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2013 DIGILAW 2683 (ALL)

Kamlesh v. Prescribed Authority, M. A. C. T. /1st A. D. J.

2013-10-29

TARUN AGARWALA

body2013
JUDGMENT Hon’ble Tarun Agarwala, J.—The husband of the petitioner No. 1 died on 16.1.2002 in a road accident. One Manoj was also injured. The father of the deceased filed a claim petition No. 95 of 2003. The petitioner filed another claim application being claim petition No. 110 of 2003 and the injured Manoj also filed a claim application, which was numbered as 96 of 2003. By an order dated 1.9.2005, all the three claim applications were consolidated and claim petition No. 95 of 2003 was made the leading case. It transpires that claim petition Nos. 95 of 2003 and 110 of 2003 were allowed by a common award dated 5.5.2010. 2. It transpires that the respondent No. 2, who is owner of the vehicle, filed a recall application, which was allowed by an order dated 2.1.2013 and the award dated 5.5.2010 was recalled. Since then, both the claim petitions are proceeding separately in the same Court. The petitioner moved an application that since the evidence has already been adduced in the connected case i.e. claim petition No. 95 of 2003, the claim petition of the petitioner may be connected with claim petition No. 95 of 2013 and the matter may be decided together. The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal rejected the application of the petitioner by an order dated 5.3.2013 and also closed the evidence of the petitioner holding that the case cannot be connected since parties are different. The petitioner, being aggrieved by the said order, has filed the present writ petition. 3. Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, the Court is of the opinion that the impugned order cannot be sustained and that issuing notice to the respondents would only entail delay in disposal of this petition as well as the claim petition and consequently, the writ petition is decided at the admission stage without issuing notice to the respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4, since the order will not affect the rights of these respondents. 4. The application of the petitioner for consolidation of the cases has been rejected by the tribunal on the ground that the parties are different. In the opinion of the Court, the tribunal is not aware about the basic principle of law. In the instant case, the Court finds that by an earlier order of the tribunal, the claim petitions were consolidated and both the petitions were heard together. In the opinion of the Court, the tribunal is not aware about the basic principle of law. In the instant case, the Court finds that by an earlier order of the tribunal, the claim petitions were consolidated and both the petitions were heard together. There was no reason for the tribunal,to segregate these two matters and deal separately. The incident is the same. One claimant is the father and the second claimant is the widow. The claim petition arises for the same cause of action i.e. from the same incident. The owner of the vehicle is the same. The insurance company is the same, namely, all the defendants are the same. Merely, because the claimants are different does not mean that the case will proceed separately. 5. In Mohd. Yusuf v. Ahmad Miya and others, AIR 1987 All 335 , this Court held that the question of consolidation of two suits would largely depend upon the identity of the subject-matter, the parties and convenience in proceeding with the trial having regard to the nature of the evidence which is to be led in the suits and the precise controversy which arises for trial in the two suits. 6. In Chitivalasa Jute Mills v. Japee Rewa Cement, AIR 2004 SC 1687 , the Supreme Court held that consolidation of suits is ordered for meeting the ends of justice as it saves the parties from multiplicity of proceeding, delay and expenses. The Supreme Court further went on to hold that even substantial and sufficient similarity of the issues arising for decision in two suits enables the two suits to be consolidated so that the parties are relieved of the need of adducing same and similar documentary and oral evidence twice over in the two suits at two different trials. 7. In the instant case the incident is the same. The cause of action is the same. The evidence is the same and no useful purpose would be served in recording the same evidence twice. The claimants are giving the same evidence and interest of justice requires that both the suits should be consolidated. 8. In the light of the aforesaid the impugned order cannot be sustained and is quashed. The writ petition is allowed. The motor accident claims tribunal is directed to consolidate the claim petition Nos. 95 of 2003 and 110 of 2003 and proceed from there onwards. 9. 8. In the light of the aforesaid the impugned order cannot be sustained and is quashed. The writ petition is allowed. The motor accident claims tribunal is directed to consolidate the claim petition Nos. 95 of 2003 and 110 of 2003 and proceed from there onwards. 9. In the event, any of the respondents is aggrieved by this order, it will be open to them to move a recall application before this Court within six weeks from the date of production of a certified copy of this order before the tribunal concerned. A certified copy of this order alongwith a copy of the impugned order passed by the motor accident claims tribunal dated 5.3.2013, Annexure-7 to the writ petition shall be placed before the Hon’ble Administrative Judge of Noida within ten days from today for necessary information and action.