JUDGMENT : Abhilasha Kumari, J. The challenge in the instant appeal filed by the appellant-State of Gujarat, is to the judgment and order dated 29.04.2000, rendered by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Valsad, at Navsari, in Sessions Case No. 214 of 1998. 2. The case of the prosecution is based upon the complaint dated 30.05.1998 at Ex.25, filed by Purnimaben (PW2), sister of deceased Alkaben. The gist of the complaint is as follows: The complainant has four sisters out of whom, Dakshaben, wife of Dipakbhai H. Mistry, is the eldest. The complainant is younger to Dakshaben. Deceased Alkaben was younger than the complainant. The fourth sister, Ilaben, is married to Navinbhai and lives at Vadodara. The father of the complainant, Navinchandra Mulchandbhai Wadia, is a retired Mamlatdar. The marriage of deceased Alkaben took place with respondent No.1, Rameshchandra Bhanabhai Mistry, about five years ago. This was her third marriage, and was the second marriage of respondent No.1. Earlier, respondent No.1 was married to Urmilaben, daughter of Khandubhai Makanjibhai Mistry. As Urmilaben had become a 'Sadhvi', Khandubhai Mistry got the marriage of deceased Alkaben performed with respondent No.1, on 27.03.1993. The deceased and respondent No.1 lived together as husband and wife. Respondent No.2, Bhavin Dineshchandra Mistry, is the son-in-law of respondent No.1, being the husband of his daughter from his first wife. The deceased earlier lived at Shantiniketan Society in Billimora with respondent No.1 and his family members. However, about a year ago, they had come to live at Govardhan Apartments at Karelibaug, Vadodara. As long as the mother-in-law of the deceased was alive, the deceased did not face any harassment. However, after the death of her Mother-in-law, the deceased faced physical and mental torture from the respondents. On 14.05.1998, the deceased came from Vadodara to Billimora with respondent No.1 and other family members. Thereafter, on the morning of 16.05.1998, at about 10:00 am, the respondents, along with the father of the deceased, came to the house of the complainant to take her to their house at Shantiniketan Society. The complainant said that she would come only if her elder sister and her husband came. On the arrival of the elder sister and brother-in-law of the complainant, she went to the house of the deceased at Shantiniketan Society with other family members, and saw that the deceased was locked inside the house. The complainant said that she would come only if her elder sister and her husband came. On the arrival of the elder sister and brother-in-law of the complainant, she went to the house of the deceased at Shantiniketan Society with other family members, and saw that the deceased was locked inside the house. According to the complainant, she started calling the deceased, who came out on the terrace of the first floor. The face of the deceased was swollen and there were dark circles under her eyes. The deceased is purported to have told the complainant and other family members that her husband and persons belonging to the "Honest Family" (referring to Khandubhai Makanji Mistry, who was the owner of Honest Industries, and the father-in-law of respondent No.1), are torturing her as they want to throw her out and get a divorce from her. The complainant asked the deceased to come with her but the deceased refused, saying that she would live and die in her matrimonial house. The complainant left the house of the deceased at 2:00 pm in the afternoon, for her own home. The elder sister and brother-in-law of the complainant, along with her father, went to the house of the "Honest Family", where there was talk of a divorce between respondent No.1 and the deceased. A writing was drawn up on a paper. It is further stated in the complaint that thereafter, respondent No.1 apologised to her elder sister and touched her feet, saying that he did not want to divorce the deceased. All family members present signed upon the piece of paper, except for the deceased. This fact was told to the complainant by her elder sister and brother-in-law, when they came to her house at 8:00 pm. Thereafter, on 17.05.1998, at about 10:00 am, the deceased came to the house of the complainant. At that time, she was in a happy frame of mind. The deceased gave the complainant a sealed envelope and told her to open it the next day. She made the complainant promise, in the name of Sai Baba and her children, that she would not open the sealed envelope earlier. The complainant kept the sealed envelop near the photograph of Sai Baba and told the complainant that she was going to the temple at Somnath. She made the complainant promise, in the name of Sai Baba and her children, that she would not open the sealed envelope earlier. The complainant kept the sealed envelop near the photograph of Sai Baba and told the complainant that she was going to the temple at Somnath. The complainant asked the deceased where she would go thereafter, to which the deceased replied that she would go to Puttaparthi (the religious seat of Sathya Sai Baba). The deceased told the complainant not to worry about her and left the house. On 17.05.1998, the day of the incident, at about 12:00 noon, the brother-in-law and sister-in-law (Jeth-Jethani) of the complainant informed her telephonically that Alkaben had expired. The complainant states that on the next day, she opened the sealed cover and found a letter addressed to the Police Department and the Judge, containing 13 pages, signed by the deceased. Along with the letter, the envelope contained a key to a locker in Vadodara, two gold bangles, a pair of anklets, a pair of ear-Page red coloured bangles and a Bank of India Passbook. The complainant further states that in the letter, the deceased had written that the letter is to be given to the Police Inspector. The complainant thereafter got an application typed and submitted it to the Sub-Inspector, Valsad Railway Police Station, along with the letter of the deceased. The complainant states that her deceased sister, Alkaben, was living in Shantiniketan Society at Billimora, three days before her death, with her husband respondent No.1, and his son-in-law, respondent No.2. The respondents and Khandubhai Makanji Mistry, were pressurising the deceased to give a divorce and were inflicting physical and mental torture upon her, for which reason she was compelled to commit suicide. 3. Though the complainant has not mentioned the manner in which the deceased committed suicide in the complaint, the record reveals that the deceased jumped onto the railway tracks and died due to the resultant injuries, being overrun by the Jammu-Tavi Superfast Train, at 11:40 hrs., on 17.05.1998. These details emerge from the Inquest Panchnama at Ex.10. 4. After registration of the complaint, the investigative machinery was set into motion. The statements of witnesses were recorded and an inquest was held on the dead body of the deceased, which was sent for autopsy. A. Panchnama of the scene of offence was prepared. These details emerge from the Inquest Panchnama at Ex.10. 4. After registration of the complaint, the investigative machinery was set into motion. The statements of witnesses were recorded and an inquest was held on the dead body of the deceased, which was sent for autopsy. A. Panchnama of the scene of offence was prepared. At the end of the investigation, as there was sufficient incriminating material against the accused, they came to be charge-sheeted before the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Gandevi. As the offence under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code ("I.P.C." for short) is exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, the learned Magistrate committed the case to the Sessions Court, Valsad at Navsari, where it was registered as Sessions Case No.214 of 1998. The Trial Court framed the charge Ex.1 against the accused on 01.07.1999. It was read over and explained to the accused, who denied their guilt and claimed to be tried. Accordingly, the case was put to Trial. In order to bring home the guilt of the accused, the prosecution examined as many as 24 witnesses and produced voluminous documentary evidence. No defence witnesses were examined. After the recording of the evidence of the prosecution witnesses was over, the Trial Court explained to the accused, the statements appearing against them in such evidence. The statements of the accused under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, were recorded. Their defence was that of total denial. 5. Having appreciated and evaluated the evidence on record, the Trial Court recorded a finding of acquittal in favour of the accused. Insofar as the charge under Section 498A of I.P.C. is concerned, the Trial Court found that respondent No.1 husband of the deceased and respondent No.2 son-in-law, of the deceased, could not have been charged with the commission of the offence under the said section, as deceased Alkaben was not the legal wife of respondent No.1, as his first wife, Urmilaben, was still alive. The Trial Court has also recorded a finding that the letter of the deceased at Ex.18, cannot be considered to be Dying Declaration, as it has not been written "in expectation of death". The Trial Court has also recorded a finding that the letter of the deceased at Ex.18, cannot be considered to be Dying Declaration, as it has not been written "in expectation of death". Regarding the charge under Section 306 of the I.P.C., the Trial Court found that the evidence on record did not establish that the deceased was tortured or harassed physically and mentally, to the extent of driving her to commit suicide. Further, it is found that there is no material on record to show that there was any active instigation or persuasion on the part of the accused to compel the deceased to commit suicide. The above findings of the Trial Court, acquitting the respondents, have given rise to the filing of the present appeal. 6. Mr. H.K. Patel, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, has vehemently assailed the findings of the Trial Court on several grounds. His submissions are briefly summarised as follows: (1) That the finding of the Trial Court that the provisions of Section 498 of the I.P.C. would not be applicable to the respondents is not correct, in view of the principles of law enunciated by the Supreme Court in Reema Aggarwal v. Anupam and others (2004)3 SCC 199 , wherein the Supreme Court has given a purposive interpretation to the provisions of Section 498A of the I.P.C., holding that it would be appropriate to construe the expression 'husband' to cover a person who enters into a marital relationship, and under the colour of such proclaimed or feigned status of husband, subjects the woman concerned to cruelty or coerces her in any manner or for any of the purposes enumerated in Sections 304B and 498A, whatever be the legitimacy of the marriage itself. It is submitted that in the above judgment, the Supreme Court has gone into the objects and reasons for the enactment of these provisions of law and the intention of the legislature to prevent crimes of this nature being committed against women. (2) That there is evidence on record to indicate that a marriage ceremony had taken place between the deceased and respondent No.1, which was attended by family members and members of their community. Thereafter, they were living together as husband and wife, to the knowledge of all concerned. (2) That there is evidence on record to indicate that a marriage ceremony had taken place between the deceased and respondent No.1, which was attended by family members and members of their community. Thereafter, they were living together as husband and wife, to the knowledge of all concerned. It is further submitted that the prosecution witnesses have referred to the deceased and respondent No.1 as "husband and wife" throughout their depositions and it is not disputed that they lived together as such for five years, before the death of Alkaben. (3) Referring to a judgment in the case of A. Subash Babu v. State of Andhra Pradesh and another, (2011)7 SCC 616 , learned Additional Public Prosecutor has submitted that the judgment in the case of Reema Aggarwal v. Anupam and others (supra) has been noticed in this judgment with approval, by the Supreme Court. Therefore, as the judgment in Reema Aggarwal v. Anupam and others (supra) still holds the field, the principles of law enunciated therein would be squarely applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor has further submitted that the provisions of Section 498A of the I.P.C. would, therefore, be applicable to the respondents and the Trial Court has erred in recording findings to the contrary. (4) Referring to the letter written by the deceased, at Ex.18, it is submitted that its contents would disclose that the deceased was being subjected to physical and mental harassment and torture by the accused, therefore, the ingredients of Section 498A of the I.P.C. are satisfied. As the Trial Court has not recorded any findings in this regard, this Court may do so as it has ample powers of re-appreciation of the evidence, while deciding an appeal against acquittal. (5) It is next submitted that the Trial Court has erred in concluding that the letter at Ex.18 written by the deceased before her death cannot be construed as a Dying Declaration. The deceased has begun the letter by stating that the complainant would receive news of her suicide, the next day. The deceased has further written that she would jump before a superfast train, failing which, she would go to Mumbai and jump into the sea at Vasai or the Narmada river. This clearly shows that the letter, Ex.18, has been written by the deceased in anticipation of her own death. The deceased has further written that she would jump before a superfast train, failing which, she would go to Mumbai and jump into the sea at Vasai or the Narmada river. This clearly shows that the letter, Ex.18, has been written by the deceased in anticipation of her own death. Referring to the provisions of Section 32 of the Evidence Act, learned Additional Public Prosecutor submits that the letter written by the deceased is regarding the cause of her death and in expectation of death, therefore, it cannot be disregarded and ought to have been treated as a Dying Declaration by the Trial Court. It is further urged that the letter clearly incriminates respondents Nos.1 and 2 and there is no reason to disbelieve the Dying Declaration of the deceased. The Trial Court has not recorded correct findings and has not appreciated Ex.18 in a correct manner, resulting in the acquittal of the respondents. (6) Learned Additional Public Prosecutor has pointed out that even though P.Ws.6 and 7 have turned hostile, certain statements made by them, such as the marks of injury on the person of the deceased as were observed by them, can be taken into consideration, in corroboration of the allegations levelled by the deceased in the letter at Ex.18 and the testimony of the other prosecution witnesses, regarding physical assault on the deceased. (7) The next submission advanced by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor is that the oral testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, namely, P.W.2, Purnimaben, sister of the deceased, P.W.5, Dipakbhai, brother-in-law of the deceased, P.W.6, Ramaben, neighbour of the deceased, P.W.7, Pravinaben, neighbour of the deceased, P.W.8, Anitaben, an independent witness, would go to show that the deceased was being harassed and tortured by respondents Nos.1 and 2. The deceased has confided in P.W.2 and P.W.8 in this regard. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses coupled with the contents of Ex.18, conclusively prove that the respondents have caused extreme harassment of a physical and mental nature, to the deceased, compelling her to take her own life. It is further submitted that the deceased has stated in Ex.18 that she was locked out of the house, not given food and water and even beaten by respondent No.1, and that respondent No.2 has also beaten her. It is further submitted that the deceased has stated in Ex.18 that she was locked out of the house, not given food and water and even beaten by respondent No.1, and that respondent No.2 has also beaten her. The respondents were constantly pressurising the deceased to divorce respondent No.1 against her will, and had created a situation where she was compelled to take the extreme step. The findings recorded by the Trial Court in this regard are unjust and improper. (8) Lastly, learned Additional Public Prosecutor has submitted that the impugned judgment is illegal and perverse as it is based on an incorrect appreciation of the legal and factual position emerging from the evidence on record. It is, therefore urged that the judgment and order of the Trial Court be quashed and set aside and the appeal allowed. 7. On the other hand, Mr. Shivang M. Shah, learned advocate for the respondents, has submitted that there is no legal infirmity in the judgment and order rendered by the Trial Court, acquitting the respondents. It is submitted that the Trial Court has given strong reasons in support of its findings, which may not be disturbed. 8. It is submitted on behalf of the respondents that insofar as the applicability of the provisions of Section 498A of the I.P.C. is concerned, the Trial Court has correctly recorded that this provision would not be applicable, as the deceased was not the legal wife of respondent No.1. The so-called marriage had taken place during the lifetime of Urmilaben, the first and legally-wedded wife of respondent No.1. Learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that the deceased and respondent No.1 had entered into a "Maitri Karaar" in which it has been specifically recorded that they would live together as friends. In the said "Maitri Karaar", it has also been recorded that after respondent No.1 obtains a divorce from his wife, the marriage of the deceased and respondent No.1 would be registered. 9. The submission on behalf of the respondents is that as there was no legal or valid marriage between respondent No.1 and the deceased, the provisions of Section 498A of the I.P.C. would not be applicable, therefore, the findings of the Trial Court in this regard are just and proper. 9. The submission on behalf of the respondents is that as there was no legal or valid marriage between respondent No.1 and the deceased, the provisions of Section 498A of the I.P.C. would not be applicable, therefore, the findings of the Trial Court in this regard are just and proper. Learned counsel for the respondents has referred to a judgment of the Supreme Court in U. Suvetha v. State by Inspector and another, (2009)6 SCC 757, wherein, it has been held that the status of "relative" is conferred only by blood, marriage or adoption and as a "girlfriend" or "concubine" is not connected by blood or marriage, she is not a relative of the husband, as per Section 498A of the I.P.C. 10. It is further submitted that persons who can commit an offence under Section 498A of the I.P.C. are the husband or his "relatives" only and as the deceased was not a "relative" of respondent No.1, he cannot be charged under Section 498A of the I.P.C. Reference has also been made to a Full Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in Shivcharan Lal Verma and another v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2007) 15 SCC 369 , wherein the Supreme Court has set aside the conviction and sentence under Section 498A of the I.P.C. against the appellant therein, on the ground that he had married the deceased during the subsistence of a valid marriage with another lady. 11. Reliance has also been placed on another judgment of the Supreme Court in Vijeta Gajra v. State of N.C.T of Delhi, AIR 2010 SC 2712 , wherein it has been held that a foster sister is not a "relative" of the husband by blood, marriage or adoption, therefore, he cannot be tried for the offence under Section 498A of the I.P.C. It is submitted that the judgments in Shivcharan Lal Verma and another v. State of Madhya Pradesh (supra) and U. Suvetha v. State by Inspector and another (supra) have been noticed in this judgment. 12. The crux of the submissions advanced on behalf of the respondents is that, as the deceased is not a relative of respondent No.1, neither he nor respondent No.2, can be tried for the offence under Section 498A of the I.P.C., therefore, the findings recorded by the Trial Court in this regard are just and proper. 13. 12. The crux of the submissions advanced on behalf of the respondents is that, as the deceased is not a relative of respondent No.1, neither he nor respondent No.2, can be tried for the offence under Section 498A of the I.P.C., therefore, the findings recorded by the Trial Court in this regard are just and proper. 13. Learned counsel for the respondents further submits that even if it is assumed that the respondents could be tried for the charge under Section 498A of the I.P.C., the evidence on record does not reveal that they have subjected the deceased to cruelty of a nature that has caused great injury or danger to her life, or have driven her to commit suicide. It is submitted that on the contrary, the evidence on record shows that the behaviour of the deceased was erratic and aggressive. It has come in evidence that she was throwing stones on the house from outside on 14.05.1998, due to which a window was broken. The allegation that the respondents had locked the deceased out of the house is not true, as the house was locked only to prevent the deceased from creating more damage and destruction. It is further submitted that the evidence shows that deceased had gone up to the terrace of the house and was threatening to jump down. Further, the evidence of P.W.3, Meenaben, reveals that the deceased threw a chair on respondent No.1, which shows that it was she who was the aggressor. No incidents of cruelty by the respondents have been cited by any of the witnesses, either before 14.05.1998 or thereafter. Further, respondent No.2, son-in-law of respondent No.1, did not live with respondent No.1 and the deceased, therefore, the charge of cruelty against him is also unfounded. The incidents that have been recorded pertain to only three days before the incident, during which time she was quarrelling with respondent No.1 for a separate house, a monthly allowance and ornaments. The aspect that the deceased wanted the family jewellery from respondent No.1, is clear from Ex.18 itself. The aggressive behaviour of the deceased emerges from the testimonies of P.W.4, Premsingh Karansingh Nepali, watchman of Govardhan Apartments where the deceased and respondent No.1 lived at Vadodara and his wife P.W.3, Meenaben Premsingh. The aspect that the deceased wanted the family jewellery from respondent No.1, is clear from Ex.18 itself. The aggressive behaviour of the deceased emerges from the testimonies of P.W.4, Premsingh Karansingh Nepali, watchman of Govardhan Apartments where the deceased and respondent No.1 lived at Vadodara and his wife P.W.3, Meenaben Premsingh. It is further submitted that there was no pressure upon the deceased by the respondents to give a divorce to respondent No.1 and the deceased herself was insisting on living separately from him. The deceased had demanded a house, Rs. 5,000/a month and ornaments from respondent No.1 and it was due to the insistence of the deceased that the document at Ex.29 was executed wherein this aspect is stated. The said document has been signed by the family members of the deceased, in the presence of respondent No.1 and the deceased on 16.05.1998, a day before the incident. 14. Reliance has been placed upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in S.S. Chheena v. Vijay Kumar Mahajan and another, (2010)12 SCC 190 , in support of the submission that the charge under Section 306 of the I.P.C. is not made out against the respondents. 15. It is submitted that there was no instigation or persuasion from the respondents upon the deceased, to commit suicide. The allegations against the respondents are general in nature and even if they are taken at their face value, none of the allegations have been established. It has not been proved that the respondents nursed an intention or had mens rea to goad the deceased to commit suicide. The deceased was desirous of living separately from respondent No.1, and as is recorded in the document at Ex.29, respondent No.1 had asked for 15 days' time to think over the matter. Before fifteen days were over, the deceased had taken the extreme step on the very next day, for unknown reasons. 16. It is next submitted on behalf of the respondents that the letter at Ex.18 does not inspire confidence as it is stated therein that the deceased was sitting on the platform of the Railway Station and waiting for the train to come, which is contrary to the testimony of P.W.2, Purnimaben, who states that the deceased came to her house in the morning on 17.05.1998, and gave her the letter saying it was to be opened the next day. If the letter at Ex.18 is to be believed, then it transpires that the deceased was writing it at the Railway Station. If that is so, the deceased could not have given the letter to P.W.2 before she went to the Railway Station. Moreover, Ex.18 is in the form of a diary where day-today events have been recorded from 14.05.1998 to 17.05.1998 and, therefore, the finding of the Trial Court that it cannot be considered as a Dying Declaration, is correct. 17. Learned counsel for the respondents has placed reliance upon a judgment Sanju Alias Sanjay Singh Sengar v. State of M.P., (2002)5 SCC 371 , in support of his submissions that there was no instigation or persuasion by the respondents to incite the deceased to commit suicide. 18. Reliance has also been placed upon a judgment of this Court dated 05.09.2007 in Criminal Appeal No.1794 of 2005, wherein the ingredients of Section 498A, 107 and 306 of the I.P.C. have been discussed. 19. Lastly, it is submitted that it is a settled position of law that where two views are possible and the Trial Court has acquitted the accused on the basis of one such view, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reverse the judgment of the Trial Court upon an independent appraisal of the evidence. 20. On the basis of the above submissions, it is urged that as the judgment of the Trial Court is a well-reasoned one and does not suffer from any perversity or illegality, the appeal may be dismissed. 21. This Court has heard learned counsel for the respective parties at great length and detail and has examined the Record and Proceedings of the case, minutely. 22. The Trial Court has not entered into the merits of the charge under Section 498A of the I.P.C. against the respondents as, according to it, this provision of law is not applicable to the respondents on the ground that the deceased is not a "relative" of respondent No.1, not being his legally-wedded wife. The Trial Court has relied upon the judgment in the case of Ramnarayan v. State of M.P., (1998) 3 Crimes 147 (MP) and Shantilata Paride v. Nrusigha Ch. Behare and another,(1998) CRI. LJ 3237 (Orissa), in support of the above findings. The Trial Court has relied upon the judgment in the case of Ramnarayan v. State of M.P., (1998) 3 Crimes 147 (MP) and Shantilata Paride v. Nrusigha Ch. Behare and another,(1998) CRI. LJ 3237 (Orissa), in support of the above findings. Whether these findings of the Trial Court are in consonance with the principles of law enunciated by the Supreme Court, is one of the issues to be determined by this Court. The second issue that arises for determination is whether the letter at Ex.18 can be considered to be a Dying Declaration, or not. If so, whether it incriminates the respondents, insofar as the charges under Section 498A and 306 are concerned. The Trial Court has not considered it as a Dying Declaration, on the ground that it has not been written in expectation of death. 23. Before arriving at a conclusion regarding the above issues, it would be proper to briefly examine the salient features of the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution. 24. P.W.2, Purnimaben is the complainant and sister of the deceased. She has been examined at Ex.16. This witness states that the marriage ceremony of her deceased sister Alkaben with respondent No.1, took place five years ago, at the house of their father. It was the third marriage of the deceased and the second marriage of respondent No.1. One year before the incident, respondent No.1 and the deceased had come to live at Vadodara with the mother of respondent No.1 and Kedar and Anupama (son and daughter of respondent No.1, from his first wife). The mother-in-law of the deceased had passed away at Vadodara. She states that on 16.05.1998, her father Navinchandra Mulchandbhai Wadia (PW19), her brother-in-law Rameshchandra and respondent No.2 had come to take her with them to Billimora, upon which she had stated that she would go only if her elder sister and her husband came. This witness further states that she accompanied these persons to Billimora and went to the house of the deceased at Shantiniketan Society. The house was locked and the deceased was nowhere to be seen. Respondent No.1 called to the deceased and searched for her in the neighourhood. Respondent No.2 climbed the compound wall and saw that a fan was on, in one of the rooms on the upper floor. It seemed that the deceased was in that room. The house was locked and the deceased was nowhere to be seen. Respondent No.1 called to the deceased and searched for her in the neighourhood. Respondent No.2 climbed the compound wall and saw that a fan was on, in one of the rooms on the upper floor. It seemed that the deceased was in that room. They shouted for the deceased to come out. Respondent No.1 is stated to have asked the deceased whether she would come out or he should send "gundas" to get her out. The deceased came out in the balcony. According to this witness, her face was swollen and there were dark circles under her eyes. The deceased is stated to have asked them why they had come and who had called them, to which the complainant asked her to come down as she would like to talk to her. When the deceased came down, the complainant asked her what had happened. As per the deposition of this witness, the deceased said that she would bear her joys and sorrows herself and live here and die here. This witness has stated that the deceased told her that Khandubhai (father of Urmilaben, first wife of respondent No.1) is harassing her. The deceased is further stated to have said that Khandubhai had sent a car in which she has come to Billimora and all of them are harassing her because they want to throw her out. All have ganged up and she is left alone. According to this witness, the deceased told her that she had been beaten and had shown her the marks on her back, from the window. This witness states that she told the deceased to come with her but the deceased refused. Thereafter, this witness describes her visit to the office of "Honest Industries" at the behest of the deceased. The father, sister and brother-in-law of this witness had also gone there. According to this witness, her sister and brother-in-law told her that a paper had been drawn up upon which they all put their signatures. 25. This witness then goes on to describe the events that took place on 17.05.1998, the day of the incident. She states that in the morning of that day, the deceased had come to her house while she was cooking. 25. This witness then goes on to describe the events that took place on 17.05.1998, the day of the incident. She states that in the morning of that day, the deceased had come to her house while she was cooking. The deceased handed over a sealed envelope to this witness and told her to open it only the next day. The sealed envelope was kept by the deceased in another room, near the photograph of Sai Baba. This witness asked the deceased where she was going, to which she replied that she was going to Somnath and thereafter, to Puttaparthy, and she should not worry. The deceased told her not to open the envelope until she reaches there and telephones her to do so. This witness states that on the afternoon of the same day, she received a telephone call to the effect that the deceased had committed suicide by jumping before a running train. 26. In her cross-examination on behalf of respondent No.1, this witness states that the letter at Ex.18 was handed over by her to the Police six days' after the death of the deceased. She further states that three days' after Alka's death, she had shown the letter to her father, P.W.19, who had told her to tear it up but she did not do so. She also showed it to one Musifbhai who told her to handover the letter to the Police. This witness further states in the cross-examination that she did not append the original letter Ex.18 with her complaint but had attached a xerox copy thereof. 27. P.W.3, Meenaben, is the wife of Premsingh, watchman of Govardhan Apartment, Vadodara. Her deposition is at Ex.30. She states that she knows the deceased and used to work at her house. Her relationship with the deceased and respondent No.1 was good. She further states that no quarrels took place between respondent No.1 and the deceased. On one occasion, when she had gone to wash utensils at the house of respondent No.1, the daughter of respondent No.1 began shouting. This witness saw that the deceased had picked up a chair and thrown it at respondent No.1. She states that she does not know why this quarrel took place. This witness further narrates that on the night of the same day, the deceased came out of the house and started pelting stones on the door. This witness saw that the deceased had picked up a chair and thrown it at respondent No.1. She states that she does not know why this quarrel took place. This witness further narrates that on the night of the same day, the deceased came out of the house and started pelting stones on the door. This witness was sleeping in her house but came out when she heard the noise and saw this. She does not know what happened thereafter. She further states that she does not know whether respondent No.1 came out of the house. As a result of pelting stones by the deceased, one window was broken. On the next day, the deceased, respondent No.1 Rameshchandra and his daughter left for Billimora in a Matador. Thereafter, the news that Alkaben had died was reported in the Newspaper. 28. In cross-examination, this witness maintains that the deceased and respondent No.1 lived peacefully without quarrelling and that she does not know whether respondent No.1 and his children harassed the deceased. 29. P.W.4 is Premsingh Karansingh, husband of P.W.3, who was working as a Watchman at Govardhan Apartments. His deposition is at Ex.31. He states that he knows respondent No.1 and the deceased and that the deceased was the wife of respondent No.1. He further states that his wife P.W.3, Meenaben, used to work at the house of the deceased and they had good relations with them. He further states that one night in June, 1998, he got up and saw the deceased sitting on the Verandah, outside her house. Thereafter, the deceased went and sat down in the middle of the road. This witness asked the deceased why she was sitting there, but the deceased got up and went out of the gate. This witness states that he asked the deceased where she was going, to which she replied that she was not going anywhere, and came back. The deceased, thereafter, started pelting stones on her house and broke the glass of one of the windows. As the deceased was pelting stones, the door to her flat was closed by respondent No.1 and his daughter, from inside. Thereafter, respondent No.1 and his daughter came out of the house and the deceased entered the house. This witness states that thereafter he had gone to sleep and does not know what transpired. As the deceased was pelting stones, the door to her flat was closed by respondent No.1 and his daughter, from inside. Thereafter, respondent No.1 and his daughter came out of the house and the deceased entered the house. This witness states that thereafter he had gone to sleep and does not know what transpired. The next day the deceased and other relatives went to Billimora. After two to four days, he came to know that the deceased had died and this news was also reported in the Newspaper. 30. In cross-examination, this witness states that the deceased was short-tempered. He further states that he is not aware of any quarrel taking place between respondent No.1 and the deceased. Regarding the incident of throwing stones, this witness states that in his opinion the deceased was at fault. He states that the deceased climbed up to the terrace and threatened to jump down from there. Respondent No.1 and his daughter rushed out of the house, after which the deceased came down from the terrace and went into the house. 31. P.W.5, Dipakbhai Harishchandra Mistry, is the brother-in-law of the deceased, and the husband of Dakshaben, the elder sister of the deceased. His deposition is at Ex.36. He states that the marriage of respondent No.1 and the deceased was solemnized in 1993. It was a second marriage for respondent No.1 whose first wife was Urmilaben, daughter of Khandubhai Makanji Mistry. Out of the said wedlock, respondent No.1 and Urmilaben had three children. This witness states that on 15.05.1998, he received a telegram dated 14.05.1998, in which it was written that Alkaben had lost her mental balance and was out of control, therefore, he should come by the first train to Vadodara. He states that on receiving the telegram, he went to the house of respondent No.1 at Vadodara and found that the flat was locked. This witness states that he met the wife of the watchman who informed him that there had been a quarrel and respondent No.1 had pushed the deceased. According to this witness, P.W.3 told him that the deceased had told her that she had been thrown out of the house. Even though she wanted to go to the bathroom, the doors and windows of the flat were locked. According to this witness, P.W.3 told him that the deceased had told her that she had been thrown out of the house. Even though she wanted to go to the bathroom, the doors and windows of the flat were locked. She is further stated to have informed this witness that on the night of 14.05.1998, the deceased, respondent No.1 and her father P.W.19, had gone to Billimora in a Matador. This witness then returned home. According to this witness, in order to find out what had transpired, he went to Billimora with his wife on 16.05.1998. He first went to the house of P.W.2 and then to the house of respondent No.1, at Shantiniketan Society. There was a lock on the door. Respondent No.1 is stated to have told him that the deceased was outside but upon searching for her, she was not found. Respondent No.2 climbed on the wall of the compound and saw that a fan was on in one of the rooms on the upper floor. On shouting for the deceased, she came out on the balcony and stated that the quarrel was between husband and wife and why have you all come here. He states that they called Alkaben down to talk to her. Respondent No.1 is stated to have told the deceased that he would call two "gundas" to get her down. Thereafter, the deceased came down and stood near the window. This witness states that he was told by his wife that she saw marks of the beatings given to the deceased by respondents Nos.1 and 2 and daughter of respondent No.1 on her back and there were dark circles under her eyes. Respondent No.1 is stated to have said that he would call his relatives and they would go to the office of "Honest Industries". This witness states that after they had gone, he went to "Honest Industries" with his wife and met Narmadaben, wife of Khandubhai, who told him that they considered the deceased like their daughter, and he should tell respondent No.1 to give her one more chance. This witness further states that when they came back to the house of the deceased at Shantiniketan Society, respondent No.1 said that he and the deceased cannot live together. This witness further states that when they came back to the house of the deceased at Shantiniketan Society, respondent No.1 said that he and the deceased cannot live together. This witness states that the deceased then said that if there is to be a divorce between them, she should be given some security for her lifetime. According to this witness, respondents Nos.1 and 2 told deceased that if she does not want to live with respondent No.1, she should state this in writing, upon which the deceased stated that until and unless some arrangement is not made for her to live comfortably during her lifetime, she would not write anything. This witness further states that the deceased demanded that the flat at Vadodara be transferred to her name and the ornaments that had been given to her at the time of her marriage should be returned. She further demanded that a sum of money be deposited in a Fixed Deposit for her monthly expenses. Thereafter, all of them went back to "Honest Industries" where a document was drawn up, in which it was written that respondent No.1 and the deceased did not want to live together. This witness states that this document is Ex.29 on which he has appended his signature. He further states that his father-in-law, Navinchandra, Dakshaben, sister of the deceased, Bhavinkumar, Kishorebhai Desai (PW11), Anupamaben Mistry (daughter of respondent No.1 from his first wife) then put their signatures on this document. Thereafter, all of them went away. In the said document, it is stated that respondent No.1 had asked for fifteen days' time to think over the matter. This witness states that on the next day, that is, 17.05.1998, when he was at work, he got the news that Alkaben had died in an accident. This witness further states that three days after her death, he had gone to the house of respondent No.2, who told him that the deceased had kept a sealed envelope near the photograph of Sai Baba and told her that only when she receives news of her reaching Puttaparthi or hears about her untimely death, should it be opened. This witness states that he then read the 13 page letter written by the deceased in her handwriting. He further states that he and P.W.2 went to Billimora Railway Station to get the complaint registered but the Police were reluctant to do so. This witness states that he then read the 13 page letter written by the deceased in her handwriting. He further states that he and P.W.2 went to Billimora Railway Station to get the complaint registered but the Police were reluctant to do so. He further states that he again went to the Police Station on 19.05.1998, but the complaint was not registered. This witness states that during the married life of the deceased and respondent No.1, they used to come to his house on occasions. The quarrels between them were ordinary and trivial in nature and they used to reconcile later. 32. In cross-examination, this witness states that the deceased had demanded an amount for her maintenance but he does not remember the figure. Respondent No.1 had asked for fifteen days to think over the matter. They were all to meet after fifteen days to discuss the issue. This witness further states in cross-examination that the letter at Ex.18 was shown to him by P.W.2, Purnimaben, four to five days after the death of Alkaben. He further states in cross-examination that deceased Alkaben was very short-tempered. He goes on to state that respondent No.1 and the deceased lived nicely together and there were only small quarrels between them. The deceased had never complained about respondent No.1 or his children to him. This witness states that eight days after the incident, he had given the letter Ex.18 to Khandubhai, to read. Before this, he had given the letter to P.W.19, his father-in-law to read. His father-in-law had said that the letter has no value. 33. P.W.6 is Ramaben Bhaskarbhai Desai, a neighbour of the deceased, who has been examined at Ex.37. This witness states that the house of respondent No.1 is behind her house and that respondent No.1 and the deceased used to live properly together. She states that whenever they used to come to Billimora, the deceased used to call for tea from her house. On the day of the incident, this witness and her sister-in-law were sitting in their compound, cutting vegetables, when the deceased called for tea. Her sister-in-law had given the deceased tea. At about 10:00 o'clock, the deceased said that she is going to Somnath and left the house. This witness has been declared hostile. 34. On the day of the incident, this witness and her sister-in-law were sitting in their compound, cutting vegetables, when the deceased called for tea. Her sister-in-law had given the deceased tea. At about 10:00 o'clock, the deceased said that she is going to Somnath and left the house. This witness has been declared hostile. 34. In cross-examination, this witness states that when the deceased asked for tea, she saw a swelling under her eyes and on her teeth and there were green bruises. However, she did not ask the deceased anything and nor did the deceased say anything. She further states that she has not seen respondent No.1 quarreling with the deceased and they used to live properly together. She states that as she was cutting vegetables, and as it was her sister-in-law who had given tea to the deceased, she had not seen the face of the deceased properly. 35. P.W.7, Pravinaben Bhupendrabhai Desai, is the sister-in-law of P.W.6 and a neighbour of the deceased. Her deposition is at Ex.38. She states that when she had gone to give tea to the deceased, she saw bruises on the portion below her teeth. At about 4:00 o'clock on the same day, she heard that deceased had died. 36. In cross-examination, this witness states that the deceased had never told her that respondents Nos.1 and 2 used to beat her. She further states that whenever the deceased and respondent No.1 came to Billimora, they ordinarily called for tea from their house. On 17.05.1998 also, they had called for tea, therefore, she did not found anything surprising in it. 37. P.W.8, Anilaben Nitinbhai Desai, has been examined at Ex.39. She is a devotee of Sathya Sai Baba and states that the 'Paduka' of Sathya Sai Baba is kept at her home and devotees come there to sing "Bhajans". The deceased also came sometimes. She further states that on 15.05.1998, there were "Bhajans" at her house and the deceased came there between 12:30 to 1:00 o'clock. The deceased went to the temple in her house, and stayed there for five minutes. She drew the curtains and when she came out, this witness saw that the deceased was crying and wiping her eyes. The deceased told this witness that she would come for the "Bhajans" in the evening. Thereafter, at 7:00 pm, the deceased came to the house of this witness for "Bhajans". She drew the curtains and when she came out, this witness saw that the deceased was crying and wiping her eyes. The deceased told this witness that she would come for the "Bhajans" in the evening. Thereafter, at 7:00 pm, the deceased came to the house of this witness for "Bhajans". After "Bhajan Satsang" was over and everyone had left, the deceased went to the temple again and kept a letter, written in pencil, there. According to this witness, the deceased was crying and had told her that respondents Nos.1 and 2 had beaten her and are pressurising her to give a divorce. This witness states that she told the deceased to talk to Khandubhai. The deceased told her that her ornaments were there. She then went away after saying that she would come after two days. According to this witness, the portion under the eyes of the deceased was green. She states that the deceased had called for a Tiffin but no one had brought the Tiffin. She had tea from the house of P.W.6, Ramaben. The deceased is stated to have told this witness that she is being pressurised to give divorce and is in shock because of this. Thereafter, the deceased went away. This witness met the deceased on the next Sunday, near her house, at about 10:30 am, when she had gone to purchase vegetables. The deceased was wearing a saree and plastic bangles on her arms. The deceased was also wearing "goggles" and had a purse and a bag with her. This witness asked the deceased to come to her house but the deceased refused and went away. This witness states that she does not know where the deceased went. At 3:00 pm, she came to know that the deceased had died. 38. In cross-examination, this witness states that the reason why she did not inform the police for fifteen to seventeen days regarding the letter kept by the deceased near the photograph of Sathya Sai Baba was, that she did not think it necessary to do so. She further states that she does not have any knowledge regarding the personal life of the deceased who had come for "Satsang" only twice. She only had formal relations with her and there was no personal relationship. She further states that she does not have any knowledge regarding the personal life of the deceased who had come for "Satsang" only twice. She only had formal relations with her and there was no personal relationship. As her relationship with Alkaben was not close, it was unusual for her to talk about her personal life to this witness. This witness further states that the deceased did not tell her anything regarding the relationship between her and respondent No.1. 39. P.W.9, Dhirubhai Patel is the Manager of the Bank in which the deceased and respondent No.1 had their account and has been examined at Ex.43. Similarly, P.W.10, Ishwarbhai is an employee of the Bank and his deposition is at Ex.45. As the testimonies of these two witnesses do not have much bearing upon the issues that arise for determination, it is not necessary to discuss them. 40. The next witness is P.W.11, Kishorebhai Daulatbhai Desai, who has been examined at Ex.46. This witness is an employee of "Honest Industries" which is owned by Khandubhai Makanji Mistry, father of Urmilaben, the first wife of respondent No.1. This witness states that the second marriage of respondent No.1 was performed with the deceased, after which they lived together happily. This witness further states that on 14.05.1998, he was told by Khandubhai to go to the house of the deceased at Vadodara, as some quarrel had taken place. He states that he was told to pacify the deceased and bring her to Billimora. He reached Vadodara between 1:00 to 1:30 pm and went to the house of respondent No.1, where he found Navinchandra, P.W.19, father of the deceased, respondent No.1, respondent No.2, the deceased, Anupama, daughter of respondent No.1 and Kedar, son of respondent No.1. According to this witness, no other person was present there. Respondent No.1 told him that there was a difference of opinion between him and the deceased, due to which a quarrel had taken place. According to this witness, at that time, the deceased started giving abuses in such foul language that he cannot repeat it. Thereafter, this witness arranged a Tempo on hire to take them to Billimora. The deceased then demanded a house and a share in the property. This witness told the deceased that whatever she wanted could be demanded when she went to Billimora. Thereafter, this witness arranged a Tempo on hire to take them to Billimora. The deceased then demanded a house and a share in the property. This witness told the deceased that whatever she wanted could be demanded when she went to Billimora. Thereafter, at about 6:00 pm, the deceased, respondent No.1, P.W.19, Navinchandra Mulchandbhai Wadia, respondent No.2, and children of respondent No.1 left for Billimora in a tempo. As the tyre of the tempo burst, they had to complete the journey by train. This witness further states that on 16.05.1998, he went to the house of respondent No.1 at Billimora on being called by him. He names other family members who were present there, along with the deceased and the respondents. He states that P.W.19, father of the deceased, told the deceased to live peacefully and not to quarrel but the deceased had stubbornly insisted that she wanted money and a house and wanted to live separately. Thereafter, respondent No.1 asked for ten to fifteen days time to think it over. The deceased insisted that this be noted down on a paper and a document was drawn up, on which this witness signed. This witness identifies this document as Ex.29. He states that this document has been signed by other relatives, but not by respondent No.1 or the deceased. The next day, that is, on 17.05.1998, at about 2:30 pm, Khandubhai called him and told him that he should go to the Railway Station to inquire. When this witness went to the Railway Station, he was shown a dead body of a woman who had died in an accident. He recognised it as that of Alkaben. 41. P.W.13, Sureshbhai Parshottamdas, is one of the Panch witnesses of the Panchnama at Ex.50, vide which one of the letters purported to have been written by the deceased was produced by P.W.19, Navinchandra Mulchandbhai Wadia, father of the deceased. This letter has been used to compare the handwriting of the deceased with the handwriting of the letter at Ex.18. P.W.14, Jayantibhai Chaganbhai is the other Panch witness of the Panchnama at Ex.50 and has been examined at Ex.51. Apart from identifying their signatures on the Panchnama, both these witnesses profess ignorance regarding all other aspects and have been declared hostile by the prosecution. P.W.15, Nareshbhai Mohanbhai Patel, is one of the Panch witnesses of the Panchnama at Ex.53. P.W.14, Jayantibhai Chaganbhai is the other Panch witness of the Panchnama at Ex.50 and has been examined at Ex.51. Apart from identifying their signatures on the Panchnama, both these witnesses profess ignorance regarding all other aspects and have been declared hostile by the prosecution. P.W.15, Nareshbhai Mohanbhai Patel, is one of the Panch witnesses of the Panchnama at Ex.53. This Panchnama is regarding the diaries (purported to have been written by the deceased) that were handed over by Anupama, daughter of respondent No.1, to the police. He has been declared hostile. The second witness of the Panchnama at Ex.53 is P.W.16, Thakorebhai Patel, who has also been declared hostile. P.W.17 is Dhirubhai, who has been examined at Ex.56. He is one of the Panch witnesses of the Panchnama at Ex.57 regarding the notebook of the deceased handed over by respondent No.1. He has been declared hostile. The testimonies of the above Panch witnesses are, therefore not useful to the prosecution. 42. P.W.18, Jayantilal Govindji, is an advocate, who has been examined at Ex.59. He states that Alkaben had filed a case against her second husband who lives in London, for maintenance. However, he does not know what happened to that case. He states that Alkaben had told him this herself but he has never appeared for her in the divorce case. He has heard that it is pending. 43. P.W.19 is Navinchandra Mulchandbhai Wadia, father of the deceased, who has been examined at Ex.60. He states that the marriage ceremony of his daughter Alka with respondent No.1 had taken place at his house at Valsad, in the year 1993. The marriage was performed by a Brahmin, in accordance with the customs of their community. After the marriage, Alka had gone to Billimora to stay with respondent No.1. He states that the married life of Alka and respondent No.1 was good and they used to frequently come to his house. When he had gone to Vadodara in May 1998, upon receipt of the Telegram from respondent No.1, Alka, respondents Nos.1 and 2 and Bhavinbhai were there. The deceased had stated that she wanted a divorce from respondent No.1. This witness further states that the deceased had insulted him and asked him who had called him. She had also thrown his bag out of the house. He states that he had tried to reason with the deceased and cool her down. The deceased had stated that she wanted a divorce from respondent No.1. This witness further states that the deceased had insulted him and asked him who had called him. She had also thrown his bag out of the house. He states that he had tried to reason with the deceased and cool her down. Everybody had decided to go to Billimora and a Matador had been arranged for this purpose. However, the tyre of the Matador burst and they all had to go by train. After reaching Billimora, they went to the house of respondent No.1. On the next day, they all went to the house of Khandubhai, where a meeting was held. Khandubhai was not present in the meeting. However, Khandubhai's wife, Dakshaben elder daughter of this witness, P.W.5 Dipakbhai Mistry, P.W.2 Purnimaben, were present, as was the deceased. It was decided that if the deceased wanted to take a divorce, fifteen days' time ought to be given to her to think about it and come to a decision. A document was executed there, which is at Ex.29. This witness states that he has signed upon the said document, as has P.W.5, respondent No.2, P.W.11 – Kishorebhai and Anupama daughter of respondent No.1. The deceased and respondent No.1 have not signed on the document. After the document was executed, this witness states that he left for Valsad. This witness further states that after two or three days, he heard the news of Alka's death. He went to Billimora and saw the dead body of the deceased. He took custody of the dead body and performed the funeral rites. This witness further states that on 15.05.1998, his daughter Alka was insisting for a divorce, and P.W.5 and Dakshaben were present there. He saw the letter at Ex.18 after Alka's death. P.W.5 had brought the xerox copy with him. This witness states that the signature on the letter is that of Alka. He asked P.W.5 why he had shown him the letter after such a long time and that there was no need to do anything further regarding it. This witness categorically states that the letter reveals that it has been written with animosity. This witness further states that his daughter Alka wanted to get a divorce and used to get agitated about small things. There was no other reason for her suicide. This witness categorically states that the letter reveals that it has been written with animosity. This witness further states that his daughter Alka wanted to get a divorce and used to get agitated about small things. There was no other reason for her suicide. His daughter did not face any harassment at the hands of the respondents. 44. In cross-examination on behalf of the defence, this witness states that he had performed the last rites of the deceased. He has no suspicion regarding any person. He reiterates that the deceased did not face any harassment in her matrimonial home and had never complained to him in this regard. He further states that in the year 1995, the deceased had married a Doctor called Ajit Mistry in Mumbai. After six months of the marriage, it broke up. He states that the deceased used to get agitated on small things and used to say whatever came into her mouth. The deceased had insisted on getting a divorce. The second marriage of Alka took place with one Bharatbhai Panchal, who lived in London. The deceased lived in London till 1990, but had thrown a hot cooker on her father-in-law, which had led to a case being filed by Bharatbhai, for divorce. This witness categorically states that the deceased had a very short temper and a bitter tongue. This witness further reiterates that it was the deceased who had insisted on taking a divorce from respondent No.1. He tried to advice her against it but she did not listen. In Vadodara, the deceased had thrown household articles and broken them. From 15.05.1998, he had stayed at Billimora in the house of the deceased till 17.05.1998. During this period, respondent No.1 had not thrown the deceased out of the house. Regarding the execution of document at Ex.29, this witness states that the deceased insisted upon taking a divorce, therefore, it was decided that fifteen days' time be given to think about it. After the document was signed, the deceased went out of Khandubhai's house, to her own house, went upstairs and locked the door. This witness tried to open the door but to no avail. Regarding the letter at Ex.18, this witness states that the allegations regarding mental and physical harassment are not true and are a figment of the imagination. 45. After the document was signed, the deceased went out of Khandubhai's house, to her own house, went upstairs and locked the door. This witness tried to open the door but to no avail. Regarding the letter at Ex.18, this witness states that the allegations regarding mental and physical harassment are not true and are a figment of the imagination. 45. P.W.20, Rameshbhai Parbhubhai Patel, was a Jamadar at Billimora Railway Station who had drawn the complaint. P.W.21, Raghunathbhai Jagannathbhai, was the Police Station Officer of the Billimora Police Station at the relevant period of time. P.W.22, Kaushikkumar Punjalal Vyas, is the handwriting expert who has opined that the handwriting of the letter at Ex.18 is that of the deceased. P.W.23, Nagarbhai Dhirubhai Chaudhary, was Police Sub Inspector at Valsad Railway Police Station. He forwarded the FIR to Billimora Town Police Station for registration of the offence. P.W.24, Anilkumar Chotubhai Desai, was the Circle Police Inspector, Billimora Town Police Station. He has taken the accused persons into custody. 46. In the background of the above evidence, it would be expedient to notice certain judicial pronouncements regarding the applicability of Section 498A of the I.P.C., on the facts and in the circumstances of the case. 47. In Reema Aggarwal v. Anupam and others (supra), the Supreme Court has answered the question as to who would be covered by the expression 'husband' by attracting Section 498A of the I.P.C. After discussing various judgments, the Supreme Court has held as below: "18. The concept of "dowry" is intermittently linked with a marriage and the provisions of the Dowry Act apply in relation to marriages. If the legality of the marriage itself is an issue, further legalistic problems do arise. If the validity of the marriage itself is under legal scrutiny, the demand of dowry in respect of an invalid marriage would be legally not recognisable. Even then the purpose for which Sections 498A and 304B, I.P.C. and Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (for short the "Evidence Act") were introduced, cannot be lost sight of. Legislations enacted with some policy to curb and alleviate some public evil rampant in society and effectuate a definite public purpose or benefit positively requires to be interpreted with certain element of realism too and not merely pedantically or hyper technically. Legislations enacted with some policy to curb and alleviate some public evil rampant in society and effectuate a definite public purpose or benefit positively requires to be interpreted with certain element of realism too and not merely pedantically or hyper technically. The obvious objective was to prevent harassment to a woman who enters into a marital relationship with a person and later on, becomes a victim of the greed for money. Can a person who enters into a marital arrangement be allowed to take a shelter behind a smokescreen to contend that since there was no valid marriage the question of dowry does not arise? Such legalistic niceties would destroy the purpose of the provisions. Such hairsplitting legalistic approach would encourage harassment to a woman over demand of money. The nomenclature "dowry" does not have any magic charm written over it. It is just a label given to demand of money in relation to marital relationship. The legislative intent is clear from the fact that it is not only the husband but also his relations who are covered by Section 498A. The legislature has taken care of children born from invalid marriages. Section 16 of the Marriage Act deals with legitimacy of children of void and voidable marriages. Can it be said that legislature which was conscious of the social stigma attached to children of void and voidable marriages closed eyes to plight of a woman who unknowingly or unconscious of the legal consequences entered into the marital relationship. If such restricted meaning is given, it would not further the legislative intent. On the contrary, it would be against the concern shown by the legislature for avoiding harassment to a woman over demand of money in relation to marriages. The first exception to Section 494 has also some relevance. If such restricted meaning is given, it would not further the legislative intent. On the contrary, it would be against the concern shown by the legislature for avoiding harassment to a woman over demand of money in relation to marriages. The first exception to Section 494 has also some relevance. According to it, the offence of bigamy will not apply to "any person whose marriage with such husband or wife has been declared void by a Court of competent jurisdiction." It would be appropriate to construe the expression "husband" to cover a person who enters into marital relationship and under the colour of such proclaimed or feigned status of husband subjects the woman concerned to cruelty or coerce her in any manner or for any of the purposes enumerated in the relevant provisions – Sections 304B/498A, whatever be the legitimacy of the marriage itself for the limited purpose of Sections 498A and 304B, I.P.C. Such an interpretation, known and recognised as purposive construction has to come into play in a case of this nature. The absence of a definition of "husband" to specifically include such persons who contract marriages ostensibly and cohabitate with such woman, in the purported exercise of his role and status as "husband" is no ground to exclude them from the purview of Section 304B or 498A I.P.C., viewed in the context of the very object and aim of the legislations introducing those provisions." (Emphasis supplied) 48. This judgment has been referred to by the Supreme Court in A. Subash Babu v. State of Andhra Pradesh and another (supra), in the following terms: "55. In view of the firm and clear law laid down on the subject, this Court is of the confirmed view that the High Court was not justified at all in quashing the proceedings initiated against the appellant under Section 498A of the Penal Code on the ground that Respondent 2 was not "wife" within the meaning of Section 498A I.P.C. and was not entitled to maintain a complaint under the said provision. The question therefore which arises for consideration of the Court is whether the said finding recorded by the High Court can and should be set aside in the present appeal which is filed by the husband. 56. The question therefore which arises for consideration of the Court is whether the said finding recorded by the High Court can and should be set aside in the present appeal which is filed by the husband. 56. It was argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that quashing of proceedings with reference to the offence punishable under Section 498A of the Penal Code is neither challenged by the State Government nor by the original complainant before this Court and the same having attained finality, the same cannot be disturbed in an appeal filed by the appellant husband in which a grievance is made regarding non-grant of relief in full by the High Court. 57. This Court does not find any substance in the above-mentioned argument of the learned counsel for the appellant. The law declared by this Court in Reema Aggarwal, (2004)3 SCC 199 was binding on all courts including the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh who decided the present case in view of the salutary provisions of Article 141 of the Constitution. The learned Single Judge of the High Court could not have afforded to ignore the law declared by this Court in Reema Aggarwal while considering the question whether proceedings initiated by Respondent 2 for commission of the offence punishable under Section 498A I.P.C. should be quashed or not. The High Court has completely misdirected itself in quashing the proceedings for the offence punishable under Section 498A I.P.C. There is no manner of doubt that the finding recorded by the High Court that Respondent 2 is not the wife within the meaning of Section 498A of the Penal Code runs contrary to the law declared by this Court in Reema Aggarwal." (Emphasis supplied) 49. Learned counsel for the respondents has relied upon U. Suvetha v. State by Inspector and another (supra), in support of his contention that there was no legal marriage between respondent No.1 and the deceased, therefore respondent No.1 cannot be said to be a "relative" and not being a "relative" neither he, nor respondent No.2 can be charged for the offence under Section 498A of the I.P.C. In that case, the FIR under Section 498A of the I.P.C. was filed against the appellant before the Supreme Court who was referred to as his "girlfriend" and "concubine". The Supreme Court held that Section 498A is a penal provision deserving strict interpretation. By no stretch of imagination would a "girlfriend" or even a "concubine" in an etymological sense, be a "relative". It was held that the word "relative" brings within its purview a status conferred by blood or marriage or adoption. If no marriage has taken place, the question of one being a relative of another would not arise. (See paragraphs 18 to 24 of the reported judgment). 50. In the present case, a marriage had taken place between the respondent No.1 and the deceased. This is evident from the testimony of P.W.19, father of the deceased, as well as the other prosecution witnesses. Nobody denies the fact that a marriage had taken place. The deceased was known as the wife of respondent No.1, by one and all. The "Maitri-Karaar" at Ex.13 states that respondent No.1 and the deceased have decided to live together as friends and that they would legally get married when respondent No.1 obtains a divorce from his first wife. The fact that they had undergone a marriage ceremony has not been denied by any of the witnesses. 51. Reference has also been made to a judgment of the Full Bench of the Supreme Court in Shivcharan Lal Verma and another v. State of Madhya Pradesh (supra), wherein on the facts of the said case, it was held that Section 498A would not be attracted as the marriage with Mohini was null and void, the same having been contracted during the lifetime of the wife Kalindi. This judgment appears to turn on its own facts, and may not be applicable to the present case, where there is specific evidence regarding the marriage ceremony taking place between the respondent and the deceased, who lived together as man and wife for five years. The deceased was treated, for all intents and purposes, as the wife of respondent No.1 by all concerned. Therefore, in the considered view of this Court, a purposive interpretation, as has been given by the Supreme Court in Reema Aggarwal v. Anupam and others (supra), is required to be given to the term "relative". As a necessary consequence of such an interpretation, the provisions of Section 498A of the I.P.C. would be applicable. 52. Therefore, in the considered view of this Court, a purposive interpretation, as has been given by the Supreme Court in Reema Aggarwal v. Anupam and others (supra), is required to be given to the term "relative". As a necessary consequence of such an interpretation, the provisions of Section 498A of the I.P.C. would be applicable. 52. The Trial Court has relied upon a judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Ramnarayan v. State of M.P. (supra), in support of the conclusion that the provisions of Section 498 would not be applicable. However, this judgment has been overruled by the Supreme Court in the case of Reema Aggarwal v. Anupam and others (supra). 53. The second judgment relied upon by the Trial Court in this regard was Shantilata Paride v. Nrusigha Ch. Behare and another (supra). This judgment would not be relevant in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Reema Aggarwal v. Anupam and others (supra). To be fair to the Trial Court, it ought to be noted that its judgment is dated 29.04.2000, before the judgment in Reema Aggarwal v. Anupam and others (supra) was delivered by the Supreme Court. 54. Having come to the conclusion that the ingredients of Section 498A of the I.P.C. are applicable to the present case, it now has to be determined whether the respondents have inflicted cruelty, within the meaning of Section 498A of the I.P.C., upon the deceased, with an intention to drive her to commit suicide or force her to meet any unlawful demand for property. 55. The prosecution has relied heavily upon the letter at Ex.18 to establish its case that the respondents treated the deceased with cruelty and that she had also been physically assaulted by them. If the entire conspectus of the evidence of the prosecution witnesses is examined minutely, in juxtaposition with the letter at Ex.18, it is evident that the allegations of the alleged cruelty cover a period of only three days, that is, from 14.05.1998 to 17.05.1998. The description of the events that allegedly constituted cruelty, as given by the deceased in the letter Ex.18, start from 14.05.1998. The genesis of the dispute appears to be the demand made by the deceased for the ornaments belonging to the father of respondent No.1 and the refusal of respondent No.1 to hand over those ornaments to her. The description of the events that allegedly constituted cruelty, as given by the deceased in the letter Ex.18, start from 14.05.1998. The genesis of the dispute appears to be the demand made by the deceased for the ornaments belonging to the father of respondent No.1 and the refusal of respondent No.1 to hand over those ornaments to her. This is clear from the letter at Ex.18, itself. The deceased has written in the said letter that respondent No.1 had said that only his children from his first wife, Urmila, would get the ornaments and the deceased would not be given anything. The incident regarding removal of the ornaments from the locker by Anupama, daughter of respondent No.1, pertains to the period before the marriage of the deceased with the respondent. This can hardly be stated to fall under the term "cruelty" and nor has it happened during the marriage span of the deceased with respondent No.1. 56. Regarding the alleged physical harassment of the deceased by the respondents, the deceased has made general allegations in this regard. According to the deceased, she was beaten by respondents Nos.1 and 2 on 14.05.1998, when she was at Vadodara. She refers to an incident that took place at Govardhan Apartments, at Vadodara, which is also described by P.W.4, Premsingh, Watchman of the society and his wife P.W.3, Meenaben Premsingh, who used to work in the house of the deceased. These two witnesses have categorically stated that Alkaben had come out of the house at night and was pelting stones on her house, and broke a window pane in the process. P.W.3 further states that the deceased had picked up a chair and thrown it at respondent No.1. She states that respondent No.1 and Alkaben used to live peacefully together without quarrelling. P.W.4 has stated that the deceased came out at night and sat on the road. On being asked why she was sitting there, she went out of the gate, came back, and started pelting stones at her house, which made respondent No.1 and his daughter come out of the house. Thereafter, the deceased entered the house. In his cross-examination, P.W.4 has categorically stated that the deceased was in an angry mood but he had not heard any quarrel between the deceased and respondent No.1. Thereafter, the deceased entered the house. In his cross-examination, P.W.4 has categorically stated that the deceased was in an angry mood but he had not heard any quarrel between the deceased and respondent No.1. He further states that the deceased had gone upto the terrace of their house and had threatened to jump down. It is only when respondent No.1 and his daughter came out of the house that she came down and went into the house. Similarly, P.W.11, Kishorebhai, who is an independent witness, has deposed about the quarrelsome behaviour and foul language used by the deceased. There is no reason to disbelieve the testimony of P.W.19, father of the deceased, who states that no cruelty was meted out to the deceased and it was she who used to behave erratically and aggressively. 57. The evidence of P.W.5, Dipakbhai Harishchandra Mistry, husband of Dakshaben, sister of the deceased, does not reveal that he has personally witnessed any incident of cruelty inflicted by the respondents upon the deceased. The black circles and green marks on the face of the deceased allegedly noticed by P.W.s 6, 7, and 8, cannot lead to a conclusion that the deceased was beaten by respondents and these marks are a result of those beatings. None of these witnesses have any personal knowledge. It has been stated by the deceased in letter Ex.18 that she had taken tablets of Alprax to calm herself down. It certainly appears that the deceased was in an agitated frame of mind during the period from 14.05.1998 to 17.05.1998. No other incidents of alleged cruelty have surfaced in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, before this period of time. Admittedly, the deceased had been married to respondent No.1 for five years and it is an admitted case that there were no differences between them earlier. It has further come in evidence that the deceased wanted to take a divorce from respondent No.1 and had insisted upon being given a house, a monthly allowance and ornaments. The deceased has stated as much, in her letter at Ex.18. She states therein that she is ready to go but she should be given all her clothes and ornaments. The deceased has further stated that she would not go out of the house until she is given her clothes, money, etc. The deceased has stated as much, in her letter at Ex.18. She states therein that she is ready to go but she should be given all her clothes and ornaments. The deceased has further stated that she would not go out of the house until she is given her clothes, money, etc. This shows that the version of the prosecution that the deceased was being forced and pressurised by the respondents to divorce respondent No.1 is not borne out from the statements of the deceased herself. A reading of the 13 page letter at Ex.18 does not reveal any such serious incident of cruelty or abetment on the part of the respondents that would be sufficient to drive her to commit suicide. On the contrary, one day before the incident, the deceased had demanded an amount of Rs. 5,000/- per month as maintenance, ornaments and a house from respondent No.1 as per the document at Ex.29. She does not state in letter Ex.18 that she was forced to execute this document. It has come in evidence that respondent No.1 had asked for fifteen days' time to think over the matter. Had he been so keen to divorce the deceased, he may not have asked for time. 58. Whether the charge of abetment to suicide can be established against the respondents, is another question that cannot be answered in the affirmative. 59. In Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2001)9 SCC 618 , a three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court has observed as under: "20. Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do "an act". To satisfy the requirement of instigation though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes instigation must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out the present one is not a case where the accused had by his acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide in which case an instigation may have been inferred. A word uttered in the fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation." 60. A word uttered in the fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation." 60. In Sanju Alias Sanjay Singh Sengar v. State of M.P. (supra), the Supreme Court has held that the presence of mens rea is a necessary concomitant of instigation. 61. In M. Mohan v. State Represented by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, AIR 2011 SC 1238 , the Supreme Court has held that there has to be clear mens rea to commit an offence under Section 306 of the I.P.C., in the following terms: "45. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained. 46. The intention of the Legislature and the ratio of the cases decided by this court are clear that in order to convict a person under section 306, I.P.C. there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It also requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no option and this act must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he/she committed suicide." 62. If the evidence on record is evaluated on the basis of the principles of law enunciated in the above judgments, it is clear that the prosecution has failed to establish that the respondents had actively instigated the deceased to commit suicide with the intention of causing her death or that there was an element of mens rea in their actions. 63. The Trial Court has not considered Ex.18 to be a Dying Declaration. However, if the said letter is perused, it is clear that in the first line itself, the deceased talks about her suicide. It does appear from the tone and tenor of the letter that the deceased had made up her mind to commit suicide. However, as discussed earlier, it does not appear that the respondents can be held criminally liable for this act of hers. To this extent, this Court is not in agreement with the findings recorded by the Trial Court. It does appear from the tone and tenor of the letter that the deceased had made up her mind to commit suicide. However, as discussed earlier, it does not appear that the respondents can be held criminally liable for this act of hers. To this extent, this Court is not in agreement with the findings recorded by the Trial Court. However, it cannot be ignored that in the letter at Ex.18, the deceased states that she is sitting on the Platform in the Railway Station, waiting for the train to come; whereas P.W.2, Purnimaben, states in her deposition that the deceased had come to her house in the morning of 17.05.1998, while she was cooking and given the letter to her. If the deceased had given the letter to her in the morning, it is not possible that she would be writing it while sitting on the Railway Station, waiting for the train to come. The letter at Ex.18 is shrouded in other suspicious circumstances, inasmuch as P.W.2 states that she did nothing regarding it for three days and handed it over to P.W.5, Dipakbhai, six to seven days thereafter; whereas P.W.5 states that after discussions, P.W.2 gave him the letter on 18.05.1998, which remained with him for four to five days. A contradictory picture emerges that the letter had been given to P.W.2, Purnimaben, by the deceased before she committed suicide, and it remained with her for at least four to five days. Instead of handing it over to the Police, P.W.2 gave it to P.W.5. It thereafter found its way to the Police. These aspects, coupled with the statement of the deceased in the said letter to the effect that she was writing it while sitting on the Platform of the Railway Station, waiting for the train, makes the entire letter a little doubtful. The letter has been written in a manner that describes the day-today events that took place from 14.05.1998 to 17.05.1998. It is dated 17.05.1998. The intention of the deceased to take her life, appears to be clear from Ex.18. The reason may be a feeling of animosity or sheer petulance. As has been discussed earlier, there is no material on record to hold the respondents liable for abetment of the suicide of the deceased. The deceased appears to have been in a disturbed and quarrelsome state of mind. The reason may be a feeling of animosity or sheer petulance. As has been discussed earlier, there is no material on record to hold the respondents liable for abetment of the suicide of the deceased. The deceased appears to have been in a disturbed and quarrelsome state of mind. It is evident from the record that her behaviour before the incident was quite aggressive. The root cause of this appears to be demand of the deceased for a house, money and ornaments so that she could live separately from respondent No.1. 64. The totality of the evidence on record, therefore, does not support the case of the prosecution, insofar as the charges against the respondents are concerned. This Court is in agreement with the conclusions arrived at by the Trial Court with regard to the finding of acquittal recorded by it. 65. It is a settled position of law that where two views are possible, the one favourable to the accused ought to be adopted. In Rohtash v. State of Haryana, (2012)6 SCC 589 : (2012)3 SCC (Cri.) 287, the Supreme Court has held as under: "27. The High Court interfered with the order of acquittal recorded by the trial court. The law of interfering with the judgment of acquittal is well settled. It is to the effect that only in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances and the judgment in appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference. (Vide State of Rajasthan v. Talevar, (2011)11 SCC 666 and Govindaraju v. State, (2012)4 SCC 722 ". These principles of law would be applicable in the present case. 66. For the afore stated reasons and as there is no illegality or perversity in the findings recorded by the Trial Court, interference by this Court is not warranted. 67. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.