ORDER 1. This application is directed against the order dated 20.3.2007 passed by learned Subordinate Judge-I, Aurangabad (Bihar) whereby the learned Court below has been pleased to dismiss the Misc. Case No. 3 of 1993 filed by the petitioner under proviso to Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Code’) for setting aside the compromise decree passed in Partition Suit No. 87 of 1986. 2. Facts of the case giving rise to the present application in brief is that a Title Suit No. 87 of 1986 was filed by the opposite party No.1 together with his minor son in the capacity of a guardian, seeking partition of the joint family property against his father, mother and the petitioner. A compromise petition was filed on behalf of the contesting parties on 4.5.1987. Following the compromise petition, the suit was disposed of by the compromise decree dated 27.7.1987. The petitioner feigning ignorance about the compromise decree, has stated that upon gathering knowledge of the same, she immediately applied for certified copy of the judgment and decree on 2.6.1989 and obtained it on 4.7.1989. It is stated that immediately thereafter she filed a Title Suit No. 199 of 1989 for setting aside the compromise decree but as it had been filed before a wrong forum, the same was withdrawn on 26.7.1990. Thereafter the petitioner filed another suit giving rise to Title Suit No. 59 of 1990 in the Court of Sub Judge-I, Aurangabad on 30.7.1990. A petition was filed on 29.4.1993 in the said suit, seeking permission of the Court to convert the same into a miscellaneous case and which was allowed on the same date giving rise to Misc. Case No. 3 of 1993. The said miscellaneous case has been dismissed by the order impugned dated 20.3.2007 on merits as well as on grounds of being barred by limitation and hence the present application. 3. Mr. Kamala Prasad Roy, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, while questioning the order impugned has referred to the concluding lines of paragraph 2 to submit that the Court below having permitted the petitioner to convert the title suit into a miscellaneous case after hearing the parties, has committed a serous infirmity in holding that the same was barred by limitation and did not accompany any petition for condonation of delay. The petitioner had no knowledge about the compromise petition filed in the Title Suit No. 87 of 1986 nor did she put her signatures on the compromise petition or had given her evidence in support of the compromise and in absence of these relevant factors, the compromise decree is illegal. It is stated that the learned Court below having recorded its finding at paragraph 9 of the impugned order that the signatures of the petitioner on the compromise petition dated 4.5.1987, did not tally with a specimen signature and despite taking note of the expert report, has held the same inconclusive and not reliable. 4. On the aforementioned grounds and on the strength of the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 2001 SC 2552 (Dhurandhar Prasad Singh versus Jai Prakash University and others), it is submitted that the compromise decree being a nullity, has to be declared as such and that the order impugned is contrary to the legal position. 5. The arguments of Mr. Roy, has been contested by Mr. Rajendra Prasad Singh, learned Senior counsel for the opposite parties. 6. With reference to the deposition of the petitioner given during the miscellaneous proceeding placed at Annexure-3 of the present proceeding more particularly to paragraph 3 it is stated that the petitioner has accepted that she got knowledge of the case 8 years back. 7. In response to the submission made by Mr. Roy with reference to the concluding four lines of paragraph 2 of the impugned order, it is submitted that the Court has merely referred to the submissions and those are not the findings of the Court. It is submitted that while withdrawing the Title Suit No. 199 of 1989, no permission as required under order 23 Rule 1 of the Code for filing a fresh suit, was obtained by the petitioner nor was granted by the Court concerned and thus the subsequent Title Suit No. 59 of 1990 which stood converted as the miscellaneous case in question, is not maintainable. It is submitted that the trial Court has framed a specific issue on this aspect. It is submitted that the trial Court has framed a specific issue on this aspect. It is submitted that although the petitioner has accepted that she got knowledge about the compromise decree 8 years back but neither the application was filed within the limitation prescribed nor was it explained in the suit/miscellaneous case nor was accompanied with a petition for condonation of delay and thus was rightly rejected by the Court below. 8. Mr. Singh, learned Senior counsel for the opposite parties again with reference to the deposition of the lawyer of the petitioner placed at Annexure-4 of the counter affidavit has submitted that the statement in paragraph 1 of the disposition is a complete answer to all the issues raised by the petitioner inasmuch as her counsel has admitted before the Court below that the petitioner was made aware of the contents of the compromise petition and whereafter she put her signature thereon. 9. With reference to a sale deed placed at Annexure-5 of the counter affidavit which is dated 5.2.1991, it is stated that the petitioner acting on the compromise decree, has gifted 1.37 acres of the share allotted to her under the compromise, to one Kamta Singh. 10. It is further submitted that the compromise decree having been passed almost 25 years back, several sale deeds have been executed by the parties, acting on the compromise and hence the circumstance do not warrant interference with the order impugned. 11. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused the materials on record. 12. The only issue which falls for consideration before this Court is whether the compromise decree passed in Title Suit No. 87 of 1986 was in accordance with law and/or the same has been obtained by the plaintiffs by practicing fraud on the petitioner and whether the judgment and order impugned dismissing the miscellaneous case filed by the petitioner suffers from any legal infirmity. 13. The sequence of events has already been dealt at the very outset and thus requires no reiteration. The records of the Title Suit No. 87 of 1986 and Misc. Case No. 3 of 1993 had been summoned and I have perused the same. 13. The sequence of events has already been dealt at the very outset and thus requires no reiteration. The records of the Title Suit No. 87 of 1986 and Misc. Case No. 3 of 1993 had been summoned and I have perused the same. The records manifest that the title suit had been filed by the opposite party No.1 and his minor son who is opposite party No.2, for partition of the joint family property seeking 1/4th share therein arraigning his father Gopal Singh, his mother Rajkali Devi and the widow of his brother Bindeshwari Singh namely, Urmila Singh who is the petitioner before this Court as defendants. 14. As taken note of a compromise petition was filed by the parties in the said suit on 4.5.1987 equally distributing the suit property amongst the parties to the suit with Schedule- I land going in favour of the plaintiff No.1, Satendra Singh and his minor son, the plaintiff No.2, Achhay Kumar Singh admeasuring 2.61 ¾ acres which fell in village Saranga and 0.66 decimals of land of village Kanchanpuri, the total share being allotted to the plaintiffs being 3.27 ¾ acres. Schedule- 2 lands was allotted in favour of the father, Gopal Singh with 2.6 acres of the lands falling in village Saranga and 0.66 decimals of land of Kanchanpur, the total share being 3.26 acres. The Schedule-3 lands went in favour of the mother Rajkali Devi which consisted of 2.68 acres of land in village Saranga and 0.59 acres of land in village Kanchanpur, the total share coming to 3.27 acres and Schedule- 4 lands was allotted in favour of the defendant Urmila Devi who is the petitioner before this Court, in which 2.69 acres of land fell in village Saranga and 0.58 acres in village Kanchanpur, the total share coming to 3.27 acres. The compromise petition gives the specific details of the plots allotted to each of the parties to the suit. The signature of the petitioner is appearing on the compromise petition. The compromise was accepted by the trial Court by order passed on 1.6.1987 and was followed by the decree which was passed on 20.7.1987 decreeing the suit in terms of the compromise and with the compromise petition forming part of the compromise decree and the same was sealed and signed on 27.7.1987. The compromise was accepted by the trial Court by order passed on 1.6.1987 and was followed by the decree which was passed on 20.7.1987 decreeing the suit in terms of the compromise and with the compromise petition forming part of the compromise decree and the same was sealed and signed on 27.7.1987. The records of the proceedings further manifest that the petitioner, following the compromise has applied for mutation giving rise to Mutation Case Nos. 345 of 1989-90 and 6 of 1991 and separate Jamabandi was opened in her name for 2.69 acres under Saranga village and for 0.23 decimals and 0.35 decimals in Kanchanpur village, a copy of the certificate to this effect is placed at Annexure-8. The petitioner thus acting on the compromise has got her name mutated in the records and which is followed by execution of a gift deed in favour of one Kamta Singh which gift deed was executed on 5.2.1991 in respect of 0.92 ½ decimals of land and 0.44 decimals of land. It is thus manifest from the records that the petitioner has acted on the basis of compromise and has also gifted away a substantial share of her land in favour of one Kamta Singh. 15. The order impugned dismisses the contentions raised by the petitioner on grounds of limitation as well as on merits. 16. Mr. Roy, has raised only two issues for questioning the order impugned namely that the limitation if any, stood condoned by the conversion of the title suit into a miscellaneous case and secondly, that even where the trial Court found difference in the signatures of the petitioner yet he has not interfered with the compromise decree. In so far as limitation is concerned, Mr. Roy is correct in his submissions. The moment the trial Court permitted the petitioner to convert the suit into a miscellaneous case, it adorned the nature of an application under Section 151 read with Order 23 rule 3 of the Code and it does not need reference to any judicial pronouncement to hold that there is no limitation prescribed for maintaining an application under Section 151 of the Code for questioning a compromise decree on grounds of fraud. 17. The issue now remains whether the discrepancy in the signature of the petitioner is sufficient to interfere with the compromise decree. 18. 17. The issue now remains whether the discrepancy in the signature of the petitioner is sufficient to interfere with the compromise decree. 18. I have already discussed the manner of allotment of shares under the compromise decree and do not find any infirmity therein which would reflect any element of fraud or that the same has acted to the detriment of the interest of the petitioner. The allotment of shares under the compromise decree is absolutely in accordance with law and there could not be any other manner of partition. The claim of 1/3 share being made by the petitioner by way of the suit in question which was converted as a miscellaneous case is not tenable in law because on the date when the compromise decree was passed, the mother of the plaintiff no.1 was alive and was entitled to a share equal to a son. The entire suit property which was subject matter of Title Suit No. 87 of 1986 having been partitioned amongst the plaintiffs and 3 defendants in four equal shares with specific details of the plots and their respective area and no complaint in that regard being made by the petitioner, she cannot be allowed to question the same on the anvil of difference in signatures and too where there are materials on record to establish that the compromise decree has been acted upon. Going a step further, a remand of the matter also cannot give any result on the quantum of share other than the compromise decree already passed in the Title Suit No. 87 of 1986 on the facts existing on that date. 19. For the reasons aforesaid, I am not persuaded to interfere with the order impugned and this application is accordingly, dismissed. 20. Let the Lower Court Records be returned to the Court concerned forthwith.