JUDGMENT B.K. NAYAK, J. In this writ application the petitioner challenges the order dated 18.12.2002 (Annexure-7) passed by the Additional District Magistrate, Bargarh in OLR (R) Case NO.1 of 2002. 2. The admitted facts are that one Manohar Sharma was the owner of Ac. 36.57 of land in two villages, namely, Barhaguda and Talsriguda, which was his self acquired property. M.S. Khata No. 308-Ac.28.10 and Khata No. 309-Ac.1.60 situated in village-Barhaguda whereas M.S. Khata No. 317-Ac.5.28, Khata No. 379-Ac.1.07 and Khata No. 380-Ac.0.52 situated in village-Talsriguda. The said Manohar Sharma left behind three sons, namely, Surajmal, Harisankar and Ramkishan (opposite party No. 6) and two daughters, namely, Chandbai, the present petitioner, and Gitabai (opposite party No.7). Surajmal pre-deceased Manohar Sharma issueless. Harisankar is dead and his two daughters, namely, Jayshree and Pramila are opposite party Nos. 4 and 5. Manohar died in 1972 and till the year 1968 he sold Ac. 17.51 of his land. The settlement R.O.R. prepared in the year 1972 stood in the name of Manohar Sharma alone. In the year 1976 a suo motu ceiling proceeding bearing OLR Case No. 261 of 1976 was initiated against Manohar Sharma by the Tahasildar-cum-Revenue Officer, Bargarh, opposite party NO.3 under Section 42 of the Orissa land Reforms Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), though Manohar Sharma was already dead by then. On 20.04.1976 notice was issued and the local R.I. was directed to submit report regarding the detail particulars of the land held by Manohar. On 01.09.1982 R.I. submitted report. On 19.05.1982 Harisankar, who is one of the sons of late Manohar appeared and raised objection and stated that out of the entire family property some lands have been sold by Manohar himself, and that in a family partition the disputed property has been partitioned between himself, his father and his younger brother-Ramkishan and by virtue of such partition they are possessing their shares separately. The Revenue Officer observed that with regard to sale of land no sale deed or affidavit had been filed and with regard to the plea of partition no paper was produced nor any witness was cited. The Revenue Officer, however, directed for preparing a draft statement showing the names' of Banibai, W/o. Surajmal, Harisankar, Ramkisan, Chandbai and Gitabai showing Ac. The Revenue Officer observed that with regard to sale of land no sale deed or affidavit had been filed and with regard to the plea of partition no paper was produced nor any witness was cited. The Revenue Officer, however, directed for preparing a draft statement showing the names' of Banibai, W/o. Surajmal, Harisankar, Ramkisan, Chandbai and Gitabai showing Ac. 24.96 as ceiling surplus since they are entitled to only 10 standard acres of land and the five persons were treated as body of individuals. On 21.05.1982 the draft statement was prepared and signed by the Tahasildar and direction was given for service of the draft statement on all the parties interested in the property. It is the contention of the petitioner that despite such direction no notice was ever served on the daughters of late Manohar, who were interested parties. The further admitted position is that Ramkisan and Harisankar filed their objection to the draft statement on 22.6.1982. But their objection was rejected on 18.08.1982 since they were absent on call and the draft statement was confirmed under Section 44 (1) of the of the O.L.R. Act as per order sheet under Annexure-3. Aggrieved by the order under Annexure-3 Ramkisan and Harisankar preferred OLR Appeal No. 60 of 1982 before the Sub-Collector, Bargarh (opposite party No.2) under Section 44 (2) of the O.L.R. Act. The appeal was allowed and the order under Annexure-3 was set aside and the matter remanded back to the Revenue Officer-cum-Tahasildar for fresh hearing by giving due opportunity to the appellants to substantiate their case. After such remand, the Revenue Officer vide his order dated 15.01.1985 under Annexure-4 accepted the contention of Ramkisan and Harisankar and disposed of the proceeding holding that both the brothers were living separately in mess and property for more than 20 years and they were married prior to the appointed date, i.e. 26.08 1970 and that their father was dead and that both are entitled to two separate ceilings and that taking into consideration the land which had already been sold, i.e., Ac. 16.95, there was no ceiling surplus as both the brothers are possessing less than what they are legally entitled to retain. 3. 16.95, there was no ceiling surplus as both the brothers are possessing less than what they are legally entitled to retain. 3. In the meantime, after passing of the order under Annexure-4 consolidation operation started in the villages but the present petitioner, 15 years after passing of the order under Annexure-4 preferred OLR Appeal No. 2 of 2000 challenging the order of the Revenue Officer under Annexure-4 mainly on the ground that in the ceiling proceeding no notice as required under Rule 30(2) of the Orissa Land Reforms General Rules, 1965 (in short 'the Rules') was issued to her by the Revenue Officer even though she had 1/4th interest in the properties left by her late father Manohar Sharma and that there was no partition of the properties. She also asserted that the other sister, Gitabai was also entitled to 1/4th share in the suit property. The Sub-Collector (opposite party No.2) by his order dated 29.09.2001 (Annexure-6) allowed the appeal and set aside the order under Annexure-4 holding that notices contemplated under Rule 30(2) and 30(3) of the Rules were not served on the appellant and there was complete violation of principle of natural justice in disposal of the proceeding before the learned Tahasildar and accordingly the whole proceeding stood vitiated. The appellate authority having set aside the order under Annexure-4 remanded the ceiling case for fresh hearing after giving due opportunity to the appellant and other holders. Challenging the aforesaid appellate order, the present opposite party Nos. 4 and 5, daughters of Harisankar filed OLR Revision Case No. 1 of 2002 before the Additional District Magistrate, Bargarh (opposite party No.1). The revision was allowed by order dated 18.12.2002 (Annexure7) by opposite party No.1 holding that the appellant and the other daughter of Manohar Sharma were major and married prior to 26.09.1970 and, therefore, they were not to be included in the family of their father or brothers and they cannot claim any land allotted to their brothers and that the appellant had sufficient knowledge regarding the disposal of the ceiling case, and therefore, she will not derive any benefit of Rule 30(2) of the Rules. Opposite party No.1 accordingly set aside the appellate order under Annexure-6. 4. Opposite party No.1 accordingly set aside the appellate order under Annexure-6. 4. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that admittedly by the date of initiation of the ceiling proceeding the petitioner's father Manohar Sharma, the recorded owner of the land, was already dead and, therefore, the petitioner acquired interest in the property by way of inheritance and that after correction of the draft statement by order of opposite party No.3 dated 19.5.1982 with direction to issue notice on 21.5.1982 and that issuance of notice under Rule 30 being a mandatory requirement and no notice having been served on the appellant, the entire proceeding stood vitiated and, therefore, the impugned order of the revisional authority cannot be sustained. He further submits that even where a person interested has knowledge of a proceeding, the mandatory requirement of notice cannot be dispensed with. He also submits that even otherwise the finding of the revisional authority that the present petitioner had knowledge of the ceiling proceeding is not based on any material on record. It is also his submission that the. petitioner having inherited the property on .the death of her father and that she being a major daughter married prior to the appointed date, she cannot be considered as a member of the family of her father or brother and instead she would be regarded as a separate unit and her own family would consist of herself, her husband and her children. The learned counsel for contesting opposite party Nos. 4 and 5 submits that the married daughter does not come within the definition of family as given in Section 37(b) of the Act and hence she cannot be said to be a person interested in the land held by Manohar Sharma. In this respect, he relies on the decision reported in 1992 (1) OLR 85: Smt. Satrupa Dei v. Land Reforms Commissioner, Orissa, Cuttack and others. In this respect, he relies on the decision reported in 1992 (1) OLR 85: Smt. Satrupa Dei v. Land Reforms Commissioner, Orissa, Cuttack and others. It is his further submission that the Tahasildar on assessment of evidence found that there was amicable partition between the two brothers, who were staying in separate mess and property and that even if for the sake of argument it is held that there was no partition, then notice to Harisankar would be sufficient notice to all the persons interested as he was the eldest member and was looking after the affairs of the family and, therefore, issuance of notice under Rule 30(2) to the petitioner was not necessary and non-issuance of the same cannot be said to be fatal to the ceiling proceeding. It is also submitted by him that the petitioner's claim for share over the land held by her father late Manohar Sharma is beyond the scope of adjudication by the Revenue Officer in a ceiling proceeding and that when the Revenue Officer has already held that there was no ceiling surplus land, the petitioner may work out her remedy with regard to her claim in the land in any other competent Court of law. He, therefore, submits that the impugned revisional order warrc1nts no interference. 5. Admittedly, the disputed land forming the subject matter of the ceiling proceeding was the self acquired property of late Manohar Sharma, who died in the year 1972. Though the proceeding was initiated in 1976 against the dead man, subsequently realizing that Manohar Sharma was already dead since 1972, the Tahasildar revised the draft statement in the names of the sons, daughters and widow of a pre-deceased son of Manohar Sharma and directed to issue notice and the draft statement to those five persons. All five persons were Class-I heirs of late Manohar Sharma as per provision of Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The heirs including the petitioner inherited the property as tenants-in-common and not as joint tenants, meaning thereby, each one of the heirs held his share independently. Therefore, each one of the heirs of Manohar was entitled to notice. All five persons were Class-I heirs of late Manohar Sharma as per provision of Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The heirs including the petitioner inherited the property as tenants-in-common and not as joint tenants, meaning thereby, each one of the heirs held his share independently. Therefore, each one of the heirs of Manohar was entitled to notice. The question whether Harisankar and Ramkisan divided the property among themselves and became separate should have been decided in presence of all the legal heirs of Manohar Sharma and this is more so, particularly when the petitioner takes the plea that there was no partition as claimed by Harisankar and Ramkisan. Rule 30(2) of the rules provides that a copy of the draft statement prepared in the ceiling proceeding shall be sent by registered post with acknowledgment due to the person to whom it relates together with a notice intimating such person for filing objection, if any. A division bench of this Court in the decision reported in 71 (1991) CLT 843: Ramnarayan Ram and others v. Revenue Officer-cum-Tahasildar, Darpan and others held as follows: "5. In the present case, on inquiry when the Revenue Officer came to hold that the present three petitioners were entitled to separate ceiling of lands being major, married and separate sons prior to the appointed date and the property in the draft statement related to them, as they held part of the said property. It was incumbent upon the Revenue Officer to issue notice to them under Rule 30(2) of the Rules and this having not been done, the impugned order passed was void being violative of the principles of natural justice. 6. The principles of audi alteram partem which required that no one shall be condemned unheard is a part of the rules of natural justice and has universal application irrespective of any statute requiring the party to be heard. By now, the law is well settled that even to an administrative action which involves civil consequences, the doctrine of natural justice must be held to be applicable." 6. By now, the law is well settled that even to an administrative action which involves civil consequences, the doctrine of natural justice must be held to be applicable." 6. The requirement of the Rule about issuance of notice to the person to whom the draft statement relates must be interpreted to mean all such persons to whom it relates, and issuance of a notice to anyone of them cannot be taken to be sufficient compliance of the mandate of the rule so far as the persons who have not been served with notice, particularly where a person has interest in the land independent of the interest of others. There is no dispute that no notice as required under Rule 30(2) of the Rules was served on the petitioner. Therefore, the order of the Tahasildar-cum-Revenue Officer dated 15.01.1985 under Annexure-4 was vitiated. The appellate order of the Sub-Collector vide Annexure-6 passed on OLR Appeal No. 2 of 2000 remanding the ceiling case to the Tahasildar to hear afresh after giving opportunity to all the persons to whom the draft statement related was quite justified. There is no material on record that the petitioner had the knowledge of the ceiling proceeding as observed by opposite party No. 1 in the impugned order. Even otherwise, provision of Rule 30(2) of the Rules being mandatory in nature mere knowledge of a proceeding by a person interested cannot be a justification for dispensing with service of notice. 7. The contention of the learned counsel for opposite party Nos. 4 and 5 that the petitioner's claim for share over the land held by her father late Manohar Sharma is beyond the scope of adjudication by the Revenue Officer in the ceiling proceeding cannot be accepted as because each of the Class-I heirs of late Manohar Sharma, who succeeded to the disputed properties has interest independent of others. Each one of such heirs should be treated as a separate 'person' or 'family' within the meaning of Section 37 of the Act. The question of partition of the properties between Manohar and his two sons which has the effect of dislodging the natural course succession to Manohar requires to be determined later on the basis of the pleas and evidence led by all the heirs/successors. The question of partition of the properties between Manohar and his two sons which has the effect of dislodging the natural course succession to Manohar requires to be determined later on the basis of the pleas and evidence led by all the heirs/successors. A full Bench of this Court in the decision reported in 66 (1988) CLT 774; Smt. Anusuya Rath and another v. State of Orissa and others 1988 (II) OLR 410 held that a daughter already married by the appointed date, i.e. 26.09.1970, would not come under the definition of "Family" of his father as defined in Section 37(b) of the Act. The Apex Court in the decision reported in 2001 (II) OLR. (SC) 225: State of Orissa and others v. K. Srinivasa Rao (dead) through L.Rs. upheld the aforesaid Full Bench decision. In the instant case being the daughter of late Manohar Sharma and being married prior to the appointed date, the petitioner cannot be considered to be a member of the 'family' of her father after the marriage. In any event the corrected draft statement in the proceeding being prepared in the name of the Class-I heirs of late Manohar Sharma, each one of such heir would be treated as a separate 'family' within the definition of Section 37 (b) of the Act for the purpose of the ceiling proceeding. They cannot also be considered as 'association or body of individuals' so as to be treated as a single person within the meaning of Section 37(a) of the Act. This proposition has stood settled by a Division Bench of this Court in the decision reported in 62 (1986) CL T116 : Surendra Prasad Parida v. State of Orissa through Secretary to Government of Orissa, Revenue Department and others, 1986 (II) OLR 311 where it has been observed as under: ".... .... Without being exhaustive where the members of a family as understood in common parlance hold land by inheritance, succession or by acquisition, they cannot be treated as an association or a body of individuals, but as a "family" or "families", as the case may be, within the purview of Section 37(b). In Jaga alias Jagannath Naik arid others v. The State of Orissa and another, one Baraja died leaving behind his wife and three sons. In Jaga alias Jagannath Naik arid others v. The State of Orissa and another, one Baraja died leaving behind his wife and three sons. It was held that while determining the ceiling area and surplus lands of one of the brothers, the property held by the two others could not be taken into account. The brothers were not treated as a body of individuals, i.e. as a 'person' within the purview of Section 37(a). They were treated as distinct "families". 6. We, therefore, ql1ashthe decisions of the Revenue Officer and the appellate and revisional authorities and hold that the petitioner and his brother Debendra shall be treated as two separate and distinct "persons" and direct that determination of their respective ceiling areas observations made by us above and law after giving them an opportunity of being heard and option to select if there be surplus lands in their hands." 8. In the light of the aforesaid discussions, this writ application is allowed and the impugned revisional order under Annexure-7 is quashed and it is directed that the Tahasildar-cum-Revenue Officer, Bargarh (opposite party No.3) shall hear and dispose of expeditiously the ceiling case afresh after giving notice to all the persons who whom the draft statement relates. No costs. Application allowed.