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2013 DIGILAW 272 (BOM)

Mannekben S. Tandel v. Pascoal Fernandes

2013-02-01

F.M.REIS

body2013
Judgment : Heard Shri Shivan Desai, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and Shri A. D. Bhobe, learned counsel appearing for the respondent no.1. 2. The above petition challenges the judgment passed by the learned Administrative Tribunal dated 14.07.2010 whereby the tenancy revision preferred by the respondent no.1 came to be allowed and the application for condonation of delay filed by the petitioners before the Dy. Collector along with the application for leave to challenge the judgment passed by the learned Mamlatdar came to be quashed and set aside. 3. Shri Desai, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has assailed the impugned judgment on the ground that the Dy. Collector upon appreciating the evidence on record has come to the conclusion that the petitioners have made out a case to condone the delay. The learned counsel has pointed out that the petitioners have filed an application for condonation of delay immediately after they learnt about the order passed by the learned Mamlatdar before the learned Dy. Collector who after appreciating the contentions raised by both the parties found favour with the explanation given by the petitioners and condoned the delay. The learned counsel further pointed out that the Dy. Collector on the basis of appreciating material on record has further found that subdelegated attorney of the petitioners by name Nitin Kudav who had filed an application to recall the order of the learned Mamlatdar was not authorised to perform such act and as such the alleged knowledge of the impugned order by the said Nitin Kudav could not be attributed to the petitioners. The learned counsel further pointed out that the learned Tribunal in revision petition was not entitled to reappreciate such material and come to contrary conclusion that the knowledge of the impugned order would have to be attributed to the petitioners on the basis of the application made by the said subdelegated attorney Shri Nitin Kudav. The learned counsel further pointed out that on perusal of the said application filed for recalling of the order before the learned Mamlatdar, the said Kudav had in fact filed an application on behalf of a dead person which is per se a nullity and as such, the Dy. Collector was justified to come to the conclusion that such exercise performed by the said Kudav should not be attributed to the petitioners. Collector was justified to come to the conclusion that such exercise performed by the said Kudav should not be attributed to the petitioners. The learned counsel has taken me through the judgments passed by the Dy. Collector as well as the Tribunal and submitted that the question of interfering in the findings of fact arrived at by the Dy. Collector are not at all justified by the impugned judgment passed by the learned Tribunal. The learned counsel further pointed out that by a reasoned order the Dy. Collector has also found that the petitioners were aggrieved with the orders impugned in respect of the purchases done by the respondent no.1 and had granted leave to challenge such impugned judgment. The learned counsel further pointed out that there was no justification for the learned Tribunal to interfere in the judgment passed by the Dy. Collector. 4. On the other hand, Shri A. D. Bhobe, learned counsel appearing for the respondent no.1 has vehemently supported the impugned judgment. The learned counsel has pointed out that the application filed by the petitioners was on the premise that there was collusion between the respondent no.1 and said Nitin Kudav which the petitioners have failed to establish by any piece of evidence. The learned counsel further pointed out that the learned Dy. Collector has ignored the contentions raised by the petitioners in the application for condonation of delay and has made out a fresh sufficient cause which does not curl out from the application for condonation of delay. The learned counsel further pointed out that the Dy. Collector has further found that there was no knowledge of the impugned order which is not averred in the application for condonation of delay. The learned counsel further pointed out that the learned Tribunal has rightly considered that the Dy. Collector has travelled beyond the pleadings/averments made by the petitioners in the application for condonation of delay and as such, the learned Tribunal was justified to interfere with the order passed by the Dy. Collector for condoning the delay. The learned counsel further pointed out that the learned Tribunal has rightly considered that the Dy. Collector has travelled beyond the pleadings/averments made by the petitioners in the application for condonation of delay and as such, the learned Tribunal was justified to interfere with the order passed by the Dy. Collector for condoning the delay. The learned counsel further pointed out that without prejudice to his first contention in case this Court find favour with the justification shown by the petitioners with regard to the condonation of delay, the learned Tribunal has not considered on merits the contention of the respondent no.1 with regard to the challenge made by him to the second portion of the impugned order passed by the Dy. Collector granting leave to the petitioners to challenge the judgment of the learned Mamlatdar. The learned counsel further pointed out that in case the delay is condoned, the learned Tribunal be directed to decide the challenge by the respondent no.1 to the leave granted by the Dy. Collector by the impugned judgment dated 28.02.2006. The learned counsel as such submits that the above petition be rejected. 5. I have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel and I have also gone through the records. It is observed by the Apex Court in the judgment reported in (1998) 7 SCC 123 in the case of N.BalakrishnanV/s M. Krishnamurthy at para 9 thus: “9. It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first court refuses to condone the delay. But it is a different matter when the first court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammelled by the conclusion of the lower court.” 6. In the present case, on perusal of the judgment dated 28.02.2006 passed by the Dy. Collector, I find that the Dy. Collector on the basis of appreciating material on record has found favour with the cause shown by the petitioners. The learned Tribunal as such was not justified to reappreciate the material on record to come to contrary findings to the effect that the knowledge of the order passed by the Mamlatdar is to be attributed to the petitioners from the time when the application dated 22.09.2004 came to be filed by Nitin Kudav to recall the order. It is to be noted that this by itself cannot be a ground to reject an application for condonation of delay when circumstances are considered. It is well known that if there is any negligence on the part of the party in approaching the Court, it is for the Court to see whether there was any gross negligence on the part of such party or there were malafides attributed to such party for deliberately approaching the Court with delay. In the present case, on perusal of the reply filed by the respondent no.1, I find that there are no malafides attributed nor any advantage accrued to the petitioners by deliberate delaying to file such appeal. On going through the application filed by the said Nitin Kudav who had filed the said application on behalf of the dead person he had no legal authority to file such application. In the facts and circumstances of the case, I find that on perusal of the material on record, the learned Tribunal was not justified to interfere and set aside the order of the Dy. Collector condoning the delay. This aspect is to be considered in the touchstone of the facts that the proceedings initiated by the respondent no.1 were without making the petitioners as parties to such proceedings. As such, I find that the impugned judgment passed by the learned Tribunal to the extent it set asides the order condoning the delay passed by the Dy. This aspect is to be considered in the touchstone of the facts that the proceedings initiated by the respondent no.1 were without making the petitioners as parties to such proceedings. As such, I find that the impugned judgment passed by the learned Tribunal to the extent it set asides the order condoning the delay passed by the Dy. Collector cannot be sustained and deserves to be quashed and set aside. Taking into consideration the contention of Shri Bhobe, learned counsel appearing for the respondent no.1 to the effect that the learned Tribunal has not gone into the merits of the contentions raised by the respondent no.1 challenging the second part of the order of the Dy. Collector in the revision about the leave granted to the petitioners to challenge the judgment of the Mamlatdar, I find on perusal of the impugned judgment that besides passing reference with that regard there is scrutiny of material on record to ascertain as to whether the contention of the respondent no.1 have been considered on merits. In such circumstances, I find that the learned Tribunal should reconsider the challenge by the respondent no.1 to the second part of the judgment passed by the Dy. Collector granting leave to the petitioners to challenge the order passed by the learned Mamlatdar after hearing the parties in accordance with law. 7. In view of the above, I pass the following : ORDER (i) The impugned judgment dated 14.07.2010 passed by the learned Administrative Tribunal in Tenancy Revision Application No. 19/06 is partly quashed and set aside. (ii) Tenancy Revision Application Nos. 19/06 challenging the judgment and order of the Dy. Collector dated 28.02.2006 passed in Case No. TNC/APL/PERN/2-87/05 is partly restored. (iii) The learned Administrative Tribunal is directed to decide the challenge to the order granting leave to the petitioners to prefer an appeal against the order passed by the learned Mamlatdar afresh after hearing the parties in accordance with law. (iv) All contentions on this aspect on merits are left open. (v) Rule is made absolute in above terms. (vi) Parties are directed to appear before the learned Administrative Tribunal on 04.03.2013 at 10.00 a.m. (vii) The petition stands disposed of accordingly.