JUDGMENT Dr. B.R.Sarangi, J. This application has been filed by the petitioner seeking to quash the proceeding initiated against him under Section 138 of the N.I. Act in I.C.C. Case No. 11 of 2004 pending in the file of learned S.D.J.M., Bargarh. 2. The fact as revealed from the complaint petition, it is found that the complainant-opposite party being a Commercial Financial Firm advances loan on hire purchase of vehicles. The petitioner availed a loan for purchase of a two wheeler from the complainant on hire purchase after executing an agreement to pay the value of the motor cycle in twenty four monthly installments. It is alleged that the petitioner having failed to comply with the terms of the agreement and failed to pay the demand, the complaint has been filed. It is further alleged that the petitioner came to the office of the complainant on 17.11.2003 and issued a cheque bearing No. 842021 for Rs.22,750/-towards full and final payment of the demand and when the said cheque was produced in S.B.I., Commercial Brach, Bargarh for collection, the Chief Manager intimated the complainant that the cheque has been dishonoured stating the reasons in the report “not arranged for” on 11.12.2003. The complainant thereafter called upon the petitioner through their Advocates to pay the cheque amount within fifteen days, but the petitioner failed to comply the notice and hence the complaint petition has been filed, which is registered as I.C.C. Case No. 11 of 2004, pending before the learned S.D.J.M., Bargarh. 3. Mr. Basudev Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the complaint petition filed under Annexure-1 having not specified requirements of Section 138 of the N.I. Act and having not given notice, the proceeding is liable to be quashed. He further submitted that the petitioner has repaid the entire installment dues and, therefore, initiation of the proceeding against the petitioner is vitiated and that ultimately amounts to abuse of the process of Court. 4. In the above backdrop of the case in hand, in order to appreciate the position of law, Section 138 and 142 of the N.I. Act is quoted below :- “138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc. 4. In the above backdrop of the case in hand, in order to appreciate the position of law, Section 138 and 142 of the N.I. Act is quoted below :- “138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc. of funds in the account-Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge in whole or in part of any debt or other liability is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or thta it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall without prejudice to any other provision of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both : Provided that nothing contained this section shall apply unless : (a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity whichever is earlier; (b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque within fifteen days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and (c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice. Explanation :-For the purposes of this section, “debt other liability” means a legally enforceable debt or other liability. 142. Explanation :-For the purposes of this section, “debt other liability” means a legally enforceable debt or other liability. 142. Cognizance of offences : Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)- (a) no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under Section 138 except upon a complaint, in writing, made by the payee or, as the case may be, the holder in due course of the cheque; (b) such complaint is made within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 : “Provided that the cognizance of a complaint may be taken by the Court after the prescribed period, if the complainant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making a complaint within such period. (c) no Court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence punishable under Section 138.” 5. In view of the above mentioned position of law in terms of Section 138 of the N.I. Act, complaint petition alleging an offence thereto must demonstrate the following ingredients exist: “(i) a cheque was issued; (ii) the same was presented; (iii) but, it was dishonoured; (iv) a notice in terms of the said provision was served on the person sought to be made liable; and (v) despite service of notice, neither any payment was made nor other obligations, if any, were complied with within fifteen days from the date of receipt of the notice.” 6. Law is well settled in 2007 (I) OLR (SC) 559 (S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla and another) = 2007 (I) OLR 347 (Saroj Kumar Poddar v. State (NCT of Delhi) and another, 2008 (41) OLR (SC) 1002 (Smt. Shamshad Begum v. B. Mohammed) that unless the ingredients of Section 138 of the N.I. Act are satisfied, the proceeding so initiated against the accused person cannot be sustainable. 7. Keeping in view the above mentioned provisions and looking at the facts of the case, in the complaint petition under Annexure-1, it is found that no notice has been given to the petitioner as required under the law compelling the petitioner to pay the dues. 7. Keeping in view the above mentioned provisions and looking at the facts of the case, in the complaint petition under Annexure-1, it is found that no notice has been given to the petitioner as required under the law compelling the petitioner to pay the dues. In paragraph-7 of the complaint petition, it is only stated that the complainant has called upon the petitioner through their Advocate to pay the cheque amount within fifteen days, but the petitioner has failed to comply the notice of the complainant in spite of receipt of the notice. It is apt to state that neither copy of any such notice has been given nor any documents have been filed indicating that such notice has ever been issued to the petitioner and on which date the notice has been made is sufficient against the petitioner. Merely making a bald statement in the complaint petition without given any material particulars with regard to the service of notice and receipt thereof, the presumption made by the complainant that there is a complaint under Section 138 of the N.I. Act is absolute misconceived one. 8. Law is well settled by the Hon’ble apex Court in S.L. Construction & another v. Alapati Srinivasa Rao and another 2009 (42) OCR (SC) 303, which reads as follows: “While taking cognizance, learned Magistrate has to specify that: (i) the cheque must be presented within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn; (ii) on the cheque being returned unpaid by the banker, a notice has to be issued within 30 days from the date of receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the cheque being unpaid; (iii) in the event, the drawer of the cheque fails to make payment of the said amount of money to be paid within 15 days from the receipt thereof, a complaint petition can be filed within the period prescribed in terms of Section 142 thereof.” A reading of the complaint petition does not satisfy the requirement of law as held by the Supreme Court in S.L. Construction(supra). 9. 9. Now the next question for consideration is whether in the light of the aforesaid factual position as projected in the complaint petition, it is a fit case where High Court should exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482, Cr.P.C. In view of the judgment reported in 2009 (II) OLR (SC) 309 (Jugesh Sehgal v. Shamsher Singh Gogi) where the Hon’ble apex Court has been held in paragraph 13, 14 and 15 to the following effect : “13. The scope and ambit of powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code has been enunciated and reiterated by this Court in a series of decisions and several circumstances under which the High Court can exercise jurisdiction in quashing proceedings have been enumerated. Therefore, it is unnecessary to burden the judgment by making reference to all the decisions on the point. It would suffice to state that though the powers possessed by the High Courts under the said provision are very wide but these should be exercised in appropriate cases, ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone the courts exits. The inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the High Court to act according to whim or caprice. The powers have to be exercised sparingly, with circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases, where the court is convinced, on the basis of material on record, that allowing the proceedings to continue would be an abuse of the process of the court or that the ends of justice require that the proceedings ought to be quashed. [See : Janata Dal Vs. H.S. Chowdhary & Ors. (1992) 4 SCC 305 , Kurukshetra University & Anr. Vs. State of Haryana & Anr. (1977) 4 SCC 451 and State of Haryana & Ors. Vs. Bhajan Lal & Ors. 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335] 14. Although in Bhajan Lal’s case (supra), the court by way of illustration, formulated as many as seven categories of cases, wherein the extra-ordinary power under the afore-stated provisions could be exercised by the High Court to prevent abuse of process of the court yet it was clarified that it was not possible to lay down precise and of the circumstances in which such power could be exercised. 15. The purport of the expression “rarest of rare cases” has been explained very recently in Som Mittal Vs. 15. The purport of the expression “rarest of rare cases” has been explained very recently in Som Mittal Vs. Government of Karnataka (2008) 3 SCC 574 . Speaking for the three-Judge Bench, Hon’ble the Chief Justice said : When the words ‘rarest of the rare cases’ are used after the words ‘sparingly and with circumspection’ while describing the scope of Section 482, those words merely emphasize and reiterate what is intended to be conveyed by the words ‘sparingly and with circumspection’. They mean that the power under Section 482 to quash proceedings should not be used mechanically or routinely, but with care and caution, only when a clear case for quashing is made out and failure to interfere would lead to a miscarriage of justice. The expression “rarest of rare cases” is not used in the sense in which it is used with reference to punishment for offences under Section 302 I.P.C., but to emphasize that the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the FIR or criminal proceedings should be used sparingly and with circumspection.” 10. In view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble apex Court and considering the factual position available in the complaint petition and taking into account that the petitioner has already paid the installment dues and he is being harassed by the complainant, I am of the opinion that in order to prevent to abuse of the process of Court and in the interest of justice, this is a fit case where this Court in exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482, Cr.P.C. should quash the proceeding initiated against the petitioner under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. Accordingly, the proceeding so initiated under Section 138 of the N.I. Act in ICC Case No. 11 of 2004 pending in the court of learned S.D.J.M., Bargarh is quashed. The CRLMC is allowed.