JUDGMENT :- M.M. Sundresh, J. 1. The appellants, who are the plaintiffs in the suit, have preferred these Original Side Appeals being aggrieved against the dismissal of the applications filed for injunction in O.A.Nos.411 and 412 of 2012 in C.S.No.325 of 2012. 2. The facts in brief: 2.1. Case of the Appellants: The appellants have adopted the word "Tastee Masala". They have registered their label in the year 2005, which also includes the name "Tastee Masala". The appellants have been manufacturing and marketing spices and masalas. They have conceived and adopted the said trade mark from the year 1994 onwards. The word "TASTEE" was coined in the year 1994 from the generic word "TASTY". In the year 2010, the appellants came to know that the respondent has been using the word "TASTII". The words used by the respondent has visual and phonetical similarity with the trade mark of the appellants. As the respondent is trying to confuse the general public by suing a mark having phonetical, structural and visual similarities with the mark of the appellants, they filed a suit seeking the relief of permanent injunction on the ground of infringing their trade mark and passing off as well. 2.2. Case of the Respondent:-In the counter affidavit, the respondent has stated that the product manufactured by the parties are different. The respondent has been selling "savouries" and not "masala". It is engaged in the said manufacturing activities from the year 1984. It adopted the trade mark "TASTII" in the year 2008 bonafidely. It was published in the Trade Mark Journal in the year 2010. The appellant cannot maintain the suit and the applications, as even according to them the word "TASTEE" is a common word from which marks of both the parties were derived. Such a stand was taken by the appellants when an opposition proceeding was initiated by one Prakash Chand Brijmohan. Even before this Court, the appellants have admitted that "TASTEE" was coined from the common word "TASTY". Further more, what has been registered by them is only the label and therefore, they cannot seek infringement of the name alone. Hence, it was prayed by the respondent that the applications were to be dismissed. Even before this Court, the appellants have admitted that "TASTEE" was coined from the common word "TASTY". Further more, what has been registered by them is only the label and therefore, they cannot seek infringement of the name alone. Hence, it was prayed by the respondent that the applications were to be dismissed. 2.3.The learned single Judge, dismissed both the applications filed by the appellants holding that the products are different and what was registered is only a label and the appellants themselves had accepted that their registered name was adapted from the common word and they took a similar stand in another proceedings. The learned single judge has made reliance upon the judgment of the Honourable Apex Court in REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS V. ASHOK CHANDRA RAKHIT LTD., (AIR 1955 Supreme Court 558). Challenging the same, the present Original Side Appeals have been filed. 3. Submissions of the Counsels: 3.1. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants, would submit that the admittedly there is a phonetic similarly between the two names used by the parties. The respondent has been using number of other products as well. The appellants are prior users. They have also registered their trade name. There is a disclaimer on the part of the respondent to use the name unsuccessfully by it. The similarities of the names would cause confusion in the mind of the public. Section 29(2) of the Trade Marks Act will have to be pressed into service in favour of the appellants. In support of his contention, the learned counsel appearing for the appellants made reliance upon the following judgments and also the judgment of this Court in O.S.A.No.71 of 2013, dated 12.04.2013. (i) The Trade Marks Act, 1999, Form TM 5; (ii) CADILA HEALTH CARE LTD., V. CADILA PHARMACEUTICALS LTD.,(2001) 5 Supreme Court Cases 73; (iii) GODFREY PHILLIPS INDIA LTD., V. GIRNAR FOOD & BEVERAGES PVT. LTD.,(1998) 9 Supreme Court Cases 531); (iv) THALAPPAKATU BIRIYANI AND FAST FOOD V. M/S THALAPPAKATTI NAIDU ANANDA VILAS BIRIYANI HOTEL (2011) 4 Law Weekly 193); (v) ALAKANDA CEMENT PRIVATE LIMITED & ANOTHER V. ULTRATECH CEMENT LIMITED ; and (vi) CHARAN DASS & M/S VEER INDUSTRIES (INDIA) V. M/S BOMBAY CROCKERY HOUSE (1984 PTC 102). 3.2. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, would submit that the learned single Judge has considered the entire materials available on record. 3.2. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, would submit that the learned single Judge has considered the entire materials available on record. The documents produced by both sides would show that neither of them can claim to use the word "TASTY" exclusively. The product manufactured and marketed by the parties are different and therefore, there cannot be any confusion. In support of his contention, the learned counsel has made reliance upon the following judgments. (i) JHAVERI INDUSTRIES V. MAJETHIA MASALA (2006) 33 PTC 394(Bom.); and (ii) T.T.KRISHNAMACHARI & CO., V. GODREJ AGROVET LIMITED. 4. CONCLUSION: 4.1. We have gone through the judgment of the learned single Judge as well as the materials produced before us. The learned single Judge has dealt with the contentions extensively for arriving at the conclusions. We do not find any error warranting interference in these Original Side Appeals. Admittedly, the product manufactured and marketed by the parties are different. Therefore, we respectfully concur with the findings of the learned single Judge on the question of infringement and passing off. Further more, what has been registered by the parties is only the "label". The names "TASTEE" and 'TASTII" are part of the labels. We also do not find any similarity between two labels. In this connection, we would like to reiterate the decision of the Honourable Apex Court in REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS V. ASHOK CHANDRA RAKHIT LTD., (AIR 1955 Supreme Court 558 page 56), wherein in paragraphs 14 it has held as follows: "14. It is true that where a distinctive label is registered as a whole, such registration cannot possibly give any exclusive statutory right to the proprietor of the trade mark to the use of any particular word or name contained therein apart from the mark as a whole. As said by Lord Esher in Pinto v. Badman: “The truth is that the label does not consist of each particular part of it, but consists of the combination of them all”. Observations to the same effect will be found also in In re Apollinaris Company's Trade Marks, In re Smokeless Powder Co., In re Clement and Cie and In re Albert Baker & Company and finally in the Tudor case referred to above which was decided by Sargant, J. This circumstance, however, does not necessarily mean that in such a case disclaimer will always be unnecessary. It is significant that one of the facts which give rise to the jurisdiction of the tribunal to impose disclaimer is that the trade mark contains parts which are not separately registered. It is, therefore, clear that the section itself contemplates that there may be a disclaimer in respect of parts contained in a trade mark registered as a whole although the registration of the mark as a whole does not confer any statutory right with respect to that part." 4.2. The learned single Judge has rightly appreciated the law laid down by the Honourable Apex Court and declined the discretionary relief of injunction pending suit. The word "TASTEE" is a common word. It is also descriptive and generic in nature. This position has also been accepted by the appellants themselves both before us and in some other proceedings. Therefore, they cannot claim an order of injunction having recourse under Section 17 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The scope of ambit of Sections 17, 29 and 30 of the Trade Marks Act has also been considered by us in O.S.A.No.71 of 2013r dated 12.04.2013, reported in Orchid Chemicals & Pharmaceuticals Ltd., V. Wockhardt Limited (2013) 3 CTC 841), wherein it has been held in the following manner. "5.6. Sections 28 to 30 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, deal with the effect of registration under Chapter IV of the Act. In so far as Section 28 of the Act is concerned, it deals with the rights conferred by registration. Section 28 of the Act specifically deals with the "exclusive" right under the Act. Therefore, a registered proprietor of a trade mark can assert an exclusive right to use the trade mark under Section 28 of the Act. However, the said assertion is subject to two conditions. The first condition is that it is "subject to other provisions of the Act". The second condition is that it is subject to its "validity". 5.7. Now coming to Section 29 of the Act, it deals with an infringement of the registered trade mark. Section 29 of the Act specifies that an infringement would occur when an unregistered Proprietor uses a registered trade mark, which is likely to cause confusion on the part of the public or which is likely to have an association with the registered trade mark. Section 29 of the Act specifies that an infringement would occur when an unregistered Proprietor uses a registered trade mark, which is likely to cause confusion on the part of the public or which is likely to have an association with the registered trade mark. Therefore, if one sees the object and reasons under Section 29 of the Act, it is clear that it is meant to be used against the person, who is not entitled to use the said trade mark under "law". This is required to constitute an infringement. 5.8. Now coming to Section 30 of the Act, it limits the effect of registered trade mark. A perusal of Section 30 of the Act would show that Section 29 of the Act is subjected to it. Therefore, Section 30 of the Act is an overriding provision to Section 29 of the Act. However, the parameters stipulated under Section 30 of the Act will have to be complied with. For example, in a case where a party is using a registered trade mark belonging to another one, if it is in accordance with honest practices in industrial or commercial matters or is detrimental to the distinctive character of the different trade mark, no infringement would occur as it limits the effect of registered trade mark. Similarly, when the usage is indicative of a kind, quality or a quantity, then there will not be any infringement notwithstanding the registration. 5.9. While considering the statutory provisions, the Courts will have to read them together to understand the intending purpose and object. Therefore, we are of the considered view that Sections 28 to 30 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, are to be read in connection with each other. Such a yardstick will have to be adopted in view of the settled interpretative principle of harmonious construction." Applying the said ratio, we do not find any reason to interfere with the well reasoned order passed by the learned single Judge. Accordingly, these Original Side Appeals are dismissed. No costs. However, it is made clear that the findings and the observations rendered in these appeals as well as in the interlocutory applications are to be construed as only for the purpose of deciding them and not in deciding the suit. We also request the learned single Judge dealing with the final hearing of the Civil Suits to expedite the hearing of the same. We also request the learned single Judge dealing with the final hearing of the Civil Suits to expedite the hearing of the same. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are also dismissed.