Judgment :- 1. This regular second appeal is preferred challenging the judgment and decree dated 09.03.2011 passed by the I Additional District Judge, Mysore, thereby allowing the appeal filed by defendant No.2 in R.A.No.593/2010 and dismissing the appeal filed by the plaintiff in R.A.No.528/2010. Appellant is aggrieved by the judgments passed in both the appeals. 2. Appellant - plaintiff is the mother of deceased Ananda Babu who was an employee of the Life Insurance Corporation of India. He met with an accident on 22.03.2003 and died on 25.05.2003 while in service. Defendant No.2 is the wife of late Ananda Babu daughter-in-law of the plaintiff. The suit O.S.No.568/2006 was instituted by the appellant, mother-in- law against the daughter-in-law and the LIC of India seeking a declaration that she was entitled for the amount of pension payable upon the death of her son and sought consequential relief of mandatory injunction against the LIC to remit 50% of the amount of pension to her. 3. It was her contention that as per the provisions of Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, pensionary benefit being property, the plaintiff who was a Class-I heir, was entitled to receive the pension equally along with her daughter-in-law upon the death of her son - Ananda Babu. It was her further case that her husband M.P.Rajanna/father of the deceased had entered into an agreement with the 2nd defendant, wife of the deceased as per the Settlement Deed dated 26.05.2003 after the demise of his son vide Ex.P1 and as per the same, the husband of the plaintiff and the widow of the deceased had both agreed that they would take the pensionary benefit 50% each. It was also agreed that the 2nd defendant would avail a job on compassionate ground from the 1st defendant - LIC. 4. Pursuant to the said settlement, the 2nd defendant got a job as 'D' group employee in the LIC at Srirangapatna in Mandya District. However, the 2nd defendant left the matrimonial house and started living separately and was not paying any money towards maintenance of the plaintiff, despite request made in this regard by the plaintiff. Hence, a legal notice was issued calling upon the 1st defendant to pay the pension amount to her. As the defendant failed to comply with the same, the plaintiff instituted the suit. 5. Hence, a legal notice was issued calling upon the 1st defendant to pay the pension amount to her. As the defendant failed to comply with the same, the plaintiff instituted the suit. 5. Defendant No.1 - Life Insurance Corporation of India contested the claim stating that the relevant rules viz., Life Insurance Corporation of India (Employees) Pension Rules, 1995 (for short, 'the Rules'), which provide for payment of family pension postulates that family pension is payable to the spouse and children and not to any other member of the family. Therefore, defendant No.2 being the legally wedded wife of deceased S.Ananda Babu, she was alone entitled for the benefit of family pension. 6. Defendant No.2 filed her written statement contending that the medical expenses of the deceased were borne by the employer-Corporation under Mediclaim and that the entire PF and gratuity benefits of S.Ananda Babu were received by the plaintiff and no amount was paid to her. She denied the family settlement dated 22.06.2003 while admitting the fact that she was employed on compassionate grounds upon the death of her husband. 7. Based on these pleadings, the Trial Court framed necessary issues, particularly with regard to the entitlement of the plaintiff for the pension amount due and payable upon the death of her son S.Ananda Babu and also as regards the plaintiff's entitlement for the relief of mandatory injunction. 8. On consideration of the evidence on record, the Trial Court in the light of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH VS RANOJI RAO SHINDE - AIR 1968 SC 1053 , wherein it is held that right to receive money is a property, found that the family pension is also required to be considered as property and hence the plaintiff being the mother of the deceased was entitled for equal share in the family pension along with the wife of the deceased as per Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act. To support this finding, the Trial Court has further placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of SMT. SARBATI DEVI & ANOTHER VS SMT. To support this finding, the Trial Court has further placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of SMT. SARBATI DEVI & ANOTHER VS SMT. USHA DEVI - 1984(1) SCC 424 , wherein the Apex Court has held that mere nomination made under Section 39 of the Life Insurance Corporation of India Act, did not have the effect of conferring on the nominee any beneficial interest in the amount payable under the life insurance policy on the death of the assured as the nomination only indicated the hand which is authorized to receive the amount on the payment of which the insurer gets a valid discharge of its liability under the policy. On the strength of this reasoning, the Apex Court has found in the aforementioned decision that on the death of the policy holder, the amount payable under the policy becomes part of the estate which is governed by the law of succession applicable to him. Such succession may be testamentary or intestate. Section 39 would not operate as a third kind of succession, which can be styled as a statutory testament. The Apex Court concluded holding that a nominee cannot be treated as being equivalent to an heir or legatee. The amount received under the policy, therefore can be claimed by the heirs of the assured in accordance with the law of succession governing them. Thus, the Trial Court decreed the suit partly declaring that the plaintiff was entitled for pension amount of her deceased son S.Ananda Babu. However, the relief of mandatory injunction sought was dismissed. 9. Aggrieved by the declaratory relief granted, the widow of deceased/defendant No.2 preferred R.A.No.593/2010, whereas feeling aggrieved by the refusal of the mandatory injunction sought, the mother of the deceased-appellant herein/plaintiff preferred R.A.No.528/2010. The lower Appellate Court having clubbed both the appeals, has dismissed the appeal filed by the plaintiff/mother, but has allowed the appeal filed by defendant No.2-widow of the deceased. The Appellate Court has found that as per the Rules governing payment of family pension, plaintiff being the mother of the deceased was not entitled to claim any right for the family pension as it was the widow and children who alone were legally entitled to claim family pension. The Appellate Court has found that as per the Rules governing payment of family pension, plaintiff being the mother of the deceased was not entitled to claim any right for the family pension as it was the widow and children who alone were legally entitled to claim family pension. The Appellate Court has also come to the conclusion that the judgments of the Supreme Court relied on by the Trial Court and the provisions contained under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, had no application to the facts where question regarding payment of family pension was involved and which was governed by the Rules framed. 10. In this background, this second appeal is filed challenging the judgment and decree passed by the lower Appellate Court. I have heard the learned Counsel for the appellant and the respondent. 11. It is undeniable that payment of family pension upon the death of S.Ananda Babu, deceased employee of the Life Insurance Corporation is regulated and governed by the relevant Rules known as Life Insurance Corporation of India (Employees) Pension Rules, 1995. Section 39 of the Rules deals with Family Pension. It states that the family of the deceased shall be entitled to family pension, the amount of which shall be determined in accordance with Appendix V. Family in relation to an employee is defined to mean, (1) wife in case of male employee or husband in case of female employee; (2) .................... (3) son who has not attained the age of 25 years and unmarried daughter who has not attained the age of 25 years including such son or daughter adopted legally. 12. It is thus clear that it is only the spouse of the deceased and his children who fall within the definition of 'family' for the purpose of family pension. In fact, this position is not disputed by the Counsel for the appellant. His contention is that having regard to Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act and keeping in mind the nature of benefit that the family of the deceased is entitled, plaintiff-mother is equally entitled to share the family pension along with the widow defendant No.2 and that any other interpretation in understanding the provision would deprive one of the heirs of the deceased who is otherwise entitled under the General Law viz.., Hindu Succession Act of the benefit. 13. 13. Payment of pension that too family pension upon the death of the employee is governed by the Rules framed. In this particular case, the Rules framed by the LIC specifically provided that it is only the widow and children of the deceased who are entitled to claim family pension. The definition of the term 'family' does not include the parents of the deceased or any other heirs. This rule is not under challenge. The lower Appellate Court has examined the nature of the rule and has applied it to the facts and circumstances of the case on hand. The lower Appellate Court has rightly found that the decision of the Apex Court in the case of STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH VS RANOJI RAO SHINDE - AIR 1968 SC 1053 , arose in a totally different context where the right to receive money is held to be a property. The controversy that arose in that case pertained to abolition of cash grants payable by the State by enacting Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Cash Grants Act, 1963. The validity of this enactment was challenged contending that it was ultra vires the provisions of the Constitution. The respondents before the Apex Court were earlier entitled to receive cash grants from the Government of Madhya Pradesh. The impugned Act abolished such grants, but provided for payment of certain compensation. The vires of the Act was challenged contending that the same was inconsistent with Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. The High Court had accepted this contention. In that background, when the State challenged the correctness of the decision of the High Court to the extent it went against its interest, the Apex Court held in paragraph 6 as under: "6. The High Court has come to the conclusion that a "cash grant" is property within the meaning of that expression in Articles 19(1)(f) and 31. This conclusion was not challenged before us. It is obvious that a right to a sum of money is property." 14. In paragraph 8, the Apex Court has observed as under: "8. From the above decisions, it follows that choses in action and money could not be acquired under Article 31(2). This conclusion was not challenged before us. It is obvious that a right to a sum of money is property." 14. In paragraph 8, the Apex Court has observed as under: "8. From the above decisions, it follows that choses in action and money could not be acquired under Article 31(2). If it is held that State by the exercise of its power of eminent domain can acquire choses in action and money belonging to its citizens, by paying a fraction of the money taken as compensation, the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(f) would be deprived of all its contents and that Article will cease to have any meaningful purpose. The power conferred under Article 31(2) is not a taxing power. That power cannot be utilized for enriching the coffers of the State. It is true that the abolition of the cash grants would augment the resources of the State but that cannot be considered as a public purpose under Article 31(2). If it is otherwise, it would be permissible for the legislatures to enact laws acquiring the public debts due from the State, the annuity deposits returnable by it and provident fund payable by it by providing for the payment of some nominal compensation to the persons whose rights are acquired as the acquisitions in question would augment the resources of the State. But nothing so bad can be said to be within contemplation of Article 31(2). That Article must be construed harmoniously with Article 19(1)(f). If so construed, it is obvious that the public purpose contemplated by that Article does not include enrichment of the coffers of the State. Further the compensation referred to in Article 31(2) is, as held by this Court in various decision, is the just equivalent of the value of the property taken. If for every rupee acquired, fifty paisas or less is made payable as compensation the violation of Article 31(2) would be patent and in those circumstances the exercise of the powers by the legislature would be considered as a fraud on its power and consequently the legislation will be struck down as a colourable piece of legislation." 15. If for every rupee acquired, fifty paisas or less is made payable as compensation the violation of Article 31(2) would be patent and in those circumstances the exercise of the powers by the legislature would be considered as a fraud on its power and consequently the legislation will be struck down as a colourable piece of legislation." 15. It is thus clear that the question that fell for consideration before the Apex Court was in the context of abolition of cash grants and the validity of the legislation was considered in the wake of the provision contained under Article 19(1)(f) and Article 31(2) of the Constitution of India. These provisions of the Constitution are no longer part of the Constitution now and the question presented before this Court has nothing to do with the validity of any law abolishing such cash grants or acquiring any property. The question that we are concerned is payment of family pension which is purely regulated by the relevant Rules. As long as the Rules prescribe that the beneficiary to receive family pension are the widow and children of the deceased and not any other heir, it is not open for the plaintiff to claim the benefit by placing reliance on Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act. Therefore, the lower Appellate Court has rightly not placed reliance on the provisions contained under Section 8 or for that matter, on the judgment of the Apex Court which were pressed into service. 16. Similarly, the other judgment of the Apex Court in the case of SMT. SARBATI DEVI & ANOTHER VS SMT. USHA DEVI - 1984(1) SCC 424 , has no relevance to the facts of the present case, as the question involved in the said case pertained to the right of a nominee in an insurance policy to receive the amount under the policy, payable upon the death of the assured who died intestate. It was held by the Apex Court that the amount received under the policy, can be claimed by the heirs of the assured in accordance with the law of succession governing them. We are not concerned with any such nomination. The right claimed in this case emanates from the rule enacted by the competent authority. 17. It was held by the Apex Court that the amount received under the policy, can be claimed by the heirs of the assured in accordance with the law of succession governing them. We are not concerned with any such nomination. The right claimed in this case emanates from the rule enacted by the competent authority. 17. Pension is payable as per the rules and if the beneficiary to receive the family pension is specified in the Rules no other person can claim such benefit by referring to the general law. Therefore, there is marked distinction in the right of a nominee appointed to receive the amount in an insurance policy and the right of a beneficiary who would receive the family pension as per the rules pertaining to payment of pension. Hence, the contention urged by the learned Counsel for the appellant is unsustainable. 18. I do not find any illegality in the judgment rendered by the lower Appellate Court. No substantial question of law arises for consideration. Hence, the appeal is dismissed. 19. However, it is made clear that the right of the plaintiff to claim maintenance against defendant No.2 is not in question in this case and therefore, it is not necessary to dilate on that. The said question has to be decided in a properly instituted proceeding in accordance with law.