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2013 DIGILAW 261 (CHH)

BABULAL v. STATE OF C. G.

2013-09-02

Radhe Shyam Sharma, SATISH K.AGNIHOTRI

body2013
ORAL JUDGMENT 1. This appeal is directed against judgment dated 06-12-2008 passed by Sessions Judge, Durg, in Sessions Trial No. 19/2008. By the impugned judgment, accused/appellant Babulal has been convicted under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay fine of Rs. 1000/-, in default of payment of fine, to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for 3 months. 2. The case of the prosecution in brief is as under:- The deceased (Santoshi Bai) was daughter-in-law (wife of son) of the appellant. Amarbai (PW-2) is wife of the appellant. Deceased Santoshi Bai and the appellant were residing in a same house. On 28/11/2007, at about 11:30 hours Madhaiya (PW-1) lodged a report in Police Station Dhamdha, where Merg Intimation (Ex.P-1) and First Information Report (Ex.P-2) was recorded. In the FIR (Ex.P-2), it is mentioned that on the date of incident, i.e., 28/11/2007 Madhaiya (PW-1) heard noise from the house of the appellant. He went to the house of the appellant. The appellant told him that he killed his daughter in law with an axe (tangiya). Madhaiya (PW-1) went to Police Station Dhamdba alongwith the appellant. On being asked by Madhaiya (PW-1) and Amarbai (PW-2), the appellant confessed his guilt and told them that he killed the deceased with the axe. The Investigating Officer reached the place of occurrence, gave notice (Ex.P-3) to Panchas and prepared inquest (Ex.P-4) on the dead body of the deceased. The dead body of the deceased was sent to the Government Hospital Dhamdha for postmortem examination vide Ex.-P/11. Doctor Narendra Kumar Bokade (PW-5) conducted postmortem on the dead body of the deceased and gave his report (Ex.-P/12), finding. The dead body of the deceased was sent to the Government Hospital Dhamdha for postmortem examination vide Ex.-P/11. Doctor Narendra Kumar Bokade (PW-5) conducted postmortem on the dead body of the deceased and gave his report (Ex.-P/12), finding. (i) incised wound, 5.5cm x3.5 cm deep upto vertebra on mandibular area and trachea (ii) incised wound, 2 cm above cavical notch (supra) and mid of thyroid bone, of 5cm x 4cm x in depth of the vertebra and trachea and main blood vessels were cut (iii) incised wound, 5.5.cm x 4cm x in depth of upto vertebra on the neck and below the chin (iv) incised wound, 5.5cm x 3cm x 3.5cm on the occipital region and vertebra joint cut (v) incised wound 4cm x 3cm x 4cm on the third and fourth vertebra and the third vertebra was cut (vi) incised wound, 5.7cm x 3.5 cm x 3.5 cm on the back side below the neck and between both of the scapular regions resulted into dislocation of joint of vertebra. He opined that the cause of death was shock (haemorrhagic and neurologic) due to cutting of spinal cords and multiple incised wounds and the death was homicidal in nature. In further investigation, spot map (Ex.P-5) was prepared by Patwari (PW6), hair of the head, pieces of bangles of the deceased, plain soil and blood stained soil were seized from the place of occurrence vide Ex.-P/6. Axe, Dhoti, Baniyan and other clothes of the appellant were seized vide EX.P-7. Another spot map (Ex.P-20) was prepared by the Investigating Officer. The seized articles were sent to Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL), Raipur vide Ex.-P/23 and a report (Ex.P-25) was received therefrom. In FSL report (Ex.P-25) it is reported that article A- hair of the deceased, article B- pieces of bangles, article E-Axe of the appellant, article F- Dhoti, and article G- Baniyan of the appellant were found stained with blood. The seized articles were sent for Serological examination and a report (Ex.P-29) was received therefrom. In (Ex.P-29), it is reported that item No.3, i.e., earth and item No.4, i.e., axe were stained with human blood. After completion of the investigation, charge sheet was filed against the appellant in the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Durg, who, in turn, committed the case to the Court of Session Judge, Durg who conducted the trial and convicted and sentenced the appellant/accused as mentioned above. 3. After completion of the investigation, charge sheet was filed against the appellant in the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Durg, who, in turn, committed the case to the Court of Session Judge, Durg who conducted the trial and convicted and sentenced the appellant/accused as mentioned above. 3. Shri C.R. Sahu, learned counsel appearing for the appellant argued that the trial Court did not properly appreciate the evidence. The finding of conviction of the appellant is arrived at on the basis of extra judicial confession made by the appellant. The so called extra judicial confession is not reliable and cannot be based for conviction. Therefore, the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence is not sustainable and the appellant deserves to be acquitted. 4. Shri Sandeep Yadav, learned Deputy Government Advocate appearing for the State/respondent, supporting the impugned judgment, submitted that the conviction and sentence awarded to the appellant do not warrant any interference by this Court. 5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record of Sessions Trial No. 19/2008, carefully. 6. The conviction of the appellant is based on the evidence of extra judicial confession made by the appellant before Madhaiya (PW -1) and Amarbai (PW-2). 7. In Gura Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan, (2001) 2 SCC 205 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as follows: "6. It is settled position of law that extrajudicial confession, if true and voluntary, it can be relied upon by the court to convict the accused for the commission of the crime alleged. Despite inherent weakness of extrajudicial confession as an item of evidence, it cannot be ignored when shown that such confession was made before a person who has no reason to state falsely and to whom it is made in the circumstances which tend to support the statement. Relying upon an earlier judgment in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 322 , this Court again in Maghar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1975) 4 SCC 234 , held that the evidence in the form of extrajudicial confession made by the accused to witnesses cannot be always termed to be a tainted evidence. Corroboration of such evidence is required only by way of abundant caution. Corroboration of such evidence is required only by way of abundant caution. If the court believes the witness before whom the confession is made and is satisfied that the confession was true and voluntarily made, then the conviction can be founded on such evidence alone. In Narayan Singh v. State of M.P., (1985) 4 SCC 26 , this Court cautioned that it is not open to the court trying the criminal case to start with a presumption that extrajudicial confession is always a weak type of evidence. It would depend on the nature of the circumstances, the time when the confession is made and the credibility of the witnesses who speak for such a confession. The retraction of extrajudicial confession which is a usual phenomenon in criminal cases would by itself not weaken the case of the prosecution based upon such a confession. In Kishore Chand v. State of H.P., (1991) 1 SCC 286 , this Court held that an unambiguous extrajudicial confession possesses high probative value force as it emanates from the person who committed the crime and is admissible in evidence provided it is free from suspicion and suggestion of any falsity. However, before relying on the alleged confession, the court has to be satisfied that it is voluntary and is not the result of inducement, threat or promise envisaged under Section 24 of the Evidence Act or was brought about in suspicious circumstances to circumvent Sections 25 and 26. The court is required to look into the surrounding circumstances to find out as to whether such confession is not inspired by any improper or collateral consideration or circumvention of law Sewati Bai (PW-1) suggesting that it may not be true. All relevant circumstances such as the person to whom the confession is made, the time and place of making it, the circumstances in which it was made have to be scrutinised. To the same effect is the judgment in Baldev Raj v. State of Haryana, 1991 Supp (1) SCC 14. All relevant circumstances such as the person to whom the confession is made, the time and place of making it, the circumstances in which it was made have to be scrutinised. To the same effect is the judgment in Baldev Raj v. State of Haryana, 1991 Supp (1) SCC 14. After referring to the judgment in Piara Singh v. State of Punjab, (1977) 4 SCC 452 , this Court in Madan Gopal Kakkad v. Naval Dubey, (1992) 3 SCC 204 , held that the extrajudicial confession which is not obtained by coercion, promise of favour or false hope and is plenary in character and voluntary in nature can be made the basis for conviction even without corroboration." 8. In Aftab Ahmad Anasari Vs. State of Uttaranchal, (2010) 2 SCC 583 , (2010) 2 SCC 583 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as follows: "52. Though extra-judicial confession is considered to be a weak piece of evidence by the courts, this Court finds that there is neither any rule of law nor of prudence that the evidence furnishing extra-judicial confession cannot be relied upon unless corroborated by some other credible evidence. The evidence relating to extra-judicial confession can be acted upon if the evidence about extra-judicial confession comes from the mouth of a witness who appears to be unbiased and in respect of whom even remotely nothing is brought out which may tend to indicate that he may have a motive for attributing an untruthful statement to the accused. 53. In State of U.P. v. M.K. Anthony, (1985) I SCC 505, this Court, while explaining the law relating to extra-judicial confession, ruled that if the words spoken by the witness are clear, unambiguous and unmistakable, one showing that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime and nothing is omitted by the witness which may militate against it, then after subjecting the evidence of the witness to a rigorous test on the touchstone of credibility, the extra-judicial confession can be accepted and can be the basis of a conviction. According to this Court, in such a situation, to go in search of corroboration itself tends to cause a shadow of doubt over the evidence and if the evidence of extra-judicial confession is reliable, trustworthy and beyond reproaching, the same can be relied upon and a conviction can be founded thereon." 9. According to this Court, in such a situation, to go in search of corroboration itself tends to cause a shadow of doubt over the evidence and if the evidence of extra-judicial confession is reliable, trustworthy and beyond reproaching, the same can be relied upon and a conviction can be founded thereon." 9. The law is well settled as to what extent extra judicial confession can be relied on. If the same is voluntary and made in a fit state of mind, it can be relied upon alongwith other materials. It is true that the extra judicial confession is a weak type of evidence and depends upon the nature of circumstances like the time when the confession was made and the credibility of the witnesses who speak to such a confession. 10. In the instant case, the extra judicial confession was made by the appellant before Madhaiya (PW-1) who is the Village Kotwar and Amarbai (PW-2) who is the wife of the appellant. Amarbai (PW-2) deposed that the appellant is the husband and Santoshi Bai (deceased) was her daughter-in-law (Bahu). When she was returning from Vyara to her house, she met with the appellant on the way. On being inquired from the appellant, he told her that he killed deceased Santoshi Bai. She further deposed that the appellant was having an axe in his hand and was going alongwith Madhaiya (PW-1), i.e., Village Kotwar and at that time, the appellant had told him that he killed the deceased with the axe. 11. Madhaiya (PW-1) is the Village Kotwar. He deposed that on the date of incident, i.e., 28/11/2007, at about 8:00 to 9:00 AM, he heard noise from the house of the appellant. He went to the house of the appellant. The appellant told him that he killed his daughter-in-law with the axe. He further deposed that the appellant was going to Police Station for lodging FIR. He went to the Police Station alongwith the appellant and lodged Merg Intimation (Ex.P-1) and First Information Report (Ex.P-2). He further deposed that on being told by the appellant, he went to the house of the appellant and saw that the dead body of the deceased (Santoshi Bai) was lying at the door of the house and she had sustained injuries on the neck and blood was oozing out. He further deposed that on being told by the appellant, he went to the house of the appellant and saw that the dead body of the deceased (Santoshi Bai) was lying at the door of the house and she had sustained injuries on the neck and blood was oozing out. In Para-8 of his cross-examination, he deposed that the appellant told him that he killed his daughter-in-law Santoshi Bai (deceased) with an axe. In para-15, he further deposed that it is true that before lodging Merg Intimation (Ex.P1) and First Information Report (Ex.P-2) the appellant had narrated the incident to him. 12. The date and time of the incident was 28/11/2007, at about 11:00 AM. The Merg Intimation (Ex.P-1) was recorded on the same date at about 11.30 AM and the First Information Report (Ex.P-2) was recorded at about 11:35 AM. It appears that the Merg Intimation was lodged within half an hour of the incident. In the Merg Intimation, it is mentioned thus: ^^?kj ls cPpksa dh jksus dh vkokt lqudj edlwnu ds ?kj x;k rks ns[kk larks”kh ckbZ dh gR;k ckcwyky lrukeh Vafx;k ls ekjdj fd;k gSA tks edlwnj ds ?kj ds njoktk ds ckgj iM+h gSA xyk ds ihNs Hkkx o tcM+k esa dkQh xgjk pksV vk;k gS [kwu ckgj fxjk gSA ckcwyky ls iwNus ij og yM+dh dkSf’kY;k ckbZ ,oa cgq larks”kh nksuksa >xM+k gqvk ftls euk djus ij cgq larks”kh ckbZ ugha ekuh ,oa xkyh nsus ij xqLlk esa vkdj Vafx;k ls larks”kh dks ekjdj gR;k djuk crk;kA** 13. Amarbai (PW-2) is the wife of the appellant and she has no motive to falsely implicate her husband i.e. the appellant. It is clear from the evidence of Madhaiya (PW-1) and Amarbai (PW -2) that the appellant had made confession before them and he had specifically told that he killed deceased Santoshi Bai with the axe. 14. Assistant Sub Inspector K.C. Das (PW-7) deposed that on 28/11/2007, the appellant came to Police Station Dhamdha alongwith the axe and produced the axe in the Police Station. He had seized the axe vide Ex.P-7. Madhaiya (PW-1) also deposed that the appellant himself produced the axe in the Police Station and the axe was seized by the Police vide Ex.P-7. The seized axe was sent to Serologist and chemical examination Kolkata for serological examination and report (Ex.P-29) was received therefrom. He had seized the axe vide Ex.P-7. Madhaiya (PW-1) also deposed that the appellant himself produced the axe in the Police Station and the axe was seized by the Police vide Ex.P-7. The seized axe was sent to Serologist and chemical examination Kolkata for serological examination and report (Ex.P-29) was received therefrom. In Serological report (Ex.P-29) it is reported that article E- Item no. 4, i.e., the axe was stained with human blood. 15. Amarbai (PW-2) is wife of the appellant. She specifically deposed that the appellant was going to the Police Station alongwith the Village Kotwar Madhaiya (PW-1). Amarbai (PW-2) deposed that: ^^;g dguk xyr gS fd tc eSa dksBkj ls vkbZ rks ckcwyky dks Vafx;k ysdj [kM+s gq, ugha ns[kh Fkh Lor% dgk fd ckcwyky Vafx;k gkFk esa j[kk Fkk vkSj dksVokj ds lkFk py jgk FkkA vkSj eq>s mlus cgq larks”kh dh Vafx;k ls gR;k djus dh ckr crkbZ FkhA** 16. The appellant was examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. In response to the question put to him in regard to his defence, he stated as under: ^^eSa ?kVuk fnukad dks vius [ksr ls 11 cts fnu okil vk;k rks viuh cgq larks”kh ckbZ dks ejs iM+s ns[kk] rc dksVokj e<+S;k ds ikl tkdj crk;k fd esjs cgq dks dksbZ ekj fn;k gS mls ;g Hkh cksyk fd Fkkuk tkdj fjiksVZ djus lkFk pyks rc dksVokj ds lkFk Fkkuk tkdj fjiksVZ fy[kk;k** 17. The appellant took the plea that he was working in the field and at about 11:00 AM, he returned his home. He saw that his daughter-in-law (the deceased) was laying dead and some person had killed her. 18. Amarbai (PW-2) specifically deposed that when she returned from Vyara to her house, she met with the appellant on the way. On being inquired from the appellant, he told her that he killed Santoshi Bai (deceased). In Para-4 of her cross-examination, she specifically deposed that: ^^eSa tc O;kjk ls ;g gYyk lqudj fd vkjksih ckcwyky us cgq larks”kh dh gR;k dj nh gS eSa vk jgh Fkh rc ckcwyky ls jkLrs esa esjh eqykdkr ckcwyky ls gqbZ Fkh rc eSaus mlls iwNh Fkh fd D;ksa ekj Mkys rc ckcwyky us eq>s crk;k Fkk fd larks”kh ckbZ us ^^eq>s xanh xanh xkyh nh gS blfy;s ekj fn;k gS** ** 19. From the evidence of Madhaiya (PW-1) and Amarbai (PW-2), it is strongly established that the appellant has not been able to prove his defence. 20. Doctor Narendra Kumar Bokade (PW-5), who conducted the postmortem examination on the dead body of the. deceased deposed that he gave the report (Ex.-P/12) finding (i) incised wound, 5.5cm x 3.5 cm deep upto vertebra on mandibular area and trachea (ii) incised wound, 2 cm above cavical notch (supra) and mid of thyroid bone, of 5cm x 4cm x in depth of the vertebra and trachea and main blood vessels were cut (iii) incised wound, 5.5.cm x 4cm x in depth of up to vertebra on the neck and below the chin (iv) incised wound, 5.5cm x 3cm x 3.5cm on the occipital region and vertebra joint cut (v) incised wound, 4cmx3cmx4cm on the third and fourth vertebra and the third vertebra was cut (vi) incised wound, 5.7cm x 3.5 cm x 3.5 cm on the back side below the neck and between both of the scapular regions resulted into dislocation of joint of vertebra. He opined that the cause of death was shock (haemorrhagic and neurologic) due to cutting of spinal cords and multiple incised wounds and the death was homicidal in nature. 21. We have carefully perused the evidence of Madhaiya (PW-1) and Amarbai (PW-2). They have specifically deposed that the appellant admitted killing of his daughter-in-law (deceased) by the axe. Their evidence is duly corroborated by medical evidence. From the medical evidence, we find that the deceased died due to shock (haemorrhagic and neurologic) due to cutting of spinal cords and multiple incised wounds and the death was homicidal in nature. 22. The extra-judicial confession of killing of his daughter-in-law (deceased) was made by the appellant before the aforesaid witnesses, therefore, it is reliable and can form the basis for conviction. 23. Learned counsel for the appellant has argued that some quarrel took place between the appellant and the deceased, therefore, the act of the appellant would not be punishable under Section 302 IPC. Even if the entire case is admitted on its face value, he would only be liable for punishment under Section 304 IPC. 24. In Gurudev Singh Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2011) 5 SCC 721 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows: "25. Even if the entire case is admitted on its face value, he would only be liable for punishment under Section 304 IPC. 24. In Gurudev Singh Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2011) 5 SCC 721 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows: "25. With regard to this plea of the accused it seems that Exceptions 1 and 4 to Section 300 IPC are sought to be taken advantage of by the accused in this case. For dealing with such plea raised on behalf of the accused person we may extract the said exceptions to Section 300 IPC, which are as under: "Exception 1. When culpable homicide is not murder.- Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, whilst deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation, causes the death of the person who gave the provocation or causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident." * * * "Exception 4.-Culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender's having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner." 26. With regard to law dealing with Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC we may refer to K.M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1962 SC 605 (AIR p. 626, para 77) in which this Court held that the following conditions must be complied with for the application of Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC : (1) the deceased must have given provocation to the accused, (2) the provocation must be grave, (3) the provocation must be sudden, (4) the offender, by reason of the said provocation, shall have been deprived of his power of self-control, (5) he should have killed the deceased during the continuance of the deprivation of the power of self-control, and (6) the offender must have caused the death of the person who gave the provocation or that of any other person by mistake or accident." 27. With regard to Exception 4 to Section 300 we may refer to Kulesh Mondal v. State of W.B., (2007) 8 SCC 578 , in which this Court held: (SCC p. 581, paras 12-13) "12. The residuary plea relates to the applicability of Exception 4.to Section 300 IPC, as it is contended that the incident took place in course of a sudden quarrel. 13. The residuary plea relates to the applicability of Exception 4.to Section 300 IPC, as it is contended that the incident took place in course of a sudden quarrel. 13. For bringing it in operation it has to be established that the act was committed without premeditation, in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel without the offender having taken undue advantage and not having acted in a cruel or unusual manner." 25. In Babulal Bhagwan Khandare Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 10 SCC 404 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court discussed in detail the law relating to Exceptions 1 and 4 to Section 300 IPC in the following terms: (SCC pp. 410-11, paras 1719) "17. The Fourth Exception to Section 300 IPC covers acts done in a sudden fight. The said exception deals with a case of prosecution (sic provocation) not covered by the first Exception, after which its place would have been more appropriate. The exception is founded upon the same principle, for in both there is absence of premeditation. But, while in the case of Exception 1 there is total deprivation of self-control, in case of Exception 4, there is only that heat of passion which clouds men's sober reason and urges them to deeds which they would not otherwise do. There is provocation in Exception 4 as in Exception 1; but the injury done is not the direct consequence of that provocation. In fact Exception 4 deals with cases in which notwithstanding that a blow may have been struck, or some provocation given in the origin of the dispute or in whatever way the quarrel may have originated, yet the subsequent conduct of both parties puts them in respect of guilt upon equal footing. A 'sudden fight' implies mutual provocation and blows on each side. The homicide committed is then clearly not traceable to unilateral provocation, nor in such cases could the whole blame be placed on one side. For if it were so, the exception more appropriately applicable would be Exception 1. 18. The help of Exception 4 can be invoked if death is caused (a) without premeditation; (b) in a sudden fight; (c) without the offender's having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner; and (d) the fight must have been with the person killed. 18. The help of Exception 4 can be invoked if death is caused (a) without premeditation; (b) in a sudden fight; (c) without the offender's having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner; and (d) the fight must have been with the person killed. To bring a case within Exception 4, all the ingredients mentioned in it must be found. It is to be noted that the 'fight' occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC is not defined in IPC. It takes two to make a fight. Heat of passion requires that there must be no time for the passions to cool down and in this case, the parties had worked themselves into a fury on account of the verbal altercation in the beginning. A fight is a combat between two and more persons whether with or without weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any general rule as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden or not must necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each case. For the application of Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that there was a sudden quarrel and there was no premeditation. It must further be shown that the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. The expression 'undue advantage' as used in the provision means 'unfair advantage'. 19. Where the offender takes undue advantage or has acted in a cruel or unusual manner, the benefit of Exception 4 cannot be given to him. If the weapon used or the manner of attack by the assailant is out of all proportion, that circumstance must be taken into consideration to decide whether undue advantage has been taken. In Kikar Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (1993) 4 SCC 238 , it was held that if the accused used deadly weapons against the unarmed man and struck a blow on the head it must be held that by using the blows with the knowledge that they were likely to cause death he had taken undue advantage." 26. In Arun Raj Vs. Union of India and others, (2010) 6 SCC 457 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held thus: "17. In Arun Raj Vs. Union of India and others, (2010) 6 SCC 457 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held thus: "17. The scope of the "doctrine of provocation" was stated by Viscount Simon in Mancini v. Director of Public Prosecutions, 1942 AC 1: (AC p. 9) "It is not all provocation that will reduce the crime of murder to manslaughter. Provocation, to have that result, must be such as temporarily deprives the person provoked of the power of self-control, as the result of which he commits the unlawful act which causes death. ... The test to be applied is that of the effect of the provocation on a reasonable man, as was laid down by the Court of Criminal Appeal in R. v. Lesbini, (1914) 3 KB 1116 (CCA), so that an unusually excitable or pugnacious individual is not entitled to rely on provocation which would not have led an ordinary person to act as he did. In applying the test, it is of particular importance (a) to consider whether a sufficient interval has elapsed since the provocation to allow a reasonable man time to cool, and (b) to take into account the instrument with which the homicide was effected, for to retort, in the heat of passion induced by provocation, by a simple blow, is a very different thing from making use of a deadly instrument like a concealed dagger. In short, the mode of resentment must bear a reasonable relationship to the provocation if the offence is to be reduced to manslaughter." 26. The determinative factor in Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code is the intentional injury, which must be sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. It is immaterial whether the offender had knowledge that an act of that kind will be likely to cause death. The offender's subjective knowledge of the consequence is irrelevant. The result of the intentionally caused injury must be viewed objectively. It is immaterial whether the offender had knowledge that an act of that kind will be likely to cause death. The offender's subjective knowledge of the consequence is irrelevant. The result of the intentionally caused injury must be viewed objectively. To find out whether the offender had intention to cause such bodily injury, which in the ordinary course of nature was sufficient to cause death, the diverse factors need to be kept in mind such as the force with which the blow was dealt with, the type of weapon used, the vital organ or the particular spot of the body targeted, the nature of the injury caused, the origin and genesis of the crime and the circumstances attended upon the death. 27. In the instant case, the plea of defence of the appellant that this case is covered under one of the above Exceptions to Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code is not supported by the evidence on record. On going through the evidence on record, we find that the provocation did not come from the deceased. The deceased sustained six injuries and these injuries were found on mandibular area. The trachea and occipital region were also cut. The nature of injuries, which the deceased suffered, clearly shows that the sharp portion of the axe was used by the appellant with a considerable force and the injuries were caused on the vital part of the body. 28. The nature of weapon used by the appellant, the manner in which the appellant assaulted the deceased, severity of the blows dealt against the deceased and the parts of body which they were selected for giving such blows would show that the appellant had intention to commit murder of the deceased. 29. In the above facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the considered opinion that the act of the appellant would not be falling under any Exception to Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code. We, accordingly, hold that the conviction of the appellant for the offence under Section 302 IPC is fully justified. 30. Therefore, the finding arrived at by the learned Sessions Judge does not call for any interference by this Court. The judgment of conviction and sentence is impeccable. 31. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. Appeal Dismissed.