JUDGMENT Hon’ble Anil Kumar, J.—Heard Sri Ramesh Singh, learned counsel for petitioner, Sri Vikrant Raghuvanshi,learned State counsel and perused the record. 2. Facts in brief of the present case are that the petitioner who was working on the post of constable, posted under Senior Superintendent of Police/Dy. Inspector General of Police, Lucknow Region, Lucknow. On 18.5.1999, deputed for carrying an accused, namely, Kamal Kishore Singh Yadav before the Court (District and Sessions Judge, Lucknow). After producing the abovesaid person in the Court, while he was returning alongwith aforesaid person, in front of Court of District and Sessions Judge, Lucknow, two unknown persons had fired upon Sri Kamal Kishore Singh Yadav with a Katta, on account of which he sustained injury in his stomach. 3. Petitioner, putting his life in danger, caught one of the person who has fired upon Sri Kamal Kishore Singh Yadav alongwith Katta. In this regard, on 18.5.1999, an FIR was also lodged at Police Station Wazirganj. 4 Further, in the incidence in question, the then District and Sessions Judge, Lucknow wrote an appreciation letter dated 30.6.1999 to Senior Superintendent of Police, Lucknow, appreciating the act of the petitioner. Thereafter, the Senior Superintendent of Police, Lucknow by letter dated 21.8.1999 taking into consideration the appreciation made by District and Sessions Judge, Lucknow wrote a letter for out of turn promotion of the petitioner, in this regard was also made by Inspector General of Police, Lucknow, Lucknow Region, Lucknow. 5. However, thereafter no heed has been paid for considering the case of the petitioner for out of turn promotion, so he approached this Court by filing a Writ Petition No. 878 (SS) of 2010, praying therein that the official respondents may be directed to consider the case of the petitioenr for out of turn promotion in view of the incidence which took place on 18.5.1999, disposed of by order dated 17.2.2010 with the following direction : “Considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the Committee of Police Establishment Board/opposite party No. 4 is directed to examine the matter and pass appropriate orders on the representation for out of turn promotion, taking into consideration the Government Order dated 3.2.1994, within a maximum period of two months from the date of presentation of a certified copy of this order. The writ petition stands disposed of in above terms. “ 6. The writ petition stands disposed of in above terms. “ 6. In pursuance to the same, the impugned order dated 6.8.2010 has been passed by which the claim of the petitioner has been rejected by O.P.No. 2. Aggrieved by the said fact, present writ petition has been filed. 7. While challenging the impugned order, learned counsel for petitioner submits that the same has been passed on the basis of report submitted by the Committee which has rejected the case of the petitioner for out of turn promotion, copy of which for the first time has been served on the petitioner by means of counter-affidavit filed by the respondents. 8. Accordingly, learned counsel for petitioner submits that the Committee while considering the case of the petitioner for out of turn promotion had not considered the case of the petitioner in correct prospective and has also not taken into consideration the appreciation letter written by District and Sessions Judge, Lucknow as well as recommendation made in favour of the petitioner on the basis of letter written by District and Sessions Judge, Lucknow by the Superintendent of Police, Lucknow and Inspector General of Police, Lucknow for out of turn promotion. 9. He further submits that even no finding has been given by the Committee in its report that why the Committee disagree with the recommendation made in favour of the petitioner for giving out of turn promotion to the next higher post. So, the impugned order dated 6.8.2010 which has been passed taking into consideration the report submitted by the Committee that the petitioner is not entitled for out of turn promotion in view of the provisions as provided under Government Order dated 3.2.1994 is an action which is illegal and arbitrary, contrary to the facts on record, liable to be set aside. 10. 10. Sri Vikrant Raghuvanshi,learned State counsel while defending the impugned order submits that the case of the petitioner as per the procedure provided under Government Order dated 3.2.1994 has been placed before the Committee constituted for the said purpose, after taking into consideration the material on record not found fit to recommend the case of the petitioner for out of turn promotion to the appropriate authority as the act which was performed by the petitioner on 18.5.1999 is an act to be performed by the police Constable while discharging his duties, further committee has given a categorical finding the petitioner has caught a person who has fired on Sri Kamal Kishore Singh Yadav with the help of public present on the spot. 11. He further submits that taking into consideration the said facts as well as the fact that the petitioner has been awarded Rs. 1000/- as reward and the recommendation given by the District and Sessions Judge, Lucknow is only an appreciation letter and the recommendation given by Senior Superintendent of Police, Lucknow as well as Inspector General of Police, Lucknow for out of turn promotion of the petitioner are only a recommendation, not binding on the Committee, so there is no illegality or infirmity in the impugned order by which the petitioner case for out of turn promotion has been rejected, hence the present writ petition liable to be dismissed. 12. I have heard learned counsel for parties and perused the record. 13. On the basis of the undisputed fact as stated above of the present case are that in the incidence which took place on 18.5.1999 in the premises/front of Court of District and Sessions Judge, Lucknow, the said authority had wrote a letter to the competent authority/Senior Superintendent of Police, Lucknow thereby appreciating the act done by the petitioner in the said incidence. Subsequently, the Senior Superintendent of Police, Lucknow wrote a letter dated 21.8.1999 to the higher authority/Inspector General of Police, Lucknow recommending the case of the petitioner for out of turn promotion, thereafter, the Inspector General of Police, Lucknow also recommended the case of the petitioner for out of turn promotion to the O.P.No. 2. 14. Subsequently, the Senior Superintendent of Police, Lucknow wrote a letter dated 21.8.1999 to the higher authority/Inspector General of Police, Lucknow recommending the case of the petitioner for out of turn promotion, thereafter, the Inspector General of Police, Lucknow also recommended the case of the petitioner for out of turn promotion to the O.P.No. 2. 14. So far as the matter in respect to giving out of turn promotion to a police personnel is concerned, the same is governed by a Government Order dated 3.2.1994 and in order to decide the controversy involved in the present case, the para No. 3 of the said Government Order is relevant quoted hereinbelow : Þiqfyl cy ds ,sls vkj{kh ;k mifujh{kd@IykVwu dekaMj v)e; lkgl ,oa ‘kkS;Z dk Án’kZu djus okys iqfyl dehZ fd dksfV esa t;saxs ftUgksaus dq[;kr vkradoknh ;k t?kU; vijk/kh ds lkFk eqBHksM+ ;k mudh fxjrkjh esa lkgl ,oa ‘kkS;Z Ánf’kZr fd;k gks ;k vius dRoZ; ds ikyu ds nkSjku tksf[ke Hkjk dk;Z fd;k gksAÞ 15. In the instant case, a Committee has been constituted to considered the case of the petitioner for out of turn promotion as per Government Order dated 3.2.1994 after considering the case of the petitioner had recommended that he is not entitled for out of turn promotion as the act performed by the petitioner on 18.5.1999 is an act which is to be performed by the police Constable while discharging his duties and the accused which has been caught by him with the help of public. 16. Needless to mention herein that from the perusal of the recommendation of the Committee, the position which emerged out that the said Committee has not given any finding whatsoever that on what ground and reason the said Committee had rejected the recommendation made by the police authorities under whom the petitioner is posted i.e. Senior Superintendent of Police, Lucknow as well as Inspector General of Police, Lucknow Region, Lucknow who have recommended the petitioner’s case for out of turn promotion taking into letter of appreciation written by District and Sessions Judge, Lucknow rather on the point in issue the report submitted by the Committee is a non-speaking. 17. 17. Thus, keeping in view the said fact, the first question which is to be considered in the present case that whether the action on the part of Committee thereby not recommending the case of the petitioner for out of turn promotion is subject to judicial review or not in view of the fact stated hereinabove. 18. This Court while exercising power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India does not exercise appellate powers. It is not intended to take away from administrative authorities the powers and discretion properly vested in them by law and to substitute Courts as the bodies making the decisions. Judicial review is a protection and not a weapon. 19. In the case of Council of Civil Service Unions (CCSU) v. Minister for the Civil Service, (1984) 3 ALL ER 935, Lord Diplock has observed the scope of judicial review in the following words : “Judicial Review as I think developed to a stage today when, without reiterating any analysis of the steps by which the development has come about, one can conveniently classify under three heads the grounds on which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground I would call ‘illegality’ the second ‘irrationality’ and the third ‘procedural impropriety”. 20. Moreover, judicial review has certain inherent limitation. It is suited more for adjudication of disputes than for performing administrative functions. It is for the executive to administer the law and the function of the judiciary is to ensure that the Government carries out its duty in accordance with the provisions of the rules and statute. 21. 20. Moreover, judicial review has certain inherent limitation. It is suited more for adjudication of disputes than for performing administrative functions. It is for the executive to administer the law and the function of the judiciary is to ensure that the Government carries out its duty in accordance with the provisions of the rules and statute. 21. In the case of Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans, (1982) 3 ALL ER 141, it was observed by Lord Hailsham as under : “Purpose of judicial review is to ensure that individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the authority, after according fair treatment reaches on a matter which it is authorized by law to decide with its conclusion which is corrected in the eyes of the Court.” In the same case, Lord Brightman observed that : “Judicial review as the words imply is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which a decision was made,” and held, that “it would be an error to think that the Court sits in judgment not only on the correctness of the decision making process but also on the correctness of the decision itself.” 22. The aforesaid observations made by the Lord Hailsham and Lord Brightman were quoted with approval by their Lordships of Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Dharmendar Prasad Singh, AIR 1989 SC 997 , and while upholding that the judicial review is directed not against the decision, but is confined to the examination of the decision making process, it was held by the Supreme Court as under : “When the issue raised in judicial review is whether a decision is vitiated by taking into account irrelevant, or neglecting to take into account, relevant factors or is so manifestly unreasonable that no reasonable authority entrusted with the power in question could reasonable have made such a decision, the judicial review of the decision making process includes examination, as a matter of law, of the relevance of the factors.” 23. In the case of Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651 , the Supreme Court stated that : “Judicial review is concerned with reviewing not the merits of the decision in support of which the application for judicial review is made but the decision making process itself,” and enumerated some broad grounds upon which an administrative action is subject to control by judicial review and classified them under the heading of ‘illegality’, ‘irrationality’ and ‘procedural impropriety.’ In their supervisory jurisdiction as distinguished form the appellate one, the Courts do not themselves embark upon rehearing of the matter but nevertheless Courts will, if called upon, act in a supervisory capacity and see that the decision making body acts fairly. If the decision making body is influenced by considerations which ought not to influence or fails to take into account the matters which ought to have been taken into account the Courts will interfere. If the decision making body comes to its decision on no evidence or comes to a finding so unreasonable that a reasonable man could not have come to it then again the Courts will interfere. Further if the decision making body goes outside its power or misconstrues the extent of its power, then too the Courts can interfere, and if the decision making body acts in a bad faith or with ulterior object which it is not authorized by law, its decision will be set aside in supervisory jurisdiction. A decision of a public authority will be liable to be quashed or otherwise dealt with by appropriate order in judicial review proceedings, where the Courts concludes that the decision is such that no authority properly directing itself on the relevant law and fact acting reasonably could have reached it.” 24. In view of the said settled position of law on the point in issue on judicial review, this Court while exercising the power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can very well take into consideration and judge the decision making process of the authority concerned. In view of the said settled position of law on the point in issue on judicial review, this Court while exercising the power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can very well take into consideration and judge the decision making process of the authority concerned. In view of the said position, I am of the considered opinion that the Committee while not considering the case of the petitioner for out of turn promotion had not given any finding that why disagree with the recommendation given by the Senior Superintendent of Police, Lucknow and Inspector General of Police, Lucknow as well as appreciation letter written by the District and Sessions Judge, Lucknow on the basis of which the abovesaid authority had recommended the case of the petitioner for out of turn promotion rather on the point in issue the report of the Committee is silent. 25. Further, in the case of Ashok Rana v. Home Secretary,U.P.Shashan and others, (2000) 3UPLBEC 2324, in which this Court has held as under, “The reports ‘of the sponsoring authorities constituted valid material for the formation of opinion as to whether the petitioner was entitled to be given out of turn promotion and were not liable to be ignored sans any rhyme or reason. The grant of power to give out of turn promotion to a police officer is no doubt subjectively formulated but the decision of the Committee one way or the other must be based on objective consideration of valid materials such a the reports/recommendations made by the SSP/DIG/IG(P). I find no valid reason justifying the order impugned herein passed in disregard of valid materials on record. (see Pooran Singh Mehra v. State of U.P. and others, 2002(4) ESC (All) 450 and Prathviraj Chauhan and another v. State of U.P. and others, (2006) 3 UPLBEC 2790 )” 26. I find no valid reason justifying the order impugned herein passed in disregard of valid materials on record. (see Pooran Singh Mehra v. State of U.P. and others, 2002(4) ESC (All) 450 and Prathviraj Chauhan and another v. State of U.P. and others, (2006) 3 UPLBEC 2790 )” 26. In the case of Constable 126, Rajiv Chandra Kaushik v. State of U.P. and others, 2006(4) ESC 2901 (All), it was held, “that in case a person has shown extra courage and bravery and recommended for out of turn promotion and the committee constituted for the said purpose if ignore the relevant valid material, the same cannot be sustained and has taken a view, ‘that the grant of power to give out of turn promotion to a police officer is no doubt subjectively formulated but the decision of the Committee one way or the other must be based on objective consideration of valid materials such as the report/recommendations made by the sponsoring authorities”. Meaning thereby the Committee which has been constituted for the purpose of out of turn promotion to take into consideration the recommendation of the sponsoring authority.” 27. This Court by judgment and order dated 14.12.2010 passed in Writ Petition No. 982 of 2010 (SB) State of U.P. and another v. Sunder Singh Solanki, decided on 14.12.2010 held while dealing with the matter with regard to out of turn promotion for the act of bravery by police personnel, the State Government or the Director General of police cannot act in arbitrary manner. State or its authorities have to discharge their obligation in a just and fair manner and the recommendations of the sponsoring authorities constitute valid material for the purpose and if ignored without valid reasons and sufficient ground, the same cannot be sustained. 28. State or its authorities have to discharge their obligation in a just and fair manner and the recommendations of the sponsoring authorities constitute valid material for the purpose and if ignored without valid reasons and sufficient ground, the same cannot be sustained. 28. Thus in view of the above said judgment, the position which emerge out to the facts that police personnel has got no right to get out of turn promotion as a matter of right but for the purpose of granting the same a report of sponsoring authority constitute valid material for formulation of material whether he is entitled to be given out of turn promotion or not and the said report /recommendation is subjective material which is taken to be consideration by the Committee while considering the case for grant out of turn promotion and if the committee disagree with the said material, it should give a valid reason for disagreement whey the person whose case has been recommended by the sponsoring authority for out of turn promotion is not entitled for the, so once the recommendation of the Committee is not in accordance with law, the impugend order dated 6.8.2010 passed by O.P.No. 2 on the basis of the same is not sustainable, liable to be set aside. 29. For the foregoing reasons, the impugned order dated 6.8.2010 (Annexure No. 1) passed by O.P.No. 2 is set aside and the matter is remanded to the said authority to reconsider again in view of the observations made hereinabove expeditiously. 30. With the above observation, the writ petition is allowed. Petition Allowed. [2013(10) ADJ 502] ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT BEFORE : SUDHIR AGARWAL, J. GIRJA KISHORE AND OTHERS ....Petitioners Versus STATE OF U.P. AND OTHERS ....Respondents (Civil Misc. 30. With the above observation, the writ petition is allowed. Petition Allowed. [2013(10) ADJ 502] ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT BEFORE : SUDHIR AGARWAL, J. GIRJA KISHORE AND OTHERS ....Petitioners Versus STATE OF U.P. AND OTHERS ....Respondents (Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 36196 of 2001, decided on 12th September, 2013) Regularisation—Class IV employees—Pursuant to an ex parte interim order petitioners have continued to work and, therefore, this continuation as founded on an ex parte interim order, must result in conferment of substantial right upon petitioners to continue in service as a regular employee, even if on merits, the real issue raised in writ petition is not decided in their favour—Services rendered pursuant to an interim order would not give any benefit to petitioners—An appointment, if not made strictly in accordance with law would not confer any right upon incumbent to hold the post—Wrong committed by respondent will not confer any cause of action or parity on the ground of equal treatment. [Paras 16 to 43] Result; Petition Dismissed. Cases cited : (2006) 4 SCC 1 ; 2007(1) ESC 483 (All) (Para 10); AIR 1967 SC 1071 ; 1972 (1) SCC 409 ; 1949 SCC 507 (Para 11); (2007) 1 SCC 575 (Para 12); (2006) 6 SCC 310 (Para 13); (2007) 1 SCC 373 ; (2007) 1 SCC 257 ; (2008) 5 SCC 241 (Para 14); (2008) 3 SCC 505 (Para 16); (2009) 4 SCC 342 (Para 18); (2008) 5 SCC 241; (2008) 15 SCC 737 ; (2009) 3 SCC 179 ; (2009) 13 SCC 90 (Para 19); (2010) 2 SCC 422 (Para 20); (2010) 2 SCC 728 (Para 21); (2010) 3 SCC 115 (Para 22); (2010) 5 SCC 475 (Para 23); JT 2010 (13) SC 7 (Para 25); (2010) 4 SCC 179 (Para 26); (2013) 2 UPLBEC 1128 (Para 29); 2007(2) ESC 987 (Para 32); AIR 1975 All 280 ; 1986 (4) LCD 196; AIR 1994 All 273 (Para 33); JT 2009 (2) SC 520 (Para 34); JT 2009 (10) SC 309 (Para 35); (2010) 2 SCC 422 (Para 37); (2010) 2 SCC 728 (Para 38); AIR 2000 SC 2306 ; AIR 2003 SC 3983 ; AIR 2004 SC 2303 ; AIR 2005 SC 5565; AIR 2006 SC 1142 (Para 39). Counsel : Vishnu Swaroop Srivastava and Shesh Kumar for the Petitioners; C.S.C. for the Respondents. Counsel : Vishnu Swaroop Srivastava and Shesh Kumar for the Petitioners; C.S.C. for the Respondents. JUDGMENT Hon’ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.—The writ petition having been restored vide order of date passed on Restoration Application, as requested by learned counsels for parties, I proceed to decide this matter finally at this stage. 2. Heard Sri Shesh Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel for the respondents. 3. This case is repetition of frequently visited litigation at the instance of illegal appointees, who are aspiring to get permanency/regularization on a post, which has been acquired and occupied by them, in a manner which is not consistent with the procedure for recruitment, and obviously continued on account of active support and collusion of appointing authority. A person, who entered a public office by committing breach of law with impunity, has come to this Court to obtain a seal of approval of his occupation so as to make it for all times to continue, without any intervention, and would confer a right upon him to such post in the garb of regularization or absorption etc. Another aspect of the argument advanced is that a person, even if entered service illegally, and, when competent authority, for whatever reason, intend to rectify his mistake by removing such illegal appointee, beneficiaries, come to this Court, obtain ex parte interim order and then continue to hold such post. After a long time, when the matter remained pending before this Court and interim order has continued, such person claim sympathy suggesting that his matter should be treated with a humane approach by conferring benefit initially given under the interim order, as a permanent one, even if on merits ultimately writ petitioner fails to make out any substantive case to succeed. In other words, an ex parte interim order having conferred benefit upon one of the party, should be constituted so as to cause a permanent loss to other side even if ultimately the writ petition fails. 4. In my view, both the submissions are thoroughly misconceived and deserve to fail outright. 5. The brief facts giving rise to the present dispute are that petitioner No. 1 was engaged as a Class IV employees against a substantive vacancy, caused due to the death of holder of the post one Ramagya Mishra. 4. In my view, both the submissions are thoroughly misconceived and deserve to fail outright. 5. The brief facts giving rise to the present dispute are that petitioner No. 1 was engaged as a Class IV employees against a substantive vacancy, caused due to the death of holder of the post one Ramagya Mishra. The competent appointing authority i.e. District Magistrate, Gorakhpur vide order dated 7.4.1993 appointed petitioner No. 1 for a period of 89 days on purely ad hoc basis with a clear stipulation that appointment is temporary and liable to be terminated at any point of time. The letter of appointment further states that after expiry of period of appointment i.e. 89 days, it shall automatically seize. The aforesaid appointment/engagement was extended from time to time and last extension was granted by order dated 13.6.2001 for the period of 8.6.2001 to 4.9.2001. Similar appointments were made in respect to petitioners No. 2, 3 and 4 and they were also granted extension from time to time. 6. Apprehending discontinuance, present writ petition was filed in November, 2001 seeking a writ of mandamus commanding respondents to allow petitioners to continue in service and do not discontinue them. Further mandamus was sought directing respondents to regularize petitioners on Class IV post, since working for more than seven years though with some artificial breaks. 7. Entertaining the writ petition, on 9.11.2001, this Court passed the following ex parte interim order: “List this petition on 22nd Nov. 2001 alongwith W.P. Nos. 30391 of 1995, 130 of 1996, and 36270 of 1995. The office will ensure that title of cases and names of parties are printed in the cause list. Till the next date of listing in case person junior than the petitioners are working then parties will maintain status quo.” 8. Pursuant to the above orders, the petitioners continued to work. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that even if petitioners were not initially appointed after following procedure for recruitment provided for Class IV employees, still they are entitled for regularization having continued to work for more than seven years, when the writ petition was filed, and now almost 19 years since then, pursuant to ex parte interim order passed in November, 2001. 10. 10. Learned Counsel for petitioners sought to rely on para 53 of the judgment in Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Uma Devi, (2006) 4 SCC 1 and contended that Apex Court has carved out an exception in respect to such employees who have continued to work for ten years more, without intervention of the Courts and tribunal, and they are entitled to be considered for regularization. He also placed reliance on a learned Single Judge of this Court in Ramveer Singh and others v. Gas Authority of India Ltd. (GAIL) and others, 2007(1) ESC 483 (All), in which it was held: “However, the Supreme Court in the case of Uma Devi (3) (supra) has carved out an exception. In paragraph-53 of the said judgment, the Supreme Court held that if the persons appointed on ad hoc, casual or contract basis were duly qualified and were working against a sanctioned post and continued to work for several years without any intervention of an order of the Court, in such an eventuality, the process of regularisation could be made and if it was ultimately found that the employee was entitled for the relief, it would be possible for the Court to accordingly mould the relief.” 11. Having given my anxious consideration, I do not find any force there to. In para 53 of the judgment, in Uma Devi (supra), the exception carved out by Apex Court is confined to the cases where the appointments are ‘irregular’ and not ‘illegal’ as explained in State of Mysore v. S.V. Narayanappa, AIR 1967 SC 1071 , R.N. Nanjundappa v. T. Thimmiah, 1972 1 SCC 409 and B.N. Nagrajan v. State of Karnataka, 1949 SCC 507. 12. The distinction between “irregular” and “illegal” appointments as referred to in para 53 of the judgment in Uma Devi (supra) has been dealt with in a subsequent decision in State of M.P. and others v. Lalit Kumar Verma, (2007) 1 SCC 575, wherein para 12 it has been held: “12. The question which, thus, arises for consideration, would be: Is there any distinction between “irregular appointment” and “illegal appointment”? The distinction between the two terms is apparent. The question which, thus, arises for consideration, would be: Is there any distinction between “irregular appointment” and “illegal appointment”? The distinction between the two terms is apparent. In the event the appointment is made in total disregard of the Constitutional scheme as also the recruitment rules framed by the employer, which is ‘State’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, the recruitment would be an illegal one; whereas there may be cases where, although, substantial compliance with the constitutional scheme as also the rules have been made, the appointment may be irregular in the sense that some provisions of some rules might not have been strictly adhered to.” 13. Learned counsel for the petitioners at this stage submitted that in Mineral Exploration Corpn. Employees’ Union v. Mineral Exploration Corpn. Limited and another, (2006) 6 SCC 310 , the Apex Court issued some direction for regularization of workmen who were continuing for a long time, referring to para 53 in Uma Devi (supra), therefore, the petitioners is also entitled. However, it would be useful to notice that relying on Mineral Exploration Corpn. Employees’ Union v. Mineral Exploration Corpn. Limited and another (supra), a similar argument was raised in State of M.P. v. Lalit Kumar Verma (supra), but the same has been negatived by referring to para 39 of Mineral Exploration Corpn. Employees’ (supra), and the observations of Court in paras 13 to 16 of the judgement of Lalit Kumar Verma (supra) are as under: “13. In National Fertilizers Ltd. v. Somvir Singh (supra) it has been held: (SCC pp.500-01) paras 23-25) “23. The contention of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents that the appointments were irregular and not illegal, cannot be accepted for more than one reason. They were appointed only on the basis of their applications. The Recruitment Rules were not followed. Even the Selection Committee had not been properly constituted. In view of the ban on employment, no recruitment was permissible in law. The reservation policy adopted by the appellant had not been maintained. Even cases of minority had not been given due consideration. 24. They were appointed only on the basis of their applications. The Recruitment Rules were not followed. Even the Selection Committee had not been properly constituted. In view of the ban on employment, no recruitment was permissible in law. The reservation policy adopted by the appellant had not been maintained. Even cases of minority had not been given due consideration. 24. The Constitution Bench thought of directing regularization of the services only of those employees whose appointments were irregular as explained in State of Mysore v. S.V. Narayanappa, R.N. Najundappa v. T.Thimmiah and B.N. Nagaranaj v. State of Karnataka, wherein this Court observed: (Uma Devi (3) case, SCC p.24, para 16). “16. In B.N.Nagarajan v. State of Karnataka, this Court clearly held that the words “regular” or “regularisation” do not connote permanence and cannot be construed so as to convey an idea of the nature of tenure of appointments. They are terms calculated to condone any procedural irregularities and are meant to cure only such defects as are attributable to methodology followed in making the appointments.” 25. Judged by the standards laid down by this Court in the aforementioned decisions, the appointments of the respondents are illegal. They do not, thus, have any legal right to continue in service.” 14. In R.S.Garg v. State of U.P., 2006(6) SCC 430 , it has been held by this Court : (SCC p.448,para 24) “24. The original appointment of the 3rd respondent being illegal and not irregular, the case would not come within the exception carved out by the Constitution Bench. Furthermore, relaxation, if any, could have been accorded only in terms of Rule 28 of the Rules; Rule 28 would be attracted when undue hardship in any particular case is caused. Such relaxation of Rules shall be permissible only in consultation with the Commission. It is not a case where an undue hardship suffered by the 3rd respondent could legitimately be raised being belonging to a particular class of employee. No such case, in law could have been made out. It, in fact, caused hardship to other employees belonging to the same category, who were senior to him; and thus, there was absolutely no reason why an exception should have been made in his case.” (See also State of Gujarat v. Karshanbhai K. Rabari, (2006) 6 SCC 21 .) 15. No such case, in law could have been made out. It, in fact, caused hardship to other employees belonging to the same category, who were senior to him; and thus, there was absolutely no reason why an exception should have been made in his case.” (See also State of Gujarat v. Karshanbhai K. Rabari, (2006) 6 SCC 21 .) 15. Yet, recently, in Principal, Mehar Chand Polytechnic v. Anu Lamba, (2006) 7 SCC 161 , it was held: (SCC p.171, para 35) “35. The respondents did not have legal right to be absorbed in service. They were appointed purely on temporary basis. It has not been shown by them that prior to their appointments, the requirements of the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution had been complied with. Admittedly, there did not exist any sanctioned post. The Project undertaken by the Union of India although continued for some time was initially intended to be a time bound one. It was not meant for generating employment. It was meant for providing technical education to the agriculturists. In the absence of any legal right in the respondents, the High Court, thus, in our considered view, could not have issued a writ of or in the nature of mandamus.” 16. We may, however, notice that in Mineral Exploration the attention of this Court was not drawn to the earlier precedents including a three-judge Bench of this Court in B.N. Nagarajan v. State of Karnataka.” 14. The same view has been reiterated in Municipal Corpn., Jabalpur v. Om Prakash Dubey, (2007) 1 SCC 373 (para 10 to 19) State of U.P. and others v. Deshraj, (2007) 1 SCC 257 (para 9 to 12) and Government of Andhra Pradesh and others v. K. Brahmanandam and others, (2008) 5 SCC 241. 15. Learned counsel for the petitioners also contended that since various Government Orders were issued and the matter was also considered by the respondents, therefore, petitioners have legitimate expectations of getting regularisation and it is not open to respondents not to consider petitioners for regularisation and instead dispense their services. 16. 15. Learned counsel for the petitioners also contended that since various Government Orders were issued and the matter was also considered by the respondents, therefore, petitioners have legitimate expectations of getting regularisation and it is not open to respondents not to consider petitioners for regularisation and instead dispense their services. 16. Here also I do not find any force in the submission particularly in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court rejecting a similar contention in Rajasthan Krishi Vishva Vidyalaya, Bikaner v. Devi Singh, (2008) 3 SCC 505 , where referring to the judgement of the Constitution Bench in Uma Devi (supra) the Apex Court rejected a similar contention. It was held that a person enters into a temporary employment or engagement on contractual or casual worker and the engagement is not based on a proper selection as provided in the rules or procedure, cannot invoke the doctrine of legitimate expectations on the post knowing it well that the appointment on the post can be made only by following a proper procedure for selection which is consistent with Article 16 of the Constitution. It was clearly observed that theory of legitimate expectations cannot be advanced on temporary, contractual or casual employees. To the same effect is the view taken in Accounts Officer (A & I) AP SRTC and others v. K.V. Ramana and others, 2007(2) SCC 324 , Management, The Assistant Salt Commissioner v. Secretary, Central Salt Mazdoor Union, JT 2008(2) SC 469 and State of Himachal Pradesh and another v. Ravinder Singh, JT 2008 (4) SC 420. 17. All the above propositions and expositions of law have continuously been followed till date and it would be appropriate to refer some of the recent authorities being follow up of Constitution Bench judgement in Uma Devi (supra). 18. In State of Karnataka v. G.V. Chandrashekhar, (2009) 4 SCC 342 , the Court referred to Para 53 of judgement in Uma Devi (Supra) as read in National Fertilizers Ltd. v. Somvir Singh (supra) and thereafter observed: “We feel bound by the observations made therein. Initial recruitment of the respondents being wholly illegal and contrary to the constitutional scheme of this country, the impugned judgment of the High Court cannot be upheld. “ 19. Same thing has been reiterated in Government. Initial recruitment of the respondents being wholly illegal and contrary to the constitutional scheme of this country, the impugned judgment of the High Court cannot be upheld. “ 19. Same thing has been reiterated in Government. of Andhra Pradesh and others v. K. Brahmanandam and others, (2008) 5 SCC 241, State of Punjab v. Bahadur Singh and others, (2008) 15 SCC 737 , C. Balachandran and others v. State of Kerala and others, (2009) 3 SCC 179 and Harminder Kaur and others v. Union of India and others, (2009) 13 SCC 90 . 20. In Union of India and another v. Kartick Chandra Mondal and another, (2010) 2 SCC 422 , the Court has gone to the extent that even if some other persons similarly placed have been absorbed, that cannot be a basis to grant a relief by the Court which is otherwise contrary to statute. In para 25 of judgment, the Court said: “Even assuming that the similarly placed persons were ordered to be absorbed, the same if done erroneously cannot become the foundation for perpetuating further illegality. If an appointment is made illegally or irregularly, the same cannot be the basis of further appointment. An erroneous decision cannot be permitted to perpetuate further error to the detriment of the general welfare of the public or a considerable section. This has been the consistent approach of this Court. However, we intend to refer to a latest decision of this Court on this point in the case of State of Bihar v. Upendra Narayan Singh and others, (2009) 5 SCC 65 , the relevant portion of which is extracted hereinbelow: “67. By now it is settled that the guarantee of equality before law enshrined in Article 14 is a positive concept and it cannot be enforced by a citizen or Court in a negative manner. If an illegality or irregularity has been committed in favour of any individual or a group of individuals or a wrong order has been passed by a judicial forum, others cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the higher or superior Court for repeating or multiplying the same irregularity or illegality or for passing wrong order ...” 21. If an illegality or irregularity has been committed in favour of any individual or a group of individuals or a wrong order has been passed by a judicial forum, others cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the higher or superior Court for repeating or multiplying the same irregularity or illegality or for passing wrong order ...” 21. In State of Karnataka and others v. Gadilingappa and others, (2010) 2 SCC 728 , the Court reiterated that it is well-settled principal of law that even if a mistake is committed in an earlier case,the same cannot be allowed to be perpetuated. In that case the employees did not possess requisite qualifications, but continued to work as primary Schools Teachers for a long period and rendered service without any break. Hence, their claim for regularization/absorption was negatived by Government. High Court, taking a passionate view directed for absorption. Reversing the judgment, the Apex Court in para 6 said: “Admittedly, the respondents herein were working as Primary School Teachers for a long period of time and they had rendered service as such continuously without any break. However, after perusing the relevant documents on record what comes to light is the fact that none of the respondents had undergone the T.C.H. course, which was the minimum prescribed qualification at the relevant time for being appointed to the post of a teacher. Since the respondents did not possess the minimum prescribed qualification and because of which their appointment was in contravention of the Cadre and recruitment Rules, we are of the considered view that their appointments were illegal appointments.” 22. In State of Karnataka and others v. Ganapathi Chaya Nayak and others, (2010) 3 SCC 115 , the Court observed that now law is well-settled. In para 8, it says: “In view of the settled position of law in this regard which has been reiterated in a number of judgments of this Court, we hold that the claims of the respondents for regularization or absorption cannot be sustained. Accordingly, we allow the appeals and set aside the orders passed by the High Court as also the KAT.” 23. In Mohd Ashif and others v. State of Bihar and others, (2010) 5 SCC 475 , the Court referring to the earlier decisions said: “7. ... Accordingly, we allow the appeals and set aside the orders passed by the High Court as also the KAT.” 23. In Mohd Ashif and others v. State of Bihar and others, (2010) 5 SCC 475 , the Court referring to the earlier decisions said: “7. ... The legal position regarding the right of an employee to seek regularisation of his services stands settled by a long line of the decisions of this Court. .... It may arise firstly in situations where against an available clear vacancy an appointment is made on ad hoc or daily-wage basis by an authority competent to do so and such appointment is continued from time to time without any artificial break in service. Any such appointment may be regularized giving him security of tenure. The all important condition precedent for such regularization is that the initial entry of such an employee must be made against a sanctioned vacancy and by following the rules and regulations governing such entry. 8. The second situation in which regularization could be granted was where the initial entry of the employee against an available vacancy was found suffering from some flaws in the procedure in making the appointment though the person appointing was competent to make such initial recruitment and had otherwise followed the procedure prescribed for such recruitment. A need may then arise for regularization of the initial appointment by the competent authority with a view to curing the irregularity if any in the same and with a view to granting security of tenure to the incumbent. It is necessary in such situations that the initial entry of the employee is not totally illegal or in breach of the established rules and regulations governing such recruitment.” 24. In Mohd Ashif (supra), Apex Court upheld termination of the employees working as Primary Health Worker after a decade and half, observing that their appointments were not made in accordance with Rules and also by the competent authority, In para 13 and 14 of judgement, the Court said: “13. In Mohd Ashif (supra), Apex Court upheld termination of the employees working as Primary Health Worker after a decade and half, observing that their appointments were not made in accordance with Rules and also by the competent authority, In para 13 and 14 of judgement, the Court said: “13. Applying the test laid down by this Court in Uma Devi’s case (supra) and the cases referred to above, to the case at hand, there is no gainsaying that the appointments of the appellants as Primary Health Workers were totally illegal and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution which guarantee equality of opportunity to all those who were otherwise eligible for such appointments. The Chief Medical Officer who had made the appointments was not vested with the power to do so nor were the claims of other candidates eligible for appointments against the posts to which the appellants were appointed, considered. Surprisingly, the appointments had come by way of absorption of the appellants who were working as Voluntary Health Workers on a monthly honorarium of Rs. 50/- only. 14. The High Court has, in our opinion, correctly held that there was no cadre of Voluntary Health Workers who were working on an honorarium in State run dispensaries. The very nature of the appointment given to the appellants as Voluntary Health Workers was honorary in nature which entitled them to the payment of not more than Rs. 50/- per month. It is difficult to appreciate how the Chief Medical Officer could have regularized/absorbed such Voluntary Health Workers doing honorary service against the post of Primary Health Workers which carried a regular pay-scale and which could be filled only in accordance with the procedure prescribed for that purpose. The appointment of the appellants against the said posts was thus manifestly illegal and wholly undeserved to say the least. Inasmuch as these appointments came to be cancelled pursuant to the said directions no matter nearly a decade and a half later the termination could not be said to be illegal so as to warrant interference of a writ Court for reinstatement of those illegally appointed. The High Court was, in that view of the matter, justified in declining interference with the order of cancellation and dismissing the writ petitions.” 25. The High Court was, in that view of the matter, justified in declining interference with the order of cancellation and dismissing the writ petitions.” 25. In Union of India and others v. A.S. Pillai and others, JT 2010 (13) SC 7, the Apex Court referring to para 48 of judgement in Uma Devi (supra) expressed its full agreement thereto in para 18 and 19 of judgement as under: “18. In our opinion, this Court has rightly held in para 48 of the said case that: “ ......There is no Fundamental Right in those who have been employed on daily wages or temporarily or on contractual basis, to claim that they have a right to be absorbed in service. As has been held by this Court, they cannot be said to be holders of a post, since, a regular appointment could be made only by making appointments consistent with the requirements of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The right to be treated equally with the other employees employed on daily wages, cannot be extended to a claim for equal treatment with those who were regularly employed. That would be treating unequals as equals. It cannot also be relied on to claim a right to be absorbed in service even though they have never been selected in terms of the relevant recruitment rules.....”. 19. We are in respectful agreement with the aforestated judgment of this Court and in our opinion the aforestated judgment will not render any help to the petitioners because there is no separate cadre of civilian Bandsmen to which the petitioners can be absorbed. Moreover, they being part-timers, cannot be absorbed in another full time cadre. Therefore, no direction with regard to absorption of the petitioners in any cadre can be given. “ 26. In Satya Prakash and others v. State of Bihar and others, (2010) 4 SCC 179 , the Apex Court also explained para 53 of judgement in Uma Devi (supra) and in paras 8, 9, 12, 13 and 15 of the judgement said as under: “8. In Umadevi’s case (supra) this Court held that the Courts are not expected to issue any direction for absorption/regularization or permanent continuance of temporary, contractual, casual, daily-wage or ad hoc employees. This Court held that such directions issued could not be said to be in consistent with the constitutional scheme of public employment. In Umadevi’s case (supra) this Court held that the Courts are not expected to issue any direction for absorption/regularization or permanent continuance of temporary, contractual, casual, daily-wage or ad hoc employees. This Court held that such directions issued could not be said to be in consistent with the constitutional scheme of public employment. This Court held that merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent, merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by the relevant rules. In view of the law laid down by this Court, the directions sought for by the appellants cannot be granted. 9. Paragraph 53 of Umadevi’s Judgment, deals with irregular appointments (not illegal appointments). The Constitution Bench specifically referred to the judgments in State of Mysore v. S.V. Narayanappa, AIR 1967 SC 1071 and R.N. Nanjudappa v. T. Thimmiah, (1972) 1 SCC 409 . in paragraph 15 of Umadevi’s judgment as well. Let us refer to paragraphs 15 and 16 of Umadevi’s judgment in this context.” “12. ... The Constitution Bench has, therefore, clearly drawn a distinction between temporary employees, daily-wagers and those who were appointed irregularly in the sense that there was non-compliance of some procedure in the selection process which did not go to the root of the selection process. The appellants in our view will not fall in the category of the employees mentioned in paragraph 53 read with paras 15 and 16 of the Constitution Bench Judgment. 13. The above view is further reinforced when we read paragraphs 8 and 55 in Umadevi’s case, wherein similar arguments were raised but rejected by the Constitution Bench.” “15. In our view, the appellants herein would fall under the category of persons mentioned in paragraphs 8 and 55 of the judgment and not in paragraph 53 of judgment in Umadevi (supra).” 27. In our view, the appellants herein would fall under the category of persons mentioned in paragraphs 8 and 55 of the judgment and not in paragraph 53 of judgment in Umadevi (supra).” 27. In State of Rajasthan and others v. Daya Lal and others (Civil Appeals No. 486-495 of 2011) decided on 13.1.2011, the Court has culled out certain principles from the decisions of Uma Devi (supra) and its follow up and held as under: “We may at the outset refer to the following well-settled principles relating to regularization and parity in pay, relevant in the context of these appeals: (i) The High Courts, in exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution will not issue directions for regularization, absorption or permanent continuance, unless the employees claiming regularization had been appointed in pursuance of a regular recruitment in accordance with relevant rules in an open competitive process, against sanctioned vacant posts. The equality clause contained in Articles 14 and 16 should be scrupulously followed and Courts should not issue a direction for regularization of services of an employee which would be violative of constitutional scheme. While something that is irregular for want of compliance with one of the elements in the process of selection which does not go to the root of the process, can be regularized, back door entries, appointments contrary to the constitutional scheme and/or appointment of ineligible candidates cannot be regularized. (ii) Mere continuation of service by an temporary or ad hoc or daily-wage employee, under cover of some interim orders of the Court, would not confer upon him any right to be absorbed into service, as such service would be “litigious employment”. Even temporary, ad hoc or daily-wage service for a long number of years, let alone service for one or two years, will not entitle such employee to claim regularization, if he is not working against a sanctioned post. Sympathy and sentiment cannot be grounds for passing any order of regularization in the absence of a legal right. Even temporary, ad hoc or daily-wage service for a long number of years, let alone service for one or two years, will not entitle such employee to claim regularization, if he is not working against a sanctioned post. Sympathy and sentiment cannot be grounds for passing any order of regularization in the absence of a legal right. (iii) Even where a scheme is formulated for regularization with a cut off date (that is a scheme providing that persons who had put in a specified number of years of service and continuing in employment as on the cut off date), it is not possible to others who were appointed subsequent to the cut off date, to claim or contend that the scheme should be applied to them by extending the cut off date or seek a direction for framing of fresh schemes providing for successive cut off dates. (iv) Part-time employees are not entitled to seek regularization as they are not working against any sanctioned posts. There cannot be a direction for absorption, regularization or permanent continuance of part time temporary employees. (v) Part time temporary employees in Government-run institutions cannot claim parity in salary with regular employees of the Government on the principle of equal pay for equal work. Nor can employees in private employment, even if serving full time, seek parity in salary with Government employees. The right to claim a particular salary against the State must arise under a contract or under a statute. [See: Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Uma Devi, 2006 (4) SCC 1 , M. Raja v. CEERI Educational Society, Pilani, 2006 (12) SCC 636 , S.C. Chandra v. State of Jharkhand, 2007 (8) SCC 279 , Kurukshetra Central Co-operative Bank Ltd v. Mehar Chand, 2007 (15) SCC 680, and Official Liquidator v. Dayanand, 2008 10 SCC 1 ]” 28. [See: Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Uma Devi, 2006 (4) SCC 1 , M. Raja v. CEERI Educational Society, Pilani, 2006 (12) SCC 636 , S.C. Chandra v. State of Jharkhand, 2007 (8) SCC 279 , Kurukshetra Central Co-operative Bank Ltd v. Mehar Chand, 2007 (15) SCC 680, and Official Liquidator v. Dayanand, 2008 10 SCC 1 ]” 28. The exposition of law is very clear that a person, if not appointed/absorbed after following the procedure prescribed in Rules, which gives equal opportunity of employment to all eligible persons and thereby complying with Article 16 of Constitution, in absence of any statutory provision entitling such person to claim regularization, validity whereof though is doubtful, since the Apex Court has said that Article 16 constitute basic feature of Constitution and nothing can be validate which may violate Article 16, can be directed to be regularized or absorbed irrespective of length of time one has continued to work. Any other view will give a licence to some of the mischievous authorities and resourceful individuals to defeat the scheme of Constitution under Article 16 as also the process of recruitment under the Rules and thereby enter a service and grasp it for all times to come through back door. The earlier sympathy, which used to generate merely on the fact that somebody has worked for a long time has been overruled by concept that rule of law should not be allowed to be breached since only those who have some extra resources can dare to violate the law and, therefore, any consideration in their favour shall confer upon them a premium of their act of committing breach of law. This is the message handed down to us by Constitution Bench in Uma Devi (supra) and has been followed and reiterated in all the subsequent authorities. 29. Sri S.Kumar further contended that since for the last more than 12 years the petitioners have continued to work, pursuant to ex parte interim order and therefore, it would be very harsh/hard in case they are rendered unemployed as a result of dismissal of the writ petition. This Court must recognize the only factum that the petitioners have continuously worked for more than 19 years and ignoring reason and background facts on account whereof they are working, mere factum to be recognized is the length of working, so as to grant benefit of regularization to the petitioner. This Court must recognize the only factum that the petitioners have continuously worked for more than 19 years and ignoring reason and background facts on account whereof they are working, mere factum to be recognized is the length of working, so as to grant benefit of regularization to the petitioner. Reliance is placed on a single judge decision of this Court in Kunj Behari Tewari v. The District Inspector of Schools, Deoria and another, (2013) 2 UPLBEC 1128. 30. The above argument is based on the fact that pursuant to an ex parte interim order passed by this Court on 9.11.2001, petitioners have continued to work and therefore, this continuation, founded on an ex parte interim order of this Court, must result in conferment of substantial right upon petitioners to continue in service as a regular employee, even if on merits, the real issue raised in the writ petition is not decided in their favour. 31. Mere fact that an interim order was passed and incumbent continued on the post, that would not confer any benefit or cause of action to petitioner if ultimately he does not succeed in the writ petition. 32. It is well established that act of the Court shall prejudice none. The services rendered pursuant to an interim order would not give any benefit to petitioners. The effect of dismissal of writ petition is, as if no interim order was ever passed. This issue has been considered by a Division Bench of this Court (in which I was also a member) in Smt. Vijay Rani v. Regional Inspectress of Girls Schools, Region-1, Meerut and others, 2007(2) ESC 987 and the Court held as under: “An interim order passed by the Court merges with the final order and, therefore, the result brought by dismissal of the writ petition is that the interim order becomes non est. A Division Bench of this Court in Shyam Lal v. State of U.P., AIR 1968 All 139 , while considering the effect of dismissal of writ petition on interim order passed by the Court has laid down as under: “It is well-settled that an interim order merges in the final order and does not exist by itself. So the result brought about by an interim order would be non est in the eye of law if the final order grants no relief. So the result brought about by an interim order would be non est in the eye of law if the final order grants no relief. The grant of interim relief when the petition was ultimately dismissed could not have the effect to postponing implementation of the order of compulsory retirement. It must in the circumstances take effect as if there was no interim order.” 33. The same principal has been reiterated in the following cases: (A) Sri Ram Charan Das v. Pyare Lal, AIR 1975 All 280 . “In Shyam Lal v. State of U.P., AIR 1968 All 139 , a Bench of this Court has held that orders of stay of injunction are interim orders that merge in final orders passed in the proceedings. The result brought about by the interim order becomes non est in the eye of law in final order grants no relief. In this view of the matter it seems to us that the interim stay became non est and lost all the efficacy, the commissioner having upheld the permission which became effective from the date it was passed.” (B) Shyam Manohar Shukla v. State of U.P., 1986 (4) LCD 196. “It is settled law that an interim order passed in a case which is ultimately dismissed is to be treated as not having been passed at all (see Shyam Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh) Lucknow, AIR 1968 All 139 and Sri Ram Charan Das v. Pyare Lal, AIR 1975 All 280 (DB).” © Kanoria Chemicals & Industries Ltd. v. U.P. State Electricity Board, AIR 1994 All 273 . “After the dismissal of the writ petitions wherein notification dated 21.4.1990 was stayed, the result brought about by the interim orders staying the notification, became non est in the eye of law and lost all its efficacy and the notification became effective from the beginning.” 34. About the benefit, one may come across, founded on interim order, the Court in Raghvendra Rao etc. v. State of Karnataka and others, JT 2009 (2) SC 520, has observed: “It is now a well-settled principle of law that merely because an employee had continued under cover of an order of Court, he would not be entitled to any right to be absorbed or made permanent in the service. .............” 35. v. State of Karnataka and others, JT 2009 (2) SC 520, has observed: “It is now a well-settled principle of law that merely because an employee had continued under cover of an order of Court, he would not be entitled to any right to be absorbed or made permanent in the service. .............” 35. So far as the service rendered by petitioners for long time is concerned, it is well-settled that long continuance, if the appointment has not been made strictly in accordance with law, would not confer any right upon incumbent to hold the post. The Apex Court in Shesh Mani Shukla (supra) JT 2009 (10) SC 309, held: “It is true that the appellant has worked for a long time. His appointment, however, being in contravention of the statutory provision was illegal, and, thus, void ab initio. If his appointment has not been granted approval by the statutory authority, no exception can be taken only because the appellant had worked for a long time. The same by itself, in our opinion, cannot form the basis for obtaining a writ of or in the nature of mandamus; as it is well known that for the said purpose, the writ petitioner must establish a legal right in himself and a corresponding legal duty in the State.” 36. Lastly it is contended that in some matters, some observations have been made by this Court that authorities concerned have regularized appointees like petitioners and therefore, similar benefit should be extended to them also. 37. Be that as it may, it cannot be doubted that if an illegal appointment has been made by authorities concerned, disobeying provisions, petitioners do not get a right to claim parity with such illegal act of the respondents. In Union of India and another v. Kartick Chandra Mondal and another, (2010) 2 SCC 422 , the Court has gone to the extent that even if some other persons similarly placed have been absorbed, that cannot be a basis to grant a relief by the Court which is otherwise contrary to statute. In para 25 of judgment, the Court said: “Even assuming that the similarly placed persons were ordered to be absorbed, the same if done erroneously cannot become the foundation for perpetuating further illegality. If an appointment is made illegally or irregularly, the same cannot be the basis of further appointment. In para 25 of judgment, the Court said: “Even assuming that the similarly placed persons were ordered to be absorbed, the same if done erroneously cannot become the foundation for perpetuating further illegality. If an appointment is made illegally or irregularly, the same cannot be the basis of further appointment. An erroneous decision cannot be permitted to perpetuate further error to the detriment of the general welfare of the public or a considerable section. This has been the consistent approach of this Court. However, we intend to refer to a latest decision of this Court on this point in the case of State of Bihar v. Upendra Narayan Singh and others, (2009) 5 SCC 65 , the relevant portion of which is extracted hereinbelow: “67. By now it is settled that the guarantee of equality before law enshrined in Article 14 is a positive concept and it cannot be enforced by a citizen or Court in a negative manner. If an illegality or irregularity has been committed in favour of any individual or a group of individuals or a wrong order has been passed by a judicial forum, others cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the higher or superior Court for repeating or multiplying the same irregularity or illegality or for passing wrong order ...” 38. In State of Karnataka and others v. Gadilingappa and others, (2010) 2 SCC 728 , the Court reiterated that it is well-settled principal of law that even if a mistake is committed in an earlier case, the same cannot be allowed to be perpetuated. 39. It is well-settled that if a wrong has been committed by the respondents in respect to some other persons, that will not provide a cause of action to claim parity on the ground of equal treatment since the equality in law under Article 14 is applicable for claiming parity in respect to legal and authorized acts. Two wrongs will not make one right. The Apex Court in the case of State of Bihar and others v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh and another, AIR 2000 SC 2306 ; Union of India and another v. International Trading Co. and another, AIR 2003 SC 3983 ; Lalit Mohan Pandey v. Pooran Singh and others, AIR 2004 SC 2303 ; M/s. Anand Buttons Ltd. etc. The Apex Court in the case of State of Bihar and others v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh and another, AIR 2000 SC 2306 ; Union of India and another v. International Trading Co. and another, AIR 2003 SC 3983 ; Lalit Mohan Pandey v. Pooran Singh and others, AIR 2004 SC 2303 ; M/s. Anand Buttons Ltd. etc. v. State of Haryana and others, AIR 2005 SC 5565; and Kastha Niwarak G.S.S. Maryadit, Indore v. President, Indore Development Authority, AIR 2006 SC 1142 , has held that Article 14 has no application in such cases. 40. At this stage, I may also notice the fact that though this writ petition was connected with some other writ petitions but all have been dismissed without any question to be decided on merits. 41. It was connected with writ petitions No. 30391 of 1995, 130 of 1996 and 36270 of 1995. I have perused the record thereof. The writ petition No. 30391 of 1995, wherein interim order was passed on 30.10.1995 was ultimately dismissed as withdrawn on 23.3.2004. Writ Petition No. 130 of 1996, wherein ex parte interim order was passed on 3.1.1996 also stood dismissed as withdrawn on 10.2.2004 and Writ Petition No. 36270 of 1995, wherein ex parte interim order was passed on 13.12.1995 stood dismissed as withdrawn on 23.3.2004. The aforesaid writ petitions and their dismissal therefore, would be of no consequence so far as this writ petitioner is concerned. I am also not concerned as to what has been done by respondent authorities with the petitioners of those writ petitions since they are not before this Court. 42. In view of the aforesaid, I find no merit in the writ petition. 43. Dismissed. 44. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.