JUDGMENT : M.R. Shah, J. As both the appeals arise out of the common judgment and order and as such can be said to be cross appeals, they are disposed of by this common judgment and order. 1.1. Criminal Appeal No. 432/2011 has been preferred by the appellant-original accused challenging the impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 21.03.2011 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Surat in Sessions Case No. 244/2009 by which the learned Judge has acquitted the appellant-accused for the offence punishable under Section 304 (Part II) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as "IPC") and sentenced to undergo 5 years' RI and fine of Rs. 2000/- and in default of payment of fine, to undergo further SI of 3 months' SI. 1.2. Criminal Appeal No.1467/2011 has been preferred by the appellant State of Gujarat for enhancement of the sentence imposed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Surat in Sessions Case No.244/2009 by which while convicting the original accused for the offence punishable under Section 304(Part II) of the IPC, the learned Judge has imposed the punishment of 5 years' RI only. 2. We have heard Shri. B.C. Dave, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the original accused and Ms. C.M. Shah, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the respondent State at length. 3. At the outset Shri. B.C. Dave, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the original accused has stated at the Bar under the instructions of his client that he does not press the appeal preferred by the accused i.e. Criminal Appeal No.432/2011 and does not challenge the impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence passed by the learned Judge convicting the accused for the offence punishable under Section 304 (Part II) of the IPC and sentencing the accused to undergo 5 years' RI. Therefore, he has requested to dismiss the said appeal as not pressed as he is not challenging the impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence passed by the learned trial Court. Under the circumstances, Criminal Appeal No.432/2011 stands dismissed as not pressed so far as the conviction is concerned and the question with respect to sentence shall be considered herein after while considering the Criminal Appeal No.1467/2011, which has been preferred by the State of Gujarat for enhancement of sentence imposed by the learned trial Court. Under the circumstances, Criminal Appeal No.432/2011 stands dismissed as not pressed so far as the conviction is concerned and the question with respect to sentence shall be considered herein after while considering the Criminal Appeal No.1467/2011, which has been preferred by the State of Gujarat for enhancement of sentence imposed by the learned trial Court. 4. Ms. Chetna M. Shah, learned APP appearing on behalf of the respondent State of Gujarat of Criminal Appeal No. 432/2011 and appellant of Criminal Appeal No.1467/2011 has submitted that as the impugned judgment and order of conviction passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge is not challenged by the accused, she is not making any further submissions on merits. However, has requested to consider the Criminal Appeal No. 1467/2011 on merits, which has been preferred by the State for enhancement of the sentence imposed by the learned trial Court. 4.1. Ms. Shah, learned APP has submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case the learned Judge has materially erred in imposing the sentence of 5 years' RI only. It is submitted that as such the accused has been convicted for the offence punishable under Section 304(Part II) of the IPC and the maximum punishment which can be imposed under section 304(Part II) of the IPC is of 10 years RI. It is submitted that the learned Judge has materially erred in not imposing maximum punishment of 10 years. It is submitted that learned Judge has not exercised the discretion judiciously and judicially while imposing the appropriate punishment. 4.2. It is submitted by Ms. Shah, learned APP that considering the fact that accused was having a knife and in fact he used the same in committing offence and because of the knife blow given by the accused, the deceased sustained injury and subsequently he succumbed to the injury and died, the learned Judge ought to have imposed the maximum punishment provided under the Statute. It is further submitted that looking to the age of the deceased i.e. 35 years at the time of incident, the learned Judge ought to have imposed maximum punishment which is provided under the Statute. It is further submitted that looking to the age of the deceased i.e. 35 years at the time of incident, the learned Judge ought to have imposed maximum punishment which is provided under the Statute. It is submitted that as such for a meagre amount which was due and payable by the accused to the deceased and due to the said dispute the accused used the knife and caused the injury by knife on the deceased due to which deceased succumbed to the injury, the learned Judge ought to have imposed maximum of 10 years RI. It is submitted that the learned Judge has materially erred in showing undue sympathy to the accused while imposing punishment of 5 years' RI. 4.3. It is further submitted by Ms. Shah, learned APP appearing on behalf of the State that no cogent reasons have been assigned by the learned Judge while imposing punishment of 5 years' RI only and not imposing maximum punishment of 10 years as provided under Section 304(Part II) of the IPC. It is submitted that while imposing the sentence/punishment of 5 years' RI, the learned Judge has considered the age of the accused i.e. 26 years and that he has aged parents. It is submitted that however, the learned Judge has not considered the age of the deceased and the fact that even the family members of the deceased and the fact that even the family members of the deceased have lost him. It is submitted that the learned Judge has not considered the plight of the family members of the deceased at all. Under the circumstances, it is requested to enhance the sentence and impose maximum punishment of 10 years' RI as provided under Section 304(Part II) of the IPC and consequently to allow Criminal Appeal No.1467/2011. In support of her above submissions, Ms. Shah, learned APP has relied upon the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of M.P. v. Bala alias Balaram reported in (2005)8 SCC 1 as well as in the case of Adu Ram v. Mukna and Others reported in (2005)10 SCC 597 . 5. In support of her above submissions, Ms. Shah, learned APP has relied upon the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of M.P. v. Bala alias Balaram reported in (2005)8 SCC 1 as well as in the case of Adu Ram v. Mukna and Others reported in (2005)10 SCC 597 . 5. While opposing Criminal Appeal No.1467/2011, Shri. B.C. Dave, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the original accused has vehemently submitted that as such and in the facts and circumstances of the case, the learned Judge has not committed any error in imposing the punishment of 5 years' RI. It is submitted that considering the fact that the blow given by the accused was not on the vital part of the body of the deceased and it was on the leg and as such there was no intention of the accused to kill the deceased, the learned Judge has rightly exercised the discretion and has exercised the discretion judiciously and has rightly not imposed the maximum punishment of 10 years' RI. It is submitted that while imposing the punishment of 5 years' RI, the learned Judge has properly applied the mind i.e. the age of accused and old aged parents of the accused and consequently has rightly imposed the punishment/sentence of 5 years' RI. 5.1. It is further submitted by Shri. B.C. Dave, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the original accused that as such while imposing the punishment of 5 years' RI, the learned has exercised the discretion judiciously and has given cogent reasons, which are not required to be interfered by this Court. However, he has submitted that in case if this Court is inclined to enhance the sentence imposed by the learned trial Court, the sentence may be enhanced to 6 years' RI only. It is submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case, if the sentence/punishment is enhanced to 6 years' RI, it will be just and proper and commensurate with the offence committed by the accused. 5.2. It is further submitted by Shri. B.C. Dave, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the original accused that at present accused is aged about 31 years and has recently married and his wife is pregnant, it is requested not to impose the sentence of more than 6 years' RI. 6. 5.2. It is further submitted by Shri. B.C. Dave, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the original accused that at present accused is aged about 31 years and has recently married and his wife is pregnant, it is requested not to impose the sentence of more than 6 years' RI. 6. Heard the learned advocates appearing on behalf of respective parties at length. At the outset it is required to be noted and as recorded herein above, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the original accused has not pressed Criminal Appeal No. 432/2011 and as such not pressed the impugned judgment and order of conviction passed by the learned trial Court convicting the accused for the offence punishable under Section 304 (Part II) of the IPC. Under the circumstances, this Court is not required to consider the legality and validity of the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned trial Court convicting the original accused for the offence punishable under Section 304(Part II) of the IPC. Therefore, this Court is required to consider the Criminal Appeal No.1467/2011 preferred by the State for enhancement of the sentence imposed by the learned trial Court while convicting the accused for the offence punishable under Section 304(Part II) of the IPC. While convicting the accused for the offence punishable under Section 304(Part II) of the IPC, the learned Judge has imposed the punishment/sentence of 5 years' RI and fine of Rs. 2000/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo further 3 months' SI. Maximum punishment which can be imposed for the offence punishable under Section 304(Part II) of IPC is 10 years' RI. Therefore, this Court is required to consider whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the learned Judge has committed any error in imposing the punishment/sentence of 5 years' RI only with fine of Rs. 2000/- and in default of payment of fine, to undergo 3 months' SI? 6.1. At the outset it is required to be noted that the accused has committed the offence punishable under Section 304 (Part II) of the IPC and for which he has been convicted. 2000/- and in default of payment of fine, to undergo 3 months' SI? 6.1. At the outset it is required to be noted that the accused has committed the offence punishable under Section 304 (Part II) of the IPC and for which he has been convicted. It has come on record that some amount was due and payable by the accused to the deceased and when the deceased asked for the said amount, instead of returning the amount, the accused started quarreling and inflicted the knife blow on the deceased and thereafter the deceased succumbed to the injury and died. It has come on record that the accused was having the knife from the very beginning which he subsequently used when the deceased asked the amount which was due and payable to him. Thus, the accused was keeping the knife with him which he actually used. This shows that the accused was having a criminal mind. 6.2. Now, so far as the submission on behalf of the accused that the accused did not cause the injury on the vital part of the body of the deceased and the knife blows were on the leg and therefore, there was no intention to kill the deceased and therefore, lenient view should be taken is concerned, it is required to be noted that as per the eyewitness as the deceased moved, he sustained the injuries on leg however, the intention of the accused was to cause the injury on the abdomen. Be that as it may, the fact remains that because of the injuries sustained by the deceased, which was caused by the accused by knife, the deceased had died. 6.3. From the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned trial Court and imposing the punishment of 5 years' RI only, it appears that what has weighed with the learned Judge is young age of the accused and that the accused has old aged parents. No other reasons have been assigned. However, while imposing the punishment/sentence the learned Judge has not considered the age of the deceased and the plight of the family members of the deceased. At the relevant time the deceased was aged about 32 years and he also had family members. Because of the untimely death of the deceased, his family members have suffered a lot. However, while imposing the punishment/sentence the learned Judge has not considered the age of the deceased and the plight of the family members of the deceased. At the relevant time the deceased was aged about 32 years and he also had family members. Because of the untimely death of the deceased, his family members have suffered a lot. Thus, according to us while imposing the punishment/sentence of 5 years' RI only and fine of Rs. 2000/- only, the learned Judge has not exercised the discretion judiciously and judicially. In the case of Aduram (Supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered the question with respect to imposition of "appropriate sentence" and proportionality of sentence. In paras 11 to 16, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed and held as under: "11. The law regulates social interests, arbitrates conflicting claims and demands. Security of persons and property of the people is an essential function of the State. It could be achieved through instrumentality of criminal law. Undoubtedly, there is a cross cultural conflict where living law must find answer to the new challenges and the Courts are required to mould the sentencing system to meet the challenges. The contagion of lawlessness would undermine social order and lay it in ruins. Protection of society and stamping out criminal proclivity must be the object of law which must be achieved by imposing appropriate sentence. Therefore, law as a cornerstone of the edifice of "order" should meet the challenges confronting the society. Friedman in his Law in Changing Society stated that: "State of criminal law continues to be as it should be a decisive reflection of social consciousness of society". Therefore, in operating the sentencing system, law should adopt the corrective machinery or the deterrence based on factual matrix. By deft modulation sentencing process be stern where it should be, and tempered with mercy where it warrants to be. The facts and given circumstances in each case, the nature of the crime, the manner in which it was planned and committed, the motive for commission of the crime, the conduct of the accused, the nature of weapons used and all other attending circumstances were relevant facts which would enter into the area of consideration. For instance a murder committed due to deep-seated mutual and personal rivalry may not call for penalty of death. For instance a murder committed due to deep-seated mutual and personal rivalry may not call for penalty of death. But an organised crime or mass murders of innocent people would call for imposition of death sentence as deterrence. In Mahesh v. State of M.P., this Court while refusing to reduce the death sentence observed thus: (SCC p.82, para 6) "It will be a mockery of justice to permit the accused to escape the extreme penalty of law when faced with such evidence and such cruel acts. To give the lesser punishment for the accused would be to render the justicing system of the country suspect. The common man will lose faith in courts. In such cases, he understands and appreciates the language of deterrence more than the reformative jargon." 12. Therefore, undue sympathy to impose inadequate sentence would do more harm to the justice system to undermine the public confidence in the efficacy of law and society could not long endure under such serious threats. It is, therefore, the duty of every Court to award proper sentence having regard to the nature of the offence and the manner in which it was executed or committed etc. This position was illuminatingly stated by this Court in Sevaka Perumal etc. v. State of T.N. 13. Criminal law adheres in general to the principle of proportionality in prescribing liability according to the culpability of each kind of criminal conduct. It ordinarily allows some significant discretion to the Judge in arriving at a sentence in each case, presumably to permit sentences that reflect more subtle considerations of culpability that are raised by the special facts of each case. Judges in essence affirm that punishment ought always to fit the crime; yet in practice sentences are determined largely by other considerations. Sometimes it is the correctional needs of the perpetrator that are offered to justify a sentence. Sometimes the desirability of keeping him out of circulation, and sometimes even the tragic results of his crime. Inevitably these considerations cause a departure from just desert as the basis of punishment and create cases of apparent injustice that are serious and widespread. 14. Proportion between crime and punishment is a goal respected in principle, and in spite of errant notions, it remains a strong influence in the determination of sentences. Inevitably these considerations cause a departure from just desert as the basis of punishment and create cases of apparent injustice that are serious and widespread. 14. Proportion between crime and punishment is a goal respected in principle, and in spite of errant notions, it remains a strong influence in the determination of sentences. The practice of punishing all serious crimes with equal severity is now unknown in civilised societies, but such a radical departure from the principle of proportionality has disappeared from the law only in recent times. Even now for a single grave infraction drastic sentences are imposed. Anything less than a penalty of greatest severity for any serious crime is thought then to be a measure of toleration that is unwarranted and unwise. But in fact, quite apart from those considerations that make punishment unjustifiable when it is out of proportion to the crime, uniformly disproportionate punishment has some very undesirable practical consequences. 15. After giving due consideration to the facts and circumstances of each case, for deciding just and appropriate sentence to be awarded for an offence, the aggravating and mitigating factors and circumstances in which a crime has been committed are to be delicately balanced on the basis of really relevant circumstances in a dispassionate manner by the Court. Such act of balancing is indeed a difficult task. It has been very aptly indicated in Dennis Councle Mc. Gautha v. State of California that no formula of a foolproof nature is possible that would provide a reasonable criterion in determining a just and appropriate, punishment in the infinite variety of circumstances that may affect the gravity of the crime. In the absence of any foolproof formula which may provide any basis for reasonable criteria to correctly assess various circumstances germane to the consideration of gravity of crime, the discretionary judgment in the facts of each case, is the only way in which such judgment may be equitably distinguished. 16. Imposition of sentence without considering its effect on the social order in many cases may be in reality a futile exercise. The social impact of the crime, e.g. where it relates to offences against women, dacoity, kidnapping, misappropriation of public money, treason and other offences involving moral turpitude or moral delinquency which have great impact on social order, and public interest, cannot be lost sight of and per se require exemplary treatment. The social impact of the crime, e.g. where it relates to offences against women, dacoity, kidnapping, misappropriation of public money, treason and other offences involving moral turpitude or moral delinquency which have great impact on social order, and public interest, cannot be lost sight of and per se require exemplary treatment. Any liberal attitude by imposing meagre sentences or taking too sympathetic view merely on account of lapse of time in respect of such offences will be result-wise counterproductive in the long run and against societal interest which needs to be cared for and strengthened by string of deterrence inbuilt in the sentencing system." In the case of Bala alias Balaram (Supra) also, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has stressed on imposing the "appropriate sentence". In paras 12 to 17, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed and held as under: "12. The punishments prescribed by the Penal Code reflect the legislative recognition of the social needs, the gravity of the concerned offence, its impact on the society and what the legislature considers as a punishment suitable for the particular offence. It is necessary for the courts to imbibe that legislative wisdom and to respect it. 13. The rationale for advocating the award of a punishment commensurate with the gravity of the offence and its impact on society, is to ensure that a civilised society does not revert to the days of 'an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth'. Not awarding a just punishment might provoke the victim or its relatives to retaliate in kind and that is what exactly is sought to be prevented by the criminal justice system we have adopted. 14. Even in the time of Kautilya, the need for awarding just punishment was recognized. According to Kautilya, "whoever imposes severe punishment becomes repulsive to people, while he who awards mild punishment becomes contemptible. The ruler just with the rod is honoured. When deserved punishment is given, it endows the subjects with spiritual good, material well being and pleasures of the senses." (See Kautilyan Jurisprudence by V.K. Gupta under the head "Nature and Scope of punishment"). This philosophy is woven into our statute and our jurisprudence and it is the duty of those who administer the law to bear this in mind. 15. This philosophy is woven into our statute and our jurisprudence and it is the duty of those who administer the law to bear this in mind. 15. This Court has on a number of occasions indicated that the punishment must fit the crime and that it is the duty of the court to impose a proper punishment depending on the degree of criminality and desirability for imposing such punishment. In Earabhadrappa v. State of Karnataka this Court observed: (SCC p. 341, para 14) "A sentence or pattern of sentence which fails to take due account of the gravity of the offence can seriously undermine respect for law. It is the duty of the court to impose a proper punishment depending upon the degree of criminality and desirability to impose such punishment as a measure of social necessity as a means of deterring other potential offenders." In Rajendra Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh Justice Sen stated: (SCC p.708, 195), "Judges are entitled to hold their own views, but it is the bounden duty of the Court to impose a proper punishment, depending upon the degree of criminality and the desirability to impose such punishment as a measure of social necessity, as a means of deterring other potential offenders." 16. It is not necessary to multiply authorities. In a recent decision in State of M.P. v. Munna Choubey and Another, this question has again been dealt with. This Court observed: (SCC p.716, para 15) "15. Imposition of sentence without considering its effect on the social order in many cases may be in reality a futile exercise. The social impact of the crime e.g. where it relates to offences against women, dacoity, kidnapping, misappropriation of public money, treason and other offences involving moral turpitude or moral delinquency which have great impact on social order and public interest, cannot be lost sight of and per se require exemplary treatment. Any liberal attitude by imposing meagre sentence or taking too sympathetic view merely on account of lapse of time in respect of such offences will be result-wise counterproductive in the long run and against societal interest which needs to be cared for an strengthened by string of deterrence inbuilt in the sentencing system." 17. Any liberal attitude by imposing meagre sentence or taking too sympathetic view merely on account of lapse of time in respect of such offences will be result-wise counterproductive in the long run and against societal interest which needs to be cared for an strengthened by string of deterrence inbuilt in the sentencing system." 17. It is true that reformation as a theory of punishment is in fashion but under the guise of applying such theory, courts cannot forget their duty to society and to the victim. The Court has to consider the plight of the victim in a case involving rape and the social stigma that may follow the victim to the grave and which in most cases, practically ruins all prospects of a normal life for the victim. Could a Court afford to forget these aspects while imposing a punishment on the aggressor? I think not. The Court has to do justice to the society and to the victim on the one hand and to the offender on the other. The proper balance must be taken to have been stuck by the legislature. Hence, the legislative wisdom reflected by the statute has to be respected by the Court and the permitted departure therefrom made only for compelling and convincing reasons." Considering the aforesaid decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court with respect to imposing the appropriate punishment and considering the facts of the case on hand, we are of the opinion that the imposition of punishment and sentence of 5 years' RI and the fine of Rs. 2000/- only cannot be said to be commensurate with the offence committed by the accused. The manner in which the offence has been committed by the accused by using the knife causing the injury on the deceased due to which ultimately the deceased succumbed to the injury and even the age of the deceased and the plight of the family members of the deceased, we are of the opinion that if the sentence of 7 years' RI is imposed, it will be just and proper and commensurate with the offence committed by the accused. 6.4. 6.4. Now, so far as the submission on behalf of the accused that the accused has recently married and his wife is pregnant is concerned, it is required to be noted that the accused has recently married while he was released on temporary bail and by that time he had undergone approximately only 2 years' RI. Therefore, as such the accused and his wife were knowing that the accused has been convicted and is required to undergo further sentence. Therefore, as such the accused and his wife have created such a situation. Under the circumstances, on the aforesaid ground, lesser punishment cannot be imposed. 7. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid two decisions on imposing "appropriate punishment/sentence", Criminal Appeal No. 1467/2011 preferred by the State for enhancement of the sentence succeeds in part. Impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 21.03.2011 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Surat in Sessions Case No. 244/2009 is hereby modified to the extent and insofar as imposing the punishment/sentence is concerned and instead of sentence of 5 years' RI, while convicting the accused for the offence punishable under Section 304(Part II) of the IPC, the accused is directed to undergo 7 years' RI with fine of Rs. 2000/- and in default of payment of fine, to undergo further 3 months' SI. Criminal Appeal No. 1467/2011 is allowed to the aforesaid extent and as stated herein above, Criminal Appeal No. 432/2011 is dismissed as not pressed. Appeal partly allowed.