Manoj Misra,J. Ref: C. M. Review Application No.162555 of 2012. Heard Sri Ravi Prakash Srivastava, learned counsel for the applicants-appellants. 2. By this application, the applicants, who are appellants in the appeal, have sought for review of the judgment and order dated 7th May, 2012, by which Second Appeal No.539 of 1995 was dismissed. 3. The submission of the learned counsel for the applicants is that an erroneous observation has been made in paragraph 24 of the judgment dated 7th May, 2012 that the appellants had not challenged the finding of the lower court with regards to the possession of the plaintiff-respondent. It has been submitted that specific grounds were taken in the memorandum of appeal that the plaintiff-respondent is not in possession of the land in dispute. Attention of the Court has been drawn to ground nos.7, 10, 11, 12 and 19 as also to substantial questions of law nos.(vii) and (viii) mentioned in the memo of appeal, as questions proposed for formulation, though not formulated by the Court for consideration in the appeal. 4. A perusal of the record reveals that the appeal was entertained for hearing only on the following substantial question of law : "whether the bar under Section 157-A of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act 1 of 1951 applies to the execution of a sale-deed by a Court in compliance of a decree for specific performance of an agreement of sale? If so, its effect?" 5. Apart from the above substantial question of law, no other question was pressed at the time of hearing of the appeal and no prayer was made, either by way of written application or orally, for framing any other substantial question of law, in exercise of power under the proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for consideration in the appeal. It is noteworthy that an application no.101523 of 2009 was moved by the appellants for amendment of the memo of appeal by seeking to add grounds as also additional substantial questions of law, which the learned counsel for the appellant did not press, accordingly, it was dismissed as not pressed by order dated 25th April, 2012. It is noteworthy that an application no.101523 of 2009 was moved by the appellants for amendment of the memo of appeal by seeking to add grounds as also additional substantial questions of law, which the learned counsel for the appellant did not press, accordingly, it was dismissed as not pressed by order dated 25th April, 2012. The appellants may have framed several grounds in the memo of appeal, but unless those grounds are pressed at the time of hearing of the appeal, the Court is not required to address itself to all those grounds. It is well settled, and is also the provision of statute i.e. sub section (5) of section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, that a second appeal is to be heard on a substantial question of law formulated by the Court. It is in this background that in paragraph 24 of the judgment, it was observed as follows : "In the instant appeal there is no challenge to the finding recorded by both the courts below that the plaintiff is in possession of the land in suit and that her name is recorded in the revenue records. In this view of the matter, the plaintiff-respondent being owner in possession is entitled to decree of her suit for permanent prohibitory injunction as against the defendant-appellants. For the reasons noted above, I'm of the considered view that the courts below were legally justified in decreeing the suit of the plaintiff and that the judgment and decree passed by the courts below does not suffer from any legal infirmity. The appeal, therefore, lacks merit and is hereby dismissed with costs." 6. Even though review cannot be used as a tool for re-hearing of the matter, however, in the interest of justice the finding with regards to possession of the plaintiff-respondent has been re-examined by the Court, with a view to find out as to whether the said finding is perverse or vitiated in any manner thereby raising a substantial question of law, because, otherwise, whether a person is, or is not, in possession is a pure question of fact. 7. A perusal of the certified copy of the trial court judgment, annexed with the memo of appeal, reveals that issue no.2 was framed with regards to the possession of the plaintiff over the disputed land. 7. A perusal of the certified copy of the trial court judgment, annexed with the memo of appeal, reveals that issue no.2 was framed with regards to the possession of the plaintiff over the disputed land. While deciding issue no.2, in favour of the plaintiff, the trial court relied on documentary evidence which disclosed that the disputed land was sold to the plaintiff, by the Court, in execution of a decree. The trial court also relied on the oral testimony of P.W.1 and P.W.2 who proved possession of the plaintiff. It also considered Exhibit 3, which was a receipt showing payment by plaintiff for getting the disputed land ploughed by Tractor, as well as Khasra (Exhibit 3-A) and Khatauni (Exhibit 4), which disclosed that with respect to the disputed land the name of the plaintiff was duly recorded in the revenue records. In light of the above evidence, it did not find the statement of DW1 that he was in possession believable. 8. A perusal of the appellate court decree (annexed with the memo of appeal), which contains the grounds of appeal, reveals that as many as six grounds were taken to challenge the trial court judgment and decree. Amongst them ground nos.4 and 5 were taken to challenge the finding returned by the trial court on issue no.2, which are being reproduced herein below:- "4. That the plaintiff-respondent is not the owner in possession over the suit land on the basis of invalid transfer, which protects the appellants, as such, the court below erred in law in restraining the defendant-appellants from interfering in possession of the plaintiff-respondent. 5. That the plaintiff-respondent in her statement recorded in Suit No. 364 of 1977 Mahavir v. Phoolwati on 20.4.77 admitted that the defendant appellants are in possession over the land in suit, as such, the court below erred in law in passing decree for injunction against the appellants." 9. The lower appellate court in paragraph 7 of its judgment dealt with the challenge to the finding of the trial court on issue no.2. While affirming the finding recorded by the trial court on issue no.2, the lower appellate court quoted and considered the alleged admission made by the plaintiff herein, on 20.4.77, in the earlier suit instituted by Mahavir (the defendant herein) against the plaintiff herein. While affirming the finding recorded by the trial court on issue no.2, the lower appellate court quoted and considered the alleged admission made by the plaintiff herein, on 20.4.77, in the earlier suit instituted by Mahavir (the defendant herein) against the plaintiff herein. The alleged admission, as quoted in the judgment of the court below, reads thus: "Vadigan Jute Va Jabardasti Ke Jor Par Vivadit Bhumi Par Kheti Kar Lete Hain". The lower appellate court interpreted the same and held that it does not amount to admitting possession of the other side. 10. At this stage, it would be useful to note that as per the lower appellate court the aforesaid statement was made in O.S. No.112 of 1975 whereas in the memo of appeal filed before this court as well as the lower court the alleged admission was made in O.S. No.364 of 1977. Be that as it may, in the grounds of appeal presented before this court the contents of the statement, as has been quoted herein above, which was considered by the court below, have not been disputed, therefore, it is quite irrelevant whether it was made in O.S. No.112 of 1975 or O.S. No.364 of 1977. 11. The question that now arise for consideration is whether the aforesaid statement of the plaintiff herein amounted to admitting the possession of the other side. In order to appreciate the import of the statement, which the defendant herein claims to be admission of his possession, it would be useful to first discuss the concept of possession. Salmond, in his treatise on Jurisprudence (Eighth Edition, Chapter XIII, paragraph 96), states thus: "the Possession of a material object is the continuing exercise of a claim to the exclusive use of it. It involves, therefore, two distinct elements, one of which is mental or subjective, the other physical or objective". The subjective element is called animus possidendi and the physical or objective part is called corpus possessionis. The intent necessary to constitute possession is the intent to appropriate to oneself the exclusive use of the thing possessed. It is an exclusive claim to a material object. It is not essential that one in possession must have the physical power to exclude alien interference. The intent necessary to constitute possession is the intent to appropriate to oneself the exclusive use of the thing possessed. It is an exclusive claim to a material object. It is not essential that one in possession must have the physical power to exclude alien interference. For example there is nothing to prevent a child from acquiring effective possession as against strong men, nor is possession impossible on the part of him who lies in his bed at the time of his death. According to Salmond, the true test is not the physical power of preventing interference, but the improbability of any interference, from whatever source this improbability arises. Possession is the security of enjoyment, and there are other means of attaining this security than personal presence or power. In case of open land, lying unprotected and unfenced, it may be difficult to imagine that a person in possession must have all the physical power at all times to prevent trespass. Thus, the nature of the corpus makes a difference while adjudging as to whether a person is in possession or not. The apex court in the case of Ashan Devi v. Phulwasi Devi, (2003) 12 SCC 219, while dealing with the concept of "possession", observed as follows : "23. Salmond on Jurisprudence explains that the word "possession" is a word of "open texture". Its legal meaning has to be ascertained from the context. The property involved in the present case is open vacant land. Such property is possessed by a person who has control over the same. This "control" over the property means "power to exclude all others". The test then for determining whether a man is in possession of anything is whether he is in "general control" of it -- maybe, that he is not in actual and physical possession or using the same." 12. On the principles noticed above, the statement of the plaintiff herein, in the earlier suit, that by use of force the other side has been able to cultivate her land, without admitting that the other side is in complete control over the same to the extent that she has been completely prevented from enjoying the benefits of her land or ousted therefrom, would not amount to admitting possession of the other side, although, it may be taken as a statement admitting interference by the other side in her possession. Further, the statement "Kheti Kar Leten Hain" suggests of an intermittent activity. It is not indicative of control or exclusivity, as is required to establish possession. Even otherwise, the above statement of the plaintiff herein is not to be seen in isolation. It has to be read along with other evidence. In the instant case, the court below considered the entire oral and documentary evidence including the above statement and then recorded its finding that the plaintiff has proved her possession. This being a finding, on a question of fact, based on appreciation of entire evidence, becomes binding on second appellate court. 13. No other point was pressed. 14. In view of the above, there is no merit in the review application. The same is, accordingly, rejected. _____________