JUDGMENT G. R. UDHWANI, J. 1. Both these petitions are moved invoking jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short "Cr.P.C."). The first petition is moved by one Navinchandra Vishnuprasad Shah - a guarantor with a prayer to quash the charge and the Criminal Case No.799 of 2005 pending before Metropolitan Magistrate Court No.20, Ahmedabad against the petitioner herein. The second mentioned petition is moved by one Bharatkumar Shantilal Sheth a power of attorney holder of loanees and a guardian of minor with a prayer to quash the above proceedings as also order dated 18.03.2008 passed below -application Exh.2 Annexure "H" rejecting the application moved by the petitioner for discharge. The petitioner also prays for discharge from the above criminal case. 2. A loan was obtained on 29.2.1988 for business purpose by the firm M/s. Chirag Enterprises constituting father daughter-in-law and grandson from Sahyog Co-operative Bank Limited which is now being represented by Jethabhai Khodidas Patel - the liquidator, respondent No.2 herein who has lodged (original complaint. A notice for recovery was served upon the petitioners on 14.11.1990 after a notice was given to the bank by petitioners disowning the liability except to an extent of Rs. 75,000/-, This dispute gave rise to a Lavad Case being No.779 of 1991 which came to be decreed on 10.9.2003 against which appeal being No.1248 of 2003 was preferred wherein interim application was also moved which was granted on 09.07.2004 after bi parte hearing. The relevant order is produced at Annexure "E" to Special Civil Application No.5903 of 2008. 3. While the above proceedings were pending in appeal, FIR dated 3.8.2004 came to be filed against the petitioners and others alleging the offence under various provisions of IPC ranging between 29.12.1988 i.e. the date when the loan was taken to 29.2.2004. It is relevant to mention here that amongst the accused, the other four entities unconnected with the above loan transaction but who had availed loan through different transactions at different points of time from Sahyog Co-operative Bank Ltd, have also been arraigned as accused. The petitioners and others moved two Criminal Misc. Applications separately being 4659 of 2005 and 4660 of 2005 for quashing of the FIR. The petitioners and others moved two Criminal Misc. Applications separately being 4659 of 2005 and 4660 of 2005 for quashing of the FIR. However, in the meanwhile, charge-sheet came to be filed and therefore both the petitions were respectively withdrawn on 9.1.2006 and 12.9.2006 without inviting any order on merits since the Court opined that as charge-sheet was filed the cases were not maintainable. 4. By a charge dated 5.4.2008, the petitioners and others were charged with the offences punishable under Sections 420, 421, 424, 465, 468, 471 and 114 of Indian Penal Code (for short "IPC" ). The petitioner – Bharat Kumar Shantilal Sheth preferred the abovementioned application for discharge before the above charge was framed. It was, however, rejected, and as stated above, he has, in his petition, challenged the said order as well. 5. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. D.D. Vyas with learned Advocate Mr. Deep Vyas for the petitioners contended that, even if the documents accompanied with the charge-sheet were to be read at face value, no offence worth the name against the petitioners was made out. He invited attention of this Court to the statement made by Jethabhai Khodidas Patel - complainant who has averred that Jippal Remedies Pvt. Ltd., Dilip Rajkumalpal & Co., Thripal Commodities & Co., Chirag Enterprise and Ranbo Track Pvt. Ltd., were sanctioned the loan but no false or forged documents, certificates etc., were found to have been submitted by them at the time of loan application. Learned Senior Advocate, while relying upon the aforesaid documents produced with the chargesheet, submitted that this is not a case where the petitioners could have been charged for the offences as above. 5.1 Learned Counsel also submitted that the joint charge along with other persons unconnected with the loan transaction entered into by the petitioners with the Bank was not maintainable and it violated the mandate of Section 218 of Cr.P.C., and therefore, in his submission, the petitioners are entitled to succeed. 5.2 He also submitted that, in fact, the civil remedy has already been resorted to by the parties and present proceedings were initiated after a period of more than 16 years and only after the petitioners were successful in obtaining the stay in the above civil proceedings. 5.2 He also submitted that, in fact, the civil remedy has already been resorted to by the parties and present proceedings were initiated after a period of more than 16 years and only after the petitioners were successful in obtaining the stay in the above civil proceedings. Learned Counsel would also submit that delay of about 16 years has not been explained by the complainant which is fatal to the prosecution, and therefore, only on this count, the petitioners were entitled to succeed. He, therefore, submitted that the criminal proceedings were nothing but abuse of process of law. 5.3 The learned Counsel would also submit that there are no ingredients constituting any offence worth the name On record. Insofar as the offence of cheating is concerned, the mens rea or intention to commit that offence must be shown to be present on the date of the transaction itself. In support of this contention, reliance was placed upon the decision of the Hon'bIe Supreme Court in Dalip Kaur and others v. Jagnar Singh and others [ (2009) 14 SCC 696 ]. 5.4 Learned Counsel would also submit that, if at all the petitioners were unable to pay their debt, there may be a breach of trust, but every breach of trust is not a criminal breach of trust. In support of this contention, reliance was placed on the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.W. Palanitkar and others v. State of Bihar and another [ (2002) 1 SCC 241 ]. 5.5 Learned Counsel would rely upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in V. C. Shukla v. State through CBI [ AIR 1980 SC 962 ] with the submission that no revision application under Section 397(2) of Cr.P.C. could have been maintained against the interlocutory order and framing of the charge was an interlocutory order and therefore the petitioners have rightly approached this Court. The learned Counsel also relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in G. Sagar Suri and another v. State of U.P. and others [2000 (2) GLH 191] and Punjab State Warehousing Corporation, Faridkot v. M/s. Sh. Durga Ji Traders & others [ AIR 2012 SC 700 ] with the submission that, even if the alternative remedy was available, the powers of the High Court under Section 482 were not curtailed down. 5.6 Insofar as Navinchandra Vishnuprasad Shah - petitioner in Criminal Misc. Durga Ji Traders & others [ AIR 2012 SC 700 ] with the submission that, even if the alternative remedy was available, the powers of the High Court under Section 482 were not curtailed down. 5.6 Insofar as Navinchandra Vishnuprasad Shah - petitioner in Criminal Misc. Application No.5903 of 2008 is concerned, in addition to what has been submitted above, the learned Counsel would submit that he is a guarantor and no allegation worth the name to show a criminal liability upon him are made in the FIR and therefore proceedings against him also be quashed. 6. Learned APP Mr. Neeraj Semi for the respondent No.1 would contend that, since discharge application by Bharatkumar was not entertained, the remedy available to him was the one under Section 397 of Cr.P.C., and according to him, Section 482 was circumscribed by two riders i.e. it can be exercised only if there is need to prevent the abuse of process of law or otherwise to serve the ends of justice. In his submission, none of these ingredients were attracted. Learned APP relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ravindra Kumar Madhanlal Goenka alld another v. M/s. Rugmini Ram Raghav Spinners P. Ltd. [ AIR 2009 SC 2383 ] with the submission that when some material is placed on record of the Court pointing to the criminal acts of the charged person, the High Court will desist from exercising the jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. Relying upon the letter addressed by second respondent to the legal advisor of Sahyog Co-operative Bank Ltd., learned APP would submit that while the petitioners contended that they were accountable only to an extent of Rs.75,000/-, the bank claimed a huge amount against them which they do not intend to pay. In 40 his submission, therefore, there was a mens rea with the petitioners in not paying such a huge amount. 7. The Learned Counsel appearing for the second respondent, while inviting the attention of this Court to the prayer clause contended that on the same ground petitions were preferred and were withdrawn and therefore now the chargesheet having been filed, these petitions were not maintainable. Learned Counsel would also submit that alternative remedy under Section 397 of Cr.P.C. was available to the petitioners, and unless that was exhausted, the petitions were not maintainable. Learned Counsel would also submit that alternative remedy under Section 397 of Cr.P.C. was available to the petitioners, and unless that was exhausted, the petitions were not maintainable. In his submission, under the revision, the High Court powers were circumscribed and the High Court would not go beyond the charge. In support of this argument learned Counsel would rely upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Munna Devi v. State of Rajasthan and another [ AIR 2002 SC 107 ] 8. Having considered the arguments advanced by the parties as also the documentary evidence relevant for the purpose of these petitions, I shall now proceed to appreciate the case on hand. 8.1 In V. C. Shukla (supra), the Hon' ble Supreme Court, after referring to Section 379 (2) and (3) of Cr.P.C. as also Section 11 thereof, laid down the proposition of law that against interlocutory order, revision would not be maintainable, and the order of framing the charge is purely an interlocutory order as it does not terminate the proceedings but the trial goes until it culminates in acquittal or conviction. 8.2 In Muna Devi (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a proposition of law that, while exercising revisional powers, the High Court has no Authority to appreciate the evidence in the manner as the trial and the appellate Courts arc required to do. It was held that the revisional powers could be exercised only when it is shown that there is a legal bar against the continuance of the criminal proceedings or the framing of charge or the facts as stated in the First Information Report even if they are taken at the face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence for which the accused has been charged. The Hon 'ble Supreme Court also held that, it was premature for the High Court to say that the material placed before the trial Court was insufficient for framing of the charge or that the statement of the prosecutrix herself was not sufficient to proceed further against the accused-respondent. 8.3 Thus, it can be seen that the Hon'ble Court was only discussing the scope of revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. In the present case, the petitioners have not invoked Section 397 but Section 482 of Cr.P.C., and therefore, the limitation as aforesaid will not apply. 8.3 Thus, it can be seen that the Hon'ble Court was only discussing the scope of revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. In the present case, the petitioners have not invoked Section 397 but Section 482 of Cr.P.C., and therefore, the limitation as aforesaid will not apply. The reliance placed upon the aforesaid case by the learned Counsel for the second respondent is, therefore, misconceived in law, and in light of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in V. C. Shukla (supra), the petitioners having approached this Court again on framing of the charge and the charge being not an interlocutory order, the revision would not be maintainable and these proceedings are properly filed. 9. Insofar as the question of the power of this Court under Section 482 of CRPC is concerned, following decisions may be glanced through :- 9.1 In Punjab State Warehousing Corporation (supra) the alternative remedy was not found to be a bar for maintainability of the petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. 9.2 Similarly, in G.Sagar Suri (supra), it was held that the jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. can be exercised even if the remedy by way of discharge application was available and was pending. Although the Hon'ble Supreme Court also observed that powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. are required to be exercised with great care and caution. 9.3 In Dalip Kaur (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 12 held as under :- "Yet again, in Hira Lal v. State of U. P. [ (2009) 11 SCC 89 ] this Court held: (SCC p.92 para 12) "12.The parameters of interference with a criminal proceeding by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code are well known. One of the grounds on which such interference is permissible is that the allegations contained in the complaint petition even if given face value and taken to be correct in their entirety, commission of an offence is not disclosed. One of the grounds on which such interference is permissible is that the allegations contained in the complaint petition even if given face value and taken to be correct in their entirety, commission of an offence is not disclosed. The High Court may also interfere where the action on the part of the complainant is malafide." 9.4 In Trisuns Chemical Industry v. Rajesh Agarwal & Ors., [1999] 8 SCC 686] dealing with the effect of existence of arbitration clause in the agreement on criminal prosecution on the ground that civil proceedings are also maintainable, the Court has held that quashing of F.I.R. or a complaint exercising power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. should be limited to a very extreme exception; merely because an act has a civil profile is not enough to stop action on the criminal side. It is further held that a provision made in the agreement for referring the disputes to arbitration is not an effective substitute for a criminal prosecution when the disputed act constitutes a criminal offence. This is not a case where both criminal and civil proceedings could have been instituted and therefore observations made in Trisuns chemical (supra) are in applicable to this case. 9.5 As noticed above, except one paragraph, that too with vague contents not sufficient to attract any of the penal provisions was attributed to the petitioners. That considering the ratio in Punjab State Warehousing Corporation, G. Sagar Suri and Dalip Kaur (all supra), and considering the facts of this case it is got to be held that the petitions squarely fall under Section 482 of Cr. Pc. 10. In so far as the question of maintainability of the petitions on the ground of the petitioners having earlier resorted to the similar proceedings is concerned, it cannot be disputed that at the relevant point of time the charge-sheet was not filed and the petitions were only filed for quashing of the FIR and it was withdrawn only because the Court opined that it was not maintainable in absence of the charge-sheet. After taking into consideration the charge-sheet and the documents along with it, the Court below has charged the petitioners as aforesaid, Therefore, the petitioners have moved this Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. independently than the previous proceedings. It is therefore held that these proceedings are maintainable. 11. After taking into consideration the charge-sheet and the documents along with it, the Court below has charged the petitioners as aforesaid, Therefore, the petitioners have moved this Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. independently than the previous proceedings. It is therefore held that these proceedings are maintainable. 11. So far as the facts on hand are concerned, it is not in dispute that the only averments made in the FIR against the petitioners were that Chirag Enterprise a partnership firm and its partners/guarantors, in connivance with the then Board of Directors misrepresented the facts and obtained a loan of Rs.20,00,000/- and thereafter frequently they availed of loan and hypothecation facilities and award in the sum of Rs.24,80,329.91 ps/- has been passed in favour of the bank which has not been complied with by them, and therefore, the amount outstanding has now accumulated to Rs.2,90,68,421/- with interest at the rate of 19.5% and that they have been avoiding to make payment with ill-intention and have used the bank money for their personal benefit; and have thus caused loss to the bank. 12. In the light of the above averments, the case against the petitioners in the context of the provisions with which they are sought to be charged is required to be appreciated. 12.1 The petitioners were charged with Sections 420, 421, 424, 465, 468, 471 read with Section 114 of the IPC. To appreciate the contents of Section 420, reference to Section 415 of IPC is necessary as it provides the definition of cheating as contemplated in Section 420 of IPC. As per this provision, an offender must deceive; such deception must result into fraudulent or dishonest inducement and a consequent delivery of a property or consent in favour of an offender to retain such property or an inducement to the person so deceived to omit to do or to do a thing favourable to an offender and thereby exposing the person deceived to a loss or damage or harm to his body, mind, reputation or property et cetera. As per the explanation to this Section a dishonest concealment of facts is also a deception. 12.2 In G. V. Rao v. L.R. V. Prasad & Ors., [(2000) 3SCC 693], in para 7, it was held thus :- "As mentioned above, Section 415 has two parts. As per the explanation to this Section a dishonest concealment of facts is also a deception. 12.2 In G. V. Rao v. L.R. V. Prasad & Ors., [(2000) 3SCC 693], in para 7, it was held thus :- "As mentioned above, Section 415 has two parts. While in the first part the person must "dishonestly" or "fraudulently" induce the complainant to deliver any property; in the second part: the person should intentionally induce the complainant to do or omit to do a thing. That is to say in the first part, inducement must be dishonest or fraudulent in the second part, the inducement should be intentional. As observed by this Court in Jaswantrai Manilal Akhaney v. State of Bombay, AIR (1956) SC 575 a guilty intention is an essential ingredient of the offence of cheating. In order, therefore, to secure conviction of a person for the offence of cheating, 'mens rea' on the part of that person, must be established. It was also observed in Mahadeo Prasad v. State of W.B., AIR (1954) SC 724 that in order to constitute the offence of cheating the intention to deceive should be in existence at the time when the inducement was offered."[emphasis 15 supplied] 12.3 In S.W. Palanitkar and others (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under :- 10. The ingredients of an offence of cheating are :- (i) there should be fraudulent or dishonest inducement of a person by deceiving him, (ii) (a) the person so deceived should be induced to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property; or (b) the person so deceived should be intentionally induced to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived; and (iii) in cases covered by (ii) (b) the act of omission should be one which causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to the person induced in body, mind, reputation or property. 11. One of us (D.P. Mohapatra J.) speaking for the Bench. in Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Anr, [2000] 4 SCC 168, on facts of that case, has expressed thus :- "In determining the question it has to be kept in mind that the distinction between mere breach of contract and the offence of cheating is a fine one. in Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Anr, [2000] 4 SCC 168, on facts of that case, has expressed thus :- "In determining the question it has to be kept in mind that the distinction between mere breach of contract and the offence of cheating is a fine one. It depends upon the intention of the accused at the time of inducement which may be judged by his subsequent conduct but for this subsequent conduct is not the sale test. Mere breach of contract cannot give rise to criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right at the beginning of the transaction, that is the time when the offence is said to have been committed. Therefore it is the intention which is the gist of the offence. To hold a person guilty of cheating it is necessary to show that he had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise. From his mere failure to keep up promise subsequently such a culpable intention right at the beginning, that is, when he made the promise cannot be presumed. " [emphasis supplied] 13. Keeping in view the above legal position, the petitioners could have been held responsible for an offence under Section 420 of IPC only if the ingredients of cheating at the time of obtaining of loan by them was present. It is required to be appreciated that a loan transaction entered into by the petitioners and others with the bank way back in 1988 is alleged to be a transaction of cheating. Apart from the fact that an FIR after a period of about 16 years could not have been taken cognizance of for want of explanation of such a huge delay, as noticed hereinabove, neither in the FIR nor the learned Counsel for the respondents are able to show from any of the documents accompanied with the chargesheet existence of any of the ingredients of cheating. If closely scrutinized, the contents of the FIR lay emphasis on the term "connivance" without explaining or mentioning the facts constituting connivance of the petitioners with the then Managing Director. On this vague allegation unsupported by any other evidence, it was not proper or permissible to frame a charge. Another aspect that has been emphasized in the FIR against the petitioners was their failure to discharge their debt. On this vague allegation unsupported by any other evidence, it was not proper or permissible to frame a charge. Another aspect that has been emphasized in the FIR against the petitioners was their failure to discharge their debt. As held in S.W. Palanitkar (supra) a mere breach of trust in absence of any criminal intent or knowledge would not constitute any offence. 14. Insofar as Section 421 is concerned, there is no material to show dishonest or fraudulent removal or concealment of property to prevent its distribution among creditors etc. This Section is also therefore not attracted. 15. Section 424 talks about dishonest or fraudulent removal or concealment of property or dishonest release of any demand or claim to which a person is entitled. Learned Counsel for the respondents are unable to show from record the ingredients of this Section. Hence, no charge could have been J framed under this provision. 16. Insofar as Sections 465, 468 and 471 are concerned, a proof of forgery or using as genuine a forged document was necessary against the petitioners. As indicated above, the evidence on record in the form of statement of complainant indicated absence of fabrication or forging of any document at the time of obtaining any loan by the petitioners and others. Thus, there was no iota of evidence suggesting forgery against the petitioners and even no chargesheet was filed under those provisions. 17. From what has been discussed hereinabove, it is crystal clear that the Court below mechanically framed the charge without applying its mind to relevant documents. Not only that when urged by Bharatkumar Shantilal Sheth - petitioner in Criminal Misc. Application No.5673 of 2008 for discharge in absence of the material against him, the trial Court refused to discharge him on the ground that the prosecution was yet to lead the evidence and therefore the fact as to whether the petitioner who was the heir of original accused Bharatkumar Shantilal Sheth had played any role in the financial transaction with the bank cannot be determined at this stage. The trial Court, thus, refused to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it. The trial Court, thus, refused to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it. Such an order, viewed in the light of Section 239 of Cr.P.C. was manifestly illegal as the said provision obliges the learned Magistrate to consider the police report and the documents with it and make examination of the accused if required, give opportunity to the prosecution and the accused of being heard and then to consider as to whether the charge is groundless or not. The charge under Section 240 can be framed only after such consideration/ examination and hearing. As discussed above, neither the complaint disclose any offence against the petitioners nor there was any accusation of forgery against accused. Further, the complainant himself had made a statement which was included in the papers with the charge-sheet that the petitioners were not involved in forgery or execution of a false documents at the time of obtaining a loan. These facts suggested a complete tack of evidence against the petitioners, and thus, the findings of the trial Court that unless the evidence was led, issue raised by the petitioners was not capable of being address is misconceived. Such an erroneous and illegal approach to the matter, both by the Court and the public prosecutor results into wastage of public time money and energy it is therefore necessary to examine the scheme of some relevant legal provisions of Cr.P.C. 18. The criminal proceedings begin with either filing of the complaint before the competent Magistrate or an FIR under Section 154 of Cr.P.C. In case of an FIR u/S 154, after following necessary procedure as required by Sections 157 and 158, and after investigation, a report under Section 173 of Cr.P.C. in the Court of competent Magistrate is required to be filed. 19. The learned Magistrate is then required to deal with the matter for taking its cognizance under Section 190 of Cr.P.C., and if it is a case upon complaint, he mayor may not, as the case may be, examine the complainant and the witnesses if any, on oath and is required to follow other necessary procedure contemplated under Section 200 of CLP.C., subject however to Section 202 thereof. He is then obliged to consider the statements recorded by him under Section 200 of the Cr.P.C., the result of the enquiry or investigation if any under Section 202 and then to form an opinion as to whether there is no sufficient ground for proceeding and if he doesn't find any such ground, shall dismiss the complaint u/S 203, with brief reasons. 20. Upon the Magistrate deciding to take cognizance, he may issue process and after following the procedure under Sections 204, 207 and 208, either commit the case to the Court of Sessions under Section 209 or proceed ahead with further process, as the case may be. 21. Insofar as trial by Court of Sessions is concerned, the public prosecutor is under an obligation to open the case by describing the charge brought against the accused and stating by what evidence he proposes to prove the guilt under Section 226 of Cr.P.C. Under Section 227, the learned judge is required to form an opinion, on the basis of record of the case and documents submitted there with, as also after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution, for discharge or otherwise, of the accused. Thus conjoint, reading of Sections 226 and 227 indicates that a complete application of mind to the facts and evidence on record is required before the decision as to discharge or otherwise of the accused is taken. If there is no material on record the accused must be discharged, else, he may be charged with the offence as contemplated under Section 228. 22. Insofar as trial by the Court of learned Magistrate is concerned, next important Section is 239 of Cr.P.C. According to this provision, the competent Magistrate is obliged to consider the police report and the documents sent with it under Section 173 and upon making such examination, if any, of the accused as the Magistrate thinks necessary and after giving the prosecution and the accused an opportunity of being heard, if the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless, he shall discharge the accused, and record his reasons for so doing. 23. Thus, it is required to be appreciated that the purpose of Sections 203, 226, 227 and 239 of Cr.P.C. is to weed out undeserving cases and concentrate on cases deserving trial. 23. Thus, it is required to be appreciated that the purpose of Sections 203, 226, 227 and 239 of Cr.P.C. is to weed out undeserving cases and concentrate on cases deserving trial. This exercise if genuinely done would enable the Court to try the genuine suspect/accused, and in the process, save public time by avoiding cases from being tried in futility. It is, therefore, necessary for the competent Court/ Magistrate to religiously address themselves under the above provisions and consider the material made available to them before sending the case to trial. 24. At this stage it will be useful to refer to observations made by Honourable Supreme Court in Trisuns Chemical Industry v. Rajesh Agarwal & Ors., [ (1999) 8 SCC 686 ] :- "15 In case of a complaint under Section 200 Cr.P.C. or IPC a Magistrate can take cognizance of the offence made out and then has to examine the complainant and his witnesses; if any, to ascertain whether a prima facie case is made out against the accused to issue process so that the issue of process is prevented on a complaint which is either false or vexatious or intended only to harass. Such examination is provided in order to find out whether there is or not sufficient ground for proceeding. The words 'sufficient ground' used under Section 203 have to be construed to mean the satisfaction that a prima facie case is made out against the accused and not sufficient ground for the purpose of conviction." 25. However, exercise of weeding out undeserving cases has to be cautiously done. The test is to peruse the case papers and without appreciating them or adding value to it, find out as to whether in reliance of penal provisions are attracted. The Courts should not venture to appreciate the evidence as it would have after recording of the evidence in a full-fledged trial. The test under the above provision would not be as to whether after full-fledged trial there arc chances of innocence of accused. The test is whether, on perusal of the evidence placed before the Court before trial or at the stages referred to in various Sections as above constitute an offence under relevant penal provisions, and for that the Courts shall have to peruse the relevant law and find out whether the facts fit in the ingredients constituting an offence. The test is whether, on perusal of the evidence placed before the Court before trial or at the stages referred to in various Sections as above constitute an offence under relevant penal provisions, and for that the Courts shall have to peruse the relevant law and find out whether the facts fit in the ingredients constituting an offence. The facts are required to be perused as they are. 26. This takes the Court to Section 218 of Cr.P.C. which requires a separate charge and trial for distinct offences unless an application is given by accused in writing and the Magistrate forms an opinion that a joint trial of all the charges is not likely to prejudice the accused. This rule will apply when charges against same person are in multiple. 27. Another relevant Section is 223 o of Cr. P.C. which talks about the situation under which several persons can be tried together, namely :- (a) persons accused of the same offence committed in the course of the same transaction; (b) persons accused of an offence and persons accused of abetment of, or attempt to commit, such offence; (c) persons accused of more than one offence of the same kind, within the meaning of Section 219 committed by them jointly within the period of twelve months; (d) persons accused of different offences committed in the course of the same transaction; (e) persons accused of an offence which includes theft, extortion, cheating or criminal misappropriation, and persons accused of receiving or retaining or assisting in the disposal or concealment of property possession of which is alleged to have been transferred by any such offence committed by the first-name? persons, or of abetment of or attempting to commit any such last• named offence; (f) persons accused of offences under Sections 411 and 414 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) or either of those Sections in respect of stolen property the possession of which has been transferred by one offence; (g) persons accused of any offence under Chapter XII of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) relating to counterfeit coin and persons accused of any other offence under the said Chapter relating to the same coin, or of abetment of or attempting to commit any such offence; and the provisions contained in the former part of this Chapter shall, so far as may be, apply to all such charges. Proviso to Section 223 permits joint trial if (1) persons are charged with separate offences (2) they do not fall in any of the categories specified in this Section (3) such persons, by application in writing desire a joint trial (4) the Magistrate/Court is satisfied that joint trial will not cause prejudice to such persons. 28. In the instant case, it is an admitted position that all the different, groups of accused are alleged to have committed the offences at different points of time arising out of different transactions and no application as contemplated under the above proviso was given. None of the conditions contemplated in clauses (a) to (g) of Section 223 were attracted and therefore the trial Court was not justified in framing a joint charge. Therefore, the charge cannot be sustained. 29. In view of above discussion, it appears that the dispute raised by the second respondent cannot be said to be attracting any of the penal provisions referred to hereinabove and therefore the petitioners could not have been charged with the offences as aforesaid. The petitions, therefore, succeed. The relief in terms of para 15(A) in both the petitions is granted. Rule is made absolute accordingly with no order as to costs. Petitions allowed