P. R. Srinivasan v. Special Tahsildar, Adi-Dravidar Welfare Department, Tirupattur
2013-07-25
R.BANUMATHI, R.SUBBIAH
body2013
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment :- R. Subbiah, J. 1. This Review Application has been filed to review the judgment (18.10.2012) delivered in S.A.No.850 of 2005. 2. Review Applicant is the respondent in the Second Appeal, which was filed by the Government aggrieved over the enhancement of compensation from Rs. Rs.69,712/-per acre to Rs.60,000/- per plot (2400 sq.ft.) for the lands acquired in Pachal Village, Tirupattur Taluk, Vellore District, with a view to provide house sites to Adi-Dradivars of Lakshmipuram and Kalarmedu of Pachal Village. For easy reference, parties are hereinafter referred to as claimant and Government respectively. 3. This Court, by judgment dated 18.10.2012, partly allowed the said appeal filed by the Government by reducing the rate of interest from 12% to 6% and confirmed the compensation awarded in the judgment and decree dated 12.01.1998 by the Reference Court (Sub Court), Tirupathur in L.A.A.No.6 of 1997. Now, the present review application is filed by the claimant for enhancement of the award amount in the appeal filed by the State based on the observation made by this Court in the judgment dated 18.10.2012. Therefore, it is necessary for this Court to deal with certain facts, which are necessary to dispose of the review application. 4. Originally the lands measuring to an extent of 5 acres and 33 cents (2.16.0 Hectare) lying in S.No.120/1, Pachal Village, Tirupattur Taluk, Vellore District, belonged to the claimant, by name, P.R.Srinivasan and they were acquired for providing house sites to Adi-Dravida families of Lakshmipuram and Kalarmedu of Pachal Village. Section 4(1) Notification was published on 02.08.1996. Enquiry was conducted on 14.08.1996 and the land owner appeared before the Special Tahsildar and requested that Rs.13,000/-has to be fixed per cent as the market value. Rejecting the said request, Notification had been published in the District Gazette on 02.12.1996. 32 sale deeds were gathered and out of which, Sl.No.16, sale deed dated 12.06.1996 (Ex.B-2) relating to land measuring to an extent of 0.52 cents in S.No.71/1C, registered as Doc.No.1800/1996, which was sold for a sum of Rs.46,000/-, was taken as sale of comparable instance and the said land was taken as data land. The Special Tahsildar, based on the said document, fixed the value per acre at Rs.69,712/- and awarded Rs.3,72,262/-for the acquired land. In the acquired lands, there were two wells, one pumpset, one tiled house, 52 coconut trees and 112 tender coconut trees.
The Special Tahsildar, based on the said document, fixed the value per acre at Rs.69,712/- and awarded Rs.3,72,262/-for the acquired land. In the acquired lands, there were two wells, one pumpset, one tiled house, 52 coconut trees and 112 tender coconut trees. Award was passed by the LAO on 27.03.1997, awarding compensation for acquired land and other things at Rs.7,05,379/-. Aggrieved over the said compensation, the claimant has preferred an appeal in L.A.A.No.6 of 1997 before the Sub Court, Tirupathur and the said Court, after considering the entire evidence, found that the land under acquisition measuring 5.34 acres (2.16.9 Hectare) was already converted into housing plots by the owner of the land as early as in the year 1986 itself and thus, calculated the market value per ground (2400 sq.ft.). For this purpose, Reference Court has relied upon Ex.A-5 sale deed marked through C.W.3, through which a plot measuring to an extent of 3600 sq.ft. situated nearer to the acquired land was sold for a sum of Rs.1,41,000/-i.e.Rs.39/- per sq.ft. Hence, Reference Court has arrived at a sum of Rs.93,600/- as market value per plot measuring to an extent of 2400 sq. ft. Thereafter, after deducting Rs.33,600/- towards development charges, Reference Court has fixed the market value at Rs.60,000/- per plot. Further, Reference Court has taken into consideration the evidence of C.W.1, who had deposed that out of total extent of 5.34 acres, 5.24 acres land was converted into plots and calculated the compensation for total 65 plots at the rate of Rs.60,000/- and also arrived at a sum of Rs.39,00,000/- as total compensation for the acquired land. This amount awarded by the Reference Court was challenged before this Court by the Government in S.A.No.850 of 2005. 5. This Court, by negativing the grounds raised by the Government, confirmed the award passed by the Reference Court. While disposing the second appeal, though this Court made an observation that the Reference court, after fixing a sum of Rs.93,600/-per plot, ought not to have deducted Rs.33,600/- towards development charges since the subject land has already been converted into housing plots in the year 1986 itself and that therefore, the question of deducting amount towards development charges would not arise, confirmed the award passed by the Reference Court since no cross appeal was filed by the Claimant. Based on the said observation, now the present Review Application is filed by the claimant. 6.
Based on the said observation, now the present Review Application is filed by the claimant. 6. Main submission of learned counsel appearing for the claimant is that this Court, having come to the conclusion that the value of the land is much more than what was filed or granted by the Reference Court, cannot refuse to grant enhancement on the ground that the land owner has not preferred any appeal. It is the further submission that the total extent of land acquired by the State is 5.34 Acres, which works out to 2,32,824 sq.ft. W hen that being so, the total area of 65 plots works out only to 1,56,000 sq.ft.(65 plots x 2400 sq.ft.). When the Reference Court has chosen to award compensation only for 1,56,000 sq.ft., out of total extent of 2,32,824 sq.ft, it ought not to have deducted further amount towards development charges when it is an admitted fact that 65 plots were already developed in the year 1986 itself. Under such circumstances, exercising power under Order 41 Rule 33 C.P.C., the High Court can enhance the compensation amount. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel has relied upon the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of PRALHAD AND OTHERS .vs. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANOTHER reported in (2010) 10 SCC 458 . 7. Learned Government Advocate vehemently opposed to grant the enhancement of compensation stating that it has to be construed that the claimant had satisfied with the amount awarded by the Reference Court. Therefore, he is not entitled to get the same. 8. This Court has considered the submissions made by both sides and perused the materials available on record. 9. In view of arguments advanced by both sides, the only question that falls for consideration is, whether the Review Application could be allowed by enhancing the compensation amount, based on the observation made by this Court in the judgment dated 18.12.2012 ? 10. This Court has already held that the Reference Court has erred in deducting the amount of Rs.33,600/- towards development charges since the land was already developed and layout was formed. The relevant paragraphs from the judgment dated 18.12.2012 are extracted hereunder: "15. Total extent of land acquired in S.F.No.120/1 was 2.16.0 Hectares i.e. 5.34 acres.
10. This Court has already held that the Reference Court has erred in deducting the amount of Rs.33,600/- towards development charges since the land was already developed and layout was formed. The relevant paragraphs from the judgment dated 18.12.2012 are extracted hereunder: "15. Total extent of land acquired in S.F.No.120/1 was 2.16.0 Hectares i.e. 5.34 acres. Instead of proceeding to award compensation based on square feet value for the entire extent of acquired land, Reference Court awarded compensation for 65 plots and awarded compensation of Rs.39,00,000/-(Rs.60,000 x 65 = Rs.39,00,000/-). Ex.A1 is the Proceedings of the Commissioner of Jolarpet Panchayat Union for forming layout in S.F.No.120 – 2.80 acres. Ex.A2 is the draft layout for S.F.No.120. Taking note of forming of layout and also developments made, Reference Court fixed the market value per plot at Rs.93,600/-. After fixing the market value at Rs.93,600/- per plot, Reference Court deducted one-third i.e. Rs.33,600/- towards development charges from the market value of Rs.93,000/- per plot. 16. Taking note of the developments made and layout formed and when the Reference Court proceeded to fix the market value per plot, Reference Court ought not to have deducted Rs.33,600/- towards development charges. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for Claimants deduction of Rs.33,600/-amounts to double deduction which causes serious prejudice to the Claimants. 17. Learned counsel for Claimants submitted that the Reference Court has fixed the market value of the acquired land at Rs.93,600/- per plot and while so, deduction of Rs.33,600/-for development charges would amount to double deduction. He would also submit that the total extent of acquired land is 5.34 acres and if we calculate on square feet basis, it comes to more than Rs.90,00,000/- and that awarding of compensation on the basis of plots and making further deduction has caused serious prejudice to the Appellant. He would also contend that exercising inherent jurisdiction Court can rectify the mistake and award correct compensation. 18. Learned Special Government Pleader fairly submitted that already the acquired land was plotted out and layout was formed and that Reference Court ought not to have made deduction. He would also submit that the said deduction of Rs.33,600/- per plot towards development charges amounts to double deduction. However, he contends that since there is no separate appeal for enhancement or cross appeal, Court cannot enhance the compensation in the appeal preferred by the Government. 19.
He would also submit that the said deduction of Rs.33,600/- per plot towards development charges amounts to double deduction. However, he contends that since there is no separate appeal for enhancement or cross appeal, Court cannot enhance the compensation in the appeal preferred by the Government. 19. Since there is no separate appeal for enhancement, we are not inclined to go into the mistake committed by the Reference Court in making double deduction." 11. Therefore, we are of the opinion, the calculation made by the Reference Court for awarding compensation by making deduction towards development charges is not legally sustainable. But, at the same time, it has to be seen, whether the claimant is entitled to get enhanced compensation in the Review Application without filing Cross Appeal. In this regard, the decision reported in (2010) 10 SCC 458 (supra), relied on by the learned counsel for the claimant, gives a fitting answer for this issue. After referring to the decision reported in (1985) 3 SCC 739 (Bhag Singh .vs. UT of Chandigarh), the Hon'ble Apex Court in paras 17 to 20 held as under: "17. Now, the only question which remains is whether the landowners, without filing an appeal before the High Court from the order of the Reference Court, are entitled to the aforesaid benefit on the basis of their application under Order 41 Rule 33 of CPC. 18. The provision of Order 41, Rule 33 of CPC is clearly an enabling provision, whereby the Appellate Court is empowered to pass any decree or make any order which ought to have been passed or made, and to pass or make such further or other decree or order as the case may require. Therefore, the power is very wide and in this enabling provision, the crucial words are that the Appellate Court is empowered to pass any Order which ought to have been made as the case may require. The expression `Order ought to have been made' would obviously mean an Order which justice of the case requires to be made. This is made clear from the expression used in the said Rule by saying `the court may pass such further or other Order as the case may require.' This expression `case' would mean the justice of the case. Of course, this power cannot be exercised ignoring a legal interdict or a prohibition clamped by law. 19.
This is made clear from the expression used in the said Rule by saying `the court may pass such further or other Order as the case may require.' This expression `case' would mean the justice of the case. Of course, this power cannot be exercised ignoring a legal interdict or a prohibition clamped by law. 19. In fact, the ambit of this provision has come up for consideration in several decisions of this Court. Commenting on this power, Mulla (CPC, 15th Edition, pg. 2647) observed that this Rule is modelled on Order 59, Rule 10(4) of the Supreme Court of Judicature of England, and Mulla further opined that the purpose of this rule is to do complete justice between the parties. 20. In Banarsi vs. Ramphal, AIR 2003 SC 1989 , this Court construing the provisions of Order 41 Rule 33 of CPC held that this provision confers powers of the widest amplitude on the appellate court so as to do complete justice between the parties. This Court further held that such power is unfettered by considerations as to what is the subject matter of appeal or who has filed the appeal or whether the appeal is being dismissed, allowed or disposed of while modifying the judgments appealed against. The learned Judges held that one of the objects in conferring such power is to avoid inconsistency, inequity and inequality in granting reliefs and the overriding consideration is achieving the ends of justice. The learned Judges also held that the power can be exercised subject to three limitations: firstly, this power cannot be exercised to the prejudice of a person who is not a party before the Court; secondly, this power cannot be exercised in favour of a claim which has been given up or lost; and thirdly, the power cannot be exercised when such part of the decree which has been permitted to become final by a party is reversed to the advantage of that party. (See SCC p.619, para 15 : AIR para 15 at p.1997). It has also been held by this Court in Samundra Devi and others vs. Narendra Kaur and others, (2008) 9 SCC 100 (para 21) that this power under Order 41, Rule 33 of CPC cannot be exercised ignoring a legal interdict." 12.
(See SCC p.619, para 15 : AIR para 15 at p.1997). It has also been held by this Court in Samundra Devi and others vs. Narendra Kaur and others, (2008) 9 SCC 100 (para 21) that this power under Order 41, Rule 33 of CPC cannot be exercised ignoring a legal interdict." 12. A reading of the said paragraphs would clearly show that the Court may exercise power under Order 41 Rule 33 of C.P.C. subject to three limitations; firstly, the power cannot be exercised to the prejudice of a person, who is not a party before the court; secondly, the power cannot be exercised in favour of a claim, which has been given up or lost; and thirdly, the power cannot be exercised when such part of the decree which has been permitted to become final by a party is reversed to the advantage of that party. But, the case on hand will not fall within the limitations mentioned in the said judgment. Therefore, in order to render complete justice, by following principles laid down in the judgment cited supra, we are of the opinion that the Review Application could be allowed. 13. In (1985) 3 SCC 737 [Bhag Singh v. UT of Chandigarh), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:-"3. ...... It must be remembered that this was not a dispute between two private citizens where it would be quite just and legitimate to confine the claimant to the claim made by him and not to award him any higher amount than that claimed though even in such a case there may be situations where an amount higher than that claimed can be awarded to the claimant as for instance where an amount is claimed as due at the foot of an account. Here was a claim made by the appellants against the State Government for compensation for acquisition of their land and under the law, the State was bound to pay to the appellants compensation on the basis of the market value of the land acquired and if according to the judgments of the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench, the market value of the land acquired was higher than that awarded by the Land Acquisition Collector or the Additional District Judge, there is no reason why the appellants should have been denied the benefit of payment of the market value so determined.
To deny this benefit to the appellants would tantamount to permitting the State Government to acquire the land of the appellants on payment of less than the true market value. There may be cases where, as for instance, under agrarian reform legislation, the holder of land may, legitimately, as a matter of social justice, with a view to eliminating concentration of land in the hands of a few and bringing about its equitable distribution, be deprived of land which is not being personally cultivated by him or which is in excess of the ceiling area with payment of little compensation or no compensation at all, but where land is acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, it would not be fair and just to deprive the holder of his land without payment of the true market value when the law, in so many terms, declares that he shall be paid such market value. The State Government must do what is fair and just to the citizen and should not, as far as possible, except in cases where tax revenue is received or recovered without protest or where the State Government would otherwise be irretrievably be prejudiced, take up a technical plea to defeat the legitimate and just claim of the citizen. We are, therefore, of the view that, in the present case, the Division Bench as well as the learned Single Judge should have allowed the appellants to pay up the deficit court fee and awarded to them compensation at the higher rate or rates determined by them." 14. The ratio laid down in the above decision squarely applies to the case on hand. Once the Court has taken the view that claimant is entitled to enhanced compensation, he should not be denied the same on the mere technical grounds of non-filing of the appeal by the claimant. Notwithstanding that the claimant has not preferred any appeal, to award fair and adequate compensation to the claimant, this review application has to be allowed. Accordingly, the Review Application is allowed. Consequently, the amount is enhanced to Rs.60,84,000/-(Rs.93,600/- per plot x 65 plots) and the claimant is entitled to interest for the entire amount at the rate of 6% from the date of 4(1) Notification till the date of deposit.
Accordingly, the Review Application is allowed. Consequently, the amount is enhanced to Rs.60,84,000/-(Rs.93,600/- per plot x 65 plots) and the claimant is entitled to interest for the entire amount at the rate of 6% from the date of 4(1) Notification till the date of deposit. The Government is directed to deposit the entire amount along with interest at 6% and solatium at 15% within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. On such deposit, the Review petitioner/claimant is permitted to withdraw the entire amount along with accrued interest. Review petitioner/claimant has to pay the court fee payable within the period of four weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order. There is no order as to costs.