K. Thayumanavan v. Director General of Police, Chennai
2013-08-06
T.RAJA
body2013
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment : 1. The present writ petition has been directed against the impugned order passed by the third respondent, the Superintendent of Police, Tiruvarur District in his proceedings dated 3.10.2008, as confirmed by the second respondent, the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Thanjavur in his proceedings dated 12.3.2009, which also have been confirmed by the first respondent, the Director General of Police vide the order dated 11.6.2009, wherein the punishment of reduction in time scale of pay by three stages for three years with cumulative effect, shall operate to affect his future increments, in P.R.07/2008 under Rule 3(b) of the Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, has been imposed against the petitioner. 2. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that while the petitioner was serving as a Grade-I Police Constable at Tiruvarur Taluk Police Station, he was placed under suspension with effect from 27.12.2007, pursuant to a proceeding made in D.O.No.1171/2007 dated 26.12.2007, raising allegation as if there was a grave charge pending against him. After sometime, the order of suspension was revoked by another order passed by the third respondent dated 25.1.2008. However, he was issued with a charge memo under Rule 3(b) of the Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules. The charge memo mentioned only one charge against the petitioner, which reads as follows:- “TAMIL” Referring to the charge memo, the learned counsel stated that a mere reading of the charge goes to show that by his contact with one absconding accused Sakthi alias Sakthivel, he had passed on messages, which resulted in the delay in securing the said Sakthi alias Sakthivel by the police. Thereafter, the petitioner was put to face the enquiry under Rule 3 (b) of the Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules for the delinquency before the enquiry officer. The enquiry officer, after completing the enquiry, finally came to the conclusion that the charge levelled against the petitioner was established. Subsequently thereafter, he was also issued with a copy of the report of the enquiry officer calling upon him to submit his further representation.
The enquiry officer, after completing the enquiry, finally came to the conclusion that the charge levelled against the petitioner was established. Subsequently thereafter, he was also issued with a copy of the report of the enquiry officer calling upon him to submit his further representation. It was contended that when he had submitted a further representation to the disciplinary authority, without even considering his explanation and also the vital fact that a mere conversation between the petitioner and the so called accused Sakthi alias Sakthivel through mobile phone has not brought home the charge, wrongly imposed the grave punishment of reduction in the time scale of pay by three stages for three years with cumulative effect, making it clear that this punishment would also have the effect on his future increments. Aggrieved by the same, when the petitioner also preferred an appeal before the second respondent-Deputy Inspector General of Police, unfortunately, the second respondent, while discharging quasi-judicial functions, has not even considered the grounds taken by the petitioner in the appeal. By a cryptic and non-speaking order, the second respondent committed one another mistake in dismissing the appeal, confirming the punishment imposed by the third respondent against the petitioner. Once again, the petitioner, aggrieved by the order passed by the third and second respondents, preferred a review before the first respondent, who also, without properly appreciating the evidence adduced before the enquiry officer and also the solid defence taken by the petitioner, both before the disciplinary authority in his written representation and also the grounds of appeal filed before the second respondent, erroneously dismissed even the review. 3. Assailing the impugned orders, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that when it is an admitted fact that the respondent-Department had not produced the contents of the conversation between the petitioner and the accused Sakthi alias Sakthivel before the enquiry officer, without ascertaining the facts as to whether he had passed on any vital clues to escape from arrest, wrongly found him guilty. The said approach is absolutely unfair and unjustified. It was also pleaded that when the petitioner has been keeping long friendship with the said Sakthivel as motor mechanic, the respondents cannot find fault with the petitioner for having frequently contacted the said Sakthivel.
The said approach is absolutely unfair and unjustified. It was also pleaded that when the petitioner has been keeping long friendship with the said Sakthivel as motor mechanic, the respondents cannot find fault with the petitioner for having frequently contacted the said Sakthivel. When it is not made known by producing the relevant conversation between the petitioner and the so called Sakthivel, showing that the petitioner alone had given some clues to the said Sakthivel to abscond from the arrest, the disciplinary authority ought not to have accepted the report of the enquiry officer holding him guilty. It was also further stated that the petitioner himself had admitted that he spoke to the said Sakthivel. Therefore, unless a strong case is made out by producing the relevant documents by the department before the enquiry that the petitioner had really spoken and passed on the sensitive informations cautioning the said Sakthivel to escape from the clutches of law, the respondents ought not to have arrived at the wrong conclusion. Now the petitioner, having been imposed with the major punishment, is also going to get affected by getting a meagre pension in view of the present impugned punishment imposed by the respondents herein. In support of his submissions, he has also relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank and others, (2009) 2 SCC 570 for the proposition that the order of the disciplinary authority, as also the appellate authority, being not supported by any reason, is liable to be interfered with. In the present case, in the light of the above ratio, he has further stated that when the orders passed by all the respondents have severe civil consequences, without there being any proper reasons for holding the petitioner guilty, punishing him with the impugned major punishment is liable to be interfered with. It was also further stated that when the report of the enquiry officer was based on mere ipse dixit, the same should not have been accepted by the third respondent. Since the third respondent has wrongly accepted the report of the enquiry officer without there being sufficient evidence to bring home the charge, the endeavour of the petitioner before the appellate authority and also before the review authority has also gone in vain. Therefore, the impugned orders passed by the respondents are liable to be interfered with.
Since the third respondent has wrongly accepted the report of the enquiry officer without there being sufficient evidence to bring home the charge, the endeavour of the petitioner before the appellate authority and also before the review authority has also gone in vain. Therefore, the impugned orders passed by the respondents are liable to be interfered with. One another judgment in Sher Bahadur v. Union of India and others, (2002) 7 SCC 142 was also pressed into service to contend that when there was no sufficient evidence to hold him guilty, the disciplinary authority ought not to have accepted the insufficient evidence by giving a wrong meaning to the preponderance of probability. Again relying upon another judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Anil Gilurker v. Bilaspur Raipur Kshetria Gramin Bank and another, (2012) 1 MLJ 978, holding that enquiry on vague charges shall stand vitiated, prayed for allowing this petition. 4. Opposing the relief, the learned Additional Government Pleader for the respondents, strongly refuting the arguments, prayed before this Court not to interfere with the impugned orders. Firstly, it was stated that it was not the case of insufficient evidence upon which the petitioner has been wrongly found guilty. When the respondent-Tiruvarur Town Police Station was making all out efforts to nab the absconding accused Sakthi alias Sakthivel for long time, the petitioner not only on one or two occasions, but on 27 occasions, had established repeated contacts with the said absconding accused Sakthi alias Sakthivel during the period from 8.12.2007 to 12.12.2007 informing then and there as to what was happening in the police station and who was going to secure him through secret method. When the petitioner has been passing on the message every now and then and this has been properly found out by P.W.1 stating that the petitioner's mobile phone had reflected even the number of the so called absconding accused Sakthi alias Sakthivel, it goes without saying that the petitioner, who is a responsible police officer, has violated the expected code of conduct of a member of the disciplined force, by keeping close association with an absconding accused.
Although there is no such charge levelled against the petitioner alleging that the petitioner has violated the expected code of conduct of a member of the disciplined force, the fact remains on record that the petitioner had frequently contacted the said absconding accused for about 27 times during the period from 8.12.2007 to 12.12.2007. Moreover, P.W.3-Deputy Superintendent of Police, another prosecution witness, also in his deposition before the enquiry officer, has established the fact that the petitioner had contacted the said absconding accused. Therefore, not only on the evidence adduced by P.W.1, but also accepting the evidence of P.W.3, who has corroborated the evidence of P.W.1, the charge levelled against the petitioner came to be established. On the basis of the findings and conclusions reached by the enquiry officer, the disciplinary authority has rightly imposed the punishment of reduction in time scale of pay by three stages for three years with cumulative effect. When this was challenged by the petitioner before the second respondent-appellate authority, the appellate authority also, by a well speaking order, has held that in the F.R., the delinquent stated that only on itemised call statement he cannot be blamed. This has been disproved by the appellate authority by giving one more reason that since the petitioner himself had spoken to the accused, who was wanted by the police, the charge was well established by the theory of preponderance of probability. When the appellate authority also has applied his mind and rightly confirmed the punishment imposed by the third respondent, the petitioner again went before the first respondent, who also, finding no merits in the review, dismissed the same. Therefore, he pleaded, sitting under Article 226, finding no infirmity in the process of holding the enquiry, this Court cannot peep into the facts that have been repeatedly found correct by all the respondents. 5. This Court fully agrees with the submissions made by the learned Additional Government Pleader for the respondents. Prima facie, the petitioner in his affidavit and also in his written representation submitted before the disciplinary authority repeatedly admitted that he had spoken to the absconding accused on six occasions. But the evidence adduced by P.W.3-Deputy Superintendent of Police shows that the petitioner has had repeated contacts with the absconding accused on 27 occasions during the relevant period from 8.12.2007 to 12.12.2007.
But the evidence adduced by P.W.3-Deputy Superintendent of Police shows that the petitioner has had repeated contacts with the absconding accused on 27 occasions during the relevant period from 8.12.2007 to 12.12.2007. It is more pertinent to extract the admitted admission made by the petitioner in his affidavit, particularly ground (iii) of the grounds, which reads as follows:- "iii) The enquiry officer has committed a grave error in arriving at a finding holding the charge proved just relying upon the BSNL phone contact statements when admittedly the conversation made by the petitioner through Sakthi alias Sakthivel through cell phone is not denied. If the conversation made by the petitioner to Sakthi alias Sakthivel through cell phone is denied, the prosecution is at liberty to prove the same either through details of conversation made through BSNL mobile or just the statement of calls made through BSNL mobile. Here is a case where the petitioner has not denied either the call made by him to Sakthi alias Sakthivel or the calls made by Sakthi alias Sakthivel to the petitioner...." 6. The above clear stand taken by the petitioner not only shows that the petitioner, being a responsible police officer, has been contacting an absconding accused in violation of the expected conduct of a member of the disciplined force, but also wilfully refused to provide the whereabouts of the absconding accused Sakthi alias Sakthivel to the higher officers working in his own police station to secure his arrest. When the department has rightly procured sufficient evidence from the BSNL including the phone contact statements proving the conversation between the petitioner and the absconding accused Sakthi alias Sakthivel, it cannot be held that the prosecution has failed to establish the charge through sufficient evidence. In fact, when the petitioner had also admitted that his cell number is 9443273593, the itemised cell phone call statement of the said Sakthi alias Sakthivel bearing cell phone No.9865775387 has indicated that the petitioner had spoken to the said accused on 27 occasions between 8.12.2007 and 12.12.2007. Therefore, the disciplinary authority, rightly finding that the enquiry officer found him guilty on the basis of the evidence adduced by P.W.1-Inspector and the P.W.3-Deputy Superintendent of Police, finally imposed the impugned punishment.
Therefore, the disciplinary authority, rightly finding that the enquiry officer found him guilty on the basis of the evidence adduced by P.W.1-Inspector and the P.W.3-Deputy Superintendent of Police, finally imposed the impugned punishment. However, on appeal before the second respondent, the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Thanjavur Range, after going through the minutes appeal petition, agreed with the findings of the disciplinary authority, for the reason that the case of the petitioner that only on itemised call statement he cannot be blamed, should not be accepted. One another reason cited by the appellate authority shows that when the petitioner had spoken to the accused who was wanted by the police, the charge levelled against the petitioner is well established by the theory of preponderance of probability. The said view has been re-affirmed by the first respondent. 7. In view of the aforementioned reasons, the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner relying upon the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Sher Bahadur v. Union of India and others, (2002) 7 SCC 142 contending that there was no sufficient evidence to hold the petitioner guilty is far from acceptance. In fact, the Hon'ble Apex Court, in the said judgment, has made it clear that the disciplinary authority should not accept the insufficient evidence before imposing any punishment. But, in the present case, when the petitioner himself had admitted the fact that he was in continuous contact with the absconding accused Sakthi alias Sakthivel through his cell number between the period 8.12.2007 and 12.12.2007 for 27 times and when P.W.1-Inspector and P.W.3-Deputy Superintendent of Police have adduced evidence supporting the charge, the punishment imposed against the petitioner cannot be complained of. Therefore, when the petitioner, who is bound to discharge his obligation before the police station in which an F.I.R., has been lodged against the absconding accused, should not have remained a silent spectator, since he had been in touch with the absconding accused on 27 occasions, as deposed by the P.W.3-Deputy Superintendent of Police. Therefore, the disciplinary authority found him guilty and this has been properly appreciated by the appellate and the review authorities. In that view of the matter, this Court, finding no merits or substance in the writ petition, is inclined to dismiss the same. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed. No costs.