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2013 DIGILAW 274 (CHH)

MANHARAN DEWANGAN v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH

2013-09-13

RADHE SHYAM SHARMA, SATISH K.AGNIHOTRI

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JUDGMENT Radhe Shyam Sharma, J. 1. This appeal is directed against judgment dated 30.10.2007, passed by 4th Additional Sessions Judge, Durg in Sessions Trial No. 20 of 2007. By the impugned judgment, the appellant/accused Manharan Dewangan has been convicted and sentenced in the following manner with a direction to run the sentences concurrently:- Conviction Sentence Under Section 376 of the I.P.C. Rigorous imprisonment for 14 years with fine of Rs. 1000/- in default of payment of fine, to further undergo R.I. for 6 months Under Section 376 of the I.P.C. Rigorous imprisonment for 14 years with fine of Rs. 1000/- in default of payment of fine, to further undergo R.I. for 6 months Under Section 506 Part-II of the I.P.C. Rigorous imprisonment for 2 years with fine of Rs. 500/-, in default of payment of fine, to further undergo R.I. for 3 months 2. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is as under:- The prosecutrix (PW/6) is the niece of the appellant and she was residing with him in his house. On 13.10.2006, at about 7:30 pm, he called the prosecutrix (PW/6) in the bathroom for washing his hands. When the prosecutrix (PW/6) came to the bathroom, he caught her, threatened her and committed sexual intercourse with her. He threatened the prosecutrix (PW/6) that if she discloses about the incident to anyone, her life would be in danger. Thereafter, the prosecutrix (PW/6) did not disclose the incident to anyone. On the next morning, he again called the prosecutrix (PW/6) in the bathroom and committed sexual intercourse with her. On the next day, on the occasion of Goverdhan Pooja, he called the prosecutrix (PW/6) in the bathroom at about 8:30 pm, threatened her of life and caught her. At that time, his wife came there and saw the incident. Thereafter, he left the prosecutrix (PW/6). The prosecutrix (PW/6) disclosed the incident to her Aunt i.e. the wife of the appellant. On 08.11.2006, the appellant/accused again threatened the prosecutrix (PW 16) and asked her for sexual intercourse with her. The prosecutrix (PW/6) fled from the house and went to Village Korguda. On the way, Ishwari Bai and Laxmi Bai met her. Thereafter, she went to her house and narrated the incident to her mother. The prosecutrix (PW/6) made a written report (Ex. P/7) in Police Station, Patan. On the basis of Ex.P/7, First Information Report (Ex. The prosecutrix (PW/6) fled from the house and went to Village Korguda. On the way, Ishwari Bai and Laxmi Bai met her. Thereafter, she went to her house and narrated the incident to her mother. The prosecutrix (PW/6) made a written report (Ex. P/7) in Police Station, Patan. On the basis of Ex.P/7, First Information Report (Ex. P/8) was recorded in the Police Station and the prosecutrix (PW/6) was sent to District Hospital, Durg for medical examination. Dr. Smt. S. Sawant (PW/4) examined her and gave her report (Ex. P/4) and prepared slide of vaginal swab of prosecutrix (PW/6) and handed it over to the Constable for medical examination and she also advised for X-ray examination for determination of age of the prosecutrix (PW/6). Dr. A.K. Sahu (PW/5) took out X-ray of the prosecutrix (PW/6) and gave his report (Ex. P/6) in which he opined that the age of the prosecutrix (PW/6) was between 15 to 16 years. The appellant was also sent to Government Hospital, Patan for medical examination. Dr. S.K. Sahu (PW9) examined the appellant and gave his report (Ex. P/13) finding that the appellant was capable of performing sexual intercourse. In further investigation, spot map (Ex. P/3) was prepared by Patwari Lalaram Sinha (PW/3) and another spot map (Ex. P/11) was prepared by the Investigating Officer. The underwear and the birth certificate of the prosecutrix (PW/6) were seized vide Ex. P/10. Vaginal slide of the prosecutrix (PW/6) was seized vide Ex. P/12. Dakhil-Kharij Register (Ex.P/16A) was seized from Assistant Teacher Sitaram Dewangan (PW/12) vide Ex. P/17 and underwear of the appellant was seized vide Ex. P/18. The seized articles were sent to Forensic Science Laboratory, Raipur for examination vide Ex. P/23. After completion of the investigation, charge-sheet was filed against the appellant in the Court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Durg, who, in turn, committed the case to the Court of Session, Durg, from where, it was received on transfer by 4th Additional Sessions Judge, Durg, who conducted the trial and convicted and sentenced the appellant as mentioned above. In support of its case, the prosecution examined Gaya Ram (PW/1), Dr. Lalit Jaiswal (PW/2), Lalaram Sinha (PW/3), Dr. Smt. S. Sawant (PW/4), Dr. A.K. Sahu (PW/5), the prosecutrix (PW/6), M.C. Gilhare (PW/7), Teerath Ram Dewangan (PW/8), Dr. S.K. Sahu (PW/9), Sunil Kumar Dewangan (PW/10), Smt. Nirmala Bai Dewangan (PW/11), Sitaram Dewangan (PW/12), Prakash Soni (PW/13). In support of its case, the prosecution examined Gaya Ram (PW/1), Dr. Lalit Jaiswal (PW/2), Lalaram Sinha (PW/3), Dr. Smt. S. Sawant (PW/4), Dr. A.K. Sahu (PW/5), the prosecutrix (PW/6), M.C. Gilhare (PW/7), Teerath Ram Dewangan (PW/8), Dr. S.K. Sahu (PW/9), Sunil Kumar Dewangan (PW/10), Smt. Nirmala Bai Dewangan (PW/11), Sitaram Dewangan (PW/12), Prakash Soni (PW/13). The appellant examined Ishwari Bai Dewangan (DW/1), Pati Ram Dewangan (DW/2) in his defence. 3. Shri S.K. Dadsena, learned counsel appearing for the appellant argued that the prosecution has not been able to prove that the prosecutrix (PW/6) was below 16 years of age on the date of incident. The F.I.R was lodged belatedly. The learned trial Court did not appreciate the evidence available on record in right perspective and attached too much importance to the statement of the prosecutrix (PW/6). There are inherent probabilities which make the prosecution case doubtful. Further, the appellant has been falsely implicated by the prosecutrix (PW/6), as there was a land dispute between the appellant and his younger brother Sunil Kumar Dewangan (PW/10). The appellant was not willing to keep the prosecutrix (PW/6) with him. He further argued that the prosecutrix (PW/6) left the appellant's house willingly with one Ravi. Therefore, the appellant has been falsely implicated at the instance of his younger brother Sunil Kumar Dewangan (PW/10) and the mother of the prosecutrix (PW/6). Sunil Kumar Dewangan (PW/10) and the prosecutrix (PW/6) had demanded a sum of Rs. 1 lac from the appellant and on his refusal, he has been falsely implicated in the case by the prosecutrix (PW/6). 4. On the other hand, Shri S.K. Mishra, learned Panel Lawyer appearing for the State/ respondent, submits that the conviction and sentence awarded by the learned Additional Sessions Judge to the appellant do not warrant any interference by this Court. 5. We have heard rival contentions of learned counsel appearing for the parties and have perused the record of Sessions Trial No. 20 of 2007 carefully. The conviction of the appellant is based on the evidence of the prosecutrix (PW/6). 6. Now, we shall first deal with the question of delay in lodging the FIR (Ex.P/8). The prosecutrix (PW/6) deposed that the appellant is her Uncle i.e. elder brother of her father. Her father had died. She further deposed that she was residing with the appellant in his house. 6. Now, we shall first deal with the question of delay in lodging the FIR (Ex.P/8). The prosecutrix (PW/6) deposed that the appellant is her Uncle i.e. elder brother of her father. Her father had died. She further deposed that she was residing with the appellant in his house. On 13.10.2006, the appellant called her in the bathroom for washing his hands. When she went to the bathroom with water, the appellant caught her, embraced her, removed her clothes and his own clothes as well and inserted his penis into her vagina and committed sexual intercourse with her for nearly about 20 minutes. The appellant threatened her if she discloses the said incident to anyone her life would be in danger. Therefore, she did not disclose the incident to, anyone. She further deposed that after two days of the incident, the appellant again committed sexual intercourse with her in the bathroom. On the occasion of Goverdhan Pooja, at about 8.30 p.m., the appellant again committed sexual intercourse with her and threatened her. She disclosed the incident to her Aunt i.e. the wife of the appellant and after 15 days of the incident, she went to Village Korguda and narrated the incident to her Aunt and her maternal grandmother. Thereafter, she made a written complaint (Ex.P/7) to the Police Station,-Patan. She further deposed that she went to the hospital of Dr. Lalit Jaiswal (PW/2) for treatment and she narrated the incident to the doctor also. The prosecutrix (PW/6) had made a written complaint (Ex. P/7) in Police Station, Patan, on the basis of which, FIR (Ex. P/8) was recorded in the same police station. The date of the incident was 13.10.2006 and the written report (Ex.P/7) was made on 15.11.2006 i.e. after about one month and two days. 7. In the FIR (Ex.P/8), it is mentioned that ^^izkfFkZ;k xzke ikVu ls xzke dksjeqMk Fkkuk ckyksn tkdj viuh ek¡ fueZyk nsokaxu dks ?kVuk crk;h rFkk viuh ek¡ ds lkFk Fkkuk vkdj lwpuk ntZ djk;h gSA** 8. Delay in lodging the F.I.R. in rape cases cannot be used as a ritualistic formula for discarding the prosecution case and doubt its authenticity. It only puts the court on guard to search for and consider if any explanation has been offered for the delay. Once it is offered, the Court is to only see whether it is satisfactory or not. It only puts the court on guard to search for and consider if any explanation has been offered for the delay. Once it is offered, the Court is to only see whether it is satisfactory or not. In case, if the prosecution fails to satisfactorily explain the delay and there is possibility of exaggeration in the prosecution version on account of such delay, it is a relevant factor. On the other hand, satisfactory explanation of delay is weighty enough to reject the plea of false implication and vulnerability of the prosecution case. 9. In Tulshidas Kanolkar vs. State of Goa, (2003) 8 SCC 590 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed thus:- "5. We shall first deal with the question of delay. The unusual circumstances satisfactorily explained the delay in lodging of the first information report. In any event, delay per se is not a mitigating circumstance for the accused when accusations of rape are involved. Delay in lodging the first information report cannot be used as a ritualistic formula for discarding the prosecution case and doubting its authenticity. It only puts the court on guard to search for and consider if any explanation has been offered for the delay. Once it is offered, the court is to only see whether it is satisfactory or not. In case if the prosecution fails to satisfactorily explain the delay and there is possibility of embellishment or exaggeration in the prosecution version on account of such delay, it is a relevant factor. On the other hand, satisfactory explanation of the delay is weighty enough to reject the plea of false implication or vulnerability of the prosecution case. As the factual scenario shows, the victim was totally unaware of the catastrophe which had befallen her. That being so, the mere delay in lodging of the first information report does not in any way render the prosecution version brittle." 10. In Sohan Singh and another vs. State of Bihar, (2010) 1 SCC 68 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed thus:- "13. When FIR by a Hindu lady is to be lodged with regard to commission of offence like rape, many questions would obviously crop up for consideration before one finally decides to lodge the FIR. It is difficult to appreciate the plight of the victim who has been criminally assaulted in such a manner. When FIR by a Hindu lady is to be lodged with regard to commission of offence like rape, many questions would obviously crop up for consideration before one finally decides to lodge the FIR. It is difficult to appreciate the plight of the victim who has been criminally assaulted in such a manner. Obviously, the prosecutrix must have also gone through great turmoil and only after giving it a serious thought, must have decided to lodge the FIR. Precisely this appears to be the reason for little delayed FIR. As mentioned hereinabove, the delay has already been found to be properly explained by both the courts below. Thus, we are not required to deal with this issue any more." 11. Mere delay in lodging the FIR cannot be a ground by itself to throw out the entire prosecution case over board. The Court has to seek an explanation for delay and test the truthfulness and plausibility of the reason assigned. If the delay is explained to the satisfaction of the Court, it cannot be counted against the prosecution. In the instant case, the prosecutrix (PW/6) was an unmarried young girl and she was residing with the appellant and the appellant was her guardian and he himself committed sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix. The prosecutrix had already lost her father. The appellant threatened the prosecutrix of life. Prosecutrix (PW/6) was residing with the appellant and the appellant gave her threat of life, therefore, the prosecutrix (PW/6) did not disclose the incident to anyone immediately and after sometime, she narrated it to her Aunt i.e. the wife of the appellant, and thereafter prosecutrix (PW/6) went to her maternal grandmother and disclosed the whole incident to her. Prosecutrix (PW/6) must have also gone through great mental agony and only after giving it a serious thought, prosecutrix (PW /6) decided to lodge the report. Therefore, she made the written complaint (Ex.P/7) in the police station. Therefore, the explanation offered by the prosecutrix (PW/6) for the delay in lodging the written complaint (Ex. P/7) is plausible and reliable. 12. Now, we shall examine whether the age of the prosecutrix (PW/6) was below 16 years on the date of incident? 13. In Alamelu and another vs. State, Represented by Inspector of Police, AIR 2011 SC 715 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed thus:- "38. P/7) is plausible and reliable. 12. Now, we shall examine whether the age of the prosecutrix (PW/6) was below 16 years on the date of incident? 13. In Alamelu and another vs. State, Represented by Inspector of Police, AIR 2011 SC 715 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed thus:- "38. The transfer certificate has been issued by a Government School and has been duly signed by the Headmaster. Therefore, it would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the girl in the absence of the material on the basis of which the age was recorded. The date of birth mentioned in the transfer certificate would have no evidentiary value unless the person, who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined." 14. In State of Chhattisgarh vs. Lekhram, (2006) 5 SCC 736 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed thus:- "A register maintained in a school is admissible in evidence to prove date of birth of the person concerned in terms of Section 35 of the Evidence Act. Such dates of births are recorded in the school register by the authorities in discharge of their public duty. It may be true that an entry in the school register is not conclusive but it has evidentiary value. Such evidentiary value of a school register is corroborated by oral evidence in this case as the same was recorded on the basis of the statement of the mother of the prosecutrix." 15. In Shekara vs. State of Karnataka, (2009) 14 SCC 76 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as follows:- "6. It is to be noted that PW 1 had produced the transfer certificate (Ext.P-9) and has stated that it pertains to the victim and her name has been entered in the certificate. Nothing has been elicited in her cross-examination to discard her evidence that Ext. P-9 pertains to the victim, that is, the daughter of PW 1. PW 12 had issued the transfer certificate and also stated in his evidenced that he was working as headmaster of the school in question. He remembered to have seen her when she came for applying for the transfer certificate for her children and had issued the transfer certificate to her and that Ext. PW 12 had issued the transfer certificate and also stated in his evidenced that he was working as headmaster of the school in question. He remembered to have seen her when she came for applying for the transfer certificate for her children and had issued the transfer certificate to her and that Ext. P-9, the transfer certificate was issued by him. It also bears the signature of the headmaster. He categorically stated that Ext. P-9 was issued on the basis of the entries made in the admission register and Ext. P-10(a) as the relevant entry on the basis of which Ext. P-9 was issued." 16. In Arjun Singh vs. State of H.P. 2009 Cri. L.J. 1332 (SC), the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as follows:- "7. In State of Chhattisgarh vs. Lekhram, (2006) 5 SCC 736 , it was held that the register maintained in a school is admissible evidence to prove the date of birth of the person concerned in terms of Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short Evidence Act). It may be true that the entry of the school register is not conclusive but it has evidentiary value." 17. In the instant case, at the time of deposition of the prosecutrix (PW/6), her age was mentioned as 16 years. Her deposition was recorded in the Court on 22.05.2007 i.e. after about 7½ months of the incident. Dr. Smt. S. Sawant (PW/4) deposed that she examined the prosecutrix (PW/6) and gave her report (Ex. P/4). She mentioned the age of the prosecutrix (PW/6) as about 16 years. Dr. A.K. Sahu (PW/5) deposed that he took out the X-ray of the right Ulna, Olicrenan, Medial Epicondile and lateral Epicondile. After X-ray, he gave his report (Ex, P/6) opining that the age of the prosecutrix (PW 16) was 15 to 16 years. Sitaram Dewangan (PW/12) deposed that he was posted as Assistant Teacher in Primary School, Akhra since 1986. He had brought Dakhil Kharij Register of the said school. The said register was maintained since 21.7.2003 and at serial No. 127 of the said register the date of birth of the prosecutrix (PW/6) was mentioned as 20.02.1992. The prosecutrix (PW 16) was admitted in the school on 04.07.2005 in class 6th and she left the school on 16.11.2006, on which, she was studying in class 7th. The Dakhil-Kharij Register is Ex. P/16 and its photo-copy is Ex. The prosecutrix (PW 16) was admitted in the school on 04.07.2005 in class 6th and she left the school on 16.11.2006, on which, she was studying in class 7th. The Dakhil-Kharij Register is Ex. P/16 and its photo-copy is Ex. P/16-A. He further deposed that the register was seized from him by the Police of Police Station, Patan vide Ex.P/17. 18. Sitaram Dewangan (PW/12), who was the Assistant Teacher of the school, specifically deposed that the date of birth of the prosecutrix (PW 16) was recorded in the Dakhil-Kharij Register. Dr. A.K. Sahu (PW/5) deposed that on the basis of X-ray Report (Ex.P/6), he found that the age of the prosecutrix (PW/6) was 15 to 16 years. The date of incident was 13.10.2006 and the date of birth of the prosecutrix (PW/6) was 20.02.1992. Hence, the age of the prosecutrix (PW/6) was 14 years 7 months and 23 days on the date of incident. Thus, it is established that the prosecutrix (PW/6) was below 16 years of age on the date of incident. Further, looking to the Dakhil-Kharij Register and the X-ray Report, it is revealed that the age of the prosecutrix (PW/6) was below 16 years on the date of incident. 19. Now, we shall examine whether the offence under section 376 of the IPC is made, out against the appellant? Evidence of Prosecutrix 20. In Mohd. Imran Khan vs. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) 2012 Cri. L.J. 693 (SC), the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as follows:- "15. It is a trite law that a woman, who is the victim of sexual assault, is not an accomplice to the crime but is a victim of another person's lust. The prosecutrix stands at a higher pedestal than an injured witness as she suffers from emotional injury. Therefore, her evidence need not be tested with the same amount of suspicion as that of an accomplice. The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter called Evidence Act), nowhere says that her evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars. She is undoubtedly a competent witness under Section 118 of Evidence Act and her evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured in cases of physical violence. The same degree of care and caution must attach in the evaluation of her evidence as in the case of an injured complainant or witness and no more. She is undoubtedly a competent witness under Section 118 of Evidence Act and her evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured in cases of physical violence. The same degree of care and caution must attach in the evaluation of her evidence as in the case of an injured complainant or witness and no more. If the court keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that it can act on the evidence of the prosecutrix, there is no rule of law or practice incorporated in the Evidence Act similar to illustration (b) to Section 114 which requires it to look for corroboration. If for some reason the court is hesitant to place implicit reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. If the totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case disclose that the prosocutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, the court should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her evidence. The court must be alive to its responsibility and the sensitive while dealing with cases involving sexual molestations. Rape is not merely a physical assault, rather it often distracts the whole personality of the victim. The rapist degrades the very soul of the helpless female and, therefore, the testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and in such cases, non-examination even of other witnesses may not be a serious infirmity in the prosecution case, particularly where the witnesses had not seen the commission of the offence. (Vide – State of Maharashtra vs. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain, AIR 1990 SC 658 : (1990 Cri LJ 889), State of U.P. vs. Pappu @ Yunus & another, AIR 2005 SC 1248 : (2004 AIR SCW 6563), and Vijay @ Chinee vs. State of M.P. (2010) 8 SCC 191 ): (AIR 2011 SC (Cri) 940: 2010 AIR SCW 5510). Thus, the law that emerges on the issue is to the effect that statement of prosecutrix, if found to be worthy of credence and reliable, requires no corroboration. The court may convict the accused on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix." 21. In Vijay alias Chinee vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2010) 8 SCC 191 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed thus:- "9. The court may convict the accused on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix." 21. In Vijay alias Chinee vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2010) 8 SCC 191 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed thus:- "9. In State of Maharashtra vs. Chandra Prakash Kewalchand Jain, (1990) 1 SCC 550 , this Court held that a woman, who is the victim of sexual assault, is not an accomplice to the crime but is a victim of another person's lust and, therefore, her evidence need not be tested with the same amount of suspicion as that of an accomplice. The Court observed "as under: (See p. 559, para 16)." "16. A prosecutrix of a sex offence cannot be put on par with an accomplice. She is in fact a victim of the crime. The Evidence Act nowhere says that her evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars. She is undoubtedly a competent witness under Section 118 and her evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured in cases of physical violence. The same degree of care and caution must attach in the evaluation of her evidence as in the case of an injured complainant or witness and no more. What is necessary is that the court must be alive to and conscious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a person who is interested in the outcome of the charge leveled by her. If the court keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that it can act on the evidence of the prosecutrix there is no rule of law or practice incorporated in the Evidence Act similar to Illustration (b) to Section 114 which requires it to look for corroboration. If for some reason the court, is hesitant to place implicit reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The nature of evidence required to lend assurance to the testimony of the prosecutrix must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. But if a prosecutrix is an adult and of full understanding the court is entitled to base a conviction on her evidence unless the same is shown to be infirm and not trustworthy. The nature of evidence required to lend assurance to the testimony of the prosecutrix must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. But if a prosecutrix is an adult and of full understanding the court is entitled to base a conviction on her evidence unless the same is shown to be infirm and not trustworthy. If the totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case disclose that the prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, the court should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her evidence." 10. In State of U.P. vs. Pappu, (2005) 3 SCC 594 , this Court held that even in a case where it is shown that the girl is a girl of easy virtue or a girl habituated to sexual intercourse, it may not be a ground to absolve the accused from the charge of rape. It has to be established that there was consent by her for that particular occasion. Absence of injury on the prosecutrix may not be a factor that leads the court to absolve the accused. This Court further held that there can be conviction on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix and in case, the court is not satisfied with the version of the prosecutrix, it can seek other evidence, direct or circumstantial, by which it may get assurance of her testimony. The Court held as under: (SCC p. 597, para 12) "12. It is well settled that a prosecutrix complaining of having been a victim of the offence of rape is not an accomplice after the crime. There is no rule of law that her testimony cannot be acted upon without corroboration in material particulars. She stands at a higher pedestal than an injured witness. In the latter case, there is injury on the physical form, while in the former it is both physical as well as psychological and emotional. However, if the court of facts finds it difficult to accept the version of the prosecutrix on its face value, it may search for evidence, direct or circumstantial, which would lend assurance to her testimony Assurance, short of corroboration as understood in the context of an accomplice, would do." 11. In State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384 , this Court held that in cases involving sexual harassment, molestation, etc. In State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384 , this Court held that in cases involving sexual harassment, molestation, etc. the court is duty-bound to deal with such cases with utmost sensitivity. Minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of a prosecutrix should not be a ground for throwing out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. Evidence of the victim of sexual assault is enough for conviction and it' does not require any corroboration unless there are compelling reasons for seeking corroboration. The court may look for some assurances of her statement to satisfy judicial conscience. The statement of the prosecutrix is more reliable than that of an injured witness as she is not an accomplice. The Court further held that the delay in filing FIR or sexual offence may not be even properly explained, but if found natural, the accused cannot be given any benefit thereof. The Court observed as under: (SCC pp. 394-96 & 403, paras 8 & 21) "8. The court overlooked the situation in which a poor helpless minor girl had found herself in the company of three desperate young men who were threatening her and preventing her from raising any alarm. Again, if the investigating officer did not conduct the investigation properly or was negligent in not being able to trace out the driver or the car, how can that become a ground to discredit the testimony of the prosecutrix? The prosecutrix had no control over the investigating agency and the negligence of an investigating officer could not affect the credibility of the statement of the prosecutrix. The courts must, while evaluating evidence, remain alive to the fact that in a case of rape, no self-respecting woman would come forward in a court just to make a humiliating statement against her honour such as is involved in the commission of rape on her. In cases involving sexual molestation, supposed considerations which have no material effect on the veracity of the prosecution case or even discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix should not, unless the discrepancies are such which are of fatal nature, be allowed to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such case amounts to adding insult to injury. Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such case amounts to adding insult to injury. Corroboration as a condition for judicial reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix is not a requirement of law but a guidance of prudence under given circumstances. * * * 21. The courts should examine the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix, which are not of a fatal nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. If evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars. If for some reason the court finds it difficult to place implicit reliance on her testimony, it may Took for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony, short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and the trial court must be alive to its responsibility and be sensitive while dealing with cases involving sexual molestations." 12. In State of Orissa vs. Thakara Besra, (2002) 9 SCC 86 , this Court held that rape is not mere physical assault, rather it often distracts (sic destroys) the whole personality of the victim. The rapist degrades the very soul of the helpless female and, therefore, the testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and in such cases, non-examination even of other witnesses may not be a serious infirmity in the prosecution case, particularly where the witnesses had not seen the commission of the offence. 13. In State of H.P. vs. Raghubir Singh, (1993) 2 SCC 622 , this Court held that there is no legal compulsion to look or any other evidence to corroborate the evidence of the prosecutrix before recording an order of conviction. Evidence has to be weighed and not counted. Conviction can be recorded on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, if her evidence inspires confidence and there is absence of circumstances which militate against her veracity. A similar view has been It iterated by this Court in Wahid Khan vs. State of M.P., (2010) 2, SCC 9, placing reliance on an earlier judgment in Rameshwar vs. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1952 SC 54 . 22. A similar view has been It iterated by this Court in Wahid Khan vs. State of M.P., (2010) 2, SCC 9, placing reliance on an earlier judgment in Rameshwar vs. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1952 SC 54 . 22. In the instant case, the prosecutrix (PW/6) deposed that she was residing with the appellant in his house. On 13.10.2006, at about 7:30 pm, the appellant called her in the bathroom for washing his hands. When she came to the bathroom, the appellant caught her, threatened her and committed sexual intercourse with her. The appellant threatened her that if she discloses about the incident to anyone, her life would be in danger. Therefore, she did not disclose the incident to anyone. On the next morning, the appellant again called her in the bathroom and committed sexual intercourse with her. On the next day, on the occasion of Goverdhan Pooja, the appellant called her to the bathroom at about 8:30 pm, threatened her of life and caught her. At that time, the wife of the appellant came there and saw the incident. Thereafter, the appellant left her. She disclosed the incident to her Aunt, i.e., the wife of the appellant. On 08.11.2006, the appellant/accused again threatened her and asked for sexual intercourse. She fled from the house and went to Village Korguda. On the way, Ishwari Bai (DW/l) and Laxmi Bai met her. Thereafter, she went to her house and narrated the incident to her mother. She made the written report (Ex. P/7) in Police Station, Patan and on the basis thereof, F.I.R. (Ex. P/8) was recorded. 23. The appellant did not take defence in his statement under Section 313 of the Cr. P.C. that the sexual intercourse was done with the consent of the prosecutrix (PW 16). Instead, he denied having had any sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix (PW/6) and took a stand that he has been falsely implicated on account of the land dispute with his younger brother Sunil Kumar Dewangan (PW/10) and mother of the prosecutrix (PW/6). Gaya Ram (PW/l) deposed that on 12.11.2006, Dayabati and mother of the prosecutrix (PW 16), namely, Smt. Nirmala Bai Dewangan (PW/11) came to him and told that the appellant had committed sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix (PW/6). Dr. Lalit Jaiswal (PW/2) deposed that the prosecutrix (PW/6) came to him along with her Aunt, Teerathram Dewangan (PW/8) and Sunil Kumar Dewangan (PW/10). Dr. Lalit Jaiswal (PW/2) deposed that the prosecutrix (PW/6) came to him along with her Aunt, Teerathram Dewangan (PW/8) and Sunil Kumar Dewangan (PW/10). Sunil Kumar Dewangan (PW/10) also deposed in similar fashion. The prosecutrix (PW/6) specifically deposed that the appellant had committed sexual intercourse with her and she disclosed the incident to the above witness. Her evidence is duly corroborated by the evidence of above witnesses. 24. Learned counsel for the appellant has argued that had the appellant committed forcible sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix (PW/6), she would have sustained injuries on her private parts, but she did not sustain any injury and falsely implicated the appellant at the instance of Sunil Kumar Dewangan (PW/10), the younger brother of the appellant. This argument is not acceptable. 25. In Balwant Singh and others vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1987 SC 1080 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus:- "14. It is difficult for us to accept the contention of the appellant that because of enmity of the father of the prosecutrix against the appellants, they have been falsely implicated in the case. It may be that litigations are going on between Dalip Singh and the appellants, but it is absurd to suggest that because of the litigations or any enmity that he may have against the appellants, the father of the prosecutrix would falsely involve his daughter in a case of rape by the appellants. On the contrary, the High Court has rightly observed that the appellants, who are debtors, had a common interest to bring disrepute to Dalip Singh, their creditor, by committing rape on his daughter, Kumari Rajwant Kaur (P.W.2). There is, therefore, no substance in the contention of the appellants that they have been falsely implicated in the case on account of the enmity of Dalip Singh against them." 26. In Prithi Chand vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1989 SC 702 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus:- "9. It was next contended that the appellant was falsely involved due to a long standing enmity between the father of the appellant and the girl's father. The prosecutrix has in her deposition stated that the two families were not on talking or visiting terms, since their relations were strained. It was suggested in the course of cross-examination that Ratna, the son of PW-8 Phulan Devi was intimate with the prosecutrix and he had raped the girl. The prosecutrix has in her deposition stated that the two families were not on talking or visiting terms, since their relations were strained. It was suggested in the course of cross-examination that Ratna, the son of PW-8 Phulan Devi was intimate with the prosecutrix and he had raped the girl. In his statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, he put forth the case that when he returned to his village in the evening, he saw some ladies at the girl's house and heard the girl saying that she was subjected to rape by Ratna. It is not possible to believe that the prosecutrix and her parents would allow the real culprit to escape and falsely involve an innocent person for the commission of the crime. Except for the suggestion made in the cross-examination of PW-8 Phulan Devi, Ratna's mother and the statement under Section 313 of the Cope of Criminal Procedure there is no other material on record which can give credence to the suggestion." 27. In Vishnu alias Undrya vs. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 1 SCC 283 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed thus:- "24. The accused in Section 313 Cr PC statement has completely denied that he had any sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix. Question 19 (p. 154 of the original record) was put to him about the statement of the prosecutrix regarding forcible intercourse with her of the fateful day, to which he replied, "This is false." Question 64 (p. 167 of the original record) was put to him as to whether he wished to say anything more in his defence, to which he replied, "I am innocent and falsely involved in this case." How he was falsely implicated has not been explained." (See also Pramod Mahto and others vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1989 SC 1475 ). 28. In the instant case, the prosecutrix (PW/6) was an unmarried girl and was below 16 years of age on the date of incident. It is not possible to believe that the prosecutrix (PW/6) would allow the real culprit to escape and falsely implicate the appellant. Therefore, the defence taken by the appellant is not acceptable. In the case on hand, the appellant is the Uncle, elder brother of her father. There was a fiduciary relationship between the appellant and the prosecutrix (PW/6) and the appellant was her legal guardian and trustee. Therefore, the defence taken by the appellant is not acceptable. In the case on hand, the appellant is the Uncle, elder brother of her father. There was a fiduciary relationship between the appellant and the prosecutrix (PW/6) and the appellant was her legal guardian and trustee. Therefore, it is net possible that the prosecutrix (PW/6) would falsely involve herself in the case of rape by her Uncle, i.e.; the appellant. 29. In O.M. Baby (Dead) by LRs. vs. State of Kerala, 2012 Cri. L.J. 3794 (SC), the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed thus:- "19. In the context of Indian culture, a woman - victim of sexual aggression - would rather suffer silently than to falsely implicate somebody. Any statement of rape is extremely humiliating experience for a woman and until she is victim of sex crime, she would not blame anyone but the real culprit. While appreciating the evidence of the prosecutrix, the courts must always keep in mind that no self-respecting woman would put her honour at stake by falsely alleging commission of rape on her and therefore, ordinarily a look for corroboration of her testimony is unnecessary and uncalled for. But for high improbability in the prosecution case, the conviction in the case of sex crime my be based on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix. It has been rightly said that corroborative evidence is not an imperative component of judicial credence in every case of rape nor the absence of injuries on the private parts of the victim can be construed as evidence of consent." 30. In the instant case, looking .to the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, particularly, that of prosecutrix (PW/6), it appears that the appellant committed sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix (PW/6) against her will. 31. We have perused the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, which is corroborated by the evidence of the prosecutrix (PW/6) and which Clearly falsify the defence taken by the appellant regarding his false implication in the case, we are of the considered opinion that in such a case like the present one, a niece will not make false allegation against her own Uncle at the cost of her reputation in the society. Therefore, we do not see any reason to interfere with the findings recorded by the Court below, which is based on proper appreciation of the facts and evidence available on record. 32. Therefore, we do not see any reason to interfere with the findings recorded by the Court below, which is based on proper appreciation of the facts and evidence available on record. 32. The rape was committed by the appellant upon the prosecutrix (PW/6) who is her niece, thrice, i.e., on 13.10.2006, on the next day and thereafter again on the third day. Therefore, the learned Additional Sessions Judge convicted and sentenced the appellant twice for the offence under section 376 of the IPC, which is incorrect. The appellant is liable for conviction and sentence under Section 376 of the IPC once only. 33. In the result, the conviction of the appellant by the trial Court twice under Section 376 IPC is set aside; instead thereof, he is convicted under section 376 IPC once only. So far as sentence is concerned, he committed sexual intercourse with her niece, therefore, the sentence of rigorous imprisonment for 14 years with fine of Rs. 1000/- awarded to him under Section 376 IPC does not call for any interference. The conviction and sentence awarded to him under Section 506 Part II IPC are affirmed. 34. With the above modifications, the appeal is dismissed. Appeal Partly Allowed.