JUDGMENT 1. The petitioners in Crl.R.C.Nos. 8 and 9 of 2009 are the accused Nos. 1 and 4 in C.C.No.10403 of 1995 on the file of the II Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore. The respondents 2 and 3 in both revision cases are the Prosecution Witnesses 2 and 4 in the said case before the lower Court. The said case was instituted by way of a private complaint by the first respondent/Labour Welfare Officer alleging that the petitioners herein and the other accused had committed an offence punishable under Section 29 of the "Industrial Disputes Act". The first petitioner/accused No.1 was the Director of a Company known as, "Addison Paints & Chemicals Limited", which is a Company governed by the Companies Act. The second petitioner/accused No.4 is the then Vice-President of the said Company. One Mr. Arjunan, yet another Director of the Company, was the second accused; one Mr. Sundaram, the then President of the Company, was the third accused; and one Mr. Suresh, the Chief Manager of the Company, was the fifth accused. Thus, altogether, there were five accused including the petitioners herein in these revision cases. 2. According to the case of the prosecution, in I.D.No.83 of 1984 on the file of the Industrial Tribunal, Chennai, the Tribunal had passed an award directing the "Addison Paints & Chemicals Limited" to pay Dearness Allowance and House Rent Allowance to the workmen and also to implement Settlements under Section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, dated 24.04.1985 and 21.06.1990. The said award dated 31.12.1992 was notified. Still, the Company did not comply with the said award. With the said allegation, the Association of Addison Paints & Chemicals Limited made a representation to the Government on 05.10.1994 requesting the Government to launch prosecution against the Company and others. Based on the said representation and the report of the Deputy Commissioner of Labour-I and the Commissioner of Labour, the Government issued G.O.(D) No.1320 Labour and Employment Department, dated 07.11.1995, authorizing the Inspector of Labour, IIIrd Circle, Chennai, to file a private complaint against all the accused. In the said Government Order, there was no authorisation to prefer a private complaint against the Company. The said Government Order was issued by the Government in exercise of its power under Section 34(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act. In the said Government Order, there was no authorisation to prefer a private complaint against the Company. The said Government Order was issued by the Government in exercise of its power under Section 34(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The offence said to have been committed by the petitioners, according to the Government Order, is punishable under Section 29 of the Industrial Disputes Act. In pursuance of the said authorisation, the Inspector of Labour, IIIrd Circle, Chennai, filed a private complaint before the II Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, upon which the learned Magistrate took cognizance in C.C.No.10403 of 1995 for the offence under Section 29 of the Industrial Disputes Act. On service of summons, all the accused appeared before the learned Magistrate and contested the case. 3. During the course of trial, on the side of the prosecution as many as four witnesses were examined and they were all cross-examined by the accused. When the accused were questioned under Section 313 Cr.P.C., they disputed the incriminating materials. On their side, they examined two witnesses. During the course of trial, the second accused viz., Arjunan, died. Finally, the trial Court, by judgment dated 18.08.2003, found all the accused, except Mr. Arjunan, guilty of the offence under Section 29 of the Industrial Disputes Act and accordingly, imposed a punishment of fine of Rs.1,000/- each, in default to undergo one week simple imprisonment each. Challenging the said conviction and sentence, the petitioners/ accused Nos. 1 and 4 filed an appeal in Crl.A.No.289 of 2003 on the file of the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court-I, Chennai. Seeking enhancement of punishment, the respondents 2 and 3 herein filed a revision case in Crl.R.C.No.1442 of 2003 before this Court. Since, this Court felt that the said revision case should also be heard by the Court, which was hearing the Criminal Appeal against the judgment of conviction and sentence, this Court transferred the said revision case to the file of the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court-I, Chennai. Accordingly, the same was renumbered as Crl.R.C.No.34 of 2005. 4. Both the Criminal Revision case as well as the Appeal were heard together by one and the same judge. By judgment dated 06.02.2008, the lower Appellate Court dismissed the appeal in Crl.A.No.289 of 2003. Accordingly, the same was renumbered as Crl.R.C.No.34 of 2005. 4. Both the Criminal Revision case as well as the Appeal were heard together by one and the same judge. By judgment dated 06.02.2008, the lower Appellate Court dismissed the appeal in Crl.A.No.289 of 2003. So far as the revision case in Crl.R.C.No.34 of 2005 is concerned, the lower Court, by a separate judgment, allowed the same and enhanced the sentence of fine from Rs.1,000/- each to Rs.5,000/-each, in default, to undergo simple imprisonment for two weeks each. The amount of Rs.1,000/- already paid as per the order of the trial Court was ordered to be adjusted. Challenging the judgment enhancing the sentence of fine made in Crl.R.C.No.34 of 2005, the petitioners/accused Nos. 1 and 4 have come up with Crl.R.C.No.8 of 2009. Similarly, challenging the dismissal of Crl.A.No. 289 of 2003, the petitioners/accused Nos. 1 and 4 have come up with Crl.R.C.No.9 of 2009. That is how, these two Criminal Revision cases are before me for disposal. 5. The respondents 2 and 3 in the Criminal Revision cases, who are the Prosecution Witnesses 2 and 4 have come up with Crl.O.P.No.8025 of 2008 under Section 482 Cr.P.C. challenging the order made in Crl.R.C.No. 34 of 2005. In this Criminal Original Petition, the petitioners therein have prayed for enhancement of sentence of fine from Rs.5,000/-. That is how, the said Criminal Original Petition is also before me for disposal. 6. When these matters came up for hearing before me on 29.03.2010, I had a doubt as to, whether the learned Sessions Judge had jurisdiction to try the Crl.R.C.No.34 of 2005, seeking enhancement of sentence. Therefore, I referred the following question for decision by a Division Bench. The question was, "Whether the Court of Sessions has got power to entertain a revision for enhancement of sentence ?" 7. A Division Bench of this Court, on considering the said reference, by order dated 19.04.2012, has answered the question as follows:- "The Court of Sessions has got power to entertain a revision for enhancement of sentence." 8. After the above answer by the Division Bench, now all the matters have been listed before me for disposal as specially ordered. In all these cases, since common issues are involved, they were heard together and disposed of by means of this common judgment/order. I have heard Mr. A.Ramesh, the learned senior counsel appearing for accused Nos. After the above answer by the Division Bench, now all the matters have been listed before me for disposal as specially ordered. In all these cases, since common issues are involved, they were heard together and disposed of by means of this common judgment/order. I have heard Mr. A.Ramesh, the learned senior counsel appearing for accused Nos. 1 and 4; Mr. S.Shanmuga Velayutham, the learned Public Prosecutor, appearing for the first respondent/State in the Criminal Revision cases; and Mr. K.M. Ramesh, learned counsel appearing for the Prosecution Witnesses 2 and 4. I have also perused the records carefully. 9. For the sake of easy reference, the parties are hereinafter referred as per their rank in the Criminal Revision cases. 10. Mr. A.Ramesh, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners/ accused Nos. 1 and 4, among other grounds, would mainly focus his argument on the ground that as per Section 32 of the Industrial Disputes Act, when a person committing an offence is a Company, there cannot be a prosecution only against the Directors and other persons responsible for the Management, in the absence of the Company being arrayed as an accused. In order to substantiate his contention, the learned Senior Counsel has relied on a recent judgment of a Full Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Aneeta Hada vs. Godfather Travels & Tours (P) Limited, reported in (2012) 5 Supreme Court Cases 661. 11. In the said case before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the primary question, which came up for consideration was, when the person committing an offence is a Company, whether prosecution of the Directors and other persons responsible for the Management, without arraying the Company as an accused, is maintainable ?". In paragraph No.3 of the said judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has framed the question as follows:- "3. The core issue that has emerged in these two appeals is whether the Company could have been made liable for prosecution without being impleaded as an accused and whether the Directors could have been prosecuted for offences punishable under the aforesaid provisions without the Company being arrayed as an accused." 12. Before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the consideration was in respect of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, which reads as follows:- "141. Before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the consideration was in respect of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, which reads as follows:- "141. Offences by companies.--(1) If the person committing an offence under Section 138 is a company, every person who, at the time the offence was committed, was incharge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly: Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any person liable to punishment if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge, or that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence: [Provided further that where a person is nominated as a Director of a company by virtue of his holding any office or employment in the Central Government or State Government or a financial corporation owned or controlled by the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, he shall not be liable for prosecution under this Chapter.] (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where any offence under this Act has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to, any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. Explanation.--For the purposes of this section, -- (a) "company" means any body corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals; and (b) "director", in relation to a firm, means a partner in the firm." 13. Admittedly, in the said case before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the Company was not made as an accused. The persons responsible for the Company alone were made as accused. But, in the trial of the case a finding was recorded that the Company had committed the offence and therefore, the persons responsible for the day-to-day affairs of the Company should also be punished. Accordingly, the Directors were punished. The persons responsible for the Company alone were made as accused. But, in the trial of the case a finding was recorded that the Company had committed the offence and therefore, the persons responsible for the day-to-day affairs of the Company should also be punished. Accordingly, the Directors were punished. The argument before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was that the Company had been indicted without affording any opportunity and without any prosecution. This was against the fair procedure to be afforded. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, after having made a scientific analysis of a number of earlier judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, ultimately held that a Company cannot be indicted, either expressly or impliedly, without arraying the Company as an accused and without affording sufficient opportunity to the Company to defend the charges. By holding so, the Hon'ble Supreme Court acquitted the Directors of the Company, because, the finding recorded against the Company is non est in the eye of law. When the finding that the Company is guilty goes, then, automatically, the conviction against the other persons responsible for the Company should also go. It was on this legal principle, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, ultimately, acquitted the persons responsible for the Company by setting aside the conviction, because the Company was not arrayed as an accused. Applying the said dictum laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the instant case, according to the learned senior counsel, the accused are entitled for acquittal. 14. But, Mr. K.M. Ramesh, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents 2 and 3/Prosecution Witnesses 2 and 4 would submit that there is a basic difference between Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and Section 32 of the Industrial Disputes Act. Section 32 of the Industrial Disputes Act, reads as follows:- "32. Offence by companies, etc.--Where a person committing an offence under this Act is a company, or other body corporate, or an association of persons (whether incorporated or not), every director, manager, secretary, agent or other officer or person concerned with the management thereof shall, unless he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge or consent, he deemed to be guilty of such offence." 15. Making a comparison of the language used in these two provisions, the learned counsel would contend that so far as Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is concerned, the said provision states that the persons responsible "as well as the Company" are liable to be punished. The learned counsel would point out that the phrase, "as well as the Company" is found missing in Section 32 of the Industrial Disputes Act and therefore, according to the learned counsel, the said judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court cannot be made applicable to the facts of the present case. 16. But, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners would submit that this aspect was also considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment in Anneta Hada's case (cited supra). He would submit that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in paragraph No.58 that the phrase, "as well as the Company" appearing in the Section makes it absolutely and unmistakably clear that if the Company is prosecuted, then only the persons mentioned in the other categories could be vicariously liable for the offence subject to the averments in the petition and proof thereof. 17. Thus, according to the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners the basic question is, whether the Company could be indicted, without affording an opportunity to the Company, and without making the Company as an accused. Therefore, according to the learned Senior Counsel, it is immaterial whether the phrase "as well as the Company" is incorporated in the provision or not. He would further submit that out of 239 Central Acts (which he has enumerated in the list of Acts produced for the perusal of this Court), where there are provisions like Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, only in seven enactments, the phrase "as well as the Company" is found missing. In all the other enactments, the said expression is found. However, the learned Senior Counsel would submit that it makes no difference at all. Therefore, according to the learned Senior Counsel, as per the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the revision petitioners are entitled for acquittal. 18. In all the other enactments, the said expression is found. However, the learned Senior Counsel would submit that it makes no difference at all. Therefore, according to the learned Senior Counsel, as per the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the revision petitioners are entitled for acquittal. 18. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents 2 and 3 would submit that before the commencement of trial before the learned Magistrate, the revision petitioners herein along with two other accused filed Crl.O.P.No.21668 of 1998 under Section 482 Cr.P.C., seeking to quash the proceedings on the ground that the prosecution of these petitioners alone, in the absence of the Company, was not maintainable. The learned counsel would further submit that the said Criminal Original Petition was dismissed by this Court by order dated 10.09.1999 holding that the prosecution of the Directors of the Company and other persons responsible for the same in the absence of prosecution of the Company is still maintainable. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, the contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the revision petitioners is not sustainable. 19. Mr. S.Shanmuga Velayutham, the learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the first respondent/State would submit that the arguments advanced by Mr. K.M. Ramesh, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents 2 and 3 need to be accepted and the conviction and sentence imposed by the lower Appellate Court should be confirmed. 20. I have considered the above submissions. 21. At the outset, I should state that fair trial, in any Criminal Case, is guaranteed as a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The principles of natural justice have also been declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, as a facet of the said fair trial. Fair trial to an accused in a criminal case assures a procedure, which gives no room for arbitrariness. Article 14 of the Constitution shall stand violated, if any finding touching upon the dignity or the reputation of a person is recorded arbitrarily without hearing. It has been so held in a number of judgments, more particularly in Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India and another, reported in (1978) 1 SCC 248 . Fair trial, as guaranteed under the Constitution of India should not be an empty formality or a farcical event. It has been so held in a number of judgments, more particularly in Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India and another, reported in (1978) 1 SCC 248 . Fair trial, as guaranteed under the Constitution of India should not be an empty formality or a farcical event. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has impressed upon, on several occasions, that fair trial to be afforded to an accused should be real in its spirit. The principle, no one could be condemned without being heard by affording sufficient opportunity applies to artificial juristic persons also. With this basic principle inbuilt in the Constitution of India as fundamental rights, let us have a further analysis of the law involved in this case. 22. Admittedly, in this case, the award of the Industrial Tribunal was not against any individual. It was only against the Company, viz., "Addisons Paints & Chemicals Limited". The award should have been satisfied only by the Company. If the Company has not satisfied the award, then the person committing the offence is the Company. In Criminal Law, in general, there is no vicarious liability, unless, there is a specific provision made creating such vicarious liability on any other person other than the person, who actually committed the crime. So far as Industrial Disputes Act is concerned, Section 32 is the provision, which creates vicarious liability on the persons enumerated therein for the offence committed by the company. 23. A Company is an artificial person and since such artificial person is a juristic person, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, on several occasions has held that the Company can be prosecuted and punished for the offence committed by the Company. At this juncture, it is pertinent to refer to a judgment of this Court in Abraham Memorial Educational Trust vs. C.Suresh Babu, reported in 2012 (5) CTC 203 ,following the judgment of a Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Standard Chartered Bank v. Directorate of Enforcement, reported in (2005) 4 SCC 530 . In the said case the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider whether a body Corporate can be prosecuted and punished for criminal offences. In paragraph Nos.6 and 31, the Constitution Bench has held as follows:- "6. There is no dispute that a company is liable to be prosecuted and punished for criminal offences. In the said case the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider whether a body Corporate can be prosecuted and punished for criminal offences. In paragraph Nos.6 and 31, the Constitution Bench has held as follows:- "6. There is no dispute that a company is liable to be prosecuted and punished for criminal offences. Although there are earlier authorities to the effect that corporations cannot commit a crime, the generally accepted modern rule is that except for such crimes as a corporation is held incapable of committing by reason of the fact that they involve personal malicious intent, a corporation may be subject to indictment or other criminal process, although the criminal act is committed through its agents. 31. As the company cannot be sentenced to imprisonment, the court cannot impose that punishment, but when imprisonment and fine is the prescribed punishment the court can impose the punishment of fine which could be enforced against the company. Such a discretion is to be read into the section so far as the juristic person is concerned. Of course, the court cannot exercise the same discretion as regards a natural person. Then the court would not be passing the sentence in accordance with law. As regards company, the court can always impose a sentence of fine and the sentence of imprisonment can be ignored as it is impossible to be carried out in respect of a company. This appears to be the intention of the legislature and we find no difficulty in construing the statute in such a way. We do not think that there is a blanket immunity for any company from any prosecution for serious offences merely because the prosecution would ultimately entail a sentence of mandatory imprisonment.... (emphasis supplied) 24. From a reading of the above judgment, it is crystal clear that, in law, if the Company commits an offence, the Company has to be prosecuted. The Company should be given an opportunity to defend and then the Company could be punished. Since, a Company is an artificial person, who acts through human agents, the law makers have created vicarious liability by making appropriate provision for the same, thereby, making the persons, who are responsible for the day-to-day affairs of the Company, such as Managing Director, Director etc., also liable for punishment under Section 32 of the Industrial Disputes Act. Since, a Company is an artificial person, who acts through human agents, the law makers have created vicarious liability by making appropriate provision for the same, thereby, making the persons, who are responsible for the day-to-day affairs of the Company, such as Managing Director, Director etc., also liable for punishment under Section 32 of the Industrial Disputes Act. If a person committing the said offence is a Company, then, the other persons enumerated therein are also liable for punishment along with the Company. Therefore, it is a condition precedent that the Company should have been found to have committed the crime. If there is a finding that the Company has committed the crime, then only, apart from the Company, the persons, who are human agents and who are responsible for the commission of the Crime by the Company should also be held liable for punishment. In the absence of any such finding against the Company, there cannot be any vicarious liability on the persons enumerated in Section 32 of the Industrial Disputes Act. Therefore, as has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decision cited supra, it is absolutely necessary that there has to be a finding that the Company had committed the offence and accordingly, the Company should be punished. While doing so, the persons enumerated in Section 32 of the Industrial Disputes Act can also be punished by invoking the enabling provision contained in Section 32 of the Industrial Disputes Act. 25. As I have already pointed out, no one can be condemned, without affording sufficient opportunity to defend, which means, a Company can be punished for any offence committed under the Industrial Disputes Act only by arraying the Company as an accused and after affording opportunity to the said Company. Without making the Company as an accused and without affording any opportunity to the Company, if any finding is recorded by any Court holding the Company guilty of any offence, it will be arbitrary, which will be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the Criminal Court is precluded from recording any finding of guilt against the Company in the absence of the Company being arrayed as an accused and without affording opportunity to the Company. Thus, if we approach the issue by keeping in mind Article 14 of the Constitution of India, then, the argument of Mr. Therefore, the Criminal Court is precluded from recording any finding of guilt against the Company in the absence of the Company being arrayed as an accused and without affording opportunity to the Company. Thus, if we approach the issue by keeping in mind Article 14 of the Constitution of India, then, the argument of Mr. K.M. Ramesh, the learned counsel for the respondents 2 and 3 that in Section 32 of the Industrial Disputes Act, the phrase, "as well as the Company" is found missing does not merit any consideration. 26. As a matter of fact, in the judgment of the Full Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Aneeta Hada vs. Godfather Travels & Tours (P) Limited, reported in (2012) 5 Supreme Court Cases 661, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the said situation also. In paragraph Nos. 56 to 59 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has summarized the law on the subject, which reads as follows:- "56. We have referred to the aforesaid passages only to highlight that there has to be strict observance of the provisions regard being had to the legislative intendment because it deals with penal provisions and a penalty is not to be imposed affecting the rights of persons whether juristic entities or individuals, unless they are arrayed as accused. It is to be kept in mind that the power of punishment is vested in the legislature and that is absolute in Section 141 of the Act which clearly speaks of commission of offence by the company. The learned counsel for the respondents have vehemently urged that the use of the term “as well as” in the Section is of immense significance and, in its tentacle, it brings in the company as well as the director and/or other officers who are responsible for the acts of the company and, therefore, a prosecution against the directors or other officers is tenable even if the company is not arraigned as an accused. The words “as well as” have to be understood in the context. 57. In Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. and others, (1987) 1 SCC 424 it has been laid down that the entire statute must be first read as a whole, then section by section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word. 57. In Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. and others, (1987) 1 SCC 424 it has been laid down that the entire statute must be first read as a whole, then section by section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word. The same principle has been reiterated in Deewan Singh and others v. Rajendra Prasad Ardevi and others and Sarabjit Rick Singh v. Union of India, (2008) 2 SCC 417 . 58. Applying the doctrine of strict construction, we are of the considered opinion that commission of offence by the company is an express condition precedent to attract the vicarious liability of others. Thus, the words “as well as the company” appearing in the Section make it absolutely unmistakably clear that when the company can be prosecuted, then only the persons mentioned in the other categories could be vicariously liable for the offence subject to the averments in the petition and proof thereof. One cannot be oblivious of the fact that the company is a juristic person and it has its own respectability. If a finding is recorded against it, it would create a concavity in its reputation. There can be situations when the corporate reputation is affected when a director is indicted. 59. In view of our aforesaid analysis, we arrive at the irresistible conclusion that for maintaining the prosecution under Section 141 of the Act, arraigning of a company as an accused is imperative. The other categories of offenders can only be brought in the dragnet on the touchstone of vicarious liability as the same has been stipulated in the provision itself. We say so on the basis of the ratio laid down in C.V. Parekh which is a three-Judge Bench decision. Thus, the view expressed in Sheoratan Agarwal does not correctly lay down the law and, accordingly, is hereby overruled. The decision in Anil Hada is overruled with the qualifier as stated in paragraph 51. The decision in Modi Distilleries has to be treated to be restricted to its own facts as has been explained by us hereinabove." 27. Thus, the view expressed in Sheoratan Agarwal does not correctly lay down the law and, accordingly, is hereby overruled. The decision in Anil Hada is overruled with the qualifier as stated in paragraph 51. The decision in Modi Distilleries has to be treated to be restricted to its own facts as has been explained by us hereinabove." 27. A cursory reading of the said judgment would make it very clear that if a finding is recorded against the Company, without the Company being arrayed as an accused, it would create a concavity in its reputation and there may be situations that the corporate reputation is affected when a director is indicted. The Supreme Court further went on to say that for maintaining the prosecution under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, arraying of the Company as an accused is imperative. In the same judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has further held that the usage of the phrase, "as well as the Company" is only to obviate doubt, if any. Thus, it is only clarificatory. Therefore, it is of no significance that the phrase, "as well as the Company" is found missing in Section 32 of the Industrial Disputes Act. 28. In view of the above position, there can be no doubt that for punishing an accused under the Industrial Disputes Act by invoking Section 32 of the said Act, it is absolutely necessary that the Company should be arrayed as an accused and only when the Court records a finding that the Company is guilty of the offence, then only the other persons enumerated in Section 32 of the Industrial Disputes Act, such as, Director, Manager, Secretary, Agent etc., can also be punished. 29. As pointed out by Mr. K.M. Ramesh, the learned counsel for the respondents 2 and 3, of course, it is true that before the commencement of trial, when the petitioners approached this Court challenging their prosecution, it was held that the prosecution of the petitioners alone is maintainable. But, in view of the authoritative pronouncement of law made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment in Aneeta Hada's case (cited supra), the view taken by this Court in the said order cannot be taken as a correct proposition of law. 30. But, in view of the authoritative pronouncement of law made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment in Aneeta Hada's case (cited supra), the view taken by this Court in the said order cannot be taken as a correct proposition of law. 30. Now turning to the facts of the present case, the Company, viz., "Addison Paints & Chemicals Limited", against which, the award was passed and which had allegedly committed the offence has not been arrayed as an accused. In the absence of the said Company being arrayed as an accused, the prosecution of the petitioners herein, who are only the Director and then Vice-President and the conviction cannot be sustained. 31. Though, the other accused have not preferred any appeal, since, I find that the conviction of the accused in the case is not at all sustainable in view of the legal hurdle, though, the other accused are not before me, I am bound to acquit those accused also. As a result, it is necessary for me to interfere with the conviction and sentence of all the accused in the case. 32. In the result, I am inclined to pass the following order:- i. The Crl.R.C.Nos. 8 and 9 of 2009 are allowed and the conviction and sentence imposed by the learned II Metropolitan Magistrate in C.C.No.10403 of 1995, dated 18.08.2003 and confirmed in Crl.A.No.289 of 2003, dated 06.02.2008, are set aside. ii. The order of enhancement of sentence of fine imposed by the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No.I, Chennai, in Crl.R.C.No.34 of 2005 is also set aside. iii. The petitioners in Criminal Revision cases as well as the other accused, who have not preferred appeal or revision, are also hereby acquitted. iv. The fine amount, if any, paid by the revision petitioners and the other accused shall be refunded to them. v. In view of the above conclusion, the Criminal Original Petition in Crl.O.P.No. 8025 of 2008 deserves to be dismissed and accordingly, the same is dismissed.