JUDGMENT By the Court.—By means of this writ petition petitioners are challenging the award dated 29.7.2009 given by the Arbitrator under Section 3-G(5) of the National Highways Act, 1956. The reliefs as sought in the writ petition are as follows: (I) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the order dated 29.7.2009 passed by respondent No. 3, District Magistrate, Ghaziabad. (II) Issue a writ order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding and directing the respondents to enhance the rate of the land compensation of the petitioner Rs. 5000/- per sq. meter or paid as per the rate given by Gail India Limited and Indian Oil Corporation fixed by compromise by both the party Rs. 4400/- per sq. meter and direct the respondents to pay 10% interest alongwith. (III) Issue any other writ order or direction which this Hon’ble Cort may deem fit and proper under the facts and circumstances of this case. 2. Heard Sri Yogendra Nath Rai, learned counsel for the petitioners, Sri R.K. Singh, learned counsel appearing for opposite party-respondent No. 2 and learned standing counsel for respondent Nos. 1 and 3. 3. The contentions as raised in the writ petition are to the effect that the petitioners are aggrieved, and thus are challenging the legality and the validity of the order dated 29.7.2009 passed by the Arbitrator/District Magistrate, Ghaziabad by which the rate of the acquired land of the petitioners has been fixed as Rs. 820.00 by the Arbitrator. It has been contended that the said compensation is totally arbitrary and against the norms. 4. The facts as stated in the writ petition are that the petitioners were the owners of gata No. 155, khasra No. 422, area 5080 sq. meter situate in Village Basantpur Saintali, Pargana Jalalabad, Tehsil Modi Nagar, District Ghaziabad; that petitioners land was acquired for the construction of National High Way (Eastern Periphered Way) and notification under Section 3A was published on 2.8.2006 under the National Highways Act, 1956 in the local newspaper on 23.8.2006 and 24.8.2006 and declaration under Section 3D of National Highway Act was published on 30.11.2006; that petitioners have received compensation as per rate of Rs. 820/- fixed by the competent authority; that without giving any opportunity of hearing to the petitioners, rate was fixed by the competent authority @ Rs. 820/- per sq. 820/- fixed by the competent authority; that without giving any opportunity of hearing to the petitioners, rate was fixed by the competent authority @ Rs. 820/- per sq. meter; that the assessed market rate of the land of the petitioners fixed by the competent authority, Court of A.D.M. is very less on 25.1.2008, which is not acceptable by the petitioners; that petitioners land was situated on Delhi Meerut Road which comes under the National Capital Region, the market value of the petitioners’ land is not less than Rs. 5,000/- per sq. meter, the assessment of the market rate decided by the Collector Ghaziabad was must less; that the circle rate is not the market value, the judgment given by the competent authority is absolutely illegal and arbitrary and the assessment of the land was not fixed as per norms prescribed for such fixation. 5. Accordingly, it has been prayed by the petitioners that the respondents be directed to pay the compensation at the rate of the market value, same being not less than Rs. 5000/- per sq. meter. 6. Thus, the petitioners are basically aggrieved against the quantum of compensation that has been fixed by the Arbitrator. 7. A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondent No. 2, in which a stand has been taken that as the petitioners have an efficacious alternative remedy available of moving an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and thereafter again by filing an appeal under Section 37 of the Act against the order, if any, passed in proceedings under Section 34 of the Act, the writ petition is not maintainable and the same is liable to be dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy, being available to the petitioners. 8. To the said counter-affidavit, a rejoinder-affidavit has been filed. 9. It has been contended by Sri Yogendra Nath Rai, learned counsel for the petitioners that no remedy lies under the provisions of Arbitration Act as the scope of interference under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act is much limited and an award can be set aside only on certain grounds mentioned therein. 10. The contention as raised at the bar necessitates reference to the following provisions. Section 34 of Arbitration and Conciliation Acc 1996 is quoted herein below: 34. 10. The contention as raised at the bar necessitates reference to the following provisions. Section 34 of Arbitration and Conciliation Acc 1996 is quoted herein below: 34. Application for setting aside arbitral award.—“(1) Recourse to a Court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award in accordance with sub-section (2) and sub-section (3). 2. An arbitral award may be set aside by the Court only if- a. the party making the application furnishes proof that- (i) a party was under some incapacity, or (ii) the arbitration agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law for the time being in force; or (iii) the party making the application was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or (iv) the arbitral award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration: Provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, only that part of the arbitral award which contains decisions on matters not submitted to arbitration may be set aside; or (v) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, unless such agreement was in conflict with a provision of this Part from which the parties cannot derogate, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with this Part; or (b) the Court finds that- (i) the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law for the time being in force, or (ii) the arbitral award is in conflict with the public policy of India. Explanation.—Without prejudice to the generality of sub-clause (ii), it is hereby declared, for the avoidance of any doubt, that an award is in conflict with the public policy of India if the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption or was in violation of Section 75 or Section 81.” 11. Reference may also be made to certain provisions of National Highways Act, 1956. Section 3G reads herein as under: 3G. Reference may also be made to certain provisions of National Highways Act, 1956. Section 3G reads herein as under: 3G. Determination of amount payable as compensation. “(l) Where any land is acquired under this Act, there shall be paid an amount which shall be determined by an order of the competent authority. (2) Where the right of user or any right in the nature of an easement on, any land is acquired under this Act, there shall be paid an amount to the owner and any other person whose right of enjoyment in that land has been affected in any manner whatsoever by reason of such acquisition an amount calculated at ten per cent of the amount determined under sub-section (1), for that land. (3) Before proceeding to determine the amount under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), the competent authority shall give a public notice published in two local newspapers, one of which will be in a vernacular language inviting claims from all persons interested in the land to be acquired. (4) Such notice shall state the particulars of the land and shall require all persons interested in such land to appear in person or by an agent or by a legal practitioner referred to in sub-section (2) of Section 3C, before the competent authority, at a time and place and to state the nature of their respective interest in such land. (5) If the amount determined by the competent authority under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) is not acceptable to either of the parties, the amount shall, on an application by either of the parties, be determined by the arbitrator to be appointed by the Central Government. (6) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996) shall apply to every arbitration under this Act. (6) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996) shall apply to every arbitration under this Act. (7) The competent authority or the arbitrator while determining the amount under sub-section (1) or sub-section (5), as the case may be, shall take into consideration - (a) the market value of the land on the date of publication of the notification under Section 3A; (b) the damage, if any, sustained by the person interested at the time of taking possession of the land, by reason of the severing of such land from other land; © the damage, if any, sustained by the person interested at the time of taking possession of the land, by reason of the acquisition injuriously affecting his other immovable property in any manner, or his earnings; (d) if, in consequences of the acquisition of the land, the person interested is compelled to change his residence or place of business, the reasonable expenses, if any, incidental to such change. 12. While raising objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition, learned counsel for the respondent has cited two Division Bench judgements in Writ-C No. 58782 of 2010; Rajesh Prasad and others v. Union of India and others, decided on 6.10.2010, Writ C No. 38273 of 2013; Sudheer Rawal v. Union of India and 3 others, decided on 17.7.2013 and a Single Bench judgement in Writ-C No. 27718 of 2013; Waseem Ahmad Khan v. State of U.P. Thru D.M. and 3 others, decided on 16.5.2013, wherein the Court has dismissed the writ petitions on the ground that the petitioners have alternative remedy available to them under the provisions of Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and, therefore, held that the writ petitioner is not maintainable. 13. Prima facie the objection as taken by the learned counsel for the respondent has much water. A perusal of Section 3G sub clause (7) shows that for determining the amount as payable under Section 3G(7), certain parameters are to be considered which have been classified in Clause a,b,c,d. Meaning thereby the fixation of quantum of compensation is not an exercise in abstract and the same is governed by the parameters given in sub-section (7) and Clause a,b,c,d, which have to be kept in mind by the authority concerned while determining the quantum of compensation. The quantum of compensation as such is a logical conclusion of the procedure to be adopted by the Arbitrator keeping in mind the parameters as given under the Act of 1956, while determining the quantum and thus, the grievance of the petitioners, if any, is to the effect that the quantum of compensation as determined is not in accordance with the parameters as prescribed under the Act, 1956 for the said purpose. 14. At this stage, it is relevant to consider the definition of public policy. Section 34 sub clause (2)(b) of the Act, 1996 provides that an arbitral award may be set aside by the Court only if it is in conflict with the public policy of India. Section 34(2)(b)(i) & (ii) of the Act 1996 are quoted herein as under: (i) the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law for the time being in force, or (ii) the arbitral award is in conflict with the public policy of India. Explanation.—Without prejudice to the generality of sub-clause (ii), it is hereby declared, for the avoidance of any doubt, that an award is in conflict with the public policy of India if the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption or was in violation of Section 75 or Section 81. Thus, it is apparent that if while determining the quantum of compensation under the provisions of National Highways Authority Act, 1956, the Arbitrator has not followed the procedure or has not considered the parameters as given under Clause 3G sub clause (7) and the parameters mentioned therein, then that would be an award against public policy. 15. It would be relevant here to consider the definition of public policy as has been expanded in the recent judgements of Hon’ble Supreme Court. Needless to say that the definition of term public policy has been expanded to a very great extent and in this regard reference may be made to the judgement rendered in the case of Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd.; (2003) 5 SCC 705 . Relevant extact of the said judgement is being quoted herein below: “16. Relevant extact of the said judgement is being quoted herein below: “16. The next clause which requires interpretation is clause (ii) of sub-section 2(b) of Section 34 which inter alia provides that the Court may set aside the arbitral award if it is in conflict with the ‘Public Policy of India’. The phrase ‘Public Policy of India’ is not defined under the Act. Hence, the said term is required to be given meaning in context and also considering the purpose of the section and scheme of the Act. It has been repeatedly stated by various authorities that the expression ‘public policy’ does not admit of precise definition and may vary from generation to generation and from time to time. Hence, the concept ‘public policy’ is considered to be vague, susceptible to narrow or wider meaning depending upon the context in which it is used. Lacking precedent the Court has to give its meaning in the light and principles underlying the Arbitration Act, Contract Act and Constitutional provisions.” “17. For this purpose, we would refer to few decisions referred to by the learned counsel for the parties. While dealing with the concept of ‘public policy, this Court in Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited and another v. Brojo Nath Ganguly and another, (1986) 3 SCC 156 , has observed thus : “92. The Indian Contract Act does not define the expression “public policy” or “opposed to public policy”. From the very nature of things, the expressions “public policy”, “opposed to public policy”, or “contrary to public policy” are incapable of precise definition. Public policy, however, is not the policy of a particular Government. It connotes some matter which concerns the public good and the public interest. The concept of what is for the public good or in the public interest or what would be injurious or harmful to the public good or the public interest has varied from time to time. As new concepts take the place of old, transactions which were once considered against public policy are now being upheld by the Courts and similarly where there has been a well recognised head of public policy, the Courts have not shirked from extending it to the new transactions and changed circumstances and have at times not even flinched from inventing a new head of public policy. There are two schools of thought- “the narrow view” school and “the broad view” school. According to the former, Courts cannot create new heads of public policy whereas the latter countenances judicial law-making in this area. The adherents of “the narrow view” school would not invalidate a contract on the ground of public policy unless that particular ground had been well- established by authorities. Hardly ever has the voice of the timorous spoken more clearly and loudly than in these words of Lord Davey in Janson v. Driefontein Consolidated Gold Mines Ltd., (1902) AC 484, 500 : “Public Policy is always an unsafe and treacherous ground for legal decision”. That was in the year 1902. Seventy-eight years earlier, Burrough, J., in Richardson v. Mellish [(1824) 2 Bing 229, 252] described public policy as “a very unruly horse, and when once you get astride it you never know where it will carry you.” The Master of the Rolls, Lord Denning, however, was not a man to shy away from unmanageable horses and in words which conjure up before our eyes the picture of the young Alexander the Great taming Bucephalus, he said in Enderby Town Football Club Ltd. v. Football Assn. Ltd. [(1971) Ch. 591, 606]; “With a good man in the saddle, the unruly horse can be kept in control. It can jump over obstacles”. Had the timorous always held the field, not only the doctrine of public policy but even the Common Law or the principles of Equity would never have evolved. Sir William Holdsworth in his “History of English Law”, In fact, a body of law like the common law, which has grown up gradually with the growth of the nation, necessarily acquires some fixed principles, and if it is to maintain these principles it must be able, on the ground of public policy or some other like ground, to suppress practices which, under ever new disguises, seek to weaken or negative them. It is thus clear that the principles governing public policy must be and are capable, on proper occasion, of expansion or modification. Practices which were considered perfectly normal at one time have today become obnoxious and oppressive to public conscience. It is thus clear that the principles governing public policy must be and are capable, on proper occasion, of expansion or modification. Practices which were considered perfectly normal at one time have today become obnoxious and oppressive to public conscience. If there is no head of public policy which covers a case, then the Court must in consonance with public conscience and in keeping with public good and public interest declare such practice to be opposed to public policy. Above all, in deciding any case which may not be covered by authority our Courts have before them the beacon light of the Preamble to the Constitution. Lacking precedent, the Court can always be guided by that light and the principles underlying the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles enshrined in our Constitution. 93. The normal rule of Common Law has been that a party who seeks to enforce an agreement which is opposed to public policy will be non-suited. The case of A. Schroeder Music Public Co. Ltd. v. Macaulay [(1974) 1 WLR 1308], however, establishes that where a contract is vitiated as being contrary to public policy, the party adversely affected by it can sue to have it declared void. The case may be different where the purpose of the contract is illegal or immoral. In Kedar Nath Motani v. Prahlad Rai [ (1960) 1 SCR 861 ], reversing the High Court and restoring the decree passed by the trial Court declaring the appellants’ title to the lands in suit and directing the respondents who were the appellants’ benamidars to restore possession, this Court, after discussing the English and Indian law on the subject, said. The correct position in law, in our opinion, is that what one has to see is whether the illegality goes so much to the root of the matter that the plaintiff cannot bring his action without relying upon the illegal transaction into which he had entered. If the illegality be trivial or venial, as stated by Williston and the plaintiff is not required to rest his case upon that illegality, then public policy demands that the defendant should not be allowed to take advantage of the position. A strict view, of course, must be taken of the plaintiff’s conduct, and he should not be allowed to circumvent the illegality by resorting to some subterfuge or by misstating the facts. A strict view, of course, must be taken of the plaintiff’s conduct, and he should not be allowed to circumvent the illegality by resorting to some subterfuge or by misstating the facts. If, however, the matter is clear and the illegality is not required to be pleaded or proved as part of the cause of action and the plaintiff recanted before the illegal purpose was achieved, then, unless it be of such a gross nature as to outrage the conscience of the Court, the plea of the defendant should not prevail. The types of contracts to which the principle formulated by us above applies are not contracts which are tainted with illegality but are contracts which contain terms which are so unfair and unreasonable that they shock the conscience of the Court. They are opposed to public policy and require to be adjudged void.” 16. Therefore, in a case where the validity of award is challenged there is no necessity of giving a narrow meaning to the term ‘Public Policy of India’ on the contrary, a wider meaning is required to be given so that the “patently illegal award” passed by the Arbitrator Tribunal would be set aside. 17. In the same judgement of O.N.G.C. (Supra), the Apex Court has further held in Paragraph Nos. 26, 27, 28, 31 which are quoted herein as under: “26. It is true that Legislature has not incorporated exhaustive grounds for challenging the award passed by the arbitral tribunal or the ground on which appeal against the order of the Court would be maintainable.” “27. On this aspect, eminent Jurist & Senior Advocate Late Mr. Nani Palkhivala while giving his opinion to ‘Law of Arbitration and Conciliation’ by Justice Dr. B.P. Saraf and Justice S.M. Jhunjhunuwala, noted thus : “I am extremely impressed by your analytical approach in dealing with the complex subject of arbitration which is emerging rapidly as an alternate mechanism for resolution of commercial disputes. The new arbitration law has been brought in parity with statutes in other countries, though I wish that the Indian law had a provision similar to Section 68 of the English Arbitration Act, 1996 which gives power to the Court to correct errors of law in the award. I welcome your view on the need for giving the doctrine of “public policy” its full amplitude. I welcome your view on the need for giving the doctrine of “public policy” its full amplitude. I particularly endorse your comment that Courts of law may intervene to permit challenge to an arbitral award which is based on an irregularity of a kind which has caused substantial injustice. If the arbitral tribunal does not dispense justice, it cannot truly be reflective of an alternate dispute resolution mechanism. Hence, if the award has resulted in an injustice, a Court would be well within its right in upholding the challenge to the award on the ground that it is in conflict with the public policy of India.” 28. From this discussion it would be clear that the phrase ‘public policy of India’ is not required to be given a narrower meaning. As stated earlier, the said term is susceptible of narrower or wider meaning depending upon the object and purpose of the legislation. Hence, the award which is passed in contravention of Sections 24, 28 or 31 could be set aside. In addition to Section 34, Section 13(5) of the Act also provides that constitution of the arbitral tribunal could also be challenged by a party. Similarly, Section 16 provides that a party aggrieved by the decision of the arbitral tribunal with regard to its jurisdiction could challenge such arbitral award under Section 34. In any case, it is for the Parliament to provide for limited or wider jurisdiction to the Court in case where award is challenged. But in such cases, there is no reason to give narrower meaning to the term ‘public policy of India’ as contended by learned senior counsel Mr. Dave. In our view, wider meaning is required to be given so as to prevent frustration of legislation and justice. This Court in Rattan Chand Hira Chand v. Askar Nawaz Jung (Dead) By LRs and others [ (1991) 3 SCC 67 ], this Court observed thus : “17. .. It cannot be disputed that a contract which has a tendency to injure public interests or public welfare is one against public policy. What constitutes an injury to public interests or welfare would depend upon the times and climes. ... The legislature often fails to keep pace with the changing needs and values nor as it realistic to expect that it will have provided for all contingencies and eventualities. What constitutes an injury to public interests or welfare would depend upon the times and climes. ... The legislature often fails to keep pace with the changing needs and values nor as it realistic to expect that it will have provided for all contingencies and eventualities. It is, therefore, not only necessary but obligatory on the Courts to step in to fill the lacuna. When Courts perform this function undoubtedly they legislate judicially. But that is a kind of legislation which stands implicitly delegated to them to further the object of the legislation and to promote the goals of the society. Or to put it negatively, to prevent the frustration of the legislation or perversion of the goals and values of the society.” “31. Therefore, in our view, the phrase ‘Public Policy of India’ used in Section 34 in context is required to be given a wider meaning. It can be stated that the concept of public policy connotes some matter which concerns public good and the public interest. What is for public good or in public interest or what would be injurious or harmful to the public good or public interest has varied from time to time. However, the award which is, on the face of it, patently in violation of statutory provisions cannot be said to be in public interest. Such award/judgment/decision is likely to adversely affect the administration of justice. Hence, in our view in addition to narrower meaning given to the term ‘public policy’ in Renusagar’s case (supra), it is required to be held that the award could be set aside if it is patently illegal. Result would be - award could be set aside if it is contrary to : (a) fundamental policy of Indian law; or (b) the interest of India; or © justice or morality, or (d) in addition, if it is patently illegal. Illegality must go to the root of the matter and if the illegality is of trivial nature it cannot be held that award is against the public policy. Award could also be set aside if it is so unfair and unreasonable that it shocks the conscience of the Court. Such award is opposed to public policy and is required to be adjudged void.” 18. The aforesaid judgement has been followed in the subsequent judgement of Phulchand Exports Limited v. O.O.O. Patriot; (2011) 10 SCC 300 . 19. Award could also be set aside if it is so unfair and unreasonable that it shocks the conscience of the Court. Such award is opposed to public policy and is required to be adjudged void.” 18. The aforesaid judgement has been followed in the subsequent judgement of Phulchand Exports Limited v. O.O.O. Patriot; (2011) 10 SCC 300 . 19. Then again in the case of Hindustan Zinc Ltd. v. Friends Coal Carbonisation; (2006) 4 SCC 445 , observation of the Apex Court with regard to public policy has been followed. 20. Reference may also be made to the case of Delhi Development Authority v. R.S. Sharma And Company, New Delhi; (2008) 13 SCC 80 , in which while placing reliance on the case of O.N.G.C. (Supra), the Court has observed as under. “20. In Hindustan Zinc Ltd. v. Friends Coal Carbonisation, (2006) 4 SCC 445 , the following principles laid down in paragraphs 13 and 14 are relevant for the disposal of the present case: 13. This Court in ONGC Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd., (2003) 5 SCC 705 , held that an award contrary to substantive provisions of law or the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 or against the terms of the contract, would be patently illegal, and if it affects the rights of the parties, open to interference by the Court under Section 34(2) of the Act. This Court observed: (SCC pp. 718 and 727-28, paras 13 and 31) 13. The question, therefore, which requires consideration is—whether the award could be set aside, if the Arbitral Tribunal has not followed the mandatory procedure prescribed under Sections 24, 28 or 31(3), which affects the rights of the parties. Under sub-section (1)(a) of Section 28 there is a mandate to the Arbitral Tribunal to decide the dispute in accordance with the substantive law for the time being in force in India. Admittedly, substantive law would include the Indian Contract Act, the Transfer of Property Act and other such laws in force. Suppose, if the award is passed in violation of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act or in violation of the Indian Contract Act, the question would be—whether such award could be set aside. Admittedly, substantive law would include the Indian Contract Act, the Transfer of Property Act and other such laws in force. Suppose, if the award is passed in violation of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act or in violation of the Indian Contract Act, the question would be—whether such award could be set aside. Similarly, under sub-section (3), the Arbitral Tribunal is directed to decide the dispute in accordance with the terms of the contract and also after taking into account the usage of the trade applicable to the transaction. If the Arbitral Tribunal ignores the terms of the contract or usage of the trade applicable to the transaction, whether the said award could be interfered. Similarly, if the award is a non-speaking one and is in violation of Section 31(3), can such award be set aside? In our view, reading Section 34 conjointly with other provisions of the Act, it appears that the legislative intent could not be that if the award is in contravention of the provisions of the Act, still however, it couldn’t be set aside by the Court. If it is held that such award could not be interfered, it would be contrary to the basic concept of justice. If the Arbitral Tribunal has not followed the mandatory procedure prescribed under the Act, it would mean that it has acted beyond its jurisdiction and thereby the award would be patently illegal which could be set aside under Section 34. 31. ... in our view, the phrase ‘public policy of India’ used in Section 34 in context is required to be given a wider meaning. It can be stated that the concept of public policy connotes some matter which concerns public good and the public interest. What is for public good or in public interest or what would be injurious or harmful to the public good or public interest has varied from time to time. However, the award which is, on the face of it, patently in violation of statutory provisions cannot be said to be in public interest. Such award/judgment/decision is likely to adversely affect the administration of justice. Hence, in our view in addition to narrower meaning given to the term public policy in Renusagar case, it is required to be held that the award could be set aside if it is patently illegal. Such award/judgment/decision is likely to adversely affect the administration of justice. Hence, in our view in addition to narrower meaning given to the term public policy in Renusagar case, it is required to be held that the award could be set aside if it is patently illegal. The result would be —award could be set aside if it is contrary to: (a) fundamental policy of Indian law; or (b) the interest of India; or © justice or morality; or (d) in addition, if it is patently illegal. Illegality must go to the root of the matter and if the illegality is of trivial nature it cannot be held that award is against the public policy. Award could also be set aside if it is so unfair and unreasonable that it shocks the conscience of the Court. Such award is opposed to public policy and is required to be adjudged void. 14. The High Court did not have the benefit of the principles laid down in Saw Pipes, and had proceeded on the assumption that award cannot be interfered with even if it was contrary to the terms of the contract. It went to the extent of holding that contract terms cannot even be looked into for examining the correctness of the award. This Court in Saw Pipes has made it clear that it is open to the Court to consider whether the award is against the specific terms of contract and if so, interfere with it on the ground that it is patently illegal and opposed to the public policy of India. 21. From the above decisions, the following principles emerge: (a) An Award, which is (i) contrary to substantive provisions of law ; or (ii)the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 ; or (iii) against the terms of the respective contract ; or (iv) patently illegal, or (v) prejudicial to the rights of the parties, is open to interference by the Court under Section 34(2) of the Act. (b) Award could be set aside if it is contrary to : (a) fundamental policy of Indian Law; or (b) the interest of India; or © justice or morality; © The Award could also be set aside if it is so unfair and unreasonable that it shocks the conscience of the Court. (b) Award could be set aside if it is contrary to : (a) fundamental policy of Indian Law; or (b) the interest of India; or © justice or morality; © The Award could also be set aside if it is so unfair and unreasonable that it shocks the conscience of the Court. (d) It is open to the Court to consider whether the Award is against the specific terms of contract and if so, interfere with it on the ground that it is patently illegal and opposed to the public policy of India. 21. In Mcdermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd. and others; (2006) 11 SCC 181 , definition of pubic policy as defined in the case of O.N.G.C. (Supra) was followed and the case was affirmed. 22. As even in recent past in the case of J.G. Engineers Private Ltd. v. Union of India and another; (2011) 5 SCC 758 , the Supreme Court has again adhered to the definition of public policy as defined in the case of O.N.G.C. (Supra). 23. Thus in view of what has been discussed above and the consistent legal position, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that they cannot seek remedy under the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is misconceived and fallacious and accordingly rejected. 24, Petitioners may approach the appropriate forum under the provisions of Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The present writ petition is thus not maintainable and accordingly the same is dismissed. 25. No order as to costs.