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2013 DIGILAW 274 (JK)

Abdul Ghani v. Union of India & Ors.

2013-05-03

DHIRAJ SINGH THAKUR, MOHAMMAD YAQOOB MIR

body2013
Yaqoob, J.— 1. By medium of this Letters Patent Appeal, judgment dismissing the writ petition of the appellant is assailed on various grounds. 2. The flashback of the factual matrix for appreciating the controversy is imperative. 3. The admitted position, as emerged from the records, would suggest that the petitioner belongs to Scheduled Tribe (ST) category, as such has participated in the Recruitment process for the post of Constable (GD) in the CRPF in 8/9th month of the year 2011 at Rajouri. After having successfully qualified all the basic tests was subjected to medical examination at Group Centre CRPF Bantalab. In short, the appellant was selected. He claims to have represented before the authorities time and again but letter of appointment was not given to him. Finally, when he could not get any response from the respondent-authorities filed writ petition, SWP No. 1512/2009 seeking issuance of writ of mandamus so as to command the respondents to issue formal appointment order in his favour. 4. The respondents, in their reply, as filed before the Writ Court, have projected that appellant failed to report to Group Centre Rambagh, Srinagar on or before March 10,2006. Such failure resulted in cancellation of his appointment order. It is added that out of 110 candidates selected, 98 candidates reported and in their favour appointment orders were issued vide Special Force Order No. 12/2006 dated 22nd March, 2006. The appellant infact was not willing for enrolment. The letter of appointment was sent through post at his home address vide letter dated 13th February, 2006. 5. Learned Single Judge after noticing the submissions has concluded, that offer of appointment has been sent to the appellant through registered post, as is evident from the records. Same is presumed to have reached to him. It is his failure to respond which resulted in automatic cancellation of his offer of appointment, in terms of para 5 of the letter of appointment. Secondly, it has been opined that the appellant has spurned the offer, now after a gap of more than three years, shall not be entitled to claim discrimination. There could be no reason for the respondents in denying provisional appointment to the appellant. On such basis, petition has been dismissed. 6. Secondly, it has been opined that the appellant has spurned the offer, now after a gap of more than three years, shall not be entitled to claim discrimination. There could be no reason for the respondents in denying provisional appointment to the appellant. On such basis, petition has been dismissed. 6. The finding of the learned Single Judge that the letter of appointment has been sent to the appellant through registered post is not correct because Dispatch Register, as produced by learned counsel for the respondents, would suggest that the letter of appointment has been sent by ordinary post. 7. Perusal of the said Dispatch Register would reveal that the letter of appointment had been sent to all them selected candidates by ordinary post, when it is so, drawing of presumption in terms of Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1977 that the letter has reached to the addressee is impermissible. 8. There is no affidavit on the part of the Dispatcher that he had dispatched the letter (containing offer of appointment) to the appellant. The position is made suspicious, the letter of appointment, photo copy of which is placed on the Writ records is shown to have been dispatched through registered post. The words 'Registered Post' are recorded on the top of the said letter. When admittedly, the said letter has not been sent through registered post. 9. The opinion of the learned Single Judge that the appellant had approached the Court after a gap of more than three years, therefore, stand of the appellant after spurning the offer is untenable. The finding recorded is not correct because the appellant, in specific terms, has pleaded that he had approached the respondents time and again for order of appointment but was told that he would get it through post office. He had diligently followed his case and moved number of representations. Positive assertion of the appellant is contained in para 5 of his memo of writ petition is not denied in the counter-affidavit filed by the respondents., In reply to paras 3 to 5 of the memo of writ petition, the respondents have only pleaded that the case of the petitioner was sent for issuance of offer of appointment. The offer of appointment was issued but as per records, petitioner has failed to report by 10th of March, 2006 for enrolment. 10. The offer of appointment was issued but as per records, petitioner has failed to report by 10th of March, 2006 for enrolment. 10. The positive assertion of the petitioner that he has been representing before the respondents praying for issuance of order of appointment and then filing of representations in this behalf is not denied by the respondents. It is in this context, writ petition appear to have been admitted for hearing vide order dated 30.05.2012. 11. Contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the delay in preferring the writ petition no more survives for consideration after the writ petition was admitted to hearing. In support thereof, has relied on a judgment of this Court reported in 2010 (2) JKJ HC-66 :2011 (1) SLJ 332. Para 14 is relevant to be quoted:- "14. A Division Bench of this Court in Bashir Ahmad Bhat v. State of J&K, LPA Nos. 138 and 168 of 1999, decided on 03.08.2004 observed that if the respondents have failed to raise the plea of delay at the admission stage, they are estopped from raising such plea later on. It is profitable to reproduce the relevant portion of para-3 of the said judgment herein, which reads as under: "......it is also the proposition of law that delay and latches should be considered before admission of the writ petition. The petition has not been admitted subject to delay and latches, which were not pressed at the time of its admission. Therefore, the writ petition under such circumstances cannot be dismissed on account of delay and latches." 12. Learned counsel for the appellant further relied on a Division Bench judgment reported in 2004 (3) JKJ 189 and also reported in 2004 (3) JKJ HC-189 : 2005 (1) SLJ 1. Relevant portion of para 22 of the said judgment is quoted herein: "......There is no doubt that if a person who has a cause of action does not come to the Court within reasonable time, he in law waives or loses his right by his conduct But there is exception to it that if the aggrieved person is prevented by some circumstances to approach the Court and submits therefore the plausible and convincing explanation which prevented him to come to the Court, in that event, his right does not die and if the Court accepts that explanation he can agitate and enforce his right..........." 13. Since the petition had been admitted to hearing, so in view of the law laid down by a Bench this Court, as quoted above, delay and latches, for the reasons and circumstances, as detailed hereinabove, do not stand in the way of the appellant. 14. Mr. Pangotra, learned Assistant Solicitor General of India while relying on the judgment reported in AIR 2005 SC 4380 , contended that writ petition has been rightly dismissed as hit by latches but the said judgment is of no help to him. Every case has to be dealt with in the background of its own facts and circumstances. It shall be quite advantageous to quote following portion from Para 7 of the judgment. "7............In support of his submission learned counsel has placed reliance on R.S. Deodhar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1974 SC 259 , wherein it has been held that the rule which says that a Court may not inquire into belated or stale claims is not a rule of law but a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion and there is no inviolable rule that whenever there is delay, the Court must necessarily refuse to entertain the petition. The question is one of discretion to be followed on the facts of each case...........It was held that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the writ petition could not be dismissed on the ground of latches........." 15. The appellant belongs to ST category and offer of appointment sent to him through ordinary post has not reached to him, his positive assertion that he had approached the respondents but was told that he would get his letter of appointment through post. He has been diligent and has filed number of representations has remained to be rebutted as in counter affidavit; the respondents have not denied the said specific assertion of the appellant. This aspect of the case has not been taken note of in the impugned judgment. 16. For the reasons detailed hereinabove, impugned judgment is set aside. Writ Petition is allowed. The respondents are directed to issue offer of appointment in favour of the appellant on the basis of his selection, within a period of six weeks from the date of this order. Appeal accordingly succeeds as such shall stand disposed. 17. 16. For the reasons detailed hereinabove, impugned judgment is set aside. Writ Petition is allowed. The respondents are directed to issue offer of appointment in favour of the appellant on the basis of his selection, within a period of six weeks from the date of this order. Appeal accordingly succeeds as such shall stand disposed. 17. Dispatch Register, as produced by the learned Assistant Solicitor General of India, be returned to him in the Court.