage of the weakness of the defence which has been taken by the defendants. In this context, it will be profitable to place reliance upon the decision of Privy Council Jagdish Narain v. Nawab Said Ahmed Khan, AIR 1946 Privy Council 59 as well as the decision of Supreme Court Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos and another v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius and others, AIR 1954 SC 526 . Thus, the plaintiffs cannot take the advantage of the defence of defendants that first defendant Poonabai solemnised a valid second marriage according to Hindu rites and custom or her second marriage was a lawful marriage. 18. So far as the argument of unchastity of Poonabai is concerned, once the husband’s estate is vested in her, which according to me, could only happen if she was chaste at the time of her husband’s death it will not be divested by unchastity after her husband’s death. In this regard, para 43(4)(ii) of Mulla’s Hindu Law 21st Edition, 2010 page 142 may be seen. It is borne out from the plaintiffs own case both from the pleadings as well as evidence that Poonabai was absolutely chaste till 1952-53 i.e. after more than 12 years of death of her first husband. In this regard, para 43(4)(ii) of Mulla’s Hindu Law 21st Edition, 2010 page 142 may be seen. It is borne out from the plaintiffs own case both from the pleadings as well as evidence that Poonabai was absolutely chaste till 1952-53 i.e. after more than 12 years of death of her first husband. It is also an admitted fact that her first husband Narbada-prasad died in the year 1939 i.e. after the enforcement of 1937 Act. Thus, the entire right of her husband Narbadaprasad after his death devolved in first defendant Poonabai. In this regard para 43(1-3) of Mulla’s Hindu Law 21st Edition, 2010 page 137 may be seen and I would like to quote the relevant provision: 43. Order of succession among sapindas. The sapindas succeed in the following order : (1-3) Son, grandson (son’s son) and great-grandson (son’s son’s son), and (after 14 April 1937) widow, predeceased son’s widow, and predeceased son’s predeceased son’s widow. A son, a grandson whose father is dead, and a great grandson whose father and grandfather are both dead, succeed simultaneously as single heir to the separate or self-acquired property of the deceased with rights of survivorship. 19. Admittedly in the year 1939 when Narbadaprasad died he was not having any son, grandson (son’s son) and great grandson (son’s son’s son), therefore, his widow, first defendant Poonabai, would succeed the right of Narbadaprasad in her on account of Section 3 of the Act of 1937 which came into force with effect from 14th April, 1937. In this regard para-43 of Mulla’s Hindu Law 21st Edition 2010 may be seen. Luminously on bare perusal of the said Section 3 of the Act of 1937 it is clear like a noon day that the widow will take own share as if a son gets. It is also proved that throughout till 22-12-1989 the first defendant Poonabai was possessing the house in question which would mean that on coming into force of Hindu Succession Act she would become absolute owner of the half property in the entire suit house which was owned by her husband Narbadaprasad in terms of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act. Therefore, according to me, if there is no heir in this sub-paras (1 to 3) then only the property of male Hindu would devolve and succeeded by other heirs which are mentioned in sub-para (5) to sub-para (23) of para 43 of Mulla’s Hindu Law 21st Edition, 2010. The mother of Narbadprasad i.e. Bhari Dulaiya would have succeeded the property of her son Narbadaprasad only if first defendant would not have been there. The decision of Supreme Court Velamuri Venkata Sivaprasad ( AIR 2000 SC 434 ) (supra) placed reliance by Shri Atulanand Awasthy, learned counsel for the respondents/plaintiffs is quite distinguishable. In this decision the Supreme Court held that even if a valid remarriage in terms of Section 6 of the Act of 1856 has not taken place, but, the widow of that case later on became unchaste, therefore, her right in the property of her deceased husband ceased and have been determined, but, the said decision is based on Madras Hindu (Bigamy, Prevention and Divorce) Act, 1949 (for brevity the 1949 Act) and the said decision was given by the Apex Court on the pretext that since the said Act of 1949 being penal in nature was especially introduced in the Statute Book to provide right of divorce on certain grounds as mentioned therein, therefore, the statutory prohibition cannot be treated to be in aid of conferment of right, since the Act of 1949 is not a conferring Statute but it is a prohibitory Statute. However, the said Act of 1949 is not applicable in Madhya Pradesh since the disputed property is situated in Sagar which is a part of State of M. P. and therefore, according to me the said decision will not be helpful to the plaintiffs. According to me, the succession never remains in abeyance and it passes and devolves in the successors as soon as a person dies. Because at the time of the death of Narbada Prasad his widow, first defendant Poonabai was alive. The moment from his death his right in the suit house devolved in his widow Poonabai because he died in the year 1939 i.e. after the commencement of the Act of 1937. 20. I shall now examine how the property (northen portion of the suit house) would be succeeded upon the death of Bhari Dulaiya. The moment from his death his right in the suit house devolved in his widow Poonabai because he died in the year 1939 i.e. after the commencement of the Act of 1937. 20. I shall now examine how the property (northen portion of the suit house) would be succeeded upon the death of Bhari Dulaiya. At the time of purchasing the remaining half portion of the suit house by Bhari Dulaiya vide registered sale-deed (Ex. P-2) on 2-7-1940 her husband Chhotelal Tiwari was alive. Indeed, it is nobody’s case that from the income of Chhotelal Tiwari half portion of the suit house was purchased in the name of Bhari Dulaiya from Lalaram on 2-7-1940 and thus, for all practical purpose it would be deemed that from her Stridhan Bhari Dulaiya purchased half portion of the suit house from Lalaram. According to me, the Stridhan of a woman who is governed by Mitakshra School of Hindu Law has been defined by Vijnaneshwara in Mitakshara School of Hindu Law and according to the said School the property which is given by the father, by the mother, by the husband, or by a brother: and that which was presented by the maternal uncles and the rest at the time of wedding before the nuptial fire; and a gift at a second marriage or gratuity on account of supersession; and the property obtained by : (I) inheritance; (II) purchase; (III) partition; (IV) seizure, eg, adverse possession, and (V) finding; is Stridhan of a woman according to the Manu (see para-115 of Mulla’s 21st Edition 2010 page 219). According to me, if a property is purchased by a woman from her Stridhan and savings of Stridhan it would constitute her Stridhan according to all the Schools of Hindu Law (see para 134 of Mulla’s Hindu Law 21st Edition, 2010). Admittedly, the Northern portion of the suit property was purchased by Bhari Dullaiya vide registered sale-deed dated 2-7-1940 (Ex. P-2) from her son-in-law Lalaram and therefore, for all practical purpose it shall be deemed to be her Stridhan and this is what para 115(3) of Mulla’s Hindu Law says which I have quoted hereinabove. The property which is obtained by a woman as her Stridhan also includes seizure, eg. adverse possession. P-2) from her son-in-law Lalaram and therefore, for all practical purpose it shall be deemed to be her Stridhan and this is what para 115(3) of Mulla’s Hindu Law says which I have quoted hereinabove. The property which is obtained by a woman as her Stridhan also includes seizure, eg. adverse possession. Indeed, on this point there is a direct decision of a Division Bench of Madhya Bharat High Court Bheron Singh Bonder Singh v. Ramchandra Bai w/o Mohan Singh and another, AIR 1957 Madhya Bharat 138 where in para-8 it has been held that if the property acquired by a Hindu widow by adverse possession of which property she held possession in her own right and dealt with it as she liked for over 12 years, becomes her Stridhan and she is at liberty to dispose of it by will or gift. I would also like to quote para-8 wherein aforesaid principle has been laid down: 8. The conclusion at which I arrive after considering all the authorities cited is that property acquired by a Hindu widow by adverse possession of which property she held possession in her own right and dealt with it as she liked for over twelve years, becomes her Stridhan and she is at liberty to dispose of it by will or gift. 21. I shall now examine the rule of succession how the Stridhan of a married woman (in the present case Bhari Dulaiya) would succeed into her heirs. In this regard, I may say that according to Mitakshara Hindu Law Stridhan divides into two parts namely Shukla and other kinds of Stridhan. The Shukla means gratuity which a girl is given in marriage. In this regard, para 147 of Mulla’s Hindu Law 21st Edition, 2010 page 236 given under the heading succession to stridhan according to Mitakshara may be seen. The present case is not coming within the ambit and sweep of Shukla which is a gratuity meaning thereby cash and ornaments etc. given to a girl at the time of her marriage, but certainly the case would come within the ambit and scope of other kinds of Stridhan and in this context para 147(2) of Mullas Hindu Law, 21st Edition, 2010 may be seen and according to which the Stridhan of a married woman would devolve in the following manner: (i) unmarried daughter; she takes before a married daughter. The rule applies to Jains in the absence of a special custom; (ii) married daughter who is unprovided for, (iii) married daughter who is provided for, (iv) daughter’s daughter; (v) daughter’s son; (vi) son; (vii) son’s son. On this point, I may profitably place reliance upon the two decisions of Madras High Court in Salemma v. Lutchmana Reddi and another, (1898) XXI Madras 100 wherein it was held that the property belonged to the deceased woman as her Stridhan is descendible to her heirs and (without deciding what control, if any, defendant had over the property) it would be succeeded in them according to law of inheritance applicable to such property. Similarly, in another decision Subramanian Chetti and others v. Arunachelam Chetti and others, (1905) XXVIII Madras 1 it has been held that savings or property purchased out of the savings by widow out of the money awarded to her by decree as maintenance is her Stridhan and it can be devolvd on daughter and on daughter’s daughter. 22. The order of succession is different in different schools of Hindu Law, but, in none of the schools the daughter-in-law of the predeceased son gets any right. However, one important fact which cannot be marginalised and blinked away is that Bhari Dulaiya died in the year 1947 and thereafter till the date of filing of the suit which is 5-2-1990 no suit for partition asking separate possession of respective share has been filed either by the daughters Badki and Halki of Bhari Dulaiya nor by the present plaintiffs by impleading each coparcener as party. This Court does not know how many copraceners are there and apart from plaintiffs and defendants 1 to 7 whether there are other coparceners also or not. Even today, the instant suit is not filed for partition impleadings all the coparceners as party to the suit. This Court does not know how many copraceners are there and apart from plaintiffs and defendants 1 to 7 whether there are other coparceners also or not. Even today, the instant suit is not filed for partition impleadings all the coparceners as party to the suit. The present suit is only for declaration that first defendants 1 to 7 are not having any right, title and interest in the suit property and therefore, sale-deed executed by them on 22-12-1989 in favour of defendants 8 and 9 (appellants) is ineffective and by the said sale- deed the defendants 8 and 9 (appellants) did not get any right to have possession of the suit house and by seeking further relief of permanent injunction that after delivering the possession the defendants 8 and 9 (appellants) should not interfere in the possession of the plaintiffs. There is firm evidence of all three plaintiffs that first defendant Poonabai was possessing the suit property as owner from 1952-53 till she along with defendants 2 to 7 sold it on 22-12-1989 to the defendants 8 and 9 and delivered possession to them. It has also been admitted by the plaintiff No.2 Shaligram who was examined as PW-2 that since 1954 the name of Poonabai as owner of the suit property is continuing and plaintiffs never tried to get it deleted or changed. Thus, it appears that from 1952 to 1953 first defendant Poonabai as well as defendants 2 to 7 who are her children were possessing the suit property as owner in the eyes of plaintiffs till it was sold out by delivering possession to defendants 8 and 9 on 22-12-1989. Therefore, according to me, the plaintiffs are not entitled for any relief prayed by them in the plaint and therefore, the suit deserves to be dismissed and the cross-objections filed on behalf of the respondents/ plaintiffs also deserve to be dismissed. 23. For the reasons stated hereinabove, the appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. The impugned judgment decreeing the suit of plaintiffs partly, that part of the judgment and decree is hereby set aside and plaintiffs suit is hereby dismissed. The cross-objections are dismissed. The parties are hereby directed to bear their own costs. Appeal allowed.