ORDER 1. The petitioner who was dismissed from service with effect from 17.10.2001 has filed the present writ petition seeking quashing of the order dated 17.10.2001 and consequently, his reinstatement in the service and other reliefs. 2. The petitioner was appointed as a Fitter (Electrical) on 03.01.1972 in Bokaro Steel Limited (BSL). On the basis of a written statement of one B.K.S. Chauhan, a constable of C.I.S.F, a Criminal Case being Bokaro Steel City P.S. Case No. 398 of 1997 was registered against the petitioner under Section 379 / 411 of the Indian Penal Code. Subsequently, the petitioner was suspended with effect from 29.12.1997 and a Charge Memo was issued for theft of Company's property. By a corrigendum dated 14 / 17.07.1998, the date of suspension of the petitioner was shifted back from 29.12.1997 to 22.11.1997. The petitioner submitted his statement of defence denying the charges levelled against him. However, an enquiry committee was constituted by order dated 14.07.1998 which was required to submit its report within 45 days. In the mean time, by order dated 28.08.2001, the petitioner was convicted for an offence under Section 379 / 411 of the Indian Penal Code and he was sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for one year. The petitioner preferred Criminal Appeal No. 60 of 2001 challenging order of conviction and sentence dated 28.08.2001. Thereafter, on 17.10.2001, the respondent-company dispensed with the departmental enquiry against the petitioner and in view of order of conviction dated 28.08.2001, dismissed the petitioner from service with effect from 17.10.2001. The Criminal Appeal No. 60 of 2001 filed by the petitioner was allowed and order of conviction and sentence dated 28.08.2001 was set-aside by the Court of 1st Additional District and Sessions Judge, Bokaro. The petitioner submitted his representation on 09.04.2002 to the respondent – company for his reinstatement in service however, inspite of several reminders and representations, the petitioner was not reinstated in service and on 04.09.2003, he was served an eviction notice for illegally occupying company's quarter. The petitioner has therefore, filed the present writ petition. 3. A counter – affidavit has been filed justifying the dismissal of the petitioner from the service and other orders impugned by the petitioner on the ground that the respondent – company can not have any trust or confidence in such an employee who has been prosecuted in a criminal case notwithstanding his acquittal by the appellate Court. 4. 3. A counter – affidavit has been filed justifying the dismissal of the petitioner from the service and other orders impugned by the petitioner on the ground that the respondent – company can not have any trust or confidence in such an employee who has been prosecuted in a criminal case notwithstanding his acquittal by the appellate Court. 4. Heard counsel for both the parties and perused the documents on record. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner has confined his argument only to the sustainability of order dated 17.10.2001 dismissing the petitioner from service. The learned counsel has submitted that once the departmental proceeding, though initiated, has been dispensed with and thus, there is no finding of misconduct arrived at in the departmental proceeding the petitioner is entitled for reinstatement in service because the order of conviction and sentence dated 28.08.2001 has been set-aside by the appellate Court. He further submitted that the petitioner was falsely implicated in the criminal case and he has been honourably acquitted in the said case and therefore, he was entitled to be reinstated in service from the date on which he was dismissed from service and his period of suspension was also liable to be counted as his regular service with full back wages. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that the petitioner has been acquitted on a technical ground because the prosecution witnesses turned hostile. The company does not have any trust and faith in him and therefore, he has been dismissed from service. 6. Heard counsel for both the parties and perused the record. It is an admitted position that the departmental proceeding which was initiated against the petitioner was not taken to its logical conclusion and after the conviction of the petitioner in the criminal case, the departmental proceeding against the petitioner was dispensed with and only on the basis of his conviction in the criminal case, the petitioner has been dismissed from service. The petitioner has now been acquitted of the charges in the criminal case. In such a situation, I find force in the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner that he is entitled for reinstatement in service with back wages. The petitioner has now been acquitted of the charges in the criminal case. In such a situation, I find force in the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner that he is entitled for reinstatement in service with back wages. I am of the opinion that had there been a regular departmental proceeding concluded in which the petitioner was found guilty of misconduct, then the position would have been different and it would have been open to the respondents to contend and justify their order dismissing the petitioner from service on the ground that order of acquittal by the criminal Court was not binding in so far as departmental proceeding was concerned. But in the present case, the departmental proceeding against the petitioner was dispensed with and therefore, there is no finding of proved misconduct against the petitioner recorded in the departmental proceeding. 7. The law relating to nature and scope of a criminal case and of a departmental proceeding has been well settled by a catena of judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court. The nature and scope of a criminal case are different from those of a departmental enquiry and an order of acquittal in the criminal case does not conclude the departmental proceeding in every case. In the case of “State of Kanataka Vs. T. Venkataramanappa”, [reported in (1996) 6 SCC 455 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that acquittal in a criminal case cannot be held to be a bar to hold departmental enquiry for the same misconduct for the reason that in a criminal trial, standard of proof is different as the case is to be proved beyond reasonable doubt but in the departmental proceeding, such a strict proof of misconduct is not required. 8. A three-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of “Ajit Kumar Nag Vs. Indian Oil Corporation Limited”, [reported in (2005) 7 SCC 764 ] has held as under:- 15. (11) “In our judgment, the law is fairly well settled. Acquittal by a criminal court would not debar an employer from exercising power in accordance with the Rules and Regulations in force. The two proceedings, criminal and departmental, are entirely different. They operate in different fields and have different objectives. (11) “In our judgment, the law is fairly well settled. Acquittal by a criminal court would not debar an employer from exercising power in accordance with the Rules and Regulations in force. The two proceedings, criminal and departmental, are entirely different. They operate in different fields and have different objectives. Whereas the object of criminal trial is to inflict appropriate punishment on the offender, the purpose of enquiry proceedings is to deal with the delinquent departmentally and to impose penalty in accordance with the service rules. In a criminal trial, incriminating statement made by the accused in certain circumstances or before certain officers is totally inadmissible in evidence. Such strict rules of evidence and procedure would not apply to departmental proceedings. The degree of proof which is necessary to order a conviction is different from the degree of proof necessary to record the commission of delinquency. The rule relating to appreciation of evidence in the two proceedings is also not similar. In criminal law, burden of proof is on the prosecution and unless the prosecution is able to prove the guilt of the accused 'beyond reasonable doubt', he cannot be convicted by a court of law. In a departmental enquiry, on the other hand, penalty can be imposed on the delinquent officer on a finding recorded on the basis of 'preponderance of probability'.” 9. In view of the judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court, there can not be any dispute that though both criminal case as well as departmental proceeding can proceed simultaneously. In certain cases if same set of evidence has been proposed to be produced in a departmental enquiry, acquittal in the criminal case would be a bar to such an enquiry [ Capt. M. Paul Anthony Vs. Bharat Gold Mines Limited, reported in (1999) 3 SCC 679 ].In the present case departmental proceeding though, was initiated however, it was dispensed with in view of the conviction of the petitioner in the criminal case and the petitioner was dismissed from service on the ground of his conviction in the criminal case. In the case of “Divisional Controller, Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation Vs. M.G. Vittal Rao” [reported in (2012) 1 SCC 442 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held:- 11. In the case of “Divisional Controller, Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation Vs. M.G. Vittal Rao” [reported in (2012) 1 SCC 442 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held:- 11. “The question of considering reinstatement after decision of acquittal or discharge by a competent criminal court arises only and only if the dismissal from services was based on conviction by the criminal court in view of the provisions of Article 311 (2) (b) [sic Article 311 (2) second proviso (a)] of the Constitution of India, or analogous provisions in the statutory rules applicable in a case. In a case where enquiry has been held independently of the criminal proceedings, acquittal in a criminal court is of no help. The law is otherwise. Even if a person stood acquitted by a criminal court, domestic enquiry can be held, the reason being that the standard of proof required in a domestic enquiry and that in a criminal case are altogether different. In a criminal case, standard of proof required is beyond reasonable doubt while in a domestic enquiry it is the preponderance of probabilities that constitutes the test to be applied.” 10. The respondents have taken the plea of loss of confidence in the employee which needs to be examined in view of the pleadings on record. In the present case, the departmental proceeding did not continue and it was dispensed with and therefore, there is no finding against the petitioner in the departmental proceeding. In the criminal case, the petitioner has been acquitted of the charges levelled against him. In the case of “Kanhaiyalal Agrawal Vs. Gwalior Sugar Co. Ltd.”, [reported in (2001) 9SCC 609], the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that loss of confidence can not be subjective, based upon the mind of the management. Objective facts which lead to a definite interference of apprehension in the mind of the management, regarding trustworthiness or reliability of the employee must be alleged and proved. In the present case, I find that except pleading loss of confidence in the petitioner the respondents have not brought on record any material which would support their contention. 11. Objective facts which lead to a definite interference of apprehension in the mind of the management, regarding trustworthiness or reliability of the employee must be alleged and proved. In the present case, I find that except pleading loss of confidence in the petitioner the respondents have not brought on record any material which would support their contention. 11. The petitioner has been dismissed from service only on the ground of his conviction in the criminal case and therefore, I am of the opinion that once the order of conviction and sentence dated 28.08.2001 has been set-aside by the appellate Court, the petitioner was entitled for reinstatement in service. However, the question regarding payment of Back-Wages has to be considered in the facts of the case. There is no evidence on record that the petitioner was not gainfully employed after termination of his service. 12. In the Case of “Hindustan Motors Limited Vs. Tapan Kumar Bhattacharya and Another”, [reported in (2002) 6 SCC 41 ], the Hon'ble Supreme court noticed that there was no pleading or evidence as to whether the respondent therein was employed elsewhere during the long interregnum and therefore, only 50 % of the back wages till the date of reinstatement was ordered. 13. In the case of “Allahabad Jal Sansthan Vs. Daya Shankar Rai and Another”, [reported in (2005) 5 SCC 124 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court did not approve granting of full back wages to the workman and instead only 50 % of the back wages was ordered to be paid to the workman. 14. In the case of “Cantonment Executive Officer and Another Vs. Vijay D. Wani and Others”, [reported in (2008) 12 SCC 230 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court after holding that the enquiry was vitiated by bias, set-aside the order and ordered 50 % back wages to the employee. It has been held; 17. “So far as grant of back wages is concerned, it depends upon case to case. But in the present case as the respondent was found guilty by the Cantonment Board but the order of Cantonment Board was set-aside because it suffered from bias it will be unfair to deny 50 % back wages to the respondent (herein). The Division Bench also directed that more than 13 years have passed, therefore, it did not permit the respondent to proceed against the petition afresh. The Division Bench also directed that more than 13 years have passed, therefore, it did not permit the respondent to proceed against the petition afresh. The Division Bench decided the matter on 10.01.2005 and now more than 16 years have lapsed. Therefore, it would not be fair to permit the respondent to proceed afresh in the matter. Consequently, we do not find any merit in this appeal and the same is dismissed. 18. The respondent be reinstated with the benefit of 50 % back wages and continuity of service.” 15. In the case of “State of Uttar Pradesh and Others Vs. Ram Daras Yadav”, [reported in (2010) 2 SCC 236 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court modified the order of dismissal with withholding of two increments and ordered that the employee would be reinstated in service with 50 % back wages. Similar is the view taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of “Bharat Coking Coal Limited Through Management Vs. National Coal Workers Congress”, [reported in (2009) 7SCC 160] and in the case of “Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board and Others Vs. Miku Prasad”, [reported in (2008) 16 SCC 762]. 16. In the result, the impugned order dated 17.10.2001 is hereby quashed. However, in peculiar facts of the case, the respondents are directed to pay 50 % of the back wages to the petitioner. The writ petition is allowed in the aforesaid terms. 17. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.