JUDGMENT: By Court.- The sole petitioner has approached this Court, challenging the order dated 27.09.2001 imposing penalty of reduction to the lower post of Assistant Grade-I (Min) with immediate effect, fixing his pay applicable to the post of Assistant Grade-I (Min) and whereby his seniority was ordered to be re-fixed at the bottom of the seniority list of Assistant Grade-I (Min). Subsequently, pursuant to a permission by this Court, petitioner has filed his appeal, which was decided on 01.08.2002. By filing I.A. No. 65 of 2003, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 01.08.2002 passed by the appellate authority also. 2. The petitioner, who was appointed on 16.09.1970 as Assistant Grade-III (Min) in the Food Corporation of India, was issued a show-cause notice on 25.07.2001 for initiating a departmental proceeding against him. By order dated 14.08.2001, an Enquiry Officer was appointed and the departmental proceeding was initiated, wherein the petitioner appeared and filed his reply. Witnesses were examined on behalf of the department and cross-examined by the petitioner and then a report dated 10.09.2001 was submitted. On consideration of the materials on record, the order of penalty dated 27.09.2001 was passed. In the aforesaid circumstance, the petitioner has approached this Court seeking quashing of orders dated 27.09.2001 and 01.08.2002. 3. The respondents appeared and filed counter-affidavit supporting their action on the ground that during the enquiry, the petitioner was given full opportunity to defend himself and on consideration of materials on record and enquiry report, impugned orders have been passed. 4. Heard counsel for the parties and perused the documents on record. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that this is a case based on 'no evidence'. The Enquiry Officer has ignored the materials, which were brought on record by the petitioner and the order of penalty has been passed excluding the relevant materials. On these grounds the petitioner has approached the Court challenging the order of penalty. He further summated that the appellate order is cryptic as no reason has been assigned. It suffers from non-application of mind and it is apparent on the face of record that relevant materials have been excluded while deciding the appeal of the petitioner. On these grounds the petitioner has approached the Court challenging the order of penalty. He further summated that the appellate order is cryptic as no reason has been assigned. It suffers from non-application of mind and it is apparent on the face of record that relevant materials have been excluded while deciding the appeal of the petitioner. The learned counsel for the petitioner drew the attention of the Court to Annexure-3/A series to substantiate his stand that prior to the alleged letter written by the petitioner, there had been correspondences with respect to one lady Smt. Sumitra Devi in the year 1988-89 till 1997-98. The petitioner has not extended any undue favour by writing a letter in dealing with the official files. He further drew the attention of the Court to the witnesses examined on behalf of the department particularly question No. 10 of the evidence of one Md. Ali Raja and question Nos. 6 and 7 in his cross-examination which are extracted below; “Q. No. 10. Does, Ext. PI bear SRM's approval in respect of issuance of Ext P II ? Ans: As per official decorum Asstt. Manager suppose to place the file to his next higher official i.e. DM (Per.) and if DM (P) is not available then next high officer RM/ SRM. In this case the file marked to DM who has seen his note para 105 and returned back to AM (P) means the approval of DM (P) for the action taken by him. Q. No. 6. Do you know respected Mr. Mundari by face ? Ans: Yes, I identify he is present here. Q. No. 7. Please read out and record before the learned ID. The penultimate para of note para 104 of exhibit P I. Ans: In this regards, DM, Saharsa may kindly be asked to furnish her full particulars,so that she can be regularised from Casual Scavenger.” 6. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents has submitted that the petitioner has been found guilty in a properly constituted departmental enquiry. He drew the attention of the Court to paragraph 11 of the report which reads as under: “Further, from examination of PW-1 it has come on record that the two note paras 104 and 105 of Ext. P/1 and the letter dated Ext. P/2, all were initiated and issued on the self same date. What was the reason for such hurry ? P/1 and the letter dated Ext. P/2, all were initiated and issued on the self same date. What was the reason for such hurry ? Defence could not have come up with even on iota of evidence on record to justify such undue hurry. As an Asstt. Manager of the Corporation the C.O. must have known the consequences of regularization of casual work in the Corporation from the pecuniary point of view. ” 7. Learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that in a departmental proceeding in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the High Court's power is really very restricted. The Court would not appreciate the evidence on record. There is no requirement in law that a detailed order should be passed by the appellate authority while exercising the appellate powers and on these grounds he supported the impugned orders. 8. The jurisdiction and power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been settled by a catena of judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In the case of “Nagendra Nath Bora and Another Vs. Commissioner of Hills Division”, [reported in AIR 1958 SC 398 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: 26. “But the question still remains as to what is the legal import of the expression 'error of law apparent on the face of the record.' Is it every error of law that can attract the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court, to quash the order impugned? This court, as observed above, has settled the law in this respect by laying down that in order to attract such jurisdiction, it is essential that the error should be something more than a mere error of law; that it must be one which is manifest on the face of the record. In this respect, the law in India and the law in England are, therefore, the same. It is also clear, on an examination of all the authorities of this Court and of those in England, referred to above, as also those considered in the several judgments of this Court, that the common-law writ, now called order of certiorari, which was also adopted by our Constitution, is not meant to take the place of an appeal where the statute does not confer a right of appeal. Its purpose is only to determine, on an examination of the record, whether the inferior tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction or has not proceeded in accordance with the essential requirements of the law which it was meant to administer. Mere formal or technical errors, even though of law, will not be sufficient to attract this extraordinary jurisdiction.” 9. A Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of “State of Orissa and others Vs. Bidyabhushan Mohapatra”, [reported in AIR 1963 SC 779 ] has held as under:- 9. “The High Court has held that there was evidence to support the findings on heads (C) and (d) of Charge (1) and Charge (2). In respect of charge 1(b) the respondent was acquitted by the Tribunal and it did not fall the be considered by the Governor. In respect of charges 1(a) and 1(e) in the view of the High court” the rules of natural justice had not been observed.” The recommendation of the Tribunal was undoubtedly founds on its findings on charges 1(a), 1(e), 1(c), 1(d) and Charge (2). The High Court was of the opinion that the findings on two of the heads under Charge (1) could not be sustained, because in arriving at the findings the Tribunal had violated rules of natural justice. The High Court therefore directed that the Government of the State of Orissa should decide whether “on the basis of those charges, the punishment of dismissal should be maintained or else whether a lesser punishment would suffice.” it is not necessary for us to consider whether the High court was right in holding that the findings of the Tribunal on charges 1(a) and 1(e) were vitiated for reasons set out by it, because in our judgment the order of the High court directing the Government to reconsider the question of punishment cannot, for reasons we will presently set out, be sustained. If the order of dismissal was based on the findings on charges 1(a) and 1(e) alone the court would have jurisdiction to declare the order of dismissal illegal but when the findings of the Tribunal relating to the two out of five heads of the first charge and the second charge was found not liable to be interfered with by the High Court and those findings established that the respondent was prima facie guilty of grave delinquency, in our view the High court had no power to direct the Governor of Orissa to reconsider the order of dismissal. The constitutional guarantee afforded to a public servant is that he shall not be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed, and that he shall not be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank until he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him. The reasonable opportunity contemplated has manifestly to be in accordance with the rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution. But the court in a case in which an order of dismissal of a public servant is impugned, is not concerned to decide whether the sentence imposed, provided it is justified by the rules, is appropriate having regard to the gravity of the misdemeanor established. The reasons which induce the punishing authority, if there has been an enquiry consistent with the prescribed rules, are not justiciable: nor is the penalty open to review by the court. If the High court is satisfied that if some but not all of the findings of the Tribunal were “unassailable”, the order of the Governor on whose powers by the rules no restrictions in determining the appropriate punishment are placed was final, and the High court had no jurisdiction to direct the Governor to review the penalty for as we have already observed the order of dismissal passed by a competent authority on a public servant, if the conditions of the constitutional protection have been complied with, is not justiciable. Therefore if the order may be supported on any findings as to substantial misdemeanor for which the punishment can lawfully be imposed, it is not for the Court to consider whether that ground alone would have weighed with the authority in dismissing the public servant. Therefore if the order may be supported on any findings as to substantial misdemeanor for which the punishment can lawfully be imposed, it is not for the Court to consider whether that ground alone would have weighed with the authority in dismissing the public servant. The Court has no jurisdiction of the findings of the enquiry officer or the Tribunal prima facie make out a case of misdemeanor, to direct the authority to reconsider that order because in respect of some of the findings but not all it appears that there had been violation of the rules of natural justice. The High court was, in our judgment, in error in directing the Governor of Orissa to reconsider the question.” 10. A similar view has been taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of “State of Andhra Pradesh and Others Vs. S. Sree Rama Rao”, reported in AIR 1963 SC 1723 . 11. The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on para 10 of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of “Bhagat Ram Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and Others”, [reported in AIR 1983 SC 454 ] which is quoted below:- 10. “ Let us make it abundantly clear that we are not sitting in appeal over the findings of the Inquiry Officer. In a petition under Article 226, the High Court does not function as a Court of appeal over the findings of disciplinary authority. But where the finding is utterly perverse, the Court can always interfere with the same. We may refer in this connection to Union of India Vs. H.C. Goel (1964) 4 SCR 718 at p 728: (AIR 1964 SC364 at p 369), Gajendragadkar, J. speaking for the Court observed as under: “It still remains to be considered whether the respondent is not right when he contends that in the circumstances of this case, the conclusion of the Government is based on no evidence whatever. It is a conclusion which is perverse and, therefore, suffers from such an obvious and patent error on the face of the record that the High Court would be justified in quashing it. It is a conclusion which is perverse and, therefore, suffers from such an obvious and patent error on the face of the record that the High Court would be justified in quashing it. In dealing with writ petitions filed by the public servants who have been dismissed, or otherwise dealt with so as to attract Article 311 (2), the High Court under Article 226 has jurisdiction to enquire whether the conclusion of the Government on which the impugned order of dismissal rests is not supported by any evidence at all. It is true that the order of dismissal which may be passed against a government servant found guilty of misconduct, can be described as an administrative order; nevertheless, the proceedings held against such a public servant under the statutory rules to determine whether he is guilty of the charge framed against him are in the nature of quasi-judicial proceedings and there can be little doubt that a writ of certiorari, for instance, can be claimed by a public servant if he is able to satisfy the High Court that the ultimate conclusion of the Govt. in the said proceedings, which is the basis of his dismissal is based on no evidence.” After applying this test in that case, the Court proceeded to have a close look at the evidence that was led in the case and in the circumstances of the case rejected the evidence of Shri Rajagopalan, who claimed to have given the bribe and reached the conclusion that the finding of the Government holding the delinquent officer guilty of excepting bribe was perverse and unsupported by any evidence. More or less the facts before us almost lead to the same conclusion.” 12. On a consideration of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court with respect to the power exercised by the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, there is no manner of doubt that power of the High Court to interfere with findings recorded in a departmental proceeding is very limited. The High Court would not appreciate the evidence on record unless the findings are so absurd or are based on 'no evidence'. 13. The High Court would not appreciate the evidence on record unless the findings are so absurd or are based on 'no evidence'. 13. In the present case, the petitioner was proceeded against on the charge that during the year 1998, he misused his official position, shown illegally to one Smt. Sumitra Devi, a Part-time Scavenger by issuing a letter bearing Reference No. Estt/Genl/Parliament Question/96 dated 24.6.1998, addressed to the District Manager, FCI, Saharsa under his signature on 24.6.1998 for Senior Regional Manger, Patna unauthorizedly. It has further been alleged that he had handed over the said Regional Office letter, in two copies, to Smt. Sumitra Devi against acknowledgment receipt on the body of the said letter in willful violation of Rules and Regulations laid down for such official information /documents /papers to an individual not entitled to receive the same, in writing or verbally and has committed gross misconduct inasmuch as failed to maintain absolute integrity, devotion to duty to discharge duty faithfully and honestly and acted in a manner prejudicial to the interest of the Corporation. 14. It is not the case of the petitioner that during the enquiry he was not afforded opportunity to defend himself. There is no violation of the principles of natural justice. The petitioner has participated in the enquiry and he has cross-examined the witnesses. On a consideration of the materials on record, the Enquiry Officer has found the charges proved against the petitioner. I am unable to accept the contention of the counsel for the petitioner that this is a case of 'no evidence'. From the evidence of Md. Ali Raja, on which the learned counsel for the petitioner has heavily relied, I do not find anything substantial coming on record which would make the charges against the petitioner unbelievable. From the documents on record, i.e. Annexure – 3 / A series, the only fact which would appear is that there were some correspondences going on with respect to some of casual labourers, the name of said Smt. Sumitra Devi also appeared in such correspondences. It is the case of the department that on the basis of the letter of the petitioner, said Smt. Sumitra Devi filed a case in the High Court, seeking her regularisation in the service. In this manner, the petitioner has committed misconduct and in the enquiry, he has been found guilty. It is the case of the department that on the basis of the letter of the petitioner, said Smt. Sumitra Devi filed a case in the High Court, seeking her regularisation in the service. In this manner, the petitioner has committed misconduct and in the enquiry, he has been found guilty. In view of the above I am not inclined to interfere in this matter, because it would be then re-appreciating the evidence on record, which is not permissible for excercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 15. Dealing with the next contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner who has submitted that the appellate authority has not considered the materials on record and the appellate order is a cryptic order, I find that the appellate order records:- “The Disciplinary Authority after going through the Inquiry report, evidence on record and connected records of the case observed Shri Mundari guilty of the charges levelled against the Co., and imposed upon Sh. Mundari the penalty of “Reduction to the lower post of AG.I (M) and his seniority will be refixed at the bottom of the senioryt list of Ag. I (M) vide order no. Estt. 36 (23)/Bihar/2001, dated 27.9.2001. Aggrieved with the order of the Disciplinary Authority, Shri S.S. Mundari, Ex. AG. I (Min.) preferred his Appeal petition dated 03.11.2001 before the Managing Director, the Appellate authority for consideration. As per existing instructions I have heard Shri S.S. Mundari, Ex. AG. I (Min.) in my Chamber on 24.07.2002 and he extended a representation dated 13.7.2002. I have carefully gone through the case record, Inquiry report, connected papers and the representation dated 13.07.2002 of the CO. I find that the Appellant has not adduced any fresh point for reconsideration. The charges have been established against the CO. I do not see any ground to interfere with the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority. The Appeal petition is therefore rejected.” 16. In the case of “Narinder Mohan Arya Vs. United India Insurance CO. LTD”, [reported in (2006) 4 SCC 713 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held, 33. The charges have been established against the CO. I do not see any ground to interfere with the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority. The Appeal petition is therefore rejected.” 16. In the case of “Narinder Mohan Arya Vs. United India Insurance CO. LTD”, [reported in (2006) 4 SCC 713 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held, 33. “An appellate order if it is in agreement with that of the disciplinary authority may not be a speaking order but the authority passing the same must show that there had been proper application of mind on his part as regards the compliance with the requirements of law while exercising his jurisdiction under Rule 37 of the Rules.” 17. The appellate authority while agreeing with the findings of the disciplinary authority has recorded in order dated 01.08.2002 that he has carefully gone through the record, enquiry report, representation dated 13.07.2002 of the petitioner and other connected materials. It has further been recorded that the appellant had not adduced any fresh point for reconsideration. In such view of the matter, the appeal of the petitioner was rejected. I am of the view that there was no necessity for the appellate authority to record each and every contention of the petitioner separately particularly, in view of the fact that the petitioner did not raise any new point for consideration of the appellate authority. The appellate order is not a non-speaking order and it satisfies the principles of natural justice. 18. In the result, the writ petition fails and accordingly, it is dismissed.