Judgment :- Babu Mathew P. Joseph, J. 1. The petitioner was initially appointed as an Upper Primary School Assistant (for short, UPSA) in a maternity leave vacancy from 26-8-2002 to 7-1-2003 in the school managed by the 1st respondent. This appointment has been approved by the 2nd respondent as per his order dated 22-11-2006. The salary due to him for that period was also paid to him. He was appointed as a High School Assistant (for short, HSA) in that school to a leave vacancy from 5-6-2006 to 31-8-2006 on daily wages. This appointment was approved by the 2nd respondent by his order dated 25-9-2006. The wages due to him was also paid. He was again appointed as HSA to a leave vacancy in that school on daily wages from 18-9-2006 to 17-11-2006. That appointment was also approved by the 2nd respondent as per his order dated 1-11-2007. The wages due to the petitioner for that period was also paid. 2. In the meanwhile, a long term leave vacancy from 7-6-2005 to 5-6-2010 in the post of UPSA arose in that school consequent on the promotion of one UPSA as HSA to a long term leave vacancy of HSA from 7-6-2005 to 5-6-2010. The 1st respondent appointed the 4th respondent to that long term vacancy of UPSA from 7-6-2005 to 5-6-2010. The proposal for the approval of the appointment of the 4th respondent was rejected by the 2nd respondent as per Ext.P1 order. Since the petitioner was entitled to be appointed to the said vacancy that arose on 7-6-2005, he preferred Ext.P2 complaint before the 2nd respondent on 30-6-2005 staking his claim for that vacancy. As no action was taken in the matter, the petitioner approached this Court by filing W.P.(C) No. 13756 of 2006 which was disposed of by this Court by judgment dated 2-6-2006 directing the Government, the 3rd respondent, to consider the petitioner's claim after hearing of the parties concerned. Thereupon the matter was heard and Ext.P3 order has been passed by the Government on 23-9-2006 directing the 2nd respondent to approve the appointment of the petitioner from 26-8-2002 to 7-1-2003, if he is otherwise eligible. Thereafter, the 2nd respondent has approved the appointment of the petitioner from 26-8-2002 to 7-1-2003 as per his order dated 22-11-2006. The 2nd respondent by his Ext. Thereafter, the 2nd respondent has approved the appointment of the petitioner from 26-8-2002 to 7-1-2003 as per his order dated 22-11-2006. The 2nd respondent by his Ext. P4 letter dated 2-3-2007 directed the 1st respondent to furnish the details regarding the appointment of the petitioner for the purpose of approving his appointment for the period from 18-9-2006 to 17-11-2006. But, the 1st respondent has not furnished the required information to the 2nd respondent. The petitioner on several occasions approached the 2nd respondent for taking further action in the matter. Since the 1st respondent has not furnished the required information, no orders have been passed by the 2nd respondent in the matter. However, the 2nd respondent has not taken any action against the 1st respondent for his inaction in the matter of furnishing the required information called for by the 2nd respondent in Ext.P4. 3. Since the 2nd respondent has failed to take appropriate action against the Manager, the petitioner was constrained to approach this Court by filing W.P.(C) No. 21734 of 2007 and this Court issued orders for complying with the directions in Ext.P4. Having found that the respondents failed to comply with the same, this Court passed Ext.P6 order. It is evident from Ext. P6 that disqualifying of the 1st respondent was proposed and the 1st respondent was given an opportunity to make his submissions against such proposal before the Deputy Director of Education, failing which, the Deputy Director of Education was directed to take further proceedings in accordance with law. Thereafter, the petitioner's appointment as HSA from 18-9-2006 to 17-11-2006 has been approved by the 2nd respondent by his Ext.P7 order dated 1-11-2007. The question with regard to the entitlement of the petitioner for appointment to the long term leave vacancy of UPSA from 7-6-2005 to 5-6-2010 was remaining then without taking any action. The 4th respondent was continuing in that vacancy. Therefore, the petitioner filed a detailed representation before the Government requesting to issue a direction to the 1st respondent to appoint him to that vacancy replacing the 4th respondent. The 4th respondent was continuing in that vacancy. Therefore, the petitioner filed a detailed representation before the Government requesting to issue a direction to the 1st respondent to appoint him to that vacancy replacing the 4th respondent. Since the 1st respondent has not appointed the petitioner who is the legitimate claimant to be appointed as UPSA from 7-6-2005 onwards, it was also requested to take action against the 1st respondent under Rule 7 of Chapter III of the Kerala Education Rules (for short, KER) after disbursing salary due to the petitioner and to recover the same from the 1st respondent. Since the Department has not taken any action on the representation, the petitioner approached this Court by filing W.P.(C) No. 37642 of 2007. This Court, by Ext.P9 judgment in that Writ Petition, directed the 2nd respondent to consider and pass appropriate orders on the representation filed by the petitioner, after affording an opportunity of being heard to the parties concerned. Accordingly, the 2nd respondent has considered the matter and passed Ext.P10 order dated 9-1-2008 directing the 1st respondent to appoint the petitioner as UPSA in his school from 7-6-2005 to 5-6-2010. The 1st respondent has not complied with the directions issued by the 2nd respondent in Ext.P10. Therefore, the petitioner has preferred Ext.P11 representation before the 2nd respondent seeking action against the 1st respondent. 4. The respondents 1 and 4 filed revision petitions before the Government challenging Ext.P10 order of the 2nd respondent. The Government, after considering those revision petitions, passed Ext.P12 order dated 27-9-2008 holding that the petitioner cannot have any claim under Rule 51A of Chapter XIV A of the KER as his appointment to the post of UPSA in the school from 26-8-2002 to 7-1-2003 was approved only on 22-11-2006. That is much after the vacancy arose on 7-6-2005. Therefore, he cannot have any preferential claim for appointment to the vacancy of UPSA that arose on 7-6-2005. Challenging Ext.P12, the petitioner has preferred this Writ Petition. 5. When this Writ Petition came up for hearing, a learned single Judge found apparent conflict between the views taken by two Division Benches of this court in the decisions in Geetha v. Geo Thomas (2009 (4) KLT 514) and in Writ Appeal No. 254 of 1972 [Ext. Challenging Ext.P12, the petitioner has preferred this Writ Petition. 5. When this Writ Petition came up for hearing, a learned single Judge found apparent conflict between the views taken by two Division Benches of this court in the decisions in Geetha v. Geo Thomas (2009 (4) KLT 514) and in Writ Appeal No. 254 of 1972 [Ext. R4 (g)] on the question as to whether approval of original appointment is necessary for claiming preference for appointment to future vacancies under Rule 51A in Chapter XIV A of the KER. In Geetha's case, a Division Bench took the view that approval of appointment was not necessary for claiming preference for appointment to a future vacancy. But, the view taken by another Division Bench in Ext. R4 (g) was that for claiming preference under Rule 51A, approval of appointment was necessary. In view of this conflict, the learned single Judge found the necessity of an authoritative pronouncement by a Full Bench of this Court on this issue and hence, passed a Reference Order for that purpose. Thereafter, this Writ Petition came up for hearing before a Division Bench. The Division Bench also found the said apparent conflict between those two judgments and hence, the matter was adjourned for considering by a Full Bench as per their Lordships' Reference Order. Thus, this Writ Petition came up for hearing before us. 6. Heard Sri. N.N. Sugunapalan, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, Sri. P.V. Jayachandran, the learned counsel appearing for the 1st respondent, Sri. Biju Meenattoor, the learned Government Pleader appearing for the respondents 2 and 3, and Sri. V.A. Muhammed, the learned counsel appearing for the 4th respondent. 7. The following questions arise for our consideration: 1. Whether approval of appointment is required for preference for appointment under Rule 51A of Chapter XIV A of the KER? 2. Whether a claim for preference for appointment under Rule 51A of Chapter XIV A of the KER accrued to a person based on his original appointment to a short term vacancy of beyond two months duration will be lost after the amendments of Rules 7A and 51A of Chapter XIV A of the KER which came into force with effect from 27-4-2005, for want of a minimum continuous service of one academic year? 8. 8. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the appointment of a teacher shall be effective from the date on which the teacher was admitted to duty irrespective of the date of approval of the appointment. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents 1 and 4 contended that the appointment will take effect only from the date of approval of that appointment by the Educational Officer. 9. Rule 7 of Chapter XIV A of the KER reads as follows: "As soon as a teacher is appointed in a school, the Manager shall immediately issue an appointment order to the teacher in Form 27 and the appointment shall be effective from the date on which the teacher is admitted to duty, provided the appointment is duly approved". 10. The Government, in Ext.P12 order, relied on a decision of a learned single Judge of this court in O.P. No. 17698 of 1995. It was observed by the learned single Judge in this decision that in view of the fact that the vacancy arose in 1993 and at that time the petitioner did not have any approved service, he cannot claim the benefit of Rule 51A of Chapter XIV A of the KER. The subsequent approval of appointment of the petitioner in 1996 cannot clothe the petitioner with any right to be considered for appointment in 1993. 11. In the judgment in Writ Appeal No. 254 of 1972 [Ext.R4 (g)], a Division Bench of this Court was dealing with a case where the appellant was appointed as a Lower Primary School Assistant from 1-7-1968 to 27-9-1968 in a leave vacancy. Subsequently, to a vacancy that arose on 3-9-1969, the Manager appointed the 4th respondent, a fresh hand. The appellant raised a claim under Rule 51A of Chapter XIV A of the KER for appointment to that vacancy. The Manager as well as the Department rejected her claim for the reason that her appointment from 1-7-1968 to 27-9-1968 was not approved. The Division Bench in that case observed that Rule 7 of Chapter XIV A provides that the appointment of a teacher shall be effective from the date on which the teacher is admitted to duty, provided the appointment is duly approved. Hence, in the absence of approval, the appointment cannot be said to have become effective. The Division Bench in that case observed that Rule 7 of Chapter XIV A provides that the appointment of a teacher shall be effective from the date on which the teacher is admitted to duty, provided the appointment is duly approved. Hence, in the absence of approval, the appointment cannot be said to have become effective. Consequently, it is not service which may give preference under Rule 51A of Chapter XIV A. Therefore, rejected the claim of the appellant for appointment under Rule 51A. 12. A learned single Judge of this Court had occasion to consider Rule 7 in Ponnamma v. Manager, K.A.M.U.P. School, Muthukulam (ILR 1972 (2) Ker 176). The learned single Judge observed in this judgment that it was clear from the Rule that the appointment shall be effective from the date on which the teacher was admitted to duty. In other words, the approval will take effect from the date on which the teacher joins duty. 13. Another learned single Judge of this Court considered a similar question in Poornima v. Director of Public Instructions (2005 (3) KLT 502). In that case the petitioner was appointed as HSA from 22-6-2000 to 1-11-2000 and the 7th respondent was appointed as HSA from 22-12-1999 to 23-2-2000. The appointment of the 7th respondent was approved by order dated 20-3-2004 and that of the petitioner much earlier. It was held in that decision that going by the relevant Rule in Chapter XIV A of the KER, the approval of appointment of the 7th respondent granted as per order dated 20-3-2004 will relate back to 22-12-1999 and the approved service of the petitioner will be from 22-6-2000. 14. In Geetha's case (supra), the appellant was appointed as UPSA in a maternity leave vacancy from 6-6-2002 to 17-10-2002. A regular vacancy of UPSA arose on 2-9-2002. The 1st respondent, a fresh hand, was appointed to that vacancy. The appointment of the appellant was approved only on 12-6-2003. In that case also the claim of the appellant for preference for appointment under Rule 51A to the vacancy that arose on 2-9-2002 was turned down for the reason that the appointment of the appellant to the leave vacancy was approved only on 12-6-2003. The appointment of the appellant was approved only on 12-6-2003. In that case also the claim of the appellant for preference for appointment under Rule 51A to the vacancy that arose on 2-9-2002 was turned down for the reason that the appointment of the appellant to the leave vacancy was approved only on 12-6-2003. The Division Bench, in that case, observed as follows: "......The Manager could not take shelter behind the plea that when the regular vacancy arose, the appointment of the appellant in the maternity leave vacancy was not approved. The Manager knew that the appointment was in a maternity leave vacancy which arose in a post sanctioned as per the Staff Fixation Order of that year, that the appellant was qualified for appointment as U.P.S.A. also and therefore, even if there is delay, the appellant's appointment was going to be approved. Therefore, when the regular vacancy arose, the appellant should have been accommodated in that vacancy and a fresh hand could have been appointed only in the remaining portion of the maternity leave vacancy, in which the appellant was working. ......" 15. Rule 7 clearly shows that the appointment shall be effective from the date on which the teacher is admitted to duty, provided the appointment is duly approved. Therefore, the appointment so made by the Manager shall be effective from the date on which the teacher is admitted to duty, if that appointment is duly approved by the concerned Educational Officer. The approval of appointment of a teacher is dependent on some other factors. Appointment and its approval do not take place simultaneously. In other words, the approval takes place, on fulfilling the required matters, on a subsequent date. When the appointment is so approved by the Educational Officer, necessarily, that appointment should be effective from the date on which the teacher was admitted to duty as provided in Rule 7. In other words, the appointment will be effective from the date on which the teacher joined duty once that appointment is approved by the Educational Officer irrespective of the date of approval of that appointment. Therefore, going by Rule 7, the approval will take effect from the date on which the teacher joined duty on the basis of appointment made by the Manager. 16. Rule 8 of Chapter XIV A of the KER deals with the matters concerning approval of appointment and the required documents. Therefore, going by Rule 7, the approval will take effect from the date on which the teacher joined duty on the basis of appointment made by the Manager. 16. Rule 8 of Chapter XIV A of the KER deals with the matters concerning approval of appointment and the required documents. Rule 8 (2) stipulates that approval may be given as expeditiously as possible, at any rate, not later than 30 days from the date of receipt of appointment order and other documents by the Educational Officer. There can be so many reasons for occurring delay in granting approval of appointment by the Educational Officer such as delay in sending the required documents by the Manager, administrative reasons in the office of the Educational Officer etc. etc. That the period within which the appointment has to be approved is not within the control of the teacher who is appointed. If a claim under Rule 51A will be defeated for the reason that the original appointment is remaining unapproved by the time the next vacancy arises, chances are high for a Manager or an Educational Officer to delay the approval of the original appointment in order to prevent that person from claiming preferential appointment under Rule 51A and to appoint another person to that vacancy on that ground. A right which is accrued under a provision of law cannot be so dependent upon the volition of a Manager or an Educational Officer. When a person is appointed, complying with Rule 7A of Chapter XIV A of the KER, in a short term vacancy shall be entitled to raise a claim for preference for appointment as provided under Rule 51A if the conditions under that Rule are satisfied. If such a right under Rule 51A is dependent upon the approval of the original appointment which may lead to arbitrary exercise of power by a Manager or an Educational Officer or by both preventing the legitimate claimants from exercising their claim under Rule 51A. This shall not be permitted to happen. The right to raise a claim under Rule 51A shall not be dependent upon the factum of approval of the original appointment. But, it should be based on the appointment made complying with Rule 7A. This shall not be permitted to happen. The right to raise a claim under Rule 51A shall not be dependent upon the factum of approval of the original appointment. But, it should be based on the appointment made complying with Rule 7A. Therefore, we overrule the view taken by the learned Judge in the judgment in O.P.No. 17698 of 1995 (C.L. Francis v. State of Kerala) and the view taken by the Division Bench in the judgment in Writ Appeal No. 254 of 1972 (K.V. Mary v. Regional Deputy Director of PublicInstructions) and we uphold the view taken by the learned Judges in Ponnamma v. Manager, K.A.M.U.P. School, Muthukulam (ILR 1972 (2) Ker 176) and in Poornima v. Director of Public Instructions (2005 (3) KLT 502) and by the Division Bench in Geetha v. Geo Thomas (2009 (4) KLT 514) as legally correct. 17. Rule 51A of Chapter XIV A of the KER has been amended by introducing two new provisos. Simultaneously, Rule 7A (3) was also amended. These amendments came into force on 27-4-2005. The first proviso to Rule 51A stipulates that a teacher who was relieved under Rule 49 or 52 shall not be entitled to preference for appointment under this Rule unless such teacher has a minimum continuous service of one academic year as on the date of relief. After the amendment, Sub Rule 3 of Rule 7A stipulates that vacancies, the duration of which is less than one academic year, shall not be filled up. There were conflicting decisions rendered by the learned single Judges of this Court regarding the impact of the newly introduced first proviso to Rule 51A. In view of the conflicting views on the point, W.P. (C) No. 19776 of 2007 was referred for decision by a Division Bench of this Court. The Division Bench considered in detail the impact of the newly introduced first proviso to Rule 51A and Sub Rule 3 of Rule 7A along with some other provisions. The decision of the Division Bench is reported in Abdurahiman v. Government of Kerala ( 2009 (2) KLT 105 ) in which it is held as follows: "14. The point to be decided is whether the persons who were appointed before 25-6-2005 to short-term vacancies extending beyond two months and whose appointments were approved and on termination who became 51A claimants, will be affected by this amendment introduced on 25-6-2005. The point to be decided is whether the persons who were appointed before 25-6-2005 to short-term vacancies extending beyond two months and whose appointments were approved and on termination who became 51A claimants, will be affected by this amendment introduced on 25-6-2005. We feel that an interpretation which will affect them is not possible, going by the plain meaning of the words of the Rule. Up to 25-6-2005, it was possible to appoint persons to vacancies having a duration not less than two months. Such appointees, on being relieved, were treated as 51A claimants also. Even in the absence of any such rule, it is a well recognised principle in Industrial Jurisprudence that a person retrenched from service should be preferred, when vacancy arises in future. Earlier, it was thought that the said benefit flowing from Chap. VA of the Industrial Disputes Act in favour of the workmen was available only if retrenchment is made after working for 240 days. The said concept has been knocked down by the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Prabhakaran v. General Manager, K.S.R.T.C. ( 1981 KLT 164 ). So, in industries, persons appointed for one or two months, if retrenched, were entitled to get re-appointments when vacancies arise in future. In the case of Educational institutions, the minimum incumbency period was fixed as two months. That is because a valid appointment can be made only if the vacancy extends beyond that period. Now, it is provided that appointments can be made, if only the duration of the vacancy is one academic year and only such incumbents are to be given preference in future appointments. But, the said amendment can in no way affect the rights accrued to persons, on the strength of their appointment to short duration vacancies exceeding two months, made earlier to the amendment. The right of them to get re-appointment was always recognised by R. 51A. But, after 25-6-2005, one can be appointed if only the vacancy has a duration of one academic year. Therefore, naturally, such persons alone can get the right to re-appointment also. So, the interpretation sought to be advanced by the respondents that the writ petitioner has no right for re-appointment under R. 51A, in view of the introduction of the first proviso to the said rule, cannot be accepted. Therefore, naturally, such persons alone can get the right to re-appointment also. So, the interpretation sought to be advanced by the respondents that the writ petitioner has no right for re-appointment under R. 51A, in view of the introduction of the first proviso to the said rule, cannot be accepted. Therefore, we overrule the view taken by the learned Judge in W.P. (C) No. 15291 of 2007 (2008 (1) KLT 437-Saleena v. State of Kerala) and uphold the view taken by the learned Judges in W.P. (C) Nos. 31924 of 2005 and 19155 of 2005, as legally correct. The reference is answered accordingly." (The amendments to Rules 7A and 51A came into force on 27-4-2005 and not on 25-6-2005). 18. Another Division Bench of this Court considered the amendments to Rules 7A and 51A in Sreelekha V. Manoj (2012 (3) KLT 54). The Division Bench held that the amendments will have only prospective effect and for appointments made prior to the amendments, the unamended Rules would apply. Therefore, the 1st respondent in that case who was appointed temporarily from 12-7-2004 31-3-2005 in the school was found to be entitled to Rule 51A claim for the next regular vacancy that arose on 2-6-2008. Even though that regular vacancy arose only after the amendments to Rules 7A and 51A, the 1st respondent was found to be eligible to the post that fell vacant on 2-6-2008. 19. The relevant portion of Rule 51A, as it stood prior to the amendment came into force on 27-4-2005, reads as follows: "51A. Qualified teachers who are relieved as per Rule 49 or 52 or on account of termination of vacancies shall have preference for appointment to future vacancies in schools under the same Educational Agency or an Educational Agency to which the school may be subsequently transferred provided they have not been appointed in permanent vacancies in schools under any other Educational Agency." The relevant portion of Rule 51A, after the amendment came into force on 27-4-2005, reads as follows: "51A. Qualified teachers who are relieved as per Rule 49 or 52 or on account of termination of vacancies shall have preference for appointment to future vacancies in schools under the same Educational Agency or an Educational Agency to which the school may be subsequently transferred provided they have not been appointed in permanent vacancies in schools under any other Educational Agency. Provided that a teacher who was relieved under rule 49 or rule 52 shall not be entitled to preference for appointment under this rule unless such teacher has a minimum continuous service of one academic year as on the date of relief: Provided further that the first preference under this rule shall be given to protected teachers." Rule 51A refers to teachers who are relieved as per Rule 49 or 52 or on account of termination of vacancies. 20. Rule 49 reads as follows: "49. Qualified teachers except Headmasters appointed in vacancies which are not permanent which extend over the summer vacation and who continue in such vacancies till the closing date shall be retained in the vacancies during the vacation, if their continuous service as on the closing day is not less than eight months. The teachers so retained shall be entitled to the vacation salary. These teachers shall be relieved on the closing day if their continuous service as on that day is less than the aforesaid period. This rule shall not apply to teacher appointed in training vacancies." This Rule deals with the appointees in temporary vacancies who have not completed eight months of service on the closing day and some other matters. This provision is not applicable to the case on hand. 21. Rule 52 reads as follows: "52. (1) Teachers who are relieved on account of any reduction in the number of posts under orders of the Department shall on re-appointment in the same school or in another school under the same management or a different management start on the same pay as they were getting at the time of relief, whether the new appointment is permanent or not. (2) Teachers thrown out from service due to the withdrawal of recognition of schools by the Department shall also be eligible to draw the pay which they were getting at the time of withdrawal of recognition of the school on re-appointment in another school." This Rule deals with teachers who are relieved on account of any reduction in the number of posts under orders of the Department and some other matters. This provision is also not applicable to the case on hand. Rule 51A deals with teachers covered by Rules 49 and 52 as well as those teachers relieved on account of termination of vacancies like the petitioner herein. This provision is also not applicable to the case on hand. Rule 51A deals with teachers covered by Rules 49 and 52 as well as those teachers relieved on account of termination of vacancies like the petitioner herein. The first proviso to Rule 51A deals with only those teachers who are relieved under Rules 49 or 52 and not the teachers relieved on account of termination of vacancies. Therefore, teachers who are relieved on account of termination of vacancies like the petitioner herein are unaffected by the introduction of first proviso to Rule 51A. In other words, the teachers who are relieved on account of termination of vacancies like the petitioner need not have a minimum continuous service of one academic year as on the date of relief even after the introduction of first proviso to Rule 51A for claiming preference for appointment. They are still entitled to claim preference for appointment under Rule 51A. 22. Rule 7A (3), as it stood before the amendment came into force on 27-4-2005, reads as follows: " 7A (1) xxxx (2) xxxx (3) Vacancies, the duration of which is two months or less, shall not be filled up by any appointment." After the amendment, it reads as follows: " 7A (1) xxxx (2) xxxx (3) Vacancies, the duration of which is less than one academic year, shall not be filled up." 23. Whether the introduction of first proviso to Rule 51A and the amendment of Sub Rule 3 of Rule 7A can take away the right of preference for appointments under Rule 51A accrued to those persons based on their appointments to short term vacancies extending beyond two months prior to 27-4-2005 is the question to be decided. The amendments came into force on 27-4-2005. These amendments were not given any retrospective application. They have only prospective application. By the appointment to short term vacancies extending beyond two months under the unamended Rule 7A, a claim under Rule 51A has been accrued to such appointees. Such a right has become vested in them by operation of Rule 51A. Such a vested right cannot be taken away by introducing amendment enhancing the duration of minimum service to one academic year. Such amendment cannot have retrospective operation affecting such vested rights and hence, can only have prospective operation. Such a right has become vested in them by operation of Rule 51A. Such a vested right cannot be taken away by introducing amendment enhancing the duration of minimum service to one academic year. Such amendment cannot have retrospective operation affecting such vested rights and hence, can only have prospective operation. We are in respectful agreement with the views expressed by the Division Benches of thiscourt in Abdurahiman's case (supra) and Sreelekha's case (supra). 24. In the case on hand, the petitioner was appointed as UPSA in a leave vacancy from 26-8-2002 to 7-1-2003 and that appointment had been approved by order dated 22-11-2006 of the 2nd respondent. By the appointment of the petitioner from 26-8-2002 to 7-1-2003, a right to claim preference for appointment under Rule 51A has been accrued to and vested with him. Such a right cannot be taken away by the amendment introduced on 27-4-2005. The right to claim preference for appointment thus accrued to the petitioner under Rule 51A survives even after the amendments to Rules 7A and 51A with effect from 27-4-2005. Therefore, the petitioner is entitled to preference for appointment to the vacancy of UPSA that arose on 7-6-2005 in the school under Rule 51A unaffected by the amendments to Rules 7A and 51A introduced with effect from 27-4-2005. 25. Learned counsel for the 4th respondent submitted that a Division Bench of this Court considered the amended Rule 51A in Writ Appeal Nos. 2964 of 2007 and 516 of 2008 and, based on the observation made in the judgment in those cases, the amendment should be applied retrospectively. He also submitted that the judgment in these Writ Appeals has been challenged before the Honourable Supreme Court by filing SLP (Civil) Nos. 6926 and 6927 of 2010 and the Honourable Supreme Court dismissed those Special Leave Petitions. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, Ext.P12 order passed by the Government is sustainable. The Division Bench of this Court has not considered the question of retrospective or prospective application of the amendments to Rules 7A and 51A in Writ Appeal Nos. 2964 of 2007 and 516 of 2008. The Division Bench in the judgment in those cases has not declared the position of law after the amendments. The Division Bench of this Court has not considered the question of retrospective or prospective application of the amendments to Rules 7A and 51A in Writ Appeal Nos. 2964 of 2007 and 516 of 2008. The Division Bench in the judgment in those cases has not declared the position of law after the amendments. Therefore, the judgment so cited by the learned counsel for the 4th respondent cannot be relied on for the proposition that the amendments will have retrospective operation and hence, Ext.P12 order is sustainable. The Special Leave Petitions were dismissed by the Honourable Supreme Court by a single line order which reads as follows: 'The Special Leave Petitions are dismissed.' No pronouncement on the question of retrospective application or prospective application of the amendments to Rules 7A and 51A of Chapter XIV A of the KER has been made by the Honourable Supreme Court. By the dismissal of the Special Leave Petitions, the judgment of the Division Bench of this court is left unaffected. But, this judgment does not lay down any binding judicial precedent in respect of the amendments to Rules 7A and 51A. Therefore, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the 4th respondent is liable to be rejected and hence, we do so. 26. For the reasons set out above, Ext.P12 order passed by the 3rd respondent is liable to be set aside. The petitioner is entitled to be appointed in the long term leave vacancy of UPSA from 7-6-2005 to 5-6-2010 as directed in Ext.P10 by the 2nd respondent and to receive the consequential service benefits. A direction to the respondents 2 and 3 shall also need be issued for taking appropriate action to disburse the salary to the petitioner for the period for which the 1st respondent has refused to give appointment to the petitioner to the leave vacancy that arose on 7-6-2005. 27. In the result, Ext.P12 order is quashed. The 1st respondent is directed to appoint the petitioner as UPSA to the leave vacancy that arose in the school on 7-6-2005 as directed by the 2nd respondent in Ext.P10 order. The 2nd respondent is directed to approve that appointment. The petitioner will be entitled to receive the consequential service benefits on the basis of that appointment. The 1st respondent is directed to appoint the petitioner as UPSA to the leave vacancy that arose in the school on 7-6-2005 as directed by the 2nd respondent in Ext.P10 order. The 2nd respondent is directed to approve that appointment. The petitioner will be entitled to receive the consequential service benefits on the basis of that appointment. The respondents 2 and 3 shall take necessary action for disbursing the salary due to the petitioner for the period for which the 1st respondent Manager has refused to appoint the petitioner to the leave vacancy of UPSA that arose on 7-6-2005 in the school. This Writ Petition is allowed as above.