R. Palanisamy v. Government of Tamilnadu, represented by its Principal Secretary to Government, Energy Department
2013-08-02
D.HARIPARANTHAMAN
body2013
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment :- 1. Both these two writ petitions, W.P.Nos.35096 of 2012 and 4618 of 2013, raise common questions of law. Therefore, these writ petitions are taken up together and are disposed of by this common order. 2. The petitioner in W.P.No.35096 of 2012 has filed the writ petition to quash the G.O.Ms.No.129, Energy Department, dated 14.11.2012 published in Tamil Nadu Government Gazette Extraordinary No.318, dated 14.11.2012, by which a notification was issued under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to acquire the lands of the petitioner in S.Nos.426/5A Part, 5B Part, 6A, 6B, 7A, 7B, 8,9,10,11,12,14, 15B, 16, 429/1 Part and 429/2 Part, measuring to an extent of 4.37.5 hectares in Pappakudi (South) village, Udayarpalayam Taluk, Ariyalur District 3. The petitioners in W.P.Nos.4618 of 2013 are husband and wife. The same G.O. also acquired the lands of these petitioners situated in S.Nos.426/13, 426/15A, 427/5A, 427/5B, 428/1A, 428/1B, 428/1C, 428/2, 428/3, 428/5, 428/6, 429/8, 430/2A, 430/6A, 430/1, 430/2C, 430/3, 433/1A1 and 433/1D1 in the same Pappakkudi (South) village, measuring to an extent of 4.37.5 hectares. 4. The lands were acquired for Power Grid Corporation of India Limited (shortly Power Grid Corporation), for erecting transmission system for the projects in Nagapattinam / Cuddalore area of Tamil Nadu. In total, lands to an extent of 25.27 hectares were acquired from various persons in 104 survey numbers at Pappakudi (South) village for the said purpose. 5. The acquisition was made by invoking the urgency clause under Section 17(2) and 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 dispensing with enquiry under Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act. 6. These writ petitions seek to quash the aforesaid G.O. with regard to acquisition of their lands invoking the emergency clause of the Land Acquisition Act. 7. The Power Grid Corporation is the Central Transmission Utility under the control of the Ministry of Power. The Corporation is responsible for planning and coordination of inter-state transmission system. It is the Government Company incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 with a view to develop an efficient Power Transmission System network throughout the country and to establish the National Power Grid in the country. 8. In W.P.No.35096 of 2012, while ordering notice regarding admission in the writ petition, this court granted interim stay of dispossession alone.
It is the Government Company incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 with a view to develop an efficient Power Transmission System network throughout the country and to establish the National Power Grid in the country. 8. In W.P.No.35096 of 2012, while ordering notice regarding admission in the writ petition, this court granted interim stay of dispossession alone. In W.P.No.4618 of 2013, while ordering notice regarding admission, this court granted an interim stay of further proceedings of the impugned G.O. 9. Both the Government as well as the Power Grid Corporation have filed counter affidavits and filed petitions to vacate the interim order. They sought to justify their action. It is stated that the Government of India accorded approval for Common Transmission System associated with Inter State Generating Station projects in Nagapattinam / Cuddalore area of Tamil Nadu for establishing a new 765 / 400 KV Pooling Station with a view to facilitate import of power to Southern Region and to improve the power distribution network in Tamil Nadu. 10. According to the respondents, the project was to be executed urgently, particularly taking into account the Electricity Power shortage in Tamilnadu. Therefore, the urgency clause was invoked and there was due application of mind by the Government to invoke the urgency clause under Sections 17(2) and 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act. 11. Heard both sides. 12. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners in W.P.No.4618 of 2013 and the learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P.No.35096 of 2012 vehemently contended that the valuable property right of the petitioners guaranteed under Article 300-A of the Constitution could not be taken away without enquiry under Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act. There was sufficient time for conducting enquiry under Section 5-A. The only opportunity available to the land losers is their right to object the acquisition under Section 5-A. The same cannot be taken away by invoking the urgency clause mechanically and in an arbitrary manner. 13. Their main contention is that there was absolutely no application of mind independently for invoking the emergency clause under Section 17(4) to dispense with 5-A enquiry. They submitted that as per the impugned notification, there was no independent application of mind for invoking Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act.
13. Their main contention is that there was absolutely no application of mind independently for invoking the emergency clause under Section 17(4) to dispense with 5-A enquiry. They submitted that as per the impugned notification, there was no independent application of mind for invoking Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act. According to them, even if there was urgency for invoking Section 17(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, the same could not justify the invoking of Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act mechanically. There should be an independent application of mind for invoking the urgency clause under Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act. According to them, the invocation of Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act is not automatic in all cases where the Government invoked Section 17(1) or 17(2) of the Land Acquisition Act. Only when the Government apply its mind to the urgency that the acquisition could not brook the delay of even a few months, then only Section 17(4) could be invoked. 14. Both counsels for the petitioners have relied on the following decisions: (i) Union of India and others Vs. Mukesh Hans reported in (2004) 8 SCC 14 . (ii) Essco Fabs Private Limited and another Vs. State of Haryana and another reported in (2009) 2 SCC 377 . (iii) Mahender Pal and others Vs. State of Haryana and others reported in (2009) 14 SCC 281 . (iv) Anand Singh and another Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others reported in (2010) 11 SCC 242 . (v) Radhy Shyam and others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others reported in (2011) 5 SCC 553 . (vi) Darshan Lal Nagpal Vs. Government of NCT of Delhi and others reported in (2012) 2 SCC 327 . (vii) Ram Dhari Jindal Memorial Trust Vs. Union of India and others reported in (2012) 11 SCC 370 . 15. Further, the learned counsel for the petitioners vehemently contended that there was an inordinate delay in issuing the impugned notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. According to them, the long delay prior to notification is fatal for acquisition. They further submitted that the Power Grid Corporation wrote a letter in October / November, 2011 for acquisition. The respondent authorities and the Tamil Nadu Government took one year for issuing the impugned notification. This delay would vitiate the acquisition proceedings. 16.
According to them, the long delay prior to notification is fatal for acquisition. They further submitted that the Power Grid Corporation wrote a letter in October / November, 2011 for acquisition. The respondent authorities and the Tamil Nadu Government took one year for issuing the impugned notification. This delay would vitiate the acquisition proceedings. 16. On the other hand, the learned Additional Advocate General produced the entire original records and submitted that the authorities acted swiftly and there was no delay at all as projected by the petitioners. Further, he took me through the original files and contended that there was independent application of mind for invoking Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act, taking into account the urgency involved in this case. 17. The learned Additional Advocate General further submitted that the judgments relied on by the petitioners would not apply to the facts of this case since there was neither prior or post delay with reference to 4(1) notification. He explained away the judgments relied on by the learned counsels for the petitioners. He strenuously contended that distinction shall be made between the acquisition made for common good as against the acquisition to benefit a private party. According to him, in this case, the acquisition is for the State to establish the sub-station to tackle the electricity problem in Tamil Nadu. 18. The learned Senior Counsel for the Power Grid Corporation submitted that they acted quickly in view of the urgency of the matter. He gave the list of dates to justify the swift action that was taken by the Corporation. There was no delay at all on the side of the Power Grid Corporation as per the dates of various events submitted by him. He further submitted that the Power Grid Corporation remitted the required compensation amount immediately as per the Act. 19. I have considered the submissions made by either side. 20. As stated above, the crux of the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioners were : (i) There was an inordinate delay prior to the publication of the impugned notification from the stage of approval granted by the Government of India. (ii) Even if there was justification for invoking Section 17(2), there was no application of mind independently after deciding to invoke Section 17(2) to invoke 17(4) to dispense with 5-A enquiry. Issue No.1 : 21.
(ii) Even if there was justification for invoking Section 17(2), there was no application of mind independently after deciding to invoke Section 17(2) to invoke 17(4) to dispense with 5-A enquiry. Issue No.1 : 21. Whether there was any pre notification delay that would make the impugned notification bad? 22. From the records, the following are the events that took place for acquisition : (a) On 17.6.2011, the Ministry of Power, Government of India accorded approval for establishing new 765/400 kV Pooling Station in Nagapattinam/Cuddalore area with a view to facilitate the import of power to Southern region and to improve the power distribution network in Tamil Nadu. (b) In June, 2011 and July itself, the Power Grid Corporation identified certain lands at Meensuriti village and Dharmasamutharam for the projects. But the revenue authorities requested the Corporation to opt for alternative site since water bodies would form part of the substantial portion of acquisition. (c) Ultimately, the Corporation identified the lands measuring to an extent of 25.38.0 hectares = 63 acres in Pappakudi South village for establishment of 765/400 kV Pooling Station. (d) The Corporation wrote a letter dated 11.11.2011 to the District Collector to acquire the lands invoking Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act. (e) On 23.11.2011, the Assistant Commissioner, Land Reforms, Trichy issued no objection certificate. (f) The Revenue Divisional Officer, Udayarpalayam sent proposals in the reports dated 16.12.2011 and 4.1.2012 to the District Collector. (g) On 24.1.2012, proposals were forwarded by the District Collector to the Government through the Commissioner, Land Administration. (h) On 31.3.2012, a public meeting was convened by the Revenue Divisional Officer, Udayarpalayam to apprise the public the importance and imminent necessity of the project. (i) On 28.6.2012, the Government issued G.O.Ms.No.76, Energy Department, according administrative sanction for acquisition of land measuring an extent of 25.38.0 hectares for establishing 765/400 kV sub-station and invoked Section 17(2) of the Land Acquisition Act. (j) On 20.7.2012, a proposal was sent for approval of draft notification under Section 4(1) and 6 by the Revenue Divisional Officer, Udayarpalayam to the District Collector, wherein there is proposal to invoke Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act. (k) On 26.7.2012, the proposal for approval of draft notification under Section 4(1) and 6 was recommended by the District Collector to the Principal Secretary and Commissioner, Land Administration.
(k) On 26.7.2012, the proposal for approval of draft notification under Section 4(1) and 6 was recommended by the District Collector to the Principal Secretary and Commissioner, Land Administration. (l) On 10.9.2012, the proposal for approval of draft notification under Section 4(1) and 6 of the Act was recommended by the Principal Secretary and Commissioner of Land Administration to the first respondent Government. (m) On 14.11.2012, the publication of Section 4(1) notification in Tamil Nadu Government Gazette was made. (n) On 30.11.2012, the publication of Section 6 declaration was made and the same was published in the Gazette. 23. The aforesaid details of various events that took place prior to impugned notification makes it clear that there was no delay prior to publication of notice under Section 4(1) of the Act that is impugned in the writ petition. 24. Hence I am not inclined to agree with the submissions made by the learned counsels for the petitioners that there was pre notification delay. The judgments in this regard are dealt with hereunder at an appropriate place. Issue No.2 : 25. It is relevant to extract Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act : "17. Special powers in cases of urgency.--(1)In cases of urgency, whenever the [appropriate Government] so directs, the Collector, though no such award has been made, may, on the expiration of fifteen days from the publication of the notice mentioned in section 9, sub-section (1), [take possession of any land needed for public purpose]. Such land shall thereupon [vest absolutely in the [Government], free from all encumbrances].
Such land shall thereupon [vest absolutely in the [Government], free from all encumbrances]. (2) Whenever, owing to any sudden change in the channel of any navigable river or other unforeseen emergency, it becomes necessary for any Railway Administration to acquire the immediate possession of any land for the maintenance of their traffic or for the purpose of making thereon a river-side or ghat station, or of providing convenient connection with or access to any such station, [or the appropriate Government considers it necessary to acquire the immediate possession of any land for the purpose of maintaining any structure or system pertaining to irrigation, water supply, drainage, road communication or electricity,] the Collector may, immediately after the publication of the notice mentioned in sub-section (1) and with the previous sanction of the [appropriate Government], enter upon and take possession of such land, which shall thereupon [vest absolutely in the [Government] free from all encumbrances]: Provided that the Collector shall not take possession of any building or part of a building under this sub-section without giving to the occupier thereof at least forty-eight hours' notice of his intention so to do, or such longer notice as may be reasonably sufficient to enable such occupier to remove his movable property from such building without unnecessary inconvenience. (3) In every case under either of the preceding sub-sections, the Collector shall at the time of taking possession offer to the persons interested compensation for the standing crops and trees (if any) on such land and for any other damage sustained by them caused by such sudden dispossession and not excepted in section 24 and, in case such offer is not accepted, the value of such crops and trees and the amount of such other damage shall be allowed for in awarding compensation for the land under the provisions herein contained.
[(3-A) Before taking possession of any land under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), the Collector shall, without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (3),-- (a) tender payment of eighty per centum of the compensation for such land as estimated by him to the persons interested entitled thereto, and (b) pay it to them, unless prevented by some one or more of the contingencies mentioned in section 31, sub-section (2), and where the Collector is no prevented, the provisions of section 31, sub-section (2), (except the second proviso thereto), shall apply as they apply to the payment of compensation under that section. (3-B) The amount paid or deposited under sub-section (3-A), shall be taken into account for determining the amount of compensation required to be tendered under section 31, and where the amount so paid or deposited exceeds the compensation awarded by the Collector under section 11, the excess may, unless refunded within three moths from the date of the Collector's award, be recovered as an arrear of land revenue.] [(4) In the case of any land to which, in the opinion of the [appropriate Government], the provisions of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) are applicable, the [appropriate Government] may direct that the provisions of section 5-A shall not apply, and, if it does so direct, a declaration may be made under section 6 in respect of the land at any time [after the date of the publication of the notification] under section 4, sub-section (1).]" 26. Though it was submitted initially that Section 17(2) would not be invoked as there was no unforeseen urgency, later the same was not pursued further and they gave up the submission in this regard. 27. The learned counsels for the petitioners concentrated their attack on the invocation of urgency clause of Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act. It was their main contention that the impugned notification discloses that there was no independent application of mind for invoking Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act. According to them, even if the Government was of the opinion to invoke the urgency clause under Section 17(1) or Section 17(2), still the Government has to exercise its discretion either to invoke Section 17(4) or not to invoke Section 17(4) depending on the matter. Their contention was that the Government failed to apply its mind and the Government invoked Section 17(4) automatically on the invocation of Section 17(2).
Their contention was that the Government failed to apply its mind and the Government invoked Section 17(4) automatically on the invocation of Section 17(2). 28. Heavy reliance is placed on "may direct" appearing in Section 17(4) of the Act. The petitioners' case is that the impugned notification does not disclose the application of mind by the Government for invoking the urgency clause under Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act. The impugned notification mechanically states that there is urgency for notification under Section 17(4). According to the petitioners, the same is not suffice as per the various decisions cited by them. 29. Once the petitioners have stated that there is no application of mind by the first respondent Government for invoking Section 17(4) of the Act, the burden of proof is on the Government by producing relevant materials before this court to establish that they applied their mind independently. 30. The files are produced as stated above. I have perused the files. On perusal of the materials placed before this Court by the Government, it has to be seen as to whether the Government discharged its burden of proof. 31. In July, 2011, the Power Grid Corporation identified lands at Dharmasamuthiram for about 72 acres. The Revenue authorities found that 70% of the lands formed part of water bodies and 30% belonged to private parties. Therefore, the Revenue authorities objected for acquisition of water bodies and it was dropped. Thereafter, the Power Grid Corporation sent a letter dated 25.10.2011 identifying 61.175 acres of lands at Pappakudi village. 32. The Revenue Divisional Officer, Udayarpalayam sent reports, dated 16.12.2011 and 4.1.2012 that lands identified by the Power Grid Corporation measuring 25.38.0 hectares could be acquired. He has sent proposals with regard to the same. Based on the proposals of the Revenue Divisional Officer, the District Revenue Officer inspected the lands and gave his remarks on 11.1.2012. 33. Thereafter, on 24.1.2012, the District Collector had forwarded the proposals for acquiring the lands measuring 25.38 hectares from 22 persons in Pappakudi village by invoking Section 17(2) of the Land Acquisition Act to the Principal Secretary-cum-Commissioner for Land Administration. On receipt of the proposals from the District Collector, the Principal Secretary-cum-Commissioner for Land Administration sent a letter dated 21.2.2012 seeking to find out the present stage of the land and the opinion of the land owners. 34.
On receipt of the proposals from the District Collector, the Principal Secretary-cum-Commissioner for Land Administration sent a letter dated 21.2.2012 seeking to find out the present stage of the land and the opinion of the land owners. 34. In the meantime, the Power Grid Corporation was writing letters to the Revenue authorities to prepare a draft notification under Sections 4(1) and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. They sent a letter, dated 13.3.2012 stating that lands were urgently required. The Power Grid Corporation also sent a letter to the Revenue Authorities seeking permission to deposit the land costs with the Revenue Department. W hen the matter was taken to the Principal Secretary, the Principal Secretary sent a letter, dated 19.3.2012 stating not to send proposals for draft notification before administrative approval from the Government. 35. While so, the Government granted administrative approval by issuing G.O.Ms.No.76, Energy Department, dated 28.6.2012. The Government accepted the proposals sent by the District Collector in his letter dated 24.1.2012 and the proposals of the Principal Secretary, dated 21.2.2012, permitting to invoke Section 17(2) for acquiring the land at Pappakudi village. The Revenue Divisional Officer, Udayarpalayam was appointed as the Land Acquisition Officer. 36. Thereafter, the Revenue Divisional Officer, being the Land Acquisition Officer, sent a detailed proposal, dated 20.7.2012 with draft notification under Sections 4(1) and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act and stated that Section 17(4) shall be invoked in view of the urgency of the project. Along with the proposal, he also enclosed 10 enclosures. Enclosures 3 and 4 are in the form of queries and answers. Enclosure 3 contain two parts. In the first part, there are 23 queries in the format as per the Government letter, dated 25.3.1993 and the answers therefor. The second part contains 30 queries and the answers therefor. 37. For query raised in Column No.18 in the first part, as to why the urgency clause is invoked, the answer is that the sub-station was to be established for the Power Grid Corporation immediately. For question No.30 in the second part, as to what was the recommendation of the Revenue Divisional Officer, he had stated that the lands to an extent of 25.38.0 hectares could be acquired. 38.
For question No.30 in the second part, as to what was the recommendation of the Revenue Divisional Officer, he had stated that the lands to an extent of 25.38.0 hectares could be acquired. 38. Based on the aforesaid proposals, dated 20.7.2012 along with the draft notification under Sections 4(1) and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, the District Collector has sent a letter dated 26.7.2012 approving the proposals of the Revenue Divisional Officer. The following passage from that letter of the District Collector is extracted hereunder in this regard : "TAMIL" (Emphasis added) 39. The same was also approved by the Principal Secretary in his proceedings, dated 10.9.2012. 40. In these circumstances, the impugned G.O.Ms.No.129, Energy Department, dated 14.11.2012 was issued. The first paragraph of the impugned G.O. is extracted hereunder : "The Draft 4(1) Notification under urgency provisions of section 17(2) of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 (Central Act II 1894) submitted by the District Collector, Ariyalur District, with her letter third read above as recommended by the Principal Secretary / Commissioner of Land Administration is approved and will be published in an extraordinary issue of the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette dated 14.11.2012 and in two Tamil Daily News Papers circulating in the locality." 41. The aforesaid paragraph in the impugned G.O. makes it clear that the G.O was issued based on the draft notification submitted by the District Collector as approved by the Principal Secretary / Commissioner for Land Administration. The letter dated 26.7.2012 is referred to as item No.3 in the reference column of the impugned G.O. A part of the G.O.Ms.No.129 also states as follows : "Under Sub-section (4) of section 17 of the said act, the Governor of Tamilnadu hereby directs that, in view of the urgency of the case, the provision of the section 5-A of the said act shall not apply to this case." 42. Hence it is clear that the Government applied its mind before invoking Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act dispensing with 5-A enquiry. Initially, it was proposed in G.O.Ms.No.76, dated 28.6.2012 to invoke Section 17(2) of the Land Acquisition Act.
Hence it is clear that the Government applied its mind before invoking Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act dispensing with 5-A enquiry. Initially, it was proposed in G.O.Ms.No.76, dated 28.6.2012 to invoke Section 17(2) of the Land Acquisition Act. Thereafter, based on the proposals that emanated from the Revenue Divisional Officer, dated 20.7.2012 and also the proposal, dated 26.7.2012 of the District Collector, Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act was invoked, i.e., there was separate conscious decision by the Government to invoke Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act. Therefore, the submissions of the learned counsels for the petitioners that there was no independent application of mind by the Government for invoking Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act are not correct. 43. The Government consciously decided to invoke both Section 17(2) as well as Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act by applying its mind to the facts in issue and particularly the urgent need of establishing the sub station at Pappakudi village. 44. Now, the judgements cited by the learned counsels for the petitioners are dealt with hereunder. 45. Union of India and others Vs. Mukesh Hans reported in (2004) 8 SCC 14 . (a) In that case, there was an annual festival called "Phool Walon Ki Sair", which was stated during Mughal regime. But, over the period, the same was discontinued. In the year 1961, the then Prime Minister of India Pt.Jawahar Lal Nehru took the initiative to revive this age-old festival to focus on the spirit of secularism. The festival was organized by an organisation called Anjuman-Saire-e-Gul-Faroshan. The President of India was its Chief Patron. The festival starts with a procession and concludes with all its participants gathering in a village Mehrauli. (b) For the aforesaid purpose, about 4000 sq. yards of lands was sought to be acquired on 24.7.1973 by a notification. No further steps were taken by the acquiring authority and the said acquisition lapsed. (c) While so, another notification, dated 30.6.1988 was issued under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act for the said purpose. Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act was invoked dispensing with 5-A enquiry. (d) The notification dated 30.6.1988 was questioned before the Delhi High Court. The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition.
(c) While so, another notification, dated 30.6.1988 was issued under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act for the said purpose. Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act was invoked dispensing with 5-A enquiry. (d) The notification dated 30.6.1988 was questioned before the Delhi High Court. The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition. When the matter was taken to the Apex Court, the Apex Court held that there was no noting in the file to the need for invoking Section 17(4). The Lt. Governor was not apprised of all the necessary facts, particularly relating to the earlier acquisition got lapsed long back. (e) The following conclusion arrived at by the Apex Court in paragraph 37 is extracted hereunder : "37......There is no material on record to show that either the said festival has been discontinued for want of land or the owners of the land where the festival has its concluding ceremony are preventing the utilisation of that land for the said purpose. We have also noticed hereinabove that an earlier attempt to acquire 40 bighas of the land for the very same purpose was allowed to be lapsed by the authorities concerned by efflux of time which was also a relevant factor to be taken note of by the Lt. Governor when he took the decision to dispense with the Section 5-A inquiry but the same was not placed before him. These facts coupled with the findings of the High Court that in almost all the notings in the file there is no reference to the need for invoking Section 17(4), indicates that the Lt. Governor was not apprised of all the necessary and relevant facts before he took the decision in question. Therefore, in our opinion, the findings of the High Court that the decision of the Lt. Governor to dispense with the Section 5-A inquiry suffered from the vice of non-application of mind has to be upheld....." (f) The aforesaid passage makes it clear that the acquisition was for festival during a particular period. The Apex Court noted that there is no material to show that either the said festival has been discontinued for want of land or the owners of land where the festival has its concluding ceremony are preventing the utilisation of the land for the said purpose. Further, there was no noting in the file to the need for invoking Section 17(4).
Further, there was no noting in the file to the need for invoking Section 17(4). (g) In this case, the acquisition is for setting up a sub station to tackle the electricity problem. Further, as extracted above, there was a detailed letter by the District Collector proposing to invoke Section 17(4) and the same was approved by the Principal Secretary and the Government thereafter. Hence this judgment cannot be applied to this case. 46. Essco Fabs Private Limited and another Vs. State of Haryana and another reported in (2009) 2 SCC 377 . (a) The Government of Haryana intended to acquire lands for residential, commercial and industrial utilisation in a village Kheri Nangal. A notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act was issued on 15.12.1982. Section 6 declaration was issued on 20.6.1984. However, the acquisition proceedings could not be completed within the stipulated period and the notifications lapsed and the lands stood released. (b) While so, one of the appellants before the Apex Court, i.e., Essco Fabs Private Limited (for shortly Essco) bought the land, which was sought to be acquired, for expansion of its export unit. On 6.6.1991, the company made an application to the Director, Town and Country Planning, Haryana for permission for change of user of the land. The same was rejected by the Director by his letter dated 5.9.1991 on the ground that the land was proposed to be acquired However, there was no acquisition for 10 years. (c) On 1.8.2001, after about 20 years of the first notification in 1982, the Haryana Government again issued a notification under Section 4(1) for acquisition of land for public purpose. The same was challenged before the High Court. (d) The other appellant in the case is the Panipet Teachers (Recognised Schools) Housing Cooperative society Limited (shortly society). The society made a representation to the Government of Haryana to allot lands for the benefit of the society and its member teachers. The State Government allotted lands by executing an agreement, dated 19.10.1985. The land was demarcated and was carved out into plots for the purpose of school, parks, temple, overhead tank, roads, green belt, etc. The society spent huge amount for development of the land. (e) While so, the land was sought to be acquired under the aforesaid notification. Section 17(4) was invoked to acquire the land dispensing with 5-A enquiry.
The land was demarcated and was carved out into plots for the purpose of school, parks, temple, overhead tank, roads, green belt, etc. The society spent huge amount for development of the land. (e) While so, the land was sought to be acquired under the aforesaid notification. Section 17(4) was invoked to acquire the land dispensing with 5-A enquiry. (f) The same was questioned by the society before the Punjab and Haryana High Court. The Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissed the writ petition. (g) Aggrieved land owners approached the Apex Court. The Apex Court held that the facts of the case are eloquent. Initially, the acquisition took place in 1982, but the same got lapsed. Thereafter, after 20 years, it was sought to be acquired. Hence the ratio of the decision in Mukesh Hans 's case (supra) squarely applies to this case. (h) Paragraphs 37 and 56 of the judgment is extracted in this regard : "37. It is vehemently contended on behalf of the appellants that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the respondents could not have invoked "urgency clause" by scuttling enquiry and dispensing with hearing of objections under Section 5-A of the Act. It was submitted that no action could have been taken in view of the circumstances mentioned earlier. As early as in 1982 proceedings were initiated for acquisition of land but they were allowed to be lapsed in spite of final notification under Section 6 of the Act by not taking appropriate actions in time. Again, in 1991, when Essco Fabs applied for change of user of land, the request was turned down on the ground that the land was likely to be needed for public purpose. It was, therefore, submitted that when preliminary notification under Section 4 was issued in 2001, there was no urgent need or compelling necessity nor was it a matter of urgency or emergency under Section 17 of the Act which could justify the action and the proceedings are liable to be quashed. ................. 56. In the instant case, the facts are eloquent. Initial action of acquisition of land was taken as early as in 1982 but the proceedings lapsed. In 1991, when Essco made an application praying for change of user of land, it was rejected on the ground that the land was likely to be required for public purpose.
................. 56. In the instant case, the facts are eloquent. Initial action of acquisition of land was taken as early as in 1982 but the proceedings lapsed. In 1991, when Essco made an application praying for change of user of land, it was rejected on the ground that the land was likely to be required for public purpose. Nothing, however, was done for about a decade. It is only in 2001 that again notification under Section 4 was issued and urgency clause was applied. We are, therefore, satisfied that the ratio laid down in Mukesh Hans squarely applies to the facts of the case. No urgency clause could have been invoked by the respondents and inquiry and hearing of objections provided by Section 5-A of the Act could not have been dispensed with. The actions of issuance of urgency clause under sub-section (4) of Section 17, dispensing with inquiry under Section 5-A and issuance of final notification under sub-section (1) of Section 6 are required to be quashed and they are accordingly quashed." (i)Therefore, this judgment also cannot be applied to this case. 47. Mahender Pal and others Vs. State of Haryana and others reported in (2009) 14 SCC 281 . (a) This case arose out of the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High court dismissing the writ petition questioning the acquisition made invoking Section 17(2) read with Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act dispensing with 5-A equiry in limine. In those circumstances, the Apex Court set aside the order remanding the matter back to the High Court. The Government was directed to file counter and produce the records. Hence that judgment cannot be of no use to the petitioners. 48. Anand Singh and another Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others reported in (2010) 11 SCC 242 . (a) The land of the appellants before the Apex Court in District Gorakhpur in Uttar Prdesh, was acquired for residential colony by Gorakhpur Development Authority. In total, 209.515 hectares of lands including the land of the appellants were acquired for the said purpose. The appellants claimed that there existed buildings on the subject land and therefore, there should be deacquisition of their lands. The lands were acquired by invoking the urgency clause under Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act and enquiry under Section 5-A was dispensed with.
The appellants claimed that there existed buildings on the subject land and therefore, there should be deacquisition of their lands. The lands were acquired by invoking the urgency clause under Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act and enquiry under Section 5-A was dispensed with. (b) The Apex Court found that no material was placed on record by the State Government either before the High Court or before the Apex Court, indicating the application of mind that the urgency was of such nature which warranted elimination of enquiry under Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act. (c) Paragraph 54 of the judgment, in this regard, is extracted hereunder : "54. Although some correspondence between the authorities and the Government was placed before the High Court by the GDA, but no material has been placed on record by the State Government either before the High Court or before this Court indicating the application of mind that the urgency was of such nature which warranted elimination of the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. It is interesting to note that GDA wanted the subject land to be acquired because their land bank had no land and they wanted land to keep the Authority running. If profit-making and the sustenance of the Development Authority was the motive, surely urgency was not of such nature that it could brook no delay whatsoever." (d) This judgment lays down the law in paragraph 51 of the judgment that the use of the power of urgency and dispensation of enquiry under Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act in a routine manner for the "planned development of city" or "development of residential area" is bad. Paragraph 51 of the judgment is extracted hereunder : "51. It must, therefore, be held that the use of the power of urgency and dispensation of enquiry under Section 5-A by the Government in a routine manner for the ‘planned development of city’ or ‘development of residential area’ and thereby depriving the owner or person interested of a very valuable right under Section 5-A may not meet the statutory test nor could be readily sustained." (e) Even in the case of planned development of city or development of residential area, in exceptional cases, it has been held that urgency clause could be invoked and 5-A enquiry could be dispensed with.
At this juncture, it is relevant to extract paragraph 50 of the judgment, which reads as follows : "50. Use of the power by the Government under Section 17 for ‘planned development of the city’ or ‘the development of residential area’ or for ‘housing’ must not be as a rule but by way of an exception. Such exceptional situation may be for the public purpose viz. rehabilitation of natural calamity affected persons; rehabilitation of persons uprooted due to commissioning of dam or housing for lower strata of the society urgently; rehabilitation of persons affected by time-bound projects, etc. The list is only illustrative and not exhaustive. In any case, sans real urgency and need for immediate possession of the land for carrying out the stated purpose, heavy onus lies on the Government to justify the exercise of such power." (f) Here, it is not the case of planned development of city or development of residential area. It is for establishing the sub station to tackle the power problem. In this case, as stated above, records are produced. I have recorded a finding that the Government applied its mind that emergency is of such nature warranting elimination of enquiry under Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act. (g) Further, the Apex Court also indicated that the Land Selection Committee was constituted to identify the lands for housing colony by the GDA in February, 2000. In April, 2001, the Committee identified and proposed acquisition of lands. After about 4 years, the notification under Section 4 was issued on 22.11.2003 / 20.2.2004 and urgency clause was invoked dispensing with 5-A enquiry. Even Section 6 declaration was issued on 28.12.2004 after one year of the notification issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act. This pre / post notification delay was also an another reason for interference. 49. Radhy Shyam and others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others reported in (2011) 5 SCC 553 . (a) In that case, the acquisition of land of the appellants before the Supreme Court was made for planned industrial development of District Gautam Budh Nagar through Noida Industrial Development Authority by invoking Sections 17(1) and 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act.
Radhy Shyam and others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others reported in (2011) 5 SCC 553 . (a) In that case, the acquisition of land of the appellants before the Supreme Court was made for planned industrial development of District Gautam Budh Nagar through Noida Industrial Development Authority by invoking Sections 17(1) and 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act. The appellants challenged the acquisition proceedings on the ground that (i) the land cannot be used for industrial purposes because in the draft Master Plan of Greater Noida (2021), the same is shown as part of the residential zone, (ii) the policy of the Government was to exempt residential structures from acquisition and since the appellants constructed dwelling houses, the acquisition should not have been done and (iii) the acquisition was made arbitrarily since the lands of the Member of Legislative Assembly and other influential persons were left out from acquisition. (b) The writ petition was dismissed by the Allahabad High Court without even directing the State to file counter affidavit. The appeal was filed against the said order before the Supreme Court. (c) The Apex Court disapproved the casual manner in which the High Court disposed the writ petition. In paragraph 16 of the judgment, the Apex Court has stated as follows : "16. At the outset, we record our disapproval of the casual manner in which the High Court disposed of the writ petition without even calling upon the respondents to file counter-affidavit and produce the relevant records. ....." (d) Further, more importantly the Apex Court found that the acquisition was made to allot those lands to private parties in the name of development. The Apex Court held that when originally the Act was enacted in 1894, it was the acquisition for the purpose of construction of roads, canals, railways, etc. But, in recent years, a new phenomena has emerged and large tracts of land have been acquired and transferred to private entrepreneurs. Paragraph 19 of the judgment is extracted in this regard : "19.
But, in recent years, a new phenomena has emerged and large tracts of land have been acquired and transferred to private entrepreneurs. Paragraph 19 of the judgment is extracted in this regard : "19. The Act, which was enacted more than 116 years ago for facilitating the acquisition of land and other immovable properties for construction of roads, canals, railways, etc., has been frequently used in the post-Independence era for different public purposes like laying of roads, construction of bridges, dams and buildings of various public establishments/institutions, planned development of urban areas, providing of houses to different sections of the society and for developing residential colonies/sectors. However, in the recent years, the country has witnessed a new phenomena. Large tracts of land have been acquired in rural parts of the country in the name of development and transferred to private entrepreneurs, who have utilised the same for construction of multi-storeyed complexes, commercial centres and for setting up industrial units. Similarly, large-scale acquisitions have been made on behalf of the companies by invoking the provisions contained in Part VII of the Act." (e) Further, the following passage found in paragraph 22 can be usefully extracted hereunder : "22. ...... If the acquisition is intended to benefit private person(s) and the provisions contained in Sections 17(1) and/or 17(4) are invoked, then scrutiny of the justification put forward by the State should be more rigorous in cases involving the challenge to the acquisition of land, the pleadings should be liberally construed and relief should not be denied to the petitioner by applying the technical rules of procedure embodied in the Code of Civil Procedure and other procedural laws." (f) In paragraph 79, the Apex Court held that the acquisition was only to cater private interest in that case. The relevant passage is extracted hereunder : "79. In our view, the abovenoted factors do not furnish legally acceptable justification for the exercise of power by the State Government under Section 17(1) because the acquisition is primarily meant to cater private interest in the name of industrial development of the district. It is neither the pleaded case of the respondents nor has any evidence been produced before the Court to show that the State Government and/or agencies/instrumentalities of the State are intending to establish industrial units on the acquired land either by itself or through its agencies/instrumentalities......
It is neither the pleaded case of the respondents nor has any evidence been produced before the Court to show that the State Government and/or agencies/instrumentalities of the State are intending to establish industrial units on the acquired land either by itself or through its agencies/instrumentalities...... " (Emphasis added) (g) In the aforesaid passage, it is made clear that if the acquisition is for the State to establish its industrial unit, the Apex Court could have viewed differently. (h) The Apex Court also recorded that lands of Ex-members of Legislative Assembly was excluded from acquisition and discrimination was practised. The following passage from paragraph 86 of the judgment is extracted in this regard : "86. We also find merit in the appellants’ plea that the acquisition of their land is vitiated due to violation of the doctrine of equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. A reading of the survey report shows that the committee constituted by the State Government had recommended release of land measuring 18.9725 ha. Many parcels of land were released from acquisition because the landowners had already raised constructions and were using the same as dwelling units. A large chunk of land measuring 4.3840 ha was not acquired apparently because the same belonged to an ex-Member of the Legislative Assembly. The appellants had also raised constructions on their land and were using the same for residential and agricultural purposes. ......" (i) Inthose circumstances, the Apex Court set aside the notification and imposed cost of Rs.5 lakhs. Hence the said case cannot be of any assistance to the petitioners. 50. Darshan Lal Nagpal Vs. Government of NCT of Delhi and others reported in (2012) 2 SCC 327 . (a) A notification dated 13.10.2009 was issued under Section 4(1) read with Sections 17(1) and 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act, acquiring some lands of the appellant at village Mandoli for establishment of electrical sub station by Delhi Transco Ltd. (for short "DTL"). Declaration under Section 6 of the Act was made on 9.11.2009. The decision to establish the substation was taken in 2004. 5 years time was taken for issuing the notification under Section 4(1) read with Sections 17(1) and (4) of the Land Acquisition Act. This delay prior to acquisition is held to be fatal by the Apex Court. (b) The following passage in paragraph 20 is extracted hereunder : "20.
The decision to establish the substation was taken in 2004. 5 years time was taken for issuing the notification under Section 4(1) read with Sections 17(1) and (4) of the Land Acquisition Act. This delay prior to acquisition is held to be fatal by the Apex Court. (b) The following passage in paragraph 20 is extracted hereunder : "20. The learned counsel for the parties reiterated the arguments made before the High Court. While Shri Dhruv Mehta relied upon the judgments of this Court in Anand Singh v. State of U.P.13 and Radhy Shyam v. State of U.P.14 to emphasise that the acquisition of land for establishment of 400/220 kV substation did not warrant invoking of the urgency provisions contained in the Act because the proposal for establishment of the substation was initiated more than five years prior to the issue of notification under Section 4(1) read with Sections 17(1) and (4) of the Act and there was no justification to deprive the appellants of the right to be heard before being deprived of their property, ......." (c) In fact, this passage is heavily relied on by the learned Additional Advocate General and submitted that in this case, it was not five years, and on the other hand, in a period of about one year, Section 4(1) notification was issued. (d) It is also relevant to extract the following passage in paragraph 29, wherein the Apex Court held that pre-notification delay of 5 years is fatal for acquisition : "29. In the light of the above, it is to be seen whether there was any justification for invoking the urgency provisions contained in Sections 17(1) and (4) of the Act for the acquisition of the appellants' land. The Division Bench of the High Court accepted the explanation given by the respondents by observing that substation in East Delhi is needed to evacuate and utilise the power generated from 1500 MW gas-based plant at Bawana. while doing so the Bench completely overlooked that there was a long time gap of more than five years between initiation of the proposal for establishment of the substation and the issue of notification under Section 4(1) read with Sections 17(1) and (4) of the Act.
while doing so the Bench completely overlooked that there was a long time gap of more than five years between initiation of the proposal for establishment of the substation and the issue of notification under Section 4(1) read with Sections 17(1) and (4) of the Act. The High Court also failed to notice that the Government of NCT of Delhi had not produced any material to justify its decision to dispense with the application of Section 5-A of the Act. The documents produced by the parties including the notings recorded in file bearing No. F.S(11)/08/L&B/LA and the approval accorded by the Lieutenant Governor do not contain anything from which it can be inferred that a conscious decision was taken to dispense with the application of Section 5-A which represents two facets of the rule of hearing, that is, the right of the landowner to file objection against the proposed acquisition of land and of being heard in the inquiry required to be conducted by the Collector." (Emphasis added) (e) The following passage found in paragraph 26 is also relied on by the Additional Advocate General. In paragraph 26, the Apex Court has extracted paragraphs 43 to 48 of Anand Singh's case (supra). The following passage in paragraphs 44 and 47 of Anand Singh's case is extracted hereunder : "44. A repetition of the statutory phrase in the notification that the State Government is satisfied that the land specified in the notification is urgently needed and the provision contained in Section 5-A shall not apply, though may initially raise a presumption in favour of the Government that prerequisite conditions for exercise of such power have been satisfied, but such presumption may be displaced by the circumstances themselves having no reasonable nexus with the purpose for which the power has been exercised. Upon challenge being made to the use of power under Section 17, the Government must produce appropriate material before the court that the opinion for dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5-A has been formed by the Government after due application of mind on the material placed before it. ......... 47. The special provision has been made in Section 17 to eliminate enquiry under Section 5-A in deserving and cases of real urgency. The Government has to apply its mind on the aspect that urgency is of such nature that necessitates dispensation of enquiry under Section 5-A. ......
......... 47. The special provision has been made in Section 17 to eliminate enquiry under Section 5-A in deserving and cases of real urgency. The Government has to apply its mind on the aspect that urgency is of such nature that necessitates dispensation of enquiry under Section 5-A. ...... " (f) In paragraph 29, the Apex Court also held that the Government failed to produce any material to justify the dispensation of application of Section 5-A of the Act. It is also held that documents and notings recorded in the file did not contain anything from which it can be inferred that conscious decision was taken to dispense with enquiry under Section 5-A. (g) According to the learned Additional Advocate General, the Government produced materials before this court that opinion for dispensing with enquiry under Section 5-A has been formed by the Government after due application of mind. (h) In this case, I recorded a finding that records produced would disclose the application of mind by the Government for invoking the urgency clause. (i) While in Anand Singh's case, referred to above, the Apex Court noticed that there is conflict of views relating to delay in pre and post notification. The Apex Court did not express any view. Paragraph 48 of Anand Singh's case, that is extracted in paragraph 26 of this judgment, is extracted hereunder : "48. As regards the issue whether pre-notification and post-notification delay would render the invocation of urgency power void, again the case law is not consistent. The view of this Court has differed on this aspect due to different fact situation prevailing in those cases. In our opinion such delay will have material bearing on the question of invocation of urgency power, particularly in a situation where no material has been placed by the appropriate Government before the court justifying that urgency was of such nature that necessitated elimination of enquiry under Section 5-A.” (j) While so, the Apex Court has laid down law that pre notification delay of 5 years would be fatal in the case of acquisition. (k) In this case, neither there is pre-notification delay nor post notification delay. The Government also produced materials discharging its burden of proof. Hence this judgment, far from helping the petitioners, has supported the case of the respondents State. 51.Ram Dhari Jindal Memorial Trust Vs.
(k) In this case, neither there is pre-notification delay nor post notification delay. The Government also produced materials discharging its burden of proof. Hence this judgment, far from helping the petitioners, has supported the case of the respondents State. 51.Ram Dhari Jindal Memorial Trust Vs. Union of India and others reported in (2012) 11 SCC 370 = AIR 2012 SC 1878 . (a) This case arose out of acquisition made for residential scheme invoking urgency clause under Sections 17(1) and 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act and dispensing with 5-A enquiry. The appellant, whose lands were acquired, unsuccessfully challenged it before the Delhi High Court. The matter was taken to the Apex Court. (b) The Apex Court, following the Anand Singh's case (supra), held that urgency clause cannot be invoked in the residential scheme acquisition and only in exceptional cases, the urgency clause can be invoked for residential scheme. Further, the Apex Court held that except the statement made in the notification, there is no other materials available on record indicating the application of mind by the Lt. Governor, Delhi on the matter of urgency. (c) In this regard, the following passage found in paragraph 19 of the judgment is extracted hereunder : "19. ...... Moreover, except the above statement in the notification, there is no other material available on record which indicates that there has been application of mind by the Lt. Governor, Delhi on the aspect that urgency was of such nature that necessitated dispensation of enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. The respondents have miserably failed to show that the stated purpose ‘Rohini Residential Scheme’ could not have brooked the delay of few months and the conclusion of the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act would have frustrated the said public purpose." Therefore, this judgment also does not help the case of the petitioners. 52. For all the aforesaid reasons, both writ petitions, W.P.Nos.35096 of 2012 and 4618 of 2013, are dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.