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2013 DIGILAW 2592 (BOM)

Suresh v. Baburao s/o Janbaji Bambhal (dead). LRs

2013-12-16

S.B.SHUKRE

body2013
Judgment 1. The appellants No.1 to 8 are the legal heirs of original defendant No.1, deceased Gadibabu and appellant No.9 is the original defendant No.2. Original respondent No.1 Smt. Nagabai wd/o Janbaji Bhambal (deleted) and original respondent No.2 deceased Baburao s/o Janbaji Bhambal (through legal heirs) are the original plaintiffs No.1 and 2. For the sake of convenience, parties to the appeal are hereinafter referred to as plaintiffs and defendants in the order in which they were arrayed in the suit. 2. Plaintiffs had filed a suit for partition, separate possession and damages against the defendants. It was their case that plaintiff No.1 was the mother of plaintiff No.2 and Janbaji, the husband of plaintiff No.1 and father of plaintiff No.2, was the younger brother of defendant No.1. Defendant No.2 was the son of defendant No.1. Janbaji and Gadibabu (defendant No.1 were the sons of Bagaji Bhambal. They had inherited a land and one house situated at Mouza Katol. These properties and other acquisitions have been particularly described in Schedule-A and Schedule-B to the plaint. 3. According to the plaintiffs, two brothers Janbaji and Gadibabu were joint in estate, residence and earning. Janbaji died on 05.02.1979 at Katol, leaving behind him the plaintiffs who inherited undivided interest of Janbaji in the joint Hindu family properties as mentioned in the schedules annexed to the plaint. They submitted that till the death of Janbaji, there was no partition of joint family and he was living at Katol in ancestral house along with defendant No.1. They submitted that Janbaji, being the younger brother of defendant No.1, focused his attention only on agriculture and defendant No.1 being educated, looked after outwardly business of the joint family and other family affairs. They submitted that there was an agricultural field bearing Survey No.250, area 8.27 acres, inherited by the family of said two brothers. It was sold by the brothers to one Kisan Domaji Shimpi vide registered sale deed for a valuable consideration. They submitted that in the sale deed, name of one Zunya s/o Bagaji Dhangar has been shown as executant of the sale deed though, it was not necessary to do so, as he was not the son of Bagaji Bhambal but one Janaji Bobde, the first husband of Kalawati, with whom Bagaji Bhambal had performed a marriage. They submitted that in the sale deed, name of one Zunya s/o Bagaji Dhangar has been shown as executant of the sale deed though, it was not necessary to do so, as he was not the son of Bagaji Bhambal but one Janaji Bobde, the first husband of Kalawati, with whom Bagaji Bhambal had performed a marriage. They submitted that Thakubai was the first wife of Bagaji Bhambal and since she did not bear any children, Bagaji Bhambal, after the death of husband of Kalawati, married with her under the Gandharva form of marriage and this Kalawati, then brought her two sons from her first marriage namely Zunya and Sadya with her and since that time they were residing with Bagaji Bhambal. Thye submitted that Zunya had no right, title or interest in the property of Bagaji Bhambal and therefore, it was not necessary to show him as executant of the sale deed by which the ancestral property, field Survey No.250, was sold away in the year 1946. 4. The plaintiffs further submitted that Bagaji Bhambal died in the year 1920 and some years later on, agricultural field bearing Survey Nos.82, 71, 74, 75 and 77 (70), together admeasuring about 19.09 acres, came to be purchased by Gadibabu (defendant No.1) and Janbaji vide registered sale dated 09.04.1943 for a valuable consideration of Rs.2600/. According to plaintiffs, this property was purchased by the family with the aid and help of the funds, received and derived from the joint family property and/or joint family earnings. They further submitted that since the defendant No.1 was the Karta of the joint Hindu family, he purchased one more field bearing Survey No.81 admeasuring 11.72 acres with the help of joint family earnings by registered sale deed dated 23.06.1947 in the name of defendant No.2, who was then minor. This agricultural field was also purchased by defendant No.1 with the help of joint family funds of the parties to the suit and therefore, this property was a joint family property of the parties to the suit. Thy further submitted that there was also ancestral house situated at Mouza Peth Budhwar, Katol recorded in the name of defendant No.1 and Janbaji. Thy further submitted that there was also ancestral house situated at Mouza Peth Budhwar, Katol recorded in the name of defendant No.1 and Janbaji. The plaintiffs thus, submitted that these properties comprising agricultural fields as described in Schedule-A to the plaint and house property as described in Schedule-B to the plaint, being joint family properties and the plaintiffs being the Class-I heirs of the deceased Janbaji, brother of defendant No.1, were entitled to claim half share in the whole property. They also claimed that there were some cattle as described in Schedule-B which were also of the joint family in which the plaintiffs had their half share. 5. The plaintiffs submitted that after the death of Janbaji, they had requested defendant No.1 orally to effect the partition of the said moveable and immoveable of joint family properties, but to no effect. They also claimed that they had sent registered notice to the defendants asking for partition and separate possession, but in vain. They further submitted that the agricultural fields were earning good income as the defendants had planted 1000 Orange trees which were giving good yield every year. The plaintiffs therefore, contended that the defendant No.1, being in exclusive possession and management of the properties, was liable to render account of the income of the joint family and to give half share to the plaintiffs in the net profits earned from the agricultural field. Accordingly, the plaintiffs filed a suit for partition, separate possession and damages from the defendants. 6. The defendant No.1 resisted the suit and denied that the suit properties as described in Schedule-A and Schedule-B, excepting the house property, were ancestral properties. He submit that in the year 1946, after the death of Bagaji, the only agricultural field left behind by Bagaji was sold by Janbaji, Gadibabu, and Zunya for a consideration of Rs.1000/-. He submitted that out of this consideration, an amount of Rs.400/- was paid to Janbaji, while defendant No.1 and Zunya received Rs.300/- each. He submitted that after the sale of the agricultural field bearing Survey No.250 in 1946, the only property that remained with the joint family was a single storeyed house situated at Peth Budhwar, Katol. He denied that Janbaji and he himself resided together till 1930. He submitted that after the sale of the agricultural field bearing Survey No.250 in 1946, the only property that remained with the joint family was a single storeyed house situated at Peth Budhwar, Katol. He denied that Janbaji and he himself resided together till 1930. He submitted that in the year 1930, Janbaji separated and along with his wife Nagabai went to reside in the house Bhimabai in Peth Budhwar, Katol and since then, he was never joint in estate, residence and earnings with Janbaji. He admitted that Janbaji died in the year 1979 while Bagaji died in the year 1920. According to defendant No.1, except for the half share of the plaintiffs in the house property left behind by Bagaji, plaintiffs had no right, title or, interest in the rest of the property, they being the self-acquired properties of defendant No.1. He denied that field Survey Nos.82, 71, 74, 75 and 77 (70) were purchased by Janbaji and he himself with the aid of joint family funds. He submitted that the entire consideration was paid by him alone and name of Janbaji was shown as a co-purchaser out of love and affection for younger brother and also to upgrade the position of the younger brother so that his son could get a suitable match in marriage. According to him, the purchase of these fields by registered sale deed in the year 1943 in the joint names of himself and Janbaji was, so far as Janbaji was concerned, a benami transaction. He submitted that he worked as a Clerk and then as a Head Clerk in a company at Katol and had independent source of earning. He submit that agricultural field bearing Survey No.81 was purchased by him from his own funds and denied that it was purchased from out of joint family income. He also denied that the cattle were a joint family property. Thus, except for the ancestral house, all the properties as mentioned in Schedule-A and B, were denied by defendant No.1 to be the joint family properties. He therefore, denied that the plaintiffs were entitled to claim partition and separate possession in these properties except in the ancestral house property. He also denied that plaintiffs were entitled for a money decree for damages as claimed by them in Schedule-C of the plaint. 7. Defendant No.2 adopted the written statement filed by the defendant No.1. 8. He therefore, denied that the plaintiffs were entitled to claim partition and separate possession in these properties except in the ancestral house property. He also denied that plaintiffs were entitled for a money decree for damages as claimed by them in Schedule-C of the plaint. 7. Defendant No.2 adopted the written statement filed by the defendant No.1. 8. The trial court framed issues, recorded evidence adduced by the parties and considering the same and arguments advanced on behalf of the rival parties, the trial court partly decreed the suit declaring that the plaintiffs were entitled for partition and separate possession of their half share in the suit properties mentioned in Schedules-A and B to the plaint and directed the plaintiffs to be put in possession of the same by the defendants. The trial court however, rejected the claim of the plaintiffs for damages of Rs.19,500/-. This judgment and decree was delivered by the trial court on 21.01.1992. The defendants challenged the same before the Additional District Judge, Nagpur by filing Regular Civil Appeal No.190/1992. During the course of argument, it was conceded that the agricultural fields bearing Survey No. 82, 71, 74, 75 and 77 (70) were joint family properties and that there was also no evidence to show that cattle were belonging to the joint family of Janbaji and defendant No.1. Thus, the argument were restricted to only filed Survey No.81 and it was found that it was not proved by the defendants that it was a self acquired property of defendant No.1. Accordingly, the first appeal was partly allowed and judgment and decree of the trial court only to the extent of direction that plaintiffs be put in possession of half of the cattle mentioned in Schedule-B was set aside and rest of the judgment and decree of the trial court was maintained. The judgment and decree in this regard was passed by the First Appellate Court on 28.11.1997. Not satisfied with the same, the appellants are now before this Court in the Second Appeal. 9. This appeal came to be admitted by this Court on 08.07.1998, upon substantial questions of law as carved out in grounds No.1 to 3, of the grounds of appeal. Not satisfied with the same, the appellants are now before this Court in the Second Appeal. 9. This appeal came to be admitted by this Court on 08.07.1998, upon substantial questions of law as carved out in grounds No.1 to 3, of the grounds of appeal. The substantial questions of law as disclosed by grounds No.1 to 3 can be stated as follows: (i) Whether the First Appellate Court could, in law, draw a presumption under the provision of Section 114 of the Evidence Act as to the jointness of the family, when there was no evidence at all to the effect that the defendant no.1 was the Karta of the alleged joint family? (ii) Whether a female family member could claim herself to be a Karta of the joint family, when there was a male member in the alleged joint family? (iii) Whether, before decreeing the claim for partition of the suit property, the courts below ought to have considered as to whether there was pleading and proof of existence of co-parcenary at the instance of the respondents-plaintiffs? 10. I have heard Shri Masood Shareef, learned counsel for the appellants (defendants) and I have carefully gone through the paper book of the appeal and record of the trial court. None appeared for the respondents (plaintiffs), through duly served. 11. Considering the pleadings and evidence on record, I think it appropriate to deal with second substantial question of law formulated in relation to a female member claiming herself to be a Karta of the joint family in face of a male member present in the joint family. Upon perusal of the pleadings of the parties and evidence available on record, I find that it is no body's case that respondent No.1 (plaintiff no.1) had claimed herself as or had a right to claim as a Karta of the joint family. The judgments of both the courts below do not refer to any such aspect of the case, there being none. Therefore, I find that no substantial question of law on this issue is involved in the case and therefore, the second substantial question of law has to be answered in the terms that this appeal does not give rise to any such question of law. 12. Therefore, I find that no substantial question of law on this issue is involved in the case and therefore, the second substantial question of law has to be answered in the terms that this appeal does not give rise to any such question of law. 12. Although in this appeal the defendants have prayed for setting aside of the decrees of the courts below and dismissal of the suit in it's entirety, during the course of argument, learned counsel for the appellants-defendants confined himself to only one of the suit lands, bearing Survey No.81, purchased in the name of defendant No.2 Vasanta on 23.06.1947, by virtue of registered sale deed vide Exh.72 to say that this field was in no way a part of the joint family property and was self acquired property of the defendants, having been purchased from the own funds of defendant No.1. He submits that the courts below have committed a serious error of law in drawing presumption of the jointness of the family even when there was no proof that defendant No.1 was the Karta of the family. He submits that when no evidence was brought on record to prove that defendant No.1 was the Karta of the family, courts below could not have drawn the presumption under the provisions of Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 as to the jointness of the family. He further submits, the courts below, by drawing such a presumption erroneously, have reached a wrong conclusion that said agricultural field was of the joint family. 13. Under Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 the Court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened. While drawing such a presumption, the Court is under a duty to take into account common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case. What could be the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business would depend on facts and circumstances of each case and it would not be possible to close-set them in a formula of universal application. What could be the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business would depend on facts and circumstances of each case and it would not be possible to close-set them in a formula of universal application. All that is required for drawing an inference under Section 114, is, court must ascertain common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business in the context of facts of that case and find out how do they help in inferring existence of one fact on the basis of another set of facts. This can be best seen from the illustrations to Section 114. 14. In this case, it is seen from the evidence available on record that the plaintiffs have proved their case that defendant No.1 was the Karta of the family till death of Janbaji in the year 1979. Plaintiff No.1 Smt. Nagabai (Exh.59) has stated that defendant No.1 was the Karta of the family and while her husband Janbaji used to cultivate the suit land, defendant No.1 used to sell agricultural produce. There is nothing in her cross-examination to disbelieve her such version. In fact, her such version is corroborated by documentary evidence available on record. There is an extract of record of rights vide Exh.67 which shows that as per the revenue settlement of the year 1954-1955, defendant No.1 is the Karta of the joint family of Janbaji and defendant No.1. The 7/12 extracts vide Exh.63 to 65 also disclose that the suit lands stood in the joint names of defendant No.1 and Janbaji as owners thereof. 15. As against said evidence of plaintiffs, defendant No.1 Gadibabu (Exh.78) in his evidence has stated that Janbaji had separated from his family in the year 1930 itself and till his death, he remained separated from his family. He has asserted that he was not the Karta of the joint family. This oral testimony of defendant No.1 is hard to believe as it is not consistent with the documentary evidence produced on record by the parties. He has not explained as to how his name has been shown as Karta of the joint family in the extract of record of rights vide Exh.67. This oral testimony of defendant No.1 is hard to believe as it is not consistent with the documentary evidence produced on record by the parties. He has not explained as to how his name has been shown as Karta of the joint family in the extract of record of rights vide Exh.67. If, it is to be believed that in 1930 itself Janbaji had started residing separately with one Bhimabai, as stated by defendant No.1, there was no reason for defendant No.1 to purchase lands bearing Survey Nos.82, 71, 74, 75 and 77 (70) in joint names of himself and Janbaji 13 years thereafter or to be precise, on 09.04.1943. He submits in his written statement that it was done by him out of love and affection for Janbaji and to save the family honour and in the hope that Janbaji would see reason and return to family fold leaving Bhimibai with whom he had started residing since the year 1930, leaving his own wife, the plaintiff No.1. But, no evidence has been brought on record by defendants to prove these averments. In fact, the defendants have conceded to the fact that they have no evidence to show that these lands were not the joint family properties. Therefore, the fact that in the year 1943 suits lands were purchased jointly in the names of defendant No.1 and Janbaji only corroborated the version of plaintiff No.1 that defendant No.1 was the Karta of the joint family and her such version appears to be more probable than the version of defendant No.1 that he was not the Karta of the joint family. 16. Thus, upon consideration of evidence of both sides, it can be safely said that the plaintiffs have established their case by brining on record cogent evidence that defendant No.1 was the Karta of the family. Once, it is proved that defendant No.1 was the Karta of the family, then there would be no difficulty in drawing the presumption of the jointness of the family of defendant No.1 and Janbaji by resorting to the provision of Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The reason is that ordinary human conduct and common course of natural events would tell us that a family would not have a head or Karta unless the members of the family intend to stay joint and manage their family affairs jointly. The reason is that ordinary human conduct and common course of natural events would tell us that a family would not have a head or Karta unless the members of the family intend to stay joint and manage their family affairs jointly. For smooth management of the affairs of a joint family, appointment of a Karta or head or professing by one of it's members to be Karta or head would come as a common course of natural events, some thing that occurs commonly and according to human conduct in similar set of facts. Therefore, I find that there has been proof brought on record by the plaintiffs that defendant No.1 was the Karta of the joint family of defendant No.1 and Janbaji till the death of Janbaji in the year 1979 and no error of law has been committed by both the courts below in drawing presumption of jointness of the family by applying the principles contained in Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. I find no merit in the argument of learned counsel for the appellants-defendants in this behalf. The first substantial question of law is answered accordingly. 17. Shri Masood Shareef, learned counsel for the appellants-defendants has submitted that even when there is a Hindu joint family, there is no presumption in law that merely because it is joint, it possess joint property. He submits that the burden of proving that any particular property is of joint family, is, therefore, in the first instance upon the person who claims it to be so and even when it is proved that there is a coparcenary property, any subsequent acquisition made by members of the joint family could not be held to be also the joint family property unless it is proved or admitted that the joint family possess sufficient nucleus to enable it to make new acquisition from out of the same. He submits that in this case there has been neither any pleading that there is a coparcenary property nor any proof that field Survey No.81 is the coparcenary property and therefore, the courts below ought not to have decreed the suit of plaintiffs in respect of this particular property. He submits that in this case there has been neither any pleading that there is a coparcenary property nor any proof that field Survey No.81 is the coparcenary property and therefore, the courts below ought not to have decreed the suit of plaintiffs in respect of this particular property. He also submits that plaintiffs have not established that there was any nucleus of the joint family and thus failed to discharge their initial burden and as such courts below have committed a serious error in shifting the burden of proving field Survey No.81 as self acquired property upon the defendants. He further submits that courts below should not have relied upon the so called contradictions between evidence of D.W.1–Gadibabu (Exh.78) and D.W. 2 – Vasanta (Exh.80). According to him, when the initial burden has not been discharged by the plaintiffs, weakness of the case of the defendants or their failure to prove that field Survey No.81 was their self-acquired property, was inconsequential. In support, he has placed reliance upon the following cases: (i) Mudigowda Gowdappa Sankh and others v. Ramchandra Revgowda Sankh (dead) by his LRs. and another, A.I.R. 1969 SC 1076. (ii) Rangamal v. Kuppuswami and another, (2011)12 SCC 220 . (iii) Makhan Singh (D) by LRs. vs. Kulwant Singh, AIR 2007 SC 1808 . (iv) D.S. Lakshmaiah and another v. L. Balasubramanyam and another, AIR 2003 SC 3800 . 18. So far as concerned the argument that plaintiffs have not pleaded any where about existence of coparcenary property. I must say, learned counsel for the appellants-defendants is not right in saying so. There have been clear pleadings made by the plaintiffs that the agricultural lands were the properties of the joint family of defendant No.1 and Janbaji. However, as regards the proof of these lands, rather only one land bearing Survey No.81, given the narrowing down of controversy to only this land, being a part of the joint family properties, it would be necessary to examine the evidence in the light of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the afore-stated cases cited by the learned counsel for the appellants-defendants. Before scrutinizing the evidence, let us see what principles of law are enumerated in these cases. 19. Before scrutinizing the evidence, let us see what principles of law are enumerated in these cases. 19. In the case of Mudigowda (supra) the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court is that the burden of proving that any particular property is joint family property, is in the first instance, upon the person who claims it as a coparcenary property. The Hon'ble Apex Court has further laid down that if the possession of a nucleus of the joint family property is either admitted or proved, any acquisition made by a member of the joint family is presumed to be the joint family property, provided the nucleus is shown to be adequate so as to make possible the purchase of the new property from that nucleus (paragraph 6). 20. In the case of Rangamal (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that when initial onus is upon the plaintiff to positively establish his case on the basis of material available and it is not discharged, no reliance upon the weakness or absence of defence of the defendant can be made so as to discharge such onus (paragraph 36). 21. In the case of Makhan Singh (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held (paragraph 9) that there is no presumption that the property owned by the members of the joint Hindu family could a fortiori be deemed to be of the same character and to prove such a status it has to be established by the pro-pounder that nucleus of joint family income is available and that the said property has been purchased from out of the said nucleus. It is categorically held that burden to prove such a situation, lays on the party, who so asserts it. 22. In the case of D.S. Lakshmaiah (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down the same law. In paragraph 18, it has observed thus, “the legal principle, therefore, is that there is no presumption of a property being joint family property only on account of existence of a joint Hindu family. The one who asserts has to prove that the property is a joint family property. In paragraph 18, it has observed thus, “the legal principle, therefore, is that there is no presumption of a property being joint family property only on account of existence of a joint Hindu family. The one who asserts has to prove that the property is a joint family property. If, however, the person so asserting proves that there was nucleus with which the joint family property could be acquired, there would be presumption of the property being joint and the onus would shift on the person who claims it to be self-acquired property to prove that he purchased the property with his own funds and not out of joint family nucleus that was available”. 23. In the same case of D.S. Lakshmaiah, the Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed in paragraph 17 that when the burden to prove that a property is a joint family is not discharged by the plaintiff, the fact that the defendant does not lead any evidence to establish his separate income is of no consequence insofar as the claim as regards joint family is concerned. 24. It is thus clear that one who asserts that a property is a joint family property, must discharge his burden either by proving that it is a joint family property or through establishing existence of sufficient nucleus of the joint family from which nucleus, new acquisitions could possible be made. It is also clear that when the initial burden to prove that a property is a joint family property is not discharged according to law by the party who so asserts it, no strength can be drawn from the weakness of the case of other side or failure of the other side to prove it's case that the property is it's self acquisition, so as to discharge such initial onus. 25. In the instant case, the initial burden placed upon the plaintiffs by law, one must say, has not been discharged at all. The plaintiffs have asserted that field Survey No.81 was purchased from out of funds of the joint family in the name of defendant No.2. But, there is no evidence brought on record showing that when the property was purchased in the year 1947, there was in existence any nucleus of the joint family and it was adequate for purchase of field Survey No.81. This Survey No.81 has been purchased for a consideration of Rs.4000/- on 23.06.1947. But, there is no evidence brought on record showing that when the property was purchased in the year 1947, there was in existence any nucleus of the joint family and it was adequate for purchase of field Survey No.81. This Survey No.81 has been purchased for a consideration of Rs.4000/- on 23.06.1947. The plaintiffs have sought to put forward a case that proceeds of the sale of ancestral land bearing Survey No.250 on 23.06.1947 by sale-deed at Exh.72 were available for at least making up a part of consideration for which field Survey No.81 was purchased in the year 1947. The First Appellate Court has considered the sale of ancestral land in the year 1946 as a relevant fact indicating that some amount of money was already available in the nucleus of joint family to enable it to make new acquisition in the year 1947. I think, the First Appellate Court has misdirected itself in considering the same as a relevant fact by itself. The law requires that it is not only the nucleus but adequate nucleus of joint family that must be shown to be in existence. In the absence of any evidence showing existence of sufficient nucleus of joint family, no presumption of new acquisition to be the joint family property can be drawn. In this case, there is no evidence adduced by plaintiffs in this regard. 26. The field Survey No.250 was sold in the year 1946 admittedly, for a consideration of Rs.1000/- and it is well nigh impossible to purchase such land from this amount in the year 1947 which was of higher value and greater in area than the area of field Survey No.250. Area of field Survey No.250 was about 8 acres and whereas area of field Survey No.81 was about 11.44 acres. If it is presumed that the proceeds of said field Survey No.250 were put to use for purchase of field Survey No.81, still, the source of remaining amount of Rs.3000/-, ought to have been shown by the plaintiffs as having emerged from the nucleus of the joint family. At that time, suit lands purchased vide Exh.73, having total 19.9 acres, were already available as joint family properties. So, it was possible for plaintiffs to show that these lands yielded handsome income then. At that time, suit lands purchased vide Exh.73, having total 19.9 acres, were already available as joint family properties. So, it was possible for plaintiffs to show that these lands yielded handsome income then. The plaintiffs, however, have not adduced any evidence as to what income these lands were generating in the year 1946-1947. There is not even a whisper on the part of the plaintiffs that in the year 1946-1947 or around that time the joint family was cultivating such crops as would return good amount of cash. P.W.1 Nagabai (Exh.59) has only stated in her evidence that there were Orange trees in the suit lands which could be about 12 years old and since the year 1984, the defendants were taking crops and earning money by selling them. Even the second witness of the plaintiffs, P.W.2 Baburao (Exh.76), has given his evidence on the same lines as P.W.1 Nagabai. His evidence was recorded on 23.08.1991 and he has stated that about 10 years back, the Orange trees were planted in the suit lands, about 1000 in number, and defendant No.1 was earning income by sale of the Orange crop. His evidence does not go as far as back as in the year 1946-1947 when it comes to generating of sufficient income from the suit lands from that year onwards. This evidence only shows that defendants were cultivating cash crops like Oranges only from the year 1984 and not before that and therefore, is of no use to ascertain income of 1946-1947. 27. Merely because there is a joint family property, it would not by itself lead to an inference that it generates healthy income capable of building sufficient nucleus of the joint family. There can be no presumption in law that a joint family holding joint family property always has in its possession, such nucleus, as is sufficient to enable it to make new acquisitions. Apart from the existence of the joint family property, it must be shown by the party asserting that it generates income, that it really yields income or is at least capable of generating good earnings for the joint family by adducing necessary evidence in that regard. Apart from the existence of the joint family property, it must be shown by the party asserting that it generates income, that it really yields income or is at least capable of generating good earnings for the joint family by adducing necessary evidence in that regard. In the instant case, no evidence has been brought on record as regards level of fertility of the agricultural lands purchased vide Exh.73 or the account of crops that were being taken from these lands since 1946-1947 so as to indicate that these lands were capable of generating healthy income from that time onwards and so a presumption about existence of adequate nucleus of the joint family could have been drawn. In such circumstances, it is seen that the plaintiffs could not show that the joint family did possess in the year 1946-1947 sufficient nucleus so as to empower it by purchasing one more land i.e. field Survey No.81. In effect, plaintiffs failed to discharge initial burden of proof that was on them and therefore, there was no way in this case that the onus to prove that field Survey No.81 was defendant's self-acquired property could have been shifted to them. 28. It appears from the careful reading of the judgments of both the courts below that they have committed serious error of law in shifting of burden to prove the character of field Survey No.81 upon the defendants. The trial court in paragraph 16 of its judgment dated 21.01.1992 observed that it well settled that burden shifts on a person who alleges that the suit properties are self-acquired properties. The trial court then went on to scrutinize the evidence of two witnesses of the defendants and upon finding that there has been material variance between the pleadings and the evidence adduced by the defendants, the trial court concluded that the defendants failed to establish that field Survey No.81 was the property purchased by defendant No.1 from out of his own income in the name of defendant No.2. The First Appellate Court drew a presumption of jointness of the property and it appears that although it has not observed in so many words that the jointness of the property would be sufficient to draw an inference about existence of sufficient nucleus of the joint family, the First Appellate Court shifted the burden of proof in this behalf upon the defendants and then taking support from weakness in the evidence of the defendants, it held that since defendants failed to prove that field Survey No.81 was their self-acquired property, the finding recorded by the trial court that it was a joint family property was legal and correct. Such an approach adopted by both the courts below is absolutely against the settled legal principles discussed earlier. Initially, the burden of proof was upon the plaintiffs who had propounded the theory that though field Survey No.81 stood in the name of defendant No.2 as owner thereof, it was in reality a joint family property with its purchase having been financed through joint family funds. The plaintiffs ought to have discharged this burden that was initially on them by establishing the fact that there was in existence sufficient nucleus of the joint family and it was only after the discharge of this burden that the defendants could have been called upon to disprove the fact that field Survey No.81 was purchased with the aid of joint family funds. The findings recorded by both the courts below as regards the jointness of field Survey No.81 are, therefore, perverse and absolutely contrary to the well settled principles of law. 29. In the circumstances, I find that the courts below have misdirected themselves in decreeing the claim for partition of field Survey No.81, there being no proof tendered by the plaintiffs in accordance with law that field Survey No.81 was also a joint or coparcenary property. The third substantial question of law is, therefore, answered in these terms. In the result, the appeal deserves to be allowed partly. 30. Thus, appeal is partly allowed. The third substantial question of law is, therefore, answered in these terms. In the result, the appeal deserves to be allowed partly. 30. Thus, appeal is partly allowed. Judgment and decree of the trial Court dated 10.01.1992 passed in Special Civil Suit No.336/1984 declaring that the plaintiffs are entitled for partition and separate possession of their half share in field Survey No.81 having area of 11.72 acres described in Schedule-A of the plaint and directing the defendants to put the plaintiffs in possession of half share in field Survey No.81, is hereby set aside and judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court dated 28.11.1997 confirming this part of judgment and decree of the trial Court is also set aside. 31. Judgment and decree dated 28.11.1997 passed in Regular Civil Appeal No.190/1992 by 4th Additional District Judge, Nagpur modifying the judgment and decree dated 10.01.1992 passed in Special Civil Suit No.336/1984 by the trial Court and confirming the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court, barring the judgment and decree of the trial Court relating to the partition of plaintiffs half share in field Survey No.81, as described in Schedule-A of the plaint and their being put in possession thereof, is hereby confirmed. In the circumstances of the case parties to bear their own costs. Decree be drawn up accordingly.